Foreign Affairs

The Russo-Chinese relationship under Putin and Xi Jinping have fairly been good, characterised by mutual economic development and close security cooperation. The Kremlin began to move closer to China after sanctions were imposed by the West on Russia for its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. President Xi Jinping has called Vladimir Putin his ‘best friend’ and when President Xi visited Moscow in 2018, he was seen making pancakes with President Putin. China is the largest investor in Russia and the Chinese view Russia as an important source of raw materials for their industries and an even more important market for their finished goods. As the Covid-19 pandemic ravaged lives and economies across the globe, China was criticised by the West for not being transparent in sharing the data related to the pandemic but Russia though suffering profoundly from the pandemic expressed support to China with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov issuing a statement condemning the criticism of China on handling of the pandemic.

Recently, there seem to be some fissures appearing in the Russo-Sino bonhomie. Russia earlier this week announced that it would be withholding the sale of S-400 Triumf mobile air defence system to China. This move by Russia, comes in the backdrop of claims that the Chinese had been spying on Russia trying to extract military secrets relating to hydroacoustics that helps to navigate and monitor submarine activity underwater. Russia’s handling of the espionage warfare with China and this incident in particular is something new because according to Mark Galeotti, a senior associate fellow at Royal United Services Institute, Russia usually, expels the Chinese agents after a word with the ambassador and the local assets are arrested on different charges and the whole matter is handled very discreetly. This was part of Russia’s narrative to portray China as a trusted partner against the West which is considered the antagonist. But with this incident, it can be perceived that Russia is growing suspicious of Chinese activities.

The agreement for the sale of 33 Russian fighter jets to India which was concluded in late June has upset the Communist Party of China and the Chinese media outlets have criticised Russia for this step. For Russia, warm relations with India go back to the cold war era and Russia cannot ignore the fact that India is a very lucrative market for its arms industries. India will also be receiving the S-400 defence systems by the end of 2021. Apart from the sale of aircrafts and anti-aircraft defence systems, Russia has also agreed to upgrade India’s existing aircrafts. Moscow has declared that it could supply India with a large number of weapons in a short period of time. Despite Beijing’s advice to not entertain India’s arms requests, Russia has gone ahead and signed arms sales agreement with India which has irked the Chinese Government. There has also been growing outrage on Chinese social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat where the netizens have accused Russia of benefitting from India-China border tensions.

As China’s border disputes with its neighbouring countries have increased after the outbreak of the pandemic, Russia also seems to be embroiled in the dispute. On July 2nd, Russia celebrated the 160th anniversary of the founding of the city of Vladivostok. This was criticised on social media by Chinese diplomats and Chinese state media officials claiming that Vladivostok was historically part of China known as ‘Haishenwei’. A tweet made Zhang Heqing, a Chinese diplomat in Pakistan read “Isn’t this (Vladivostok) what in the past was our Haishenwei?”. Though the Chinese Government has not endorsed any claims made on the social media, it has also not refuted these claims publicly. There were no comments made by the Russian Government. Both China and Russia have settled their outstanding border disputes through an agreement signed in 2008 and have enjoyed a stable border since then.

Russia has become more dependent than ever on China for investments and technology for its economic development since the annexation of Crimea. Russia and China both view Washington as a threat to their national interest and this has driven both of them to band together and any attempt to drive a wedge in between China and Russia by the West would be considered naïve. Though both the countries enjoy strategical relationship with each other, Beijing has now understood that Kremlin’s support to Chinese external activities reaches only to a certain extent. While there are some strains in the bilateral relations, it is too soon to assume that Russo-Sino relationship will be heading for the worse.

MOHAMMED YAQOOB SALEEM is a MA student in the Department of International Studies,Political Science and History, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru

"Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the University

Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean region exists prior to its intervention in Syria. It’s long-standing ties with the Republic of Cyprus as an offshore investment haven has been significant since the latter’s EU membership in 2004. Despite its infamous involvement in Syria, it has bolstered energy and maritime agreements with the incumbent Syrian government while developing ties with Egypt through its energy as well as economic channels, thereby, constantly trying to improve its strategic alignment in the region. Turkey’s ambitious military involvement in Libya has turned the tide by drawing Russia closer to the region. Russia has succinctly established its ambitions to wield leverage in the region by proactively engaging in ceasefire talks in Libya which is evident from the five-nation alliance spanning Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, UAE and France against Turkey ensuing a skewed rapprochement with Russia which supports the alliance ambitions in Libya’s state of affairs.

