Defence & Security

Disarmament and Arms Control have over the years become distinctive and highly significant concerns in the International Arena and politics since the 20th Century. The horrors of the First and then the Second World War, made the need for the adoption and implementation of the two principles of Disarmament and Arms Control the need of the hour. The order, peace, and stability of the International Political scenario strongly depend on the success of these two principles, which have been in recent times used interchangeably with one another, despite having essential differences between each other. In general terms, Arms Control expects to restrict the number of weapons and to manage their use by the ethics of bilateral or multilateral arrangements or treaties, whereas, Disarmament focuses on putting a complete end to the whole weapon owning system.

According to Hans Morgenthau, “Disarmament implies the reduction or elimination of armaments, whereas, Arms Control envisages regulating the armaments race to create a measure of military stability”.

In the 21st Century, Security and Defence have played important roles in determining the actions and behaviour of Nations, projected through their Foreign policies. The constant threats of a potential war, or military invasion, that the Nations are under every day have pushed them away from the adoption of complete disarmament. On the other side, has made the Nations realize the importance and the need for Arms Control, which they are looking forward to including as their foreign policy goal.

The concepts of Disarmament and Arms Control have pulled in within themselves a high degree of intellectual debates, where the one school advocates for the adoption of the Arms Control concept, citing Disarmament to be an essentially idealistic goal to be achieved. According to the supporting proponents of the Arms Control race, the achievement and the possibility of acquiring a world without arms and weapons is a highly impossible and utopian idea.

ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL

Arms Race has been identified and viewed by several political thinkers as a potential determinant behind the instigation of war as well as a threat to world peace and stability. The two most prominent Political Thinkers, Couloumbis and Wolfe have gone ahead in dividing the Arms Control into two categories namely:

● Arms Reduction or Partial Reduction relies on mutually agreed sets of arms and weapons usages, that could be based on regional or worldwide premises.

● Arms Limitation encompasses the distinctive international treaties and accords that are designed to restrict the brunt of any war as well as to prohibit the sudden outbreak of any accidents.

NEED FOR ARMS CONTROL

● The need for Arms Control has over the years has been all the more felt since the devastations caused by the two World Wars.

● It has been seen as a major step needed toward the strengthening of domestic as well as international ties and relations.

● The promotion of peace and security that is dreamed of the all the nations of the world, could be achieved only once all the nations come together to limit or restrict their arms acquisitions. National, as well as International prosperity and stability, can be acquired with the adoption of arms control.

DISARMAMENT:

Disarmament even though being an idealist concept has over the years inculcated within itself several types and categorizations that have led to it becoming a very important international relations concept. Disarmament turned into a more dire and convoluted issue with the accelerated development and improvement of the atomic weapons usage, capable of mass destructions. Since the first nuclear bomb explosion in 1945, the earlier conflict that arms races were monetarily pointless and driven definitely to war was supplanted by the contention that the future utilization of atomic weapons in amount undermined the proceeded with presence of human advancement itself. During the post-World War II period, there were conversations at a few levels pointed toward restricting and controlling the usages of arms and weapons.

NEED FOR DISARMAMENT

● The fundamental aim of Disarmament is to avoid war at any cost. The limited acquisition of weapons and arms, under Arms Control, raises the possibility of warheads being used in the future.

● It increases the psychological tensions, and insecurities within states, rather than improving and guaranteeing international peace and security.

● A reduction or a complete prohibition on the usage and procurement of arms relaxes the tension and strains imposed on the economy of nations, which are under the constant burden of improving and keeping up with arms and weapons made using new and advanced technology.

● Disarmament also would guarantee more resources allocated towards the social sectors of the economy, which have been over the years neglected to provide funds to build the nation's militaries.

MAJOR INITIATIVES OF DISARMAMENT SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Since the Second World War, a large variety of arms control measures were put forth by nations to protect the world order from the threats of another devastating war. The first in line was ‘The Baruch Plan’ of 1946, which suggested the formation of a United Nations Atomic Development Authority, that would keep nuclear energy under the control of the international order. Although the suggestion was never adopted, it laid the foundation on which the nations could deliberate and discuss the need for disarmament. ‘The Gromyko Plan’, put forth by the Soviet foreign Affairs Minister was rejected by the US Administration. ‘The Rapacki Plan’ that suggested the need to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons inro Central Europe also failed to gather the support of the international community. The developments in this context came in 1959, with the adoption of the Antarctica Treaty, which aimed at restricting the procurement of arms and weapons. Several Multilateral and Bilateral Treaties were signed by the world governments, to secure itself and the world from the threat of another devastating world war.

Some of the important treaties signed bilaterally are:

● Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992, entered into force in 2002, allowed unarmed reconnaissance flights between NATO and Russia.

● Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), signed 1991, entered into force 1994, expired 2009 (START I was a successor to the expired SALT agreements.), provided limitations on strategic offensive arms.

● START II, signed 1993, ratified 1996 (United States) and 2000 (Russia), terminated following Russian withdrawal 2002, prohibited intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

● New START Treaty, signed by Russia and the United States in April 2010, entered into force in February 2011, reduced strategic nuclear missiles by half.

Some of the Multilateral treaties are:

● Partial Test Ban Treaty signed and entered into force in 1963, prohibited nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere.

● Outer Space Treaty signed and entered into force in 1967, prohibited the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space.

● Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed 1968, entered into force 1970, prohibited countries without nuclear weapons from acquiring them while committing nuclear-armed states to eventual disarmament.

● Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed and ratified 1972, in force 1972–1977, the limited introduction of new intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

● Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed and entered into force 1972, terminated following U.S. withdrawal 2002, restricted anti-ballistic missiles.

● Biological Weapons Convention signed 1972, entered into force 1975, prohibited production of biological weapons SALT II signed 1979, never entered into force, limited production of long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

● Chemical Weapons Convention signed 1993, entered into force 1997, prohibited production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

● The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty signed in 1996, has not entered into force. It prohibits nuclear weapons testing.

NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION TREATY:

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose goal and objective is to forestall and prohibit the spread of atomic weapons and weapon technology, to advance collaboration in peaceful usage of nuclear power, and further achieving the objective of accomplishing atomic disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty addresses the solitary restricting responsibility in a multilateral arrangement to the objective of disarmament by the atomic weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty went into power in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was broadened uncertainly. An aggregate of 191 States has joined the Treaty, including the five atomic weapon States. A larger number of nations have endorsed the NPT than some other arms limit and demobilization arrangement, a demonstration of the Treaty's importance.

