Papers

This study explores how media systems shape the representation of interest groups in public policy debates, with a focus on artificial intelligence (AI) policy in four countries—Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—over the period 2018-2024. We use a novel dataset of all news covering AI in 8 newspapers (2 newspapers per country) over 6 years, with more than 37K registries. By employing several text analysis techniques we assess coverage, prioritization and tone of the news with respect to different types of interest groups that we identify. Our findings show that liberal media systems (UK, US) tend to offer more balanced and diverse representations of interest groups, whereas polarized pluralist systems (Italy, Spain) display stronger interest representation biases, often amplifying groups aligned with dominant ideological currents. Additionally, we observe clear hierarchies in how interest groups are portrayed, alongside marked tonal disparities, with polarized systems exhibiting sharper contrasts in sentiment. Unexpectedly, the analysis reveals subtle intra-system variations in partisan coverage and nuanced tonal shifts that point to complex underlying media dynamics, challenging simplified categorizations of media systems. These findings advance our understanding of the interplay between media systems and interest group politics, underscoring the critical role of inclusive and balanced media representations in fostering informed public deliberation and enhancing democratic governance

Electoral rules in autocracies have attracted increasing academic attention, yet critical gaps in understanding persist. This paper seeks to fill some of these gaps by studying i) when autocrats decide to reform electoral rules, and ii) under what conditions do they implement reforms that introduce partisan bias. To this end, I propose a two-step argument where the Regime's Strength and the presence of Ethnic cleavages explain autocrats’ electoral rule choices. In the first step, I argue that the regime strength will have a negative impact on the likelihood of reforming electoral rules. As autocrats generally benefit from existing rules, if they are in a strong position, they will have few incentives to change them and will prioritise institutional continuity. In the second step, I suggest that autocrats ruling countries with rooted ethnic cleavages will be more likely to implement reforms with strong partisan bias using elements such as malapportionment or gerrymandering. Ethnicity acts as a cognitive shortcut that gives autocrats the information required to introduce these manipulations. To test these arguments, I leverage an original database containing data for 117 countries and 145 reforms from 1979 to 2023. Results confirm the paper's expectations, providing an important contribution to this field. 

Can mass protests for racial justice influence police patrol tactics? Which racial and spatial mechanisms underlie these changes? Previous literature suggests that high-profile events can lead departments to alter their enforcement activities by ‘de-policing’. However, literature is scarce (and conflicting) about the relationship of de-policing with crime, and effects across racial groups are underexplored. In this article, I argue that this apparent de-policing is, in reality, a (positive) reform of police patrol tactics induced by public pressure, which forced law enforcement to reconsider its approach to police-civilians interactions and focus on adopting a conservative stopping strategy, more targeted against higher-risk individuals, and more sensitive regarding the unequal treatment of minorities. To do so, I analyze this issue combining pedestrian stops and crime data from Chicago, asking whether the 2020 BLM protests led the CPD to change its patrol strategy. When protests erupted, crime and policing got progressively decoupled: when criminality rose, stops did not. While crime simply returned to its pre-BLM (and pre-COVID-19) trends and levels, policing changed radically: stops, searches and arrests dropped and became stationary, while hit rates rose sharply. Stops also decreased differently across racial groups: almost exclusively for Black civilians, and mostly in minority districts.

What explains sustained individual engagement in politics, and how do social activists and party members differ in their long-term political trajectories? This article addresses these questions by examining the Chilean Constitutional Convention (2021–2022), a failed constitution-making body elected after the 2019 social outbreak. The research employs a quasi-experimental design comparing the political trajectories of former delegates (treatment group) and near-winner candidates (control group) before and after the Convention (treatment period). The control group was constructed by simulating a scenario in which district magnitudes were doubled; under the same electoral rules used in the original election, the additional seats were assigned to near-winner candidates. A difference-indifferences analysis of an original dataset tracking individual political trajectories reveals that former delegates are more likely to remain politically active than the control group. However, the results diverge by delegate profile: party members often advance within political hierarchies or become advisors, whereas social activists face barriers to sustained engagement. To explore the mechanisms behind these patterns, I analyze qualitative data from 22 in-depth interviews with former delegates and a systematic press review, focusing on three potential drivers: political socialization, civic skills, and political networking. The findings contribute to the study of political trajectories by bridging research on political elites and the biographical consequences of collective action. Moreover, this article demonstrates how participation in high-stakes institutional processes shapes individual trajectories while revealing differentiated pathways for party-affiliated and activist delegates.