My research focuses on topics related to applied political economy, with a particular focus on how religious groups influence political and economic outcomes. I am primarily interested in understanding the causal relationship between religious beliefs and economic outcomes: do religious institutions and doctrines impact economic outcomes or do economic constraints impact the behavior of religious institutions? In other words, do religious dogs wag economic tails or do economic tails wag religious dogs?
Publications:
Piano, E., Bauer, B. and Piano, C. (2025), Competition Within the Church: Market Entry and the Rise of Traditional Catholicism in the United States. Kyklos. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12476
After the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Catholic Church enacted broad reforms, notably to the liturgies that Catholics must attend every Sunday. There has been a revival of preVatican II practices recently, however, such as the Traditional Latin Mass (TLM). We explore the role played in this resurgence by the entry of a traditionalist Catholic competitor (the Society of Saint Pius X) in the market for religious services. Using data from the continental United States, we show that the presence of SSPX chapels significantly increases the availability of TLMs, particularly on Sundays when attendance is higher. Our results suggest that the effect is strongest at a local level and that it has intensified over time, possibly due to Pope Benedict XVI’s liberalization of TLM celebrations in 2007.
Working Papers:
Papal Elections (co-authored with Peter Leeson and Ennio Piano): https://drive.google.com/file/d/18d9r-3pBFy7ZZeDP9gwb1rqWXNuwwrVC/view?usp=sharing
During the Investiture Controversy (1045-1122), the Catholic Church adopted a variety of papal election rules, which often imposed strict restrictions on cardinals. These rules would later evolve into the modern conclave system. Why did the Church adopt election rules for the pope and why these rules changed over time? We argue that the College of Cardinals functioned as a supranational body representing various monarchs, whose material interests often clashed and constantly threatened to escalate into costly wars. The institution provided adjudication services by selecting an impartial person, the pope, to mediate the conflicting property rights claims. The election rules were designed to incentivize the selection of popes with impartial qualities, ensuring that the body could not be manipulated for predatory purposes.
Do RINOS of a Feather Flock Together? Marginal Determinants of Congressional Defection: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MqxQZJGze4kVeySvFUoqRoDYzgQBJ7aC/view?usp=sharing
Political parties wield significant influence over legislative outcomes. One such mechanism is the selective distribution of campaign funding to loyal members. I propose that politicians representing less secure electoral districts exhibit a lower propensity to defect from party lines. This trend stems from the calculus of "playing ball" within the party apparatus, where loyalty is rewarded with crucial electoral funding, support, and endorsements. In contrast, politicians with well-established careers and representing safe districts will have more flexible voting behavior. To test this hypothesis, I utilize rollcall data and election returns from 1788 to 1999 to construct a doubly robust difference-in-differences. I find that politicians from unsafe districts are significantly less likely to be reelected if they defect from party lines. Conversely, politicians from safe districts are significantly more likely to be reelected if they defect.
Work-In-Progress Papers
Bargaining for Saints: Asymmetric Information in the Market for Catholic Relics:
The veneration of relics—whether body parts or clothing from departed saints—has long been a practice within the Catholic Church. The Council of Trent (1545) decreed that "the holy bodies of holy martyrs and of others now living with Christ—which bodies were the living members of Christ and the 'temple of the Holy Ghost' (1 Cor. vi, 19), and which are by Him to be raised to eternal life and glorified—are to be venerated by the faithful." As early as the 4th century, there are accounts of fraudulent monks offering to sell relics of questionable origin. Given the severe information asymmetries in this market (e.g., how can I know if this finger belonged to a saint or my neighbor?), how can such a market function? In this paper, I apply a modified version of Akerlof’s Market for Lemons model to explain the relic market from the 4th century until 1545.
Synthetic Scofield: Dispensationalism and the Origins of Modern Zionism (with Caleb Petitt):
How and when are the ideas of religious leaders and prophets adopted? In 1909, Cyrus Scofield published the Scofield Reference Bible (SRB), a foundational text in modern dispensationalist thought. Among other commentaries, Scofield suggested that it was sinful to not materially bless Israel and predicted that the modern nation-state would be founded. This interpretation was recently cited by Ted Cruz in an interview with Tucker Carlson - why? Following Magness and Makovi (2023), we create a synthetic Scofield, who published his reference bible in 1946 - at the founding the of Israel. Then using congregational-level data, we measure the impact of the SRB on zionism sentiment.