The Treaty is viewed as the foundation of the worldwide atomic limitation system and a fundamental establishment for the quest for atomic disarmament.

NPT serves as a building measure between States parties, by setting up a shield framework under the obligation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Treaty advances participation in the field of peaceful atomic innovation and equivalent admittance to this innovation for all States parties, intending to forestall the redirection of fissile material for weapons use.

The NPT is structured and pillared on three important principles namely;

● Non-Proliferation

● Disarmament,

● Right to peacefully use Nuclear Technology.

The NPT remains unique as there is no other international agreement based on a bargain between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. The non-proliferation record of the NPT is not perfect, although the Treaty has helped curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Its disarmament impact, however, is far more contentious, which helps explain the broad support for the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The NPT has to be credited for keeping the number of countries armed with nuclear weapons under lower rates.

There are only six nations who have chosen to not abide by the NPT from the start: India, which completed an atomic test in 1974; Pakistan, which directed atomic tests consecutive with India in 1998; Israel, which has neither affirmed nor rejected that it has atomic weapons; South Sudan; Cuba; and North Korea.

There are positive instances of nations that joined the NPT despite the fact that they at first gained atomic weapon capacity or were near acquiring it. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 after it had destroyed its small arms stockpile. Argentina and Brazil consented to the Treaty during the 1990s after they had commonly consented to stop their weapons-related exercises. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became NPT member nations after they surrendered the atomic weapons they had acquired in 1991, following the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

ISSUES AND HURDLES IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT:

● The greatest issue related to disarmament is the ratio according to which nations should disarm themselves. The attempts made by nations have mostly been unsuccessful and have not yielded any fruits as it is extremely difficult to encourage nations to arrive at decisions that would suit the interests of all.

● The constant fear and insecurity that is housed within the nations. In the era, where security has taken the steering of the nation, disarmament is left with no other choice but to take the back seat. Nations are in perpetual fear of aggression or war or military invasion. Thus, to keep themselves safe, nations have resorted to increasing their military and arms grip.

● There is a never-ending sense of mistrust between nations. The intentions of nations are under constant suspicion, and so in this kind of atmosphere, disarmament cannot be achieved.

● The greatest issue in achieving the concept of disarmament is the fact that all the attempts made towards accomplishing it are politically driven. The trust for acquiring world dominance and supremacy within nations leads to the ultimate results of increased arms accumulation.

● The ever-evolving and advancing military technologies have made the possession of arms easier and desirable by nations. The nations have indulged themselves into a race of getting control over the high quality of arms produced using new technologies along with aiming to improve upon their existing arms with improving on then using the superior technology made available to them.

● The lobbying of the arms industry has played a very dominant part in the policy planning and execution of decisions related to arms and weapons. The production and consumption of arms and weapons have become one of the greatest contributors to the GDP of many nations.

● Power rivalries along with the insincerity possessed by the leaders of the nations too have served as a major obstacle in the way of achieving disarmament.

● The idea of a disarmed world is a Utopian and Idealistic concept.

● The absence of any legal or bounding force on the implementation of the disarmament treaties serves as a hurdle in the way of achieving a disarmed world.

● It is not guaranteed that Disarmament would bring about world peace and stability and its success highly depends upon nations following and abiding by the provisions of the treaty.

There remains a large degree of concern concerning Arms Controls. The treaties which were put forth by nations have failed to yield any fruitful results. Except for the NPT, all the other treaties have remained unfinished. A more comprehensive plan acceptable by nations should be undertaken to preserve the peace and stability of the international order. Nations will have to keep their self-interests aside for the time being and work towards building a safer and happier world for the generations to come.

Where did things go wrong?

India's border with China spans across three main sectors: The Ladakh region in the west, Sikkim in the middle, and Arunachal Pradesh in the east. The border is known as the "Line of Actual Control (LAC)", but there have been debates from both sides over the same. China claims control over Aksai Chin - the region near Ladakh - while India has included it in its official maps. But following the 1962 Indo-China War, the region has been administered by China.

A history of conflict

First mentions of the LAC came in 1959 in letters addressed to India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, from China's first Premier, Zhou Enlai. Through these letters, it was revealed that China laid claim to the region of Aksai Chin, which India had not formally recognized. In short, India and China followed two separate demarcations that were made earlier - the Johnson Line and the Macartney–MacDonald Line respectively.

The Johnson Line showed Aksai Chin as a part of India - like it is shown in Indian maps today - while the Macartney–MacDonald Line showed it as a part of China, with the LAC separating it and Ladakh. After Mr. Nehru refused to accept the LAC, China attacked India in 1962, but eventually withdrew its troops behind the LAC. Several border skirmishes followed in the coming decades, but the two countries mutually agreed to a LAC in 1996. Despite this, the dispute has still dragged on.

This brutally short history of the border dispute between India and China just shows how complex the situation actually is. But it's worth looking at the political situations that more or less led to the skirmishes in the Galwan Valley now.

Contrasting ideologies

Things were very different back in 1947. Mr. Nehru was to lead a newly formed independent India and one of his first decisions was to ally with China. India was the second country to recognize China following the country's entry into communism. India backed China for permanent membership in the Security Council. It was safe to say that Mr. Nehru wanted to have cordial relations with China. But one thing to note is that Mr. Nehru was an idealist. He felt good relations between India and China would foster peace. China had different ideas. While it would be an exaggeration to say that China took advantage of Mr. Nehru's soft stance in 1962, it would be ignorant to not take it into consideration.

Fast-forward to 2020 and things are not very different. Mr. Nehru was never a nationalist, but Narendra Modi is. But the idealism still lingers. We as a country are still driven by the fact that Kashmir is ours, despite the Line of Control (LoC) and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) carving out nearly half the region for our neighbors. Ignore Pakistan. They would be nothing without China. But there is no scope to ignore China. Because the Chinese are realists.

The Kashmir issue has always been a topic for every election. But it has seldom been related to China. Pakistan is our fierce rival and almost throughout our independent history, the Kashmir issue has been about them. Whether our leaders have been paying attention to China or are just choosing to ignore public discourses on it, we'll never know. But in this case, ignorance is not bliss.

