Table of Contents
Banking risk is inherent in all banking products, activities, processes and systems, and the effective management of risks has always been a fundamental element of a bank’s risk management Program. Banking risk impact the stakeholders, lenders, employees, government, creditors, customers and even the society at large. The typical risks for banking activities consists of the following: credit risk, meaning the risk of losses that result from the inability of the bank's clients or other stakeholders to meet their financial commitments; market risk, generated by trading activities (interest rates, foreign exchange, loss of value of financial instruments, etc.); operational risk, which refers to the risk of losses or sanctions due to procedural failures, human error or external events; liquidity risk, the risk that the bank cannot meet its cash flow obligations when they are due. As a result, sound risk management is a reflection of the effectiveness of the board and senior management in administering its portfolio of products, activities, processes, and systems. Risk management generally encompasses the process of identifying risks to the bank, measuring exposures to those risks (where possible), ensuring that an effective capital planning and monitoring program is in place, monitoring risk exposures and corresponding capital needs on an on-going basis, taking steps to control or mitigate risk exposures and reporting to senior management and the board on the bank’s risk exposures and capital positions. Bank risk managers across the globe struggle to manage these challenges and overcome their impact. To overcome risks, internal controls are typically embedded in a bank’s day-to-day business and are designed to ensure, to the extent possible, that bank activities are efficient and effective, information is reliable, timely and complete and the bank is compliant with applicable laws and regulation.
The banking sector has always been a backbone of the economy; however, failures in financial markets have time and again proved that no bank sector or economy is shielded from developments across the globe. In earlier times, banks had a very limited definition of risk which primarily focused on the risk of misrepresentation in financial statements and operational risk, and therefore, the efforts were also concentrated on managing these risks. However, increasingly changing scenarios in business, society, geography and politics mean with the growing importance of Technology, Environment & Data, many catastrophic risks such as data leakage and privacy risk have now been staring at the face of the banks. Cyber security risk and reputational risk are the latest entrants to the complex web of risks. Further, with very limited tools and resources available to quantify the amount of damage these risks can cause, they have quickly become the topmost agenda of any banking boardroom discussion.
Vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of a Bank to a risk event in terms of criteria related to the bank’s preparedness, agility, and adaptability. Vulnerability is related to impact and likelihood. The more vulnerable the Bank is to the risk, the higher the impact will be should the event occur. If risk responses including controls are not in place and operating as designed, then the likelihood of an event increases. Assessing vulnerability allows entities to gauge how well they’re managing risks. Hence, Sound internal governance forms the foundation of an effective risk management Framework. The board of directors should take the lead in establishing a strong risk management culture. The board of directors and senior management should establish a culture that is guided by strong risk management and that supports and provides appropriate standards and incentives for professional and responsible behaviour. Banks should develop, implement and maintain a Framework that is fully integrated into the bank’s overall risk management processes. The Framework for risk management chosen by an individual bank will depend on a range of factors, including its nature, size, complexity and risk profile.
The major risks in banks are:
1. Credit Risk: Credit risk or default risk involves inability or unwillingness of a customer or counterparty to meet commitments in relation to lending, trading, hedging, settlement and other financial transactions. Measurement of risk through credit rating/scoring, Quantifying the risk through estimating expected loan losses, and Risk pricing can some of the mitigations.
2. Market Risk: Market risk arises from adverse changes in market variables, such as interest rate, foreign exchange rate, equity price and commodity price. Banks should have risk measurement systems that capture all material sources of market risk and assess the effects on the bank.
3. The Liquidity Risk: Liquidity risk of banks arises from funding of long-term assets by short-term liabilities, thereby making the liabilities subject to rollover or refinancing risk. A bank has adequate liquidity when sufficient funds can be raised, either by increasing liabilities or converting assets, promptly and at a reasonable cost. It encompasses the potential sale of liquid assets and borrowings from money, capital and forex markets.
4. Preventable Risk: The tolerance levels for Preventable risks should be zero in bank. These are usually the known risks with experience. These risks are usually controllable. In certain cases, preventable risks can be eliminated completely using advanced automations.
