Abstract  We examine the impact of framing on individuals’ risk-taking behavior in the context of health risks during the coronavirus outbreak. We elicit risk attitudes from a sample of 3385 individuals across seven European countries using an incentivized decision-making task. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three versions of the task: one involving the risk of a bomb explosion, one involving the risk of contracting an infectious disease, and one involving opening an empty box. We find that the framing of the task significantly affects risk-taking behavior, with participants exhibiting greater risk aversion in the health task than in the bomb or neutral task. This framing effect is observed in the majority of the countries studied.

Abstract  We examine the impact of framing on individuals’ risk-taking behavior in the context of health risks during the coronavirus outbreak. We elicit risk attitudes from a sample of 3385 individuals across seven European countries using an incentivized decision-making task. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three versions of the task: one involving the risk of a bomb explosion, one involving the risk of contracting an infectious disease, and one involving opening an empty box. We find that the framing of the task significantly affects risk-taking behavior, with participants exhibiting greater risk aversion in the health task than in the bomb or neutral task. This framing effect is observed in the majority of the countries studied.

Abstract  We investigate heterogeneity in patterns of preferences for health insurance features using health insurance choice data from a controlled laboratory experiment. Within the experiment, participants make consecutive insurance choices based on choice sets that vary in composition and size. We keep the health risk constant and equal for everyone. In addition, we implement a treatment that entails a feature-based insurance filter, allowing us to validate feature preferences. We also account for individually elicited risk preferences. On aggregate, we find that there is considerable heterogeneity in consumer choice. Participants differ particularly (a) in their willingness to pay to insure themselves against illnesses that differ in terms of their probability of occurrence and the size of the losses to be covered and (b) in their preference to forgo deductibles. However, if we measure the quality of individuals’ decisions based on risk preferences, the heterogeneity among participants disappears. Our results suggest that heterogeneity in health insurance choices is not reflected in decision quality when we assume a rank dependent expected utility model of risk preferences.