Life under Mr. Modi

Our Hindu nationalist Prime Minister was less of a leader and more of a traveler in his first term, as he forged alliances with a number of countries around the world, including China. This warming up to China continued in his second term too. He did not invite representatives of Taiwan and Tibet - two highly contested regions China claims control over - for his inauguration like he did in his first term and took Chinese President Xi Jinping on a guided tour of Mahabalipuram, during the latter's visit to the country in October 2019. India has also maintained its neutrality in the US-China conflict, despite its support for investigations into China's role in the spread of COVID-19.

But there have been shortfalls. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A was a major one. China, along with Pakistan, did not approve of the move and called the formation of Ladakh as a union territory "unacceptable". Kashmir is an internationally disputed region, that is claimed by three nuclear powers. Unilaterally taking a decision on the region was bound to ruffle some feathers. The removal of the Articles gave any Indian citizen the right to own property in the region. Irrespective of whether China's and Pakistan's claims are legitimate or not, the impending consequences of such a highly sensitive and controversial move should have been clearly thought through.

"Aatmanirbhar Bharat" is the trend now. An amazing piece of oration, devoid of any facts and true sentiment, delivered by Mr. Modi drilled in the self-reliant spirit into Indians. But now that very speech could potentially cause a problem for the Prime Minister. His government has been on a "Make in India" campaign since 2014. But it has had nowhere close to the impact Mr. Modi would have liked, with reasons ranging from delays to just plain complicated bureaucracy. And now he faces a challenge. With the "boycott China" voice becoming louder, what can India do? There is no way India can forgo Chinese products simply because it doesn't have the manufacturing capability. But can the Prime Minister deliver this message to his people and potentially threaten his political stronghold?

Boycott the "boycott" campaign China is India's largest trading partner. India's imports from China make up nearly 14% of India's total imports. Our country's exports to China, on the other hand, just make 5% of all our exports. In short, we are not in a position to "boycott" China. The Chinese economy will hardly be affected even if we do ban all their products. Exports to India and imports from India just make up 3% and 4% of the Chinese economy respectively. China is the largest manufacturer in the world, by far. Almost every single country in the world relies on China in some way or the other.

But that's not all. Chinese FDI in India stood at $4.1 billion in 2019 and major Indian startups like BigBasket, MakeMyTrip, Flipkart, Byju's, Swiggy, Zomato, Ola, Oyo, PayTM and Snapdeal all have parts of their companies owned by Chinese MNCs. There are a number of Indian companies with offices in China and thousands of Indians employed in Chinese companies. The economic relationship between the two countries is so intertwined. But that is the nature of global trade and that is why we are seeing more and more Indian startups succeed every year. A massive decision like banning trade with China could be potentially disastrous.

There have also been calls to ban Chinese restaurants and restaurants serving Chinese food in India. The absurdity of such a statement cannot be emphasized enough. These restaurants are owned by Indians and they employ Indians too. Moreover, the vegetables and food grains used by these restaurants are all grown in India. A ban on restaurants will affect potentially millions across a number of sectors. It is time to quell this "boycott" talk.

So what next?It's important that India doesn't commit the same mistakes it has in the past. Since the 1970s, China has built itself into a manufacturing giant. The entire global economic system relies on China, without whom it will collapse. China has worked towards being in the position it is right now and that is why it has the power to make controversial political moves like in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and now in the Galwan Valley. India needs to understand that being idealistic and patriotic in its approach won't get it anywhere.

That being said, India doesn't have to accept defeat either. The Modi government needs to be rigorous in its diplomacy and at the same time effectively stop this anti-China sentiment blanketing the country. Yes, China is the aggressor and it needs to be taught a lesson. But potentially endangering millions of lives isn't the way to do so. India needs to start being practical in its approach, else things might turn ugly. Mr. Modi now has the chance to break away from the traditional approach started by Mr. Nehru and be realistic in handling a difficult situation with easily one of the smarter world powers. But the real question is: after prioritizing patriotism over practicality for 70 years, will the nation let him?

Neither ‘security’ nor ‘internal security’ is defined anywhere in the Constitution. However, five related terms that find mention are ‘pubic order’ (List II, Entry 2), ‘war’, (Article 352), ‘external aggression’ (Article 352), ‘armed rebellion’ (Article 352), and ‘internal disturbance’ (Article 355). The Government of India’s Report of the Committee on Centre-State Relations (2000) defines ‘Internal Security’ as, “security against threats faced by a country within its national borders, either caused by inner political turmoil, or provoked, prompted or proxied by an enemy country, perpetrated even by such groups that use a failed, failing or weak state, causing insurgency, terrorism or any other subversive acts that target innocent citizens, cause animosity between and amongst groups of citizens and communities intended to cause or causing violence, destroy or attempt to destroy public and private establishment.”

The Indian Constitution accords ‘federal exclusivity’ to handle external security and ‘federal supremacy’ to maintain internal security. Either way, the Centre has a role to play. Pertaining to internal security, the Union List has 25 entries, as against five entries in the State List and 11 entries in the Concurrent List. This apart, a number of articles of the Constitution suggest that the Centre enjoys more powers than the States on internal security matters: 245-254, 256-258, 312, 339, 352, 353, 355, 356, and 365. In short, constitutionally, the division of powers is in favour of the Centre than States in the internal security arena. Reiterating this, the Supreme Court, in S. R. Bommai’s case, observed: “A review of the provisions of the Constitution shows unmistakably that while creating a federation, the Founding Fathers wished to establish a strong Centre. In the light of the past history of this sub-continent, this was probably a natural and necessary decision. In a land as varied as India is, a strong Centre is perhaps a necessity.”

The need for the deployment of the Central forces occurs when there is a “war”, “external aggression”, “internal disturbance” or “in aid of the civil”. Since the “defence of India and every part thereof” is Centre’s responsibility under Entry 1, List I, it has blanket power of deployment of “armed forces of the Union” in any State for the defence of the country. Under Article 355, the Centre can deploy its forces to protect a State against “external aggression and internal disturbance” even when the State concerned does not take the Centre’s help and unwilling to receive the Central forces. In case of a State’s opposition to the deployment of armed forces of the Union, constitutionally, the right course is first to issue directives under Article 355 to the concerned State, and in the event of the State not complying with the directive of the Central Government, the Centre can take further action under Article 356. Though prior consultation with the State Government is not obligatory, the Sarkaria Commission suggested that it “is desirable that the State Government should be consulted, wherever feasible, and its cooperation sought by the Union Government.” The civil power in the State will continue to function even after the deployment of the armed forces of the Union, though the superintendence, control and administration of the Central forces while on such deployment is vested with the Union (Entry 2A, List I).