5. Strategic Risk: Strategy risks are not undesirable risks as preventable risks. These risks are taken by the bank as they are unavoidable to maintain competitiveness or profitability.
6. Regulatory Risk: Banks faces this risk that regulators expectations might not be met. The risks that any regulatory releases are missed by the banks (if the banks are not very dynamic). To manage such risks, the responsibility is given to the second line of defense in a bank.
7. Business Risk: Business risk comes into picture because of reasons such as concentration (meaning an exposure in single groups or investments etc.), fluctuations in interest rates or forex, lack of liquidity, failing new products, failing investments etc. These risks are to be managed by the most experienced senior managers in the bank.
8. Economic and Political Risk: Political risk is commonly faced by all corporations including banks due to wrong political decisions, policies or events, or conditions significantly affecting the profitability of a business. Economic risks are risks related to huge differences in demand and supply and other economic consequences. The bank has to have a strong vision diversified businesses to face such risks.
The Banking sector has always been a backbone of the economy. However, failures in Banks especially too big to fail banks have time and again proved that no Bank is shielded from developments across the globe. With an increase in global trade, there is an ever-increasing dependence on different interconnected Banks for overall sustained growth and hence, newer risks in one economy quickly cascade to the rest of the banking sector economies too.
Risk and its management by banks have always been dynamic and evolving. Long back the two key categories of risk which were perceived important to the management were financial and operational risk. There were controls being devised to ensure there is no financial misstatement, strict reliance on documented procedures and concepts of delegation of authority over key activities to avoid operational failures. Risk management policies were developed more from a point of view of giving shareholders comfort rather than any active risk management. Then came an era of regulatory driven risk management which basically meant corporates had to comply with a plethora of regulations, failing which hefty penalties were levied besides legal charges which could derail a banks growth strategy. This suddenly drew huge attention as no management wanted to cross the line with the regulator.
Compliance departments were set up and manpower deployed to keep a check on any regulatory changes impacting their business and the risks perceived thereof.
Technology adoption is inevitable for any Bank to grow, however, if not adopted in a measured way, technology opens the doors to IT and cyber-security risks. On one hand, concepts such as machine learning, internet of things and artificial intelligence are helping risk managers perform their tasks with efficiency and on the other hand, the growing use of these concepts in the financial sector has opened the doors to frauds.
The world of risks is growing more and more complex and intertwined. Whether it’s a political change in a country, commodity demand supply concerns, or an unpredictable/unfavorable central bank policy, each of these has made the job of risk managers challenging and demanding, and therefore, the response from banks to risk management processes has duly increased.
We now see separate departments being carved out, each responsible for identifying, monitoring and managing of risk, investments being made in people, processes and technology and elevation of the role of the “Chief Risk Officer (CRO)”. Risk mitigating measures have to be commensurate with the Banks size, the country in which it operates its presence around the globe, strength of human resources, past trends of un-favorable circumstances, etc.
The risk management process in banks can be broken down into below phases:
Risk Identification Analysis and Prioritization
Risk Assessment Monitoring and Reporting
Risk Control and Mitigation
Business Resiliency and continuity
Disclosures
Risk Communication
Risk identification is the process of taking stock of vulnerabilities that bank may fall in and raising awareness of these risks inside the bank. It is the starting point for understanding and managing risk activities. However, many legacy risk identification processes have not fully served risk management needs, particularly those related to firm-specific stress testing and identified the firm’s largest vulnerabilities. This, in turn, led to critical gaps in risk management. Hence, comprehensive risk management is done in banks through two techniques called
1) Top Bottom Risk Identification and,
2) Bottom Top Risk Identification
"If a bank is serious about risk management, then it will be serious from the top till bottom.” The top management should be aware of the major risk factors that would hit the business. The top bottom risk identification talks about the awareness of risk among Sr. Managers (CEO, CFO, COO…) in the bank and what steps they are going to take to mitigate such risks and how they are messaging the bottom lines of their respective LOB’s (/Lines of Business). For e.g., the management should be aware if:
There is a concentration risk which is maximum number of exposures which have the potential to produce losses large enough to threaten the ability of the bank to continue operating.
