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Tacitus’ account of the battle of Mons Graupius is the story of a Roman assault against a native army deployed on a hill somewhere in Scotland. Yet he provides us with very few details. Nevertheless, at Rossie Law we have two of the fundamental elements in relation to the narrative, a Roman army camped at the base of a distinctive hill. Very few other sites in Scotland, if any, provide us with this correlation. Although Tacitus does not mention an amphibious landing, he assumes the involvement of both the army and the navy in the preparation for the battle. He begins his account of the conflict by telling us:
(Agricola) sent forward the fleet to make descents on various places, and to spread a general and vague panic; and then, with his army in light marching order, and strengthened by the best of the British soldiers – men tried through long years of peace -he advanced to Mount Graupius, of which the enemy was already in occupation (29).
It is difficult to determine what weight to place on the reference to ‘a lightly equipped force’, but it has been suggested the latin expedito implies troops moving 'without heavy baggage' or a baggage train.
The inference in this lack of baggage is Agricola was engaged in a short campaign that did not involve a prolonged march or sustained programme of conquest. Again the evidence of the Carpow-Carey-Dunning marching camps clearly fits with just such a description. Although the battle of Mons Graupius is intended by Tacitus to represent the climax of his narrative, there is a possibility his conquest of the north was completed the year before. We are told that in that year the Roman army was inspired to 'go deep into Caledonia and...find the furthest limit to Britain' (27). If the conquest of northern Britain was already complete then Mons Graupius represents an insurrection, rather than a final battle in a long campaign which played well for Tacitus' narrative. This idea of insurrection might also explain why the battle occurs towards the end of the year. Agricola's attentions were not focused on the north and if Tacitus is to be believed he may well have been contemplating the invasion of Ireland. Yet events in the north forced his hand and he had to quickly deploy an army to resolve a rebellion. (All we have seen so far in terms of marching camps would be consistent with such a scenario). Tacitus tells us after the crushing defeat of a previous battle the Britons recognised they had a choice of
vengeance or slavery, and learning at last that a common danger must be repelled by union, had brought into the field, by means of envoys and treaties, the flower of all their tribes (29).
Recent excavations a few miles from Rossie Law might also explain why this area was chosen as the gathering point for this resistance. These excavations have revealed one of the largest neolithic ceremonial centres in the whole of western Europe and suggest its significance persisted well into the Pictish era (Brophy and Noble, 2021). Such a site with its ancestral ties and apparent national influence would provide an ideal rallying point for the Caledonian resistance against Rome.
Mons Graupius
Mons Graupius
Another possible point of contact between Tacitus and Rossie Law is the name Mons Graupius. Tacitus’ ‘Mons Graupius’ is thought to be a Latin transliteration of a native Celtic name. The toponymist William Watson believed it could be related to the Welsh word crwb, which means hump or haunch. This conclusion has since been contested (Breeze 2002). Nevertheless, it has been suggested the name Duncrub which appears at the base of Rossie Law might be related to the designation Mons Graupius.
Pictish scholar Kenneth Jackson (1948) noted ‘the Romans often confused Celtic ‘c’ and ‘g’, e.g. Clanoventa variant Glanoventa’. (Other examples are Clevo for Glevo and Vindogladia for Vindocladia). This Roman tendency to confuse the 'c' and 'g' in the spellings of Celtic names means Tacitus’ Graup- could represent ‘a mishearing or mis-rendering of Craup-‘ (Fraser 2005, 74). The battle might have occurred at a place called Mons Craupius. Yet Jackson goes on to argue ’ Duncrub could be Mons Craupius, philologically’ as Crub can be derived from Craupius. The fort of Crub and the hill of Craup are potentially synonymous. However, others see this argument as highly speculative as they insist 'Tacitus calls the hill Mons Graupius, not Craupius' (Campbell 2015). Nevertheless, there is an intriguing possibility of a coincidence in the name Duncrub which given the evidence of the marching camps and Ptolemy deserves further consideration.
Field of Battle
Field of Battle
The largest part of Tacitus' narrative, aside from the two speeches of Calgacus and Agricola, is concerned with the battle itself. According to Tacitus, Agricola's army was made up of 8,000 auxiliary troops and 3,000 cavalry with an additional 2,000 held in reserve. These troops were probably accompanied by two Roman legions of around 4,000 - 5,000 men each. This puts the Roman army somewhere between 21,000-23,000 men. Comparative measurements imply that a legion with a full complement of auxiliaries and cavalry (c.9,000 – 9,500 men) occupied an area of around 17ha. This means that two legions and their auxiliaries would require a camp of at least 34ha. At Dunning this leaves around 12ha for the additional cavalry units. Although not an exact science, this suggests the size of the Carpow-Carey-Dunning camps at around 46ha is congruent with the relative strengths Tacitus gives of the Roman forces at the battle, assuming he is accurately reflecting these forces. Yet such a large army would require considerable room for manoeuvring and positioning. It is estimated that the Roman line may have stretched for as much as two miles (3.4km). The lack of suitable terrain and room for manoeuvring is the main problem with the camp at Durno at the foot of Bennachie, the other principal contender for the battle of Mons Graupius. Not only is there a river separating the field of battle from the camp (denying the Roman forces any sanctuary if the battle should turn), but the terrain and space available is wholly problematic. (Perhaps the best explanation of the scale of the Dunro camp is an exercise in shock and awe, to impress the proto-Pictish inhabitants of the Bennachie region with whom the Romans may have been negotiating). No such problems exist for the terrain at the base of Rossie Law.