Can the Centre withdraw its forces unilaterally from a disturbed state? The same logic applies: as long as the disturbance continues, the Centre is obligated to keep its forces, though it is not unconstitutional if it is done. But, the Centre may scale down the force level depending on the situation, which is usually done in consultation with the concerned state. This ‘consultation’, however, is not taking place in the case of West Bengal. As Sarkaria Commission pertinently observed, any unilateral action “may not be politically proper”.

It should be noted that the threat matrix to India’s internal security is such that it is beyond the capability of the States of India to counter them effectively. Although the State police forces are considered as the “first responders”, they are the weakest link in the entire response chain. With their restricted territorial jurisdiction and limited resources, the State police forces have been finding it difficult to deal with internal security threats that have inter-State and global dimensions. Therefore, Centre’s role has become inevitable in case the situation goes beyond control.

Although the State police forces are considered as the “first responders”, they are the weakest link in the entire response chain. With their restricted territorial jurisdiction, meagre resources and limited capabilities, the State police forces have been finding it difficult to deal with internal security threats, which have inter-State and global dimensions. In the modernisation of police forces, the State governments are found wanting. The issue is, as a Parliamentary Committee rightly points out, “… when it comes to the control and superintendence of police forces, the States do not want to yield even an inch of their jurisdiction. But at the same time when it comes to improve and strengthen their police forces, they simply raise their hands expressing their inability to do so because of financial constraints.”

Internal security is indeed a national issue requiring national solutions. Yet, states and local governments cannot be ignored. Effective response to internal security challenges requires considerable collaboration and cooperation between a wide range of federal, State, and local agencies. As Sarkaria Commission pertinently observed, “the very purpose of deployment of the armed forces of the Union – to restore public order – cannot be achieved without the active assistance and co-operation of the entire law enforcing machinery of the State Government.” None other than the Centre could do the coordination on a national issue. The federal interdependence of the Centre and the States in matters of internal security is often lost sight of in the political gamesmanship which is often practised. It is important to de-politicise security.

Thunderbolts, elite commando force of Kerala Police, gunned down three suspected Maoists in forest areas of Attapadi Hills of Palakad on 28 October 2019. The incident confirms the reports that the Maoists have been spreading to the south of India beyond the so-called “red corridor”. They are also known to have been moving to the northeast and to urban areas of the country.

It is known that the Indian Maoists have good network with several key militant groups of the northeast India that commenced roughly since the mid-1990s. The linkage ranges from getting arms, ammunitions, communication devices to training from the northeast militant groups like National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), anti-talk faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) led by Paresh Barua, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (Prepak), Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Gorkha Liberation Tiger Force (GLTF), Gurkha Liberation Organisation (GLO), Adibasi National Liberation Army, Adivasi People’s Army (APA), and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Chinese small arms find their way to the ‘Red Corridor’ mainly through these groups. It is through the northeast groups the Maoists have good access to militant groups of Myanmar. Maoists, in turn, are said to be providing explosives (ammonium nitrate) and funds to the northeast groups.

The mutual support between Naxals and northeast militant groups is not just restricted to material, but extends to moral aspects as well. While Naxals have strongly supported “people’s movements” of the northeast, the northeast militant groups have stood by “revolutionaries”. ULFA leader Paresh Baruah once remarked, “The Indian colonial government is also viewed as an enemy by the Maoists. Our enemy is also the same and so there is an understanding with them.”

But, what is more concerning is attempts by the Maoists to push the boundaries of the ‘Red Corridor’ and set up support bases in upper Assam and some of the tribal areas in the hilly interiors. The presence of Maoists is felt in pockets of Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Sivasagar, Golaghat and Karbi Anglong districts of Assam and Lohit district of Arunachal Pradesh (adjoining Tinsukia). The hub of Maoists activities is said to be in Sadiya area, situated in Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. Maoists have found parts of the northeast of India as a new zone of “revolution” to establish what they call as “base areas”. In this regard, two major causes are being exploited: deprivation among the tea workers of Assam and anti-dam sentiments in Arunachal Pradesh. Since there is political vacuum in both cases, Maoists are more than willing to fill them. Interestingly, adivasis in tea gardens are descendants of migrants from present-day Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, Chhatisgarh and Madhya Pradesh during the British times. The Maoists have already set up local committees in these areas. From there it will become easy for them to link up to southern parts of Bhutan, where Nepali refugees are populated.

The Maoists have also been trying to extend their presence in southern India. Way back in 2013, the presence and movement of the armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) have been noticed on over two dozen occasions in Malappuram, Wayanad and Kannur in Kerala and Mysore, Kodagu, Udupi, Chikmagalur and Shimoga in Karnataka. Though adjoining areas of Tamil Nadu have not witnessed any movement of armed Naxal cadres, activities of its front bodies have increased in Erode district. As is their wont, the Maoists try to exploit the local grievances to gain influence. In the tri-junction area, they smelt an opportunity in the eviction of forest dwellers and tribals from the Western Ghats under the National Park Act and the government’s move to implement the Kasturi­rangan report on conservation of the Ghats. Significantly, Palakad and Mallapuram have been identified by the government of Kerala as Maoists-affected districts to receive security-related expenditure on LWE.

Maoists have also been trying to spread in the urban areas of India. Significant Maoist activities, especially of its front organisations, have been reported from places like Delhi, Gurgaon, NOIDA, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Bengaluru, Pune, Nagpur, Surat, Ahmedabad, Bhopal, Ranchi, Jamshedpur, Raipur, Durg, Patna, Hyderabad, Rourkela, Bhubaneswar, Guwahati and Chandigarh. The urban fronts comprise organisations involved in “revolutionary democratic” activities, opposition to “war on people”, displacement and “violence on women”, and in “cultural” activities. Also, significantly, CPI (Maoist) is systematically penetrating the student community as well as the workers in the unorganised sectors, which could have a large impact on the future course of the movement.

Due to depleting tribal cadre base, Maoists have found urban regions a good catchment area for replenishment. The main advantage with the urban cadres, which is absent in their tribal counterparts, is the “intellect” to take the movement forward. The urbanites may find life in the forest too difficult to sustain, yet the Maoists wish to cultivate them “to lead militant activities that are facing a leadership crisis due to depleting recruitment, elimination of the existing cadres due to security operations and large-scale surrenders by senior cadres.” Immense financial and human resources are being invested in running “urban activities and guidance on how to develop better coordination among the urban frontal organisations of the party.”