The management should be in a position to assess several Investment risks such as possibility that
a) fixed-rate debt instrument will decline in value as a result of a rise in interest rates.
b) the issuer of a stock or a bond may go bankrupt or be unable to pay the interest or principal in the case of bonds
c) a particular bond issuer will not be able to make expected interest rate payments and/or principal repayment
d) the value of an asset or income will be eroded as inflation shrinks the value of a country's currency so on and so forth.
Management should take measures to check the Interest Rate Risk which is the potential for changes in interest rates to reduce a bank's earnings and lower its net worth.
Management should be cognizant of factors that affect the overall performance of the financial markets.
Bottom top Risk Identification is more towards the Line of Business level identification of risks. As the name suggests, this is reverse reporting system where Lines of Business identify the risk and report the Sr. Managers of the Bank. The below are the verticals that affect the Bottom top risk identification.
• Risk Identification at Process Level
• Risk Identification at Department Level
• Risk Identification at Functional Level
• Risk Identification at Business Unit Level
i) Risk Identification at Process Level:
The type and composition of the process vary among banks depending on the banking organization’s facilities, locations, business units and departments. There are factors, though, that may indicate that a process presents an unacceptable level of risk and merits further evaluation. Those factors include a history of errors, volume, system downtime, complexity of the process, frequency of change in process, availability of required skills, number of interfaces and degree of controls incorporated into a process. Let’s now discuss each of the topics as given below:
a) History of Errors:
The first process of error identification is by studying the historical errors trend. The trend should be built in such a way that it must contain a detail of a) Errors which are critical and non-affordable b) Errors which have regulatory impact c) Errors which are repetitive in nature d) Errors which are silly and caused due to overlook.
b) Volumes:
Volume Analysis is a major challenge in processes such as payments or call centres in a bank as these are customer specific. However, historical volume trends are always available in bank to curtail hike in volumes. Identification becomes imperative or vital when the volumes cannot be handled. The identification of volume process starts with a) Trend analysis b) leveraging business personal and front office knowledge c) Regular follow-ups between and across lines of business in banks d) Study Capacity models to perform skill gap analysis.
c) System Downtime:
System downtime cannot be curbed by any Bank however identification of alternatives while system downtime is always feasible such as
a) Alternate data entry techniques
b) Opportunity to identify light automations to integrate data such as “.xls” to core banking system.
ii) Risk Identification at Department level:
Departmental level risk identification at minimum should contain following:
a) Customer Complaints:
Customer in this scenario does not mean the end user unless such department has direct interaction with the end user (customer). Here the customer means the services which are provided to the next level or to the services giver. Any complaints received from their end should form the basis of risk identification.
b) Employee and Stake holders’ feedback:
All employees, and key stakeholders, may have some insight on risks that they encounter during business as usual that would otherwise are not at all considered. But these feedbacks help to identify departmental level risks.
c) Losses at Departmental level:
Breaches such as confidentiality or data, loss due to downtimes such as system downtimes, loss due to pandemic, loss due to low employee moral which are usually internal to departments should be taken into consideration while calculating the department level risks.
d) Business Continuity:
Business Continuity if available whether is restricted only to Work from home or other plans such as split operations or operations available overseas etc., should be analysed during identification of departmental risk.
iii) Risk Identification at Functional Level:
The identification of risks at functional levels at minimum is as given below:
a) Budget and Head Count Projections:
Risks such as whether the allotted budget at functional level has over shot or underutilized should be measured at a gap of at least every quarter. Head count management such as, early recruitments (due to long notice periods) of incoming employees, whether there are sufficient reward and recognition programs at functional level, frequent Internal job postings, early warning signals from department managers, entertainment budgets for staff and availability of separate attrition budget for staff, all form a part of risk identification.