The Battle
The Battle
In front of the temporary marching camp at Dunning there is a large open and level area between it and the area known as Duncurb. This area would provide amble room for the marshalling of troops prior to the battle. There is also a suggestion in Tacitus that the legions were stationed in front of the camp for the duration of the battle, being held in reserve. If this is the case the legions would not have joined the battle lines, but would have provided an intimidating presence in front of the fort that would have protected one of Agricola's flanks. The battle lines of auxiliaries and calvary would have then spread out on a gentle ridge which runs from Duncrub towards Castle Craig allowing for a line at least two miles long. From this ridge the Roman army would have gently descended towards the Caledonian chariots in front of the tribal warriors on the slopes of Craig Rossie. They would have then been subject to a series of charges from these warriors which would have attempt to break their lines using the momentum of the elevation. The Caledonian plan appears to have then been to descend on Agricola's right flank, coming down from the obscured ridges of the far side of Craig Rossie and appearing behind the chaotic and frenzied fighting caused by the charges. However, Agricola's deployment of his reserve calvary put pay to this maneuverer and the Caledonian attack soon feel to pieces.
Aftermath
Aftermath
Tacitus vividly describes the scene after the battle. He tells us:
Night and satiety ended the pursuit. The enemy's slain amounted to ten thousand men; on our side fell three hundred and sixty, among them Aulus Atticus, the commander of a cohort, whom youthful ardour and a spirited horse carried into the enemy’s lines. Night was jubilant with triumph and plunder for the victors: the Britons, scattering amid the mingled lamentations of men and women, began to drag away their wounded, to summon the unhurt, to abandon their homes, and even, in their resentment, to set fire to them with their own hands. They selected hiding-places and as quickly renounced them: they took some counsel together, and then acted separately: sometimes they broke down at the spectacle of their loved ones, more often it excited them; it was credibly reported that some of them laid violent hands upon wives and children, as it were in pity. The morrow revealed more widely the features of the victory: everywhere was dismal silence, lonely hills, houses smoking to heaven.
Tacitus also goes on to tells us:
as summer was now over, (it was impossible) to extend the war, Agricola led back his army into the territory of the Boresti. He received hostages from them, and then ordered the commander of the fleet to sail round Britain. A force for this purpose was given him, which great panic everywhere preceded (38).
Although the description of this march and hostage taking may be ancient hyperbole, the above thesis would locate the Borest in Fife. Such a supposition is not without grounds. Ptolemy’s second century CE map identifies a place called Orrea near Aberneathy. The seventh century CE Ravenna Cosmography speaks of Poreo in the same area. If one substitutes the 'b' sound of Boresti which could be a crude Latinisation of a Celtic pronunciation with a more familiar 'p' sound then one can see a potential association between poresti and poreo, just as the names poreo and orrea might also be related. Therefore, Tacitus' statement could be consistent with Agricola returning to his fleet at Carpow and from there commanding them to sail round Britain.
However, caution is also always required when using a historical text. One cannot disregard the inherent danger in trying to use such a text to interpret and explain archaeological and other data. Yet various elements of the Carpow-Carey-Dunning series of marching camps do resonate with themes found in Tacitus’ description of the battle of Mons Graupius. These marching camps can be interpreted in terms of a Roman Flavian assault focused on a former hill fort in Perthshire. The size of the army and the possibility that these troops may have been deployed by sea are all consistent with Tacitus’ account. There is even a suggestion the name of the hillfort may have been known as the fort of Crup , giving us a possible coincidence with Tactius' hill of Craupius. Beside such detail the topography matches extremely well all that Tacitus details. There is sufficient space in front of the camp at Dunning to comfortably marshal two legions. There is also a wide relatively flat area in front of Craig Rossie that would allow for the orchestrating of the Roman lines as they advanced on the Caledonian positions spreading up towards Rossie Law, and for other opposition forces to join on the flanks from other areas on the hill. Although these details are far from proof of the battle of Mons Graupius, it is never the less consistent with the various elements of the battle which can be gleaned from Tacitus. This situation, together with the evidence of Ptolemy's map and the marching camps mean at the very least this must invite the serious consideration of Dunning as a possible site of this battle.
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