Overall, the spread of Maoists to the ‘new’ areas like northeast, south and urban areas of India may not be alarming, but is concerning. Coordination is called for at three levels – between the Centre and the States, among the States and among the security and intelligence agencies – to effectively counter the ‘red menace’.

In a layman’s understanding ‘Cyberspace’ (coined and first used by William Gibson in a science fiction Neromancer to describe his vision of a global computer network, linking all people, machines and sources of information in the world, and through which one could move or navigate as through virtual space) is a world of computers and the society gathered around it. It is characterised by blurred boundaries; there are no clear demarcations between civilian and military, state and non-state, and foreign and domestic as in other domains. It is those same characteristics that make it an ideal medium for committing malafide activities which can have repercussions for national and international security. Primary targets include critical national infrastructure network systems with electricity, air traffic control, financial markets and Government computer networks taking centre-stage.

Part of the problem is that the Internet’s organic evolution – open all-inclusive, decentralised environment – meant that security was not a consideration. The blurred boundaries and the anonymity provided by cyber-space make it difficult to pin responsibility for such attacks, which, going by current trends, will be perpetrated by individuals, networks, communities and organisations, with the state acting as a facilitator, and nationalistic fervour providing the motivation. Cyber threat has acquired dangerous proportions and impinges on national security when a state-criminal network-hacker nexus builds up.

Coming to the Indian context, cyber warfare has turned out to be one of the serious threats to Indian security. It is in fact considered as the “next generation of threats”. Statistically, India has always been among the top five targets of malicious activity on the Internet that ranges from virus, Trojan, malware, identity theft, hacking, cyber stalking, cyber squatting, spamming, email-bombing, email-spoofing, cyber defamation, web defacement, data diddling, web jacking, denial of service attack, key logging and Internet time theft. The threats we face range from individual criminal hackers to organised criminal groups, from terrorist networks to advanced nation states. Defending against these threats to our security, prosperity, and personal privacy requires networks that are secure, trustworthy, and resilient. Our digital infrastruc­ture, therefore, is a strategic national asset, and protecting it—while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties—is a national security priority.

The present concern relates to cyberspace turning into “a force multiplier for terrorist networks in India and abroad, driven by the sophisticated use and unlimited access to Internet and computer technology.” Taking advantage of the anonymous nature of the Internet, terrorists use cyberspace for communications, geographic mapping, recruitment, fund raising and, most importantly, intelligence gathering. With increasing vigilance on the traditional channels of communications (such as tracking of e-mails, mobile phones, etc), terrorists have now resorted to using new tactics, for example, not sending e-mails but saving them as drafts in an encrypted manner or even through blogs. Many organised terror groups pitched against India host websites and use fixed Internet sites to communicate with their partners. There have been known incidents in India where terrorists have resorted to several other innovative techniques, such as using bulletin boards and other websites that provide free uploading services, and posting steganographed picture messages to pass on ‘confidential’ execution details.

On securing cyberspace, neither government nor the private sector nor individual citizens can meet this challenge alone; all have to work together to investigate cyber intrusion and to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents. It is also important to strengthen our interna­tional partnerships on a range of issues, including the development of norms for acceptable conduct in cyberspace; laws concerning cybercrime; data preservation, protection, and privacy; and approaches for network defense and response to cyber attacks.

While it is a challenge for law enforcement agencies to monitor every cyber café, it is here that cyber forensics based audits and evidence gathering can play a pivotal role in dissuading criminal use of the cyber cafés. Similarly, ISPs can use that technology to monitor the traffic data of the cyber cafés to a greater degree, and develop (real time) trends and patterns at the micro level. Cyber forensics can be applied to networks, and in case of any red flags or once the IP is tracked, it can help in imaging the hard disk and track the individuals responsible for the activity. The metadata of the files or any document can be analysed and matched with the log maintained by the cyber café. Some of these measures would require policy and legal changes to ensure compliance and prevent misuse.

Technologically, investigation agencies in India need to scale up in terms of acquiring more advanced equipment for digital investigations. The biggest operational challenge, however, is not the procurement of equipment for cyber forensics, but acquiring the requisite skills to effectively use that equipment for investigations. This calls for a two-layered training approach for the investigative agencies. At the first layer, there is an immediate need to inculcate a systematic cyber crime investigations culture, placing impetus on awareness about the amended cyber laws, their implications on cyber investigations and evidence chain management-across the ranks of the agencies. At the second layer (which is more operational in nature), the investigating officers should be trained on effective evidence chain management in digital investigations and related best practices, including monitoring and intelligence creation. At this stage, the focus is more on the integration of technologies for pattern analysis and effective intelligence gathering.

Beyond this, there needs to be centralised monitoring stations and large-scale data-mining capabilities to detect trends and patterns associated with suspicious activities and known threat sources. This requires massive infrastructure, as well as the partnership between government and corporate entities.

Multiple bomb blasts on Easter Day in Sri Lanka has established the fact that the island state has emerged as new hub for Islamic radicalisation. But, how many know that Pakistan’s ISI has been working for quite some time to establish Sri Lanka as a base against Indian interests?

The involvement of ISI in Sri Lanka against India emerged first in 2014 with the arrest of two Sri Lankan Muslims (Mohammed Sakir Hussain and Suleman Hussain) and an Indian Muslim (Thameen Ansari) in Chennai by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for spying on behalf of Pakistan’s ISI. The arrestees confessed that their handlers were agents posted at Pakistani High Commission based in Colombo: Amir Zubair Siddiqui and Haji alias Siraj Ali, who were posted as visa counsellors.

This is not to suggest that Sri Lanka is conniving with Pakistan against India, but to say that the island state is being used as a base by the ISI. It should be pointed out that Sri Lanka never allowed its territory for any anti-India activities. Things may be happening without Colombo’s knowledge. However, some questions need to be answered: Why Sri Lanka has been chosen as a base by the ISI? What are the reasons for the involvement of Sri Lankans? What is the purpose behind the ‘Colombo module’ of ISI?

The ISI has been operating from some of the neighbouring countries of India like Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Myanmar and even Maldives. The southern front of India remained unpenetrated for quite some time. Sri Lanka was the best base to do that for more than one reason:

One: given the proximity and similarity of language and appearance, Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims, who also speak Tamil, would not find it difficult to reach Tamil Nadu and mix-up with the local population. According to Sri Lankan Defence Chief, the mastermind of Easter bombing, Zahran Hashmi, has “transited Tamil Nadu” without being noticed. Presence of large number of Sri Lankan refugees is yet another facilitating aspect.