b) Project Procurement and Execution:
Availability of financing of projects, milestones of projects, sufficient staffing for execution, skill matrix levels of staff executing the project all form a part of functional level risk identification.
c) Migrations:
All the risks of migration of any new project or process such as availability of desks, skillset availability in that location, availability of technology in that location etc., form a part of functional level risk identification.
iv) Risk Identification at Business Unit Level:
Below are the minimum risk identifications at Business Unit Level.
a) Availability of Procedures: Availability of Procedures which are global in nature: Most of the Business units fail as either they do not have procedures or they prefer operating on their own even though the procedures are available or do not have global procedures common to any location where bank or branches or back offices are operating.
b) Communication between First, Second and Third Lines of Businesses:
All the lines of defences should be in sing and should have same understanding of the process at Business Unit Level. Identification of risks starts with any difference of opinion between the three lines of defences.
c) Knowledge Transfer:
Risks such as whether sufficient knowledge transfer is happening between internal departments and external stakeholders forms the basis of risk identification at KT level in a Business Unit.
Risk analysis is the systematic study of uncertainties and risks bank may encounter during its business course. Risk Analysts estimate the impact (financial or otherwise) of adverse outcomes. Let us learn some of the Risk Analysis Tools as given below:
a. Audit Findings:
Audit findings primarily focus on control weaknesses and vulnerabilities. They also provide insight into inherent risk due to internal or external factors.
b. Internal Loss Data Collection:
Internal loss data provides meaningful information for assessing a bank’s exposure to operational risk, reputational risk and strategic risk also, effectiveness of internal controls. Analysis of loss events can provide insight into the causes of large losses and information on whether control failures are isolated or systematic. Banks may also find it useful to capture risk contributors such as credit /market risk related losses in order to obtain a more complete view of risk exposure.
c. External Data Collection:
External data elements consist of gross operational loss amounts, dates, recoveries, and relevant causal information for any loss events occurring at organisations other than the bank. External loss data can be compared with internal loss data or used to explore possible weaknesses in the control environment or consider previously unidentified risk exposures.
d. Risk Assessments:
In a risk assessment, often referred to as a Risk Self-Assessment (RSA), a bank assesses the processes underlying its operations against potential threats and vulnerabilities and considers their potential impact. Most of the banks use a similar approach called Risk Control Self Assessments (RCSA) a method that typically evaluates inherent risk (the risk before controls are considered) and the effectiveness of the control environment and residual risk (the risk exposure after controls are considered). Scorecards build on RCSAs by weighting residual risks to provide a means of translating the RCSA output into metrics that give a relative ranking of the control environment.
e. Business Process Mapping:
Business process mappings identify the key steps in business processes, activities and organisational functions. They also identify the key risk points in the overall business process. Process maps can reveal individual risks, risk interdependencies, and areas of control or risk management weakness. They also can help prioritise subsequent management action.
f. Risk and Performance Indicators:
Risk and performance indicators are risk metrics and/or statistics that provide insight into a bank’s risk exposure. Risk indicators, often referred to as Key Risk Indicators (KRIs), are used to monitor the main drivers of exposure associated with key risks. Performance indicators, often referred to as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), provide insight into the status of operational processes, which may in turn provide insight into operational weaknesses, failures, and potential loss. Risk and performance indicators are often paired with escalation triggers to warn when risk levels approach or exceed thresholds or limits and prompt mitigation plans.
g. Scenario Analysis:
Scenario analysis is a process of obtaining expert opinion of business line and risk managers to identify potential operational risk events and assess their potential outcome. Scenario analysis is an effective tool to consider potential sources of significant risk and the need for additional risk management controls or mitigation solutions. Given the subjectivity of the scenario process, a robust governance framework is essential to ensure the integrity and consistency of the process.
Banks should regularly review the Risk Framework to ensure that the bank has identified and is managing its overall risks arising from internal procedures and policies, external market changes and other environmental factors, as well as those risks associated with new products, activities, processes or systems, including changes in risk profiles and priorities.