The region apparently through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) is fundamentally set to rival Russia’s key energy market - Europe, explaining thus, the upswing in its activities. Tacit cooperation with EMGF countries economically enables Russia to dictate the rules of the game, a major energy player whose presence in exploration projects in the offshore projects of the region is already visible. Hence, the simmering instability created by Turkey has been capitalized by Russia through its explicit support for the five-nation alliance both diplomatically and militarily in Libya which boasts of significant untapped hydrocarbons, an area of interest for Russia.

Russia’s deepening ties with the region comes at a time when the oil prices have been depressed due to the pandemic and its market rivals (Saudi Arabia and UAE) proxy stronghold in Libya has been waning due to Turkey-backed GNA’s (Government of National accord) significant strategic gains recently against Khalifa Haftar’s April 2019 offensive. This comes against the backdrop of the Eastern Mediterranean region seeking to establish itself as an energy hub amidst ongoing maritime delimitation agreements providing a fertile ground for Russia to showcase its energy prowess. Besides, the region seems quite neutral in taking an anti-China paradigm, as it remain a major beneficiary of the OBOR project, an another political standpoint for Russia to enhance its influence.

As USA engages in blaming Russia’s military presence in the region amid lukewarm response form NATO and EU, Russia’s strategic strides in terms of negotiating with Turkey on the Syrian and Libyan front, showcases its astute political will in carving a vital influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Germany seeks to balance the geopolitical interests of Greece, Cyprus, France, Italy, Egypt, Israel with that of Turkey. However, Germany seems to falter given its lingering interests in Nord Stream 2 project reflecting its inability to hinder Russia from broadening the crisis in Libya. Russia’s active interests in the region showcases its drive to balance its rivals namely China, Turkey and EU that has significantly earmarked its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean by converging on energy and infrastructure prospects to gain strategic foothold in the region.

The recent five-day visit (7-11 February 2020) of Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa to India is significant in the India-Sri Lanka relations. It comes within few months of visit of his brother and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Several issues were deliberated at various levels during the visit, the most important being ethnic issue in Sri Lanka.

On the settlement of the ethnic issue, India has consistently maintained that it stood in favour of “a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.” For India, the full implementation of the 13th Amendment provisions as an interim arrangement and going beyond it for the permanent settlement is practical. This was reiterated by Indian Prime Minister.

But, the Sri Lankan state thought differently after the decimation of the LTTE. Mahinda Rajapaksa, when he was President, initially promised to look “beyond 13th Amendment” through All Party Representative Committee (APRC). But, in military triumphalism, he changed stance and started denouncing that “there is no ethnic issue, but only development issue.” At a later date, he went to the extent of constituting a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) to look into the existing 13th Amendment framework that devolved powers to provinces. But, this faced challenge from the outset. Apart from non-participation of Opposition parties in PSC, Sinhala hardline parties like Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), National Freedom Front (NFF) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) wanted to do away with the existing 13th Amendment that made provisions for provinces. Ironically, a dominant section of the then Rajapaksa government supported this stance of the hardline parties, in the form of “13th Amendment Minus” arrangement. India was disappointed at the turn of things.

However, with the change of government in 2015 things looked positive. The new President Sirisena presented a plan for a new constitution in January 2016 and subsequently a Constituent Assembly was established in March 2016 to draft a new constitution. The Steering Committee of the Constituent Assembly headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe submitted an interim report in November 2017. The report touched on several aspects like principles of devolution, state land, provincial subjects, second chamber, electoral system, and public security. Although the interim report talks of “aekiya raajyaya” and “orumiththa nadu” (respectively Sinhala and Tamil terms for undivided and indivisible country), opposition to the draft has already emerged from the Buddhist clergy and Sinhala hardliners. India also has been pushing for ethnic reconciliation in the post-conflict Sri Lanka both at bilateral and multilateral levels. New Delhi firmly believes that without ethnic reconciliation, it is difficult to find a lasting political solution. India’s stand at the Human Rights Council was forward-looking and positive: to push the reconciliation process seriously so that the war-affected Sri Lankan society could rebuild itself in a sustainable manner. But with the coming back of Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime Minister and brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the President, things are back to square one. “National interest” is being invoked for certain dos and don’ts, especially on the ethnic reconciliation and long-term political settlement.

It should be noted that India has always stood by Sri Lanka in its difficult times and extended its unambiguous support to safeguarding the latter’s unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Looking at the trajectory of ties since independence, these bilateral ties have matured and, in the present context, serve as a model of good neighbourly relations. No wonder Mahatma Gandhi once rightly referred to Sri Lanka as India’s “daughter state”. Undermining domestic ethnic harmony and interests of the neighbourhood in the name of “national interests” is not in the long-term interest of the island state.