My research focuses on topics related to applied political economy, with a particular focus on how religious groups influence political and economic outcomes. I am primarily interested in understanding the causal relationship between religious beliefs and economic outcomes: do religious institutions and doctrines impact economic outcomes or do economic constraints impact the behavior of religious institutions? In other words, do religious dogs wag economic tails or do economic tails wag religious dogs?

Publications:

Piano, E., Bauer, B. and Piano, C. (2025), Competition Within the Church: Market Entry and the Rise of Traditional Catholicism in the United States. Kyklos. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12476 

After the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Catholic Church enacted broad reforms, notably to the liturgies that Catholics must attend every Sunday. There has been a revival of pre-Vatican II practices recently, however, such as the Traditional Latin Mass (TLM). We explore the role played in this resurgence by the entry of a traditionalist Catholic competitor (the Society of Saint Pius X) in the market for religious services. Using data from the continental United States, we show that the presence of SSPX chapels significantly increases the availability of TLMs, particularly on Sundays when attendance is higher. Our results suggest that the effect is strongest at a local level and that it has intensified over time, possibly due to Pope Benedict XVI’s liberalization of TLM celebrations in 2007. 

Working Papers:

Papal Elections (co-authored with Peter Leeson and Ennio Piano): 

During the Investiture Controversy (1045-1122), the Catholic Church adopted a variety of papal election rules, which often imposed strict restrictions on cardinals. These rules would later evolve into the modern conclave system. Why did the Church adopt election rules for the pope and why these rules changed over time? 

This paper develops a theory of third-party adjudication as a means of resolving conflict among competing rulers. When rulers face uncertainty about relative strength, exogenous shocks to the balance of power generate disputes that often result in costly conflict. Although rulers generally prefer to avoid fighting, conflict emerges from a coordination problem akin to a stag hunt: peaceful compliance with shared legal norms is preferred by all parties but risk-dominated by violent conflict. Third-party adjudication resolves this coordination problem by enabling rulers to credibly commit ex ante to a peaceful equilibrium based on the impartial enforcement of existing international law and norms. The effectiveness of adjudication depends on the adjudicator’s ability to enforce these rules impartially rather than discretionarily. Since compliance is voluntary, authority rests on shared beliefs about neutral rule enforcement, supported by institutional constraints that limit the adjudicator’s capacity to accumulate coercive power and impose costs on deviations from impartiality. Ex ante selection mechanisms emerge to screen for adjudicators with low time preference and no intrinsic allegiances, thereby aligning expectations prior to disputes. Our model predicts that adjudication is sustainable only under a fragmented balance of power. When hegemony emerges, the adjudicator becomes the agent of the dominant ruler, rendering impartial rule enforcement incentive incompatible. To test our predictions, we examine the medieval papacy, focusing particularly on the timing and content of papal election reforms. 

Relics: 

The veneration of relics, whether body parts or clothing from departed saints, is a longstanding practice within the Catholic Church. In the early Middle Ages, the discovery and enshrinement of these holy objects in monasteries attracted substantial donations, often including highly productive land. Why did medieval kings grant valuable land to monks, and why were relics instrumental in generating these transfers?

This paper develops a theory of monastic delegation to explain both the rapid expansion of medieval monasteries and the centrality of relics in early medieval Europe (c. 475–1250). I develop a model of income-maximizing warlords, who seek to maximize their territory subject to the constraint of self-enforced property rights. Delegation to military agents is inherently unstable: because agents share land-maximizing preferences, they can transform delegated resources into coercive capacity and challenge their principals. Standard solutions to this agency problem are weak when both principal and agent have comparable military power. I argue delegating land to monk-agents, who are bound by rules prohibiting wealth accumulation, dynastic succession, and violence, limits opportunism and prevents the emergence of rival coercive centers. To make this arrangement credible, monk-agents invest in costly, income-generating reputational goods. These assets are valuable only if the monks adhere to their internal rules and are contestable if they defect. The threat of forfeiting future income disciplines present behavior, creating a stable equilibrium. I evaluate evidence from early medieval monasteries in Gaul to defend these claims. 

Work-In-Progress Papers

Do RINOS of a Feather Flock Together? Marginal Determinants of Congressional Defection: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MqxQZJGze4kVeySvFUoqRoDYzgQBJ7aC/view?usp=sharing

Political parties wield significant influence over legislative outcomes. One such mechanism is the selective distribution of campaign funding to loyal members. I propose that politicians representing less secure electoral districts exhibit a lower propensity to defect from party lines. This trend stems from the calculus of "playing ball" within the party apparatus, where loyalty is rewarded with crucial electoral funding, support, and endorsements. In contrast, politicians with well-established careers and representing safe districts will have more flexible voting behavior. To test this hypothesis, I utilize rollcall data and election returns from 1788 to 1999 to construct a doubly robust difference-in-differences. I find that politicians from unsafe districts are significantly less likely to be reelected if they defect from party lines. Conversely, politicians from safe districts are significantly more likely to be reelected if they defect. 

Synthetic Scofield: Dispensationalism and the Origins of Modern Zionism (with Caleb Petitt):

How and when are the ideas of religious leaders and prophets adopted? In 1909, Cyrus Scofield published the Scofield Reference Bible (SRB), a foundational text in modern dispensationalist thought. Among other commentaries, Scofield suggested that it was sinful to not materially bless Israel and predicted that the modern nation-state would be founded. This interpretation was recently cited by Ted Cruz in an interview with Tucker Carlson - why? Following Magness and Makovi (2023), we create a synthetic Scofield, who published his reference bible in 1946 - at the founding the of Israel. Then using congregational-level data, we measure the impact of the SRB on zionism sentiment.