Two: Pakistan’s activities in Sri Lanka have not been seen with suspicion by the security establishment of the island state. Sri Lanka-Pakistan relations have been good without any irritants. Sri Lanka is ever grateful to Pakistan for all the military and diplomatic support during and after the Eelam War and thereafter.

There are various reasons for the involvement of Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims in the spy ring. The primary motivation is monitory gain. Unemployed youth are easy targets. There is a theory that argues that part of the reason for the involvement of Sri Lankan Muslims in ISI’s spy network is their increasing radicalisation. But, the theory may explain if they are involved in spying western targets based in India, but not acting against Indian targets.

Pakistan obviously has denied the existence of an ISI base in Sri Lanka targeted against India as “speculative” and “malicious media campaign”. The denial is not surprising. Pakistani ISI has been assiduously pursuing the objective of establishing espionage networks for collection of India’s defence related information with reference to deployment/movement of armed forces, information relating to vital installations including sensitive information pertaining to the latest knowhow with reference to technological advancement etc. For this purpose, it has been able to organise resident agents and even allure the lower staff in sensitive organizations for collection and communication of sensitive information. When there is a roadblock there, it has moved on to tap ethnic similarities in the neighbourhood.

What is concerning is the security dimension of the espionage. There are two aspects to ISI spying. One is to just gather information about the enemy for the purpose of having information advantage. The second aspect is to collect information with the aim to inflict damage on the adversary. Reconnaissance of Kalapakkam nuclear plant site, NSG Hub in Chennai, Coast Guard installations on the eastern coast, Officers’ Training Academy (OTA) in Chennai, Nagapattinam Port, the Madras Regimental Centre in Wellington, harbours in Chennai and Ennore, DGP office and the High Court complex in Chennai and Vizag and Kochi ports have been carried out. Places like the Sulur Air Base, the Naval detachment in Karikal, naval installations located in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were on the pipeline. But, by then the spies had been arrested. Going by the confessions of the arrestees, information gathering was meant for planning a terror attack. The first ever terror attack in Chennai in May 2014 was not unconnected to the larger ISI plot.

Moving ahead, whoever had been arrested is only a tip of the iceberg. It is important to find out how many more spies are on the prowl. This requires a thorough review and revamping of counter-intelligence capabilities of India. Counter-intelligence continues to be a weak spot in the Indian intelligence infrastructure. It is important to develop a totally different set of intelligence capabilities to cater to rapidly changing threat environment. This needs to be done at several levels—from training modules to doctrines to equipment to motivation. Intelligence at the state level requires modernisation. Human intelligence (HUMINT) requires more attention than just technical intelligence (TECHINT). Not the least, the intelligence flow has to be both ways: from the Centre to States and vice versa.

Cyber warfare has turned out to be one of the serious threats to Indian security. It is, in fact, has been considered as one of the foremost among the “next generation of threats” and an “area of emerging concern”. Statistically, India has been among the top five targets of malicious activity on the internet that range from virus, trojan, malware, identity theft, hacking, cyber stalking, cyber squatting, spamming, email-bombing, email-spoofing, cyber defamation, web defacement, data diddling, web jacking, denial of service attack, key logging and internet time theft. The cyber threats that India face come from both state and non-state actors: individual criminal hackers to organised criminal groups, from terrorist networks to advanced nation states. Attacks on Indian cyberspace have increased manifold in the recent past; and they have increased in sophistication and anonymity. There is a method behind the madness. Future attacks could be more dangerous, given the exponential growth of our IT networks and our increasing reliance on these networks.

Countries like China and Pakistan use this mode to infringe on Indian cyber space because it is not only relatively cheaper and easier, but also the amount of anonymity it gives without leaving trails. On the other hand, the victim country like India has to invest considerable amount of time and resources to detect, and counter these attacks – potential and real. Five sectors especially are at most risk: banking, transport, telecommunication, power and sensitive information with the government. Presently, inimical countries are concentrated on eavesdropping on secret Indian information. There are many instances of breaking into Indian government and network of embassies by hackers traced to China. For instance, the Stuxnet worm originated from China that reportedly caused to shut down two dozens of INSAT 4B transponders was considered more deadly. Similarly, hackers claiming themselves as “Predators PK” from Pakistan managed to encroach into several Indian websites. In no time, these attacks could be diverted to paralyse the country.

However, what is of prime concern is the cyberspace turning into “a force multiplier for terrorist networks in India and abroad, driven by the sophisticated use and unlimited access to Internet and computer technology.” Taking advantage of the anonymous nature of the Internet, terrorists use cyberspace for communications, geographic mapping, recruitment, fund raising and, most importantly, intelligence gathering. With increasing vigilance on the traditional channels of communications (such as tracking of e-mails and mobile phones), terrorists have now resorted to using new tactics, for example, not sending e-mails but saving them as drafts in an encrypted manner or even through blogs. Many organised terror groups pitched against India host websites and use fixed Internet sites to communicate with their partners. There have been known incidents in India where terrorists have resorted to several other innovative techniques, such as using bulletin boards and other websites that provide free uploading services, and posting steganographed picture messages to pass on ‘confidential’ execution details.

Defending against these threats to our security, prosperity, and personal privacy requires networks that are secure, trustworthy, and resilient. Our digital infrastruc­ture, therefore, is a strategic national asset. Protecting it is a national security priority. It is vital to make our cyber systems as secure and as non-porous as possible with highest standards of cyber security. Fool-proof security cannot be guaranteed by technology alone. Since battle between hackers and defenders is an ongoing process, due prominence should be given to constant training and orientation of the people and the process involved to meet compliance of best practices in this field. India’s strength in information technology, in this regard, should be put to maximum use by drawing expertise from private sector, academia and free lancers. Ethical hackers could be encouraged to work with the government for information security. All users across the country need to be oriented on cyber defence against cyber attacks (similar to civil defence in the case of normal attacks). Periodic mock practices and drills to test the alertness of response systems are necessary.

Cyber threat is not local, but a global issue. Cyber attacks can be launched from any part of the world, and hence can’t be tackled by nations purely at the individual level. While country-level security is important, what is also equally required is a global cooperation and synergy. However, unlike other areas, international norms and conventions in this arena are too primitive. The Council of Europe is the only international body that has adopted an internationally binding treaty on cyber crime in 2004, including 43 countries. But, a global cyber security treaty is the need of the hour to make the entire cyber space safe and peaceful. Recently, 15 countries, including India, have sent recommendations to the United Nations for negotiation of an international cyber security treaty. An international cyber treaty would create norms of accepted behavior in cyberspace, exchange information on national legislation and cyber security strategies, and strengthen the capacity of less-developed countries to protect their computer systems. Such a treaty should not limit itself to state actors, but should bind all non-state actors and private individuals in making the world free of cyber threats.