A Risk Analysis may identify a number of risks that appear to be of similar ranking or severity. When too many risks are clustered at or about the same level, a method is needed to prioritize risk responses and where to apply resources. Such a method should be tied to the banks mission/business needs and maximize the use of available resources. A rational and common sense prioritization is a key component of a risk management program and becomes necessary when requirements cannot be fully satisfied. To adequately defend risk response decisions made by senior leaders/executives, decision makers should know or be able to obtain the answers to the following questions:
How critical would the immediate impact be to banks operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation) and protection of banks asset?
How critical would the future impact be to banks operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation) and protection of banks asset?
The answers to the above questions provide the basis for a justifiable prioritization that is based on current and future banks’ needs. Mission/business owners (or their designees) and mission/business subject matter experts can be consulted to obtain the most complete and up-to-date information.
Next, answer the following questions to further refine a group of risks with the same or similar rating:
What is the expected loss from a single occurrence of the threat?
What if the risk can materialize more than once, what is the overall expected loss for the time period of concern?
The remainder of the questions can be used to better understand the relationship of a particular risk and/or mitigation to other risks and/or mitigations.
Supervisors of the banks should conduct (directly or indirectly), regular independent evaluations of a bank’s policies, processes and systems to assess risks. As part of the assessment of the banking framework, supervisors must ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms in place which allow them to remain apprised of developments at the bank. In performing this assessment, cooperation and exchange of information with other supervisors, in accordance with established procedures, may be necessary.
Supervisors if required may choose to use internal auditors and external auditors (in case of urgency/need to know top priority) in these assessment processes. Senior management should ensure the identification and assessment of the operational risk inherent in all material products, activities, processes and systems to make sure the inherent risks and incentives are well understood.
Senior management should ensure that there is an approval process for all new products, activities, processes and systems that fully assesses inherent risks. Risk Assessment Procedure of the bank’s operational risk assessment should be incorporated into the overall bank business strategy development processes.
Banks should play an active role in encouraging on-going internal development efforts by monitoring and evaluating a bank’s recent improvements and plans for prospective developments.
Banks should have measuring tools to monitor each exposures to risks (where possible), and ensure that an effective planning and monitoring programme is in place. Banks should take steps to control or mitigate risk exposures and reporting to senior management and the board on the bank’s risk exposures and capital positions.
Banks should ensure that not only internal controls have been embedded in a bank’s day-to-day business but have to monitor whether they are appropriately designed to ensure the extent possible that bank activities are efficient and effective, reliable, timely and complete and the bank is compliant with applicable laws and regulation.
Banks should have written procedures describing its approach to establish and monitor thresholds or limits for inherent and residual risk exposure. The board should monitor management adherence to the risk appetite and tolerance statement and provide for timely detection and remediation of breaches.
Senior management should ensure that bank activities are monitored by staff with the necessary experience, technical capabilities and access to resources. Staff responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the institution’s risk policy should have “Exclusive Authority” and should be “Independent” from the units they oversee.
Banks should capture and monitor contributions to operational, credit and market risk related losses in order to obtain a more complete view of their risk exposures.
The implementation of new products, activities, processes and systems should be monitored in order to identify any material differences to the expected operational risk profile, and to manage any unexpected risks.
