Publications
Léa Marchal, Claire Naiditch, Betül Simsek. Aid as a Migration Policy Tool. Accepted in The World Economy.
Foreign aid is often promoted as a way to curb emigration by improving welfare in countries of origin. However, the effectiveness of such a policy remains debated. To contribute to this debate, we develop a random utility maximisation model yielding a gravity equation, which we estimate using OECD migration and aid data for 2011-2019. We exploit the differences between bilateral aid and multilateral aid, for which donors are masked, to isolate the donor-specific and non-donor-specific effects of aid on migration. We show that aid increases rather than reduces migration. The donor-specific channel plays a dominant role in explaining the positive effect of aid on migration, primarily through an information channel.
Jerg Gutmann, Léa Marchal, Betül Simsek (2025). Women's Rights and the Gender Migration Gap. World Development.
Abstract: This is the first global study of how institutionally entrenched gender discrimination affects the gender migration gap using data on 158 origin and 37 destination countries over the period 1961-2019. We estimate a gravity equation derived from a RUM model of migration that accounts for migrants' gender. Instrumental variable estimates indicate that increasing gender equality in economic or political rights generally deepens the gap, i.e., it reduces female emigration relative to that of men. Studying heterogeneity across income levels, we find that higher-income countries drive this average effect. In contrast, increased gender equality in rights reduces the gender migration gap in lower-income countries by facilitating female emigration.
Media coverage: The Conversation
Anne van Aaken, Betül Simsek (2021). Rewarding in International Law. American Journal of International Law. Lead article.
Abstract: Why states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology and illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the rationale, potential, and limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist and psychological approaches. Both approaches provide ample justifications for making greater use of rewarding in international law.
Symposia centered on our paper: American Journal of International Law, Anne van Aaken & Betül Simsek, "Rewarding in International Law"
Völkerrechtsblog On Rewarding in International Law