Illegal migration into India is one of the major security concerns. According to the Group of Ministers Report on National Security (2001), “massive illegal immigration poses a grave danger to our security, social harmony and economic well-being.” Illegal migration mainly takes place in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country from neighbouring Bangladesh. Bangladeshis have been moving out of their country due to economic, political and social reasons. There is a serious crisis of ‘lebensraum’ (living space) in Bangladesh due to alarming population growth rate without proportionate availability of land. This is going to worsen further in the future with the impact of climate change and natural disasters. As per 2018 estimates, the population density of Bangladesh is 1138.89 per sq km, one of the highest in the world. And, this is expected to increase further in the coming years. The illegal immigration from Bangladesh has led to demographic upheaval and generated serious communal, political, social and economic tensions and conflicts in several areas of the northeast of India. The most affected states are Assam, Megalaya, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh, although migrants are seen in other states of India as well. It is estimated that there are about 15-20 million Bangladeshis staying illegally in India.

The illegal migration of Bangladeshis in fact triggered the agitation in Assam by All Assam Students Union (AASU) in 1979-85. Despite the Assam Accord of 1985, the issue remains unresolved to this day and the “silent demographic invasion” persists. Due to vote-bank politics, the motivation to block illegal migrants from Bangladesh is absent. The gravity and scope of threats arising out of illegal migration was highlighted by the then Governor of Assam, Lt Gen S. K. Sinha in his report. Inter alia, he points out,

This silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of the geo-strategically vital districts of Lower Assam. The influx of these illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made. The rapid growth of international Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force for this demand. In this context, it is pertinent that Bangladesh has long discarded secularism and has chosen to become an Islamic State. Loss of Lower Assam will sever the entire land mass of the North East, from the rest of India and the rich natural resources of that region will be lost to the Nation.

This applies to other states of the northeast, especially those that share borders with Bangladesh like Tripura and Meghalaya. In Tripura, the migrants have reduced the locals to a minority leading to rise of insurgent groups like All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). Bangladeshi migrants have even spread to far off states in the region like Arunachal Pradesh, and other parts of India and are seen as potential threat bearers. Some of these migrants give shelter to Bangladeshi militant groups like HuJI (B) and are very amenable to ISI activities. The Supreme Court, in its 114-page judgment, in July 2005 observed that “The presence of such a large number of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, which runs into millions, is in fact an aggression on the State of Assam and has also contributed significantly in causing serious internal disturbances in the shape of insurgency of alarming proportions.”

Despite the enormity of the issue, the response has been grossly inadequate. The entire stretch of 4,096-km India-Bangladesh border is heavily populated, making monitoring extremely difficult. Fencing has, to a large extent, been acting as an obstacle, but not the whole border has been fenced. The remaining stretch should be fenced at the earliest, complimented with floodlights and hi-tech surveillance devices. Although the Border Security Force (BSF), in charge of policing the border, has been doing its job creditably, the force levels are not sufficient to monitor the long and difficult border. Apart from raising new battalions, it is important not to divert the BSF for duties other than border management. They also have to be equipped legally to handle situations at borders that include not only illegal migration, but also smuggling, drug-trafficking, counterfeits, and militant movements.

Apart from creating physical hurdles, it is also important to discourage illegal migrants through suitable deterrent legislation. Till recently, illegal migrants in Assam were handled by Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, that was held as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005 as it was “coming to the advantage of such illegal migrants as any proceedings initiated against them almost entirely ends in their favour, enables them to have a document having official sanctity to the effect that they are not illegal migrants.” An exclusive refugee/migration law is long pending. It is also vital to hasten the present plan of issuing multi-purpose identity cards, at least to curb further illegal migration. At some pockets, issue of temporary work permits can be considered so that Bangladeshis can come, work and go back. At the macro level, India should help in the overall economic development and prosperity of Bangladesh so that its citizens need not to go elsewhere for their livelihood.

Defending its territory and people from cross-border terrorism has been one of the greatest challenges of the Indian state. Successive governments of India have faced instances of civilian deaths due to operations originating in Pakistan occupied territories. Following the Uri attacks in September 2016, the Indian forces conducted ‘Surgical Strikes’ in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). According to the Indian Government, the Surgical Strikes led to the neutralisation of terror cells and also the death of terrorists. The Indian media and the public perceived the Surgical Strikes as an unprecedented move. The Strikes also became an internet and social media sensation. From a foreign policy perspective, the Surgical Strikes were bold and assertive way of sending signals to threat bearers.

The Indian Government considers the Surgical Strikes an effective way of countering cross-border terrorism. However, tensions along the LoC have not subsided following the Strikes. The terror attack in Pulwama shook the nation due to its sheer impact. The Pulwama incident happened at a time when the Indian public had eulogised the Surgical Strikes of 2016. Counter-terrorism as a concept needs a refined understanding in the Indian context. Is the Indian Government preventing, solving, or deterring terror? This is a question that needs to be addressed. The Surgical Strikes was only a ‘response’ to an act of terrorism. The Indian Government said it managed to neutralise terror camps in POK, however this has not led to the end of cross-border terrorism. When viewed logically, the Surgical Strikes was only a way to deter possible future incidents and to avenge Uri and ensure justice to those martyred. Therefore, the Surgical Strikes have served a temporary objective of deterrence.

Surgical Strikes are operations that have a specific target and an objective. They only lead to the neutralization of these specific targets and not the entirety of infrastructure. The 2016 Strikes were no exception, it only achieved a short term objective. There is a need for the Indian Government to rethink this approach to terrorism. Terrorism as a concept is complex and is not limited to sleeper cells and transnational networks. The Indian Government needs to establish effective ‘counter-terror infrastructure’ to prevent terrorism. There is a need for the Indian Government to change the ‘deterrence’ approach to terrorism. The Surgical Strikes of 2016 and even the Balakot air Strikes after Pulwama have not managed to prevent infiltrations permanently. There should be a focus on a more permanent prevention of infiltrations. India’s border security needs revisiting. Though successive governments in India have claimed that they are striving to find a ‘solution’ to terrorism, they have only found limited success in this particular endeavour. ‘Solution’ to terrorism is a long term goal and needs a clarity of purpose.

When dealing at the level of non-state actors, states should have the will to think ahead of mere deterrence. India faces a peculiar enemy in the form of non-state actors who receive constant funding from state actors. Terrorism is asymmetrical and unpredictable, it cannot be solved using traditional security measures. As long as the sovereign states of the world are comfortable with only deterring acts of terrorism, these acts are bound to continue and cause further civilian casualties across the world. The Indian Government should give more emphasis on solving and preventing terrorism. The need of the hour is the effective utilization of the nation’s intelligence infrastructure and using it to provide a direction to the existing counter-terrorism mechanism. The primary objective of the Indian Government in its actions against terrorism should be conflict resolution.

While we continue to think about the multidimensionality of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, the news reports have almost ignored the military – a critical component in Venezuelan politics – by giving it just passing references. Whereas a comprehensive approach inclusive of the military could have enhanced our understanding of the crisis itself. More important, the predecessor of President Maduro, Hugo Chavez himself came from the military and before Chavez passed away he had created few institutions with national and regional dimensions that are alleged to be overtly associated with the present crisis.

The Venezuelan military has avoided coming to the scene of political controversy by giving public statements. On the other side, we have noticed that the United States too have avoided using military power in altering the balance to one side, despite issuing threats of direct military involvement. The ‘American way’ of engagement with Venezuela today may attest to the fact that the efficacy of military has waned, but this may apply to Venezuelan national politics to a limited extent. Like other countries in Latin America, any national government in Venezuela has to constantly engage with its armed forces.

The military, as an institution, has its own institutional interests. But this institution is not homogenous as one would think. It embodies all those social values and their expressions that are relevant in the national politics in Venezuela. Thus, according to some, the military as a ‘merit-led institution’ can well be considered a source of social mobility and change. Given so much of importance of the military, its consistent appreciation would increase our understanding of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. While doing so a relevant question can be raised: ‘why the military is glued with President Maduro?’

Apparently, support of the military is critical for a regime’s survival in Venezuela. It applies on Marudo Government as well. It can also be stated that Marudo understands the importance of the Venezuelan military and effectively ‘takes care’ of its institutional interest. Chavez had done the same and Marudo continues with the legacy. Both Chavez and Marudo might have realised the role that the Venezuela military has played in the national politics of this country.

But more important is the ‘patience’ that the military has shown in supporting President Maduro despite political volatility that we are witnessing in Venezuela. Perhaps, one speculation is possible now on behalf of the military that it may be well aware of its limitation of resolving the current crisis and therefore staying back in the barrack is easier for it than landing in the Parliament.

The first visit of Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, crown prince, of Saudi Arabia to India on 19-20 February 2019 is significant for India-Saudi Arabia relations. Several agreements were signed on areas like investments, tourism, housing, broadcasting, disaster management and energy. Apart from these agreements, both sides reaffirmed commitment to deepen the existing ‘strategic partnership’. However, counter-terrorism still remains an important issue.

India-Saudi Arabia relations have been on the upswing since January 2006 when King Abdullah visited India as chief guest of India’s Republic Day celebrations. The ‘Delhi Declaration’ that was signed during the visit termed that the “visit heralds a new era in India-Saudi Arabia relations and constitutes a landmark in the development of increased understanding and cooperation between the two countries. Apart from areas like economy, trade, science & technology, health and culture, the two countries recognised the “need to intensify and coordinate bilateral, regional and global cooperation to combat and eradicate the menace of terrorism.” However, there was no concrete agreement on counter-terrorism cooperation except for signing a ‘MoU on Combating Crime’. Although the MoU provided for cooperation between the security agencies of the two countries for combating organised crime, illicit trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and historical artefacts, and counterfeiting of currency and travel documents, in practice there were problems.

The obstacles came in the form of perception of what constituted “crime” and priorities in addressing them. However, the overall bilateral relations improved to the level of ‘strategic partnership’ in 2010 when Saudi Arabia considered India a major power. This was reflected in the signing of an Extradition Treaty between the two countries in the same year. DefenceMinister AK Antony’s visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2012 boosted security ties between the two countries, including counter-terrorism. A MoU on Defence Cooperation was signed during the visit of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to India in February 2014. However, a major push on terrorism cooperation came during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2016 with the signing of a MoU on cooperation in intelligence-gathering on money laundering and financing of terrorism. This was significant because of donations emanating from Saudi Arabia to several Islamist radical groups based in India and its neighbourhood.

During this visit, Crown Prince Salman, who is also Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, shared “India’s concern on terrorism”. Decision to start a “comprehensive security dialogue” at the level of National Security Advisors (NSAs) was taken, apart from agreeing to set up a Joint Working Group to boost counter-terrorism efforts. A high-level monitoring mechanism called the “Strategic Partnership Council” led by the Indian premier and the Saudi crown prince is on the cards. India’s main concern is that the Saudi prince did not term Pakistan a source of terror attacks on India.

Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to confront Pakistan on terrorism lies in the nature of Pak-Saudi relations, which is considered “longstanding and intimate”. Saudi Arabia is one of Pakistan’s major aid givers and investors. Most of the madaris based in Pakistan are funded by Saudi donors. On its part, Pakistan has stationed its troops in Saudi Arabia and offered its nuclear umbrella.

Yet, to be fair to Riyadh, it has of late tried to balance relations between India and Pakistan, despite objections from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to deport key terror leaders like Fasih Mohammad and Abu Jundal to India. While Fasih was a point’s man of Indian Mujahideen, Abu Jundal was the only Indian present at the “control room” in Karachi that guided the entire course of 26/11 Mumbai attack. It is important that the cooperation between the two countries goes further in identifying the network of those already radicalised and safeguarding Indians based in the Kingdom from any radicalising attempts by Jihadi groups.

Further, Saudi Arabia should arrest and deport all Indian fugitives hiding in that country and also discourage such elements from entering it. Much attention is also required in blocking funds to Indian terror groups from non-state actors based in Saudi Arabia. The two countries stand to gain not only on economic cooperation, but also on security and defence cooperation. A Joint Committee on Security similar to the one on Defence should be set up to make the security cooperation comprehensive: intelligence sharing, monitoring and surveillance, joint exercises, high-level visits, exchange programmes, and so on. Using the present momentum, India should make best use of its diplomatic energies to prevail on violent non-state actors based in Pakistan, like the LeT, through Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s help is vital for New Delhi to counter Islamic terrorism.