On 11th December 2012 Statement of Facts was incorporated by reference as part of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (the “Agreement”) between the United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of West Virginia (collectively, the “Department”) and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC Bank USA”) and HSBC Holdings plc (“HSBC Holdings”). The Department alleges, and HSBC Bank USA admits, that HSBC Bank USA’s conduct violated the BSA. Specifically, HSBC Bank USA violated Title 31, United States Code, Section 5318(h)(1), which makes it a crime to willfully fail to establish and maintain an effective AML program, and Title 31, United States Code, Section 5318(i)(1), which makes it a crime to willfully fail to establish due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts. From 2006 to 2010, HSBC Bank USA violated the BSA and its implementing regulations. Specifically, HSBC Bank USA ignored the money laundering risks associated with doing business with certain Mexican customers and failed to implement a BSA/AML program that was adequate to monitor suspicious transactions from Mexico. At the same time, Grupo Financiero HSBC, S.A. de C.V. (“HSBC Mexico”), one of HSBC Bank USA’s largest Mexican customers, had its own significant AML problems. As a result of these concurrent AML failures, at least $881 million in drug trafficking proceeds, including proceeds of drug trafficking by the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle Cartel in Colombia, were laundered through HSBC Bank USA without being detected. HSBC Group was aware of the significant AML compliance problems at HSBC Mexico, yet did not inform HSBC Bank USA of these problems and their potential impact on HSBC Bank USA’s AML program. There were at least four significant failures in HSBC Bank USA’s AML program that allowed the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds through HSBC Bank USA:
1. Failure to obtain or maintain due diligence or KYC information on HSBC Group Affiliates, including HSBC Mexico.
2. Failure to adequately monitor over $200 trillion in wire transfers between 2006 and 2009 from customers located in countries that HSBC Bank USA classified as “standard” or “medium” risk, including over $670 billion in wire transfers from HSBC Mexico;
3. Failure to adequately monitor billions of dollars in purchases of physical U.S. dollars (“banknotes”) between July 2006 and July 2009 from HSBC Group Affiliates, including over $9.4 billion from HSBC Mexico; and
4. Failure to provide adequate staffing and other resources to maintain an effective AML program.
From at least 2006 to 2010, HSBC Bank USA did not conduct due diligence on HSBC Group Affiliates for which it maintained correspondent accounts, including HSBC Mexico. The decision not to conduct due diligence was guided by a formal policy memorialized in HSBC Bank USA’s AML Procedures Manuals.
From 2006 to 2009, HSBC Bank USA knowingly set the thresholds in CAMP ( Customer Account Monitoring Program) so that wire transfers by customers located in countries categorized as standard or medium risk, including foreign financial institutions with correspondent accounts, would not be subject to automated monitoring unless the customers were otherwise classified as high risk. During this period, HSBC Bank USA processed over 100 million wire transfers totaling over $300 trillion. Over two-thirds of these transactions involved customers in standard or medium risk countries. Therefore, in this four-year period alone, over $200 trillion in wire transfers were not reviewed in CAMP. Despite the Advisory from FinCEN, HSBC failed to properly monitor Banknotes transactions for HSBC Group Affiliates, including HSBC Mexico. Moreover, unlike camp there was no automated system available for reporting suspicious transactions.
Stringent regulations and the need to adjust to market developments require rapid, fact-based decision making, which means banks should develop better risk reporting models and techniques. Banks need to think of replacing paper-based reports with interactive tablet solutions that offer information in real time and enable banks to do quick root-cause analyses.
Risk reporting support to the broad management should have all the facets of financial and non-financial risks. Banks should develop ability to aggregate risk exposures and identify concentrations quickly and accurately at the bank group level, across business lines and between legal entities.
Even though data and risk reporting processes require significant investments of financial and human resources the banks should ensure that proper paper less reporting mechanism exists which will benefit them in long run.
Defining, gathering and processing risk data in banks should be according to suggestions made by regulators and banks must ensure that proper, accurate and reliable information is generated by implementing proper technologies such as machine learning.
Risk reports should include:
Breaches of the bank’s risk appetite and tolerance statement, as well as thresholds or limits
Details of recent significant internal risk events and losses and,
Relevant external events and any potential impact on the bank and operational risk capital.
Risk Control strategy comprises of written policies and procedures for risk identification and measurement, appropriate internal organisation/bank’s risk organizational structure, effective and efficient risk management process covering all risks the bank is exposed to or may potentially be exposed to in its operations, adequate internal controls system, appropriate information system and adequate process of internal capital adequacy assessment. Risk Controls are requirement for all of the below processes:
I. Internal Process:
Are the banks in control of their volumes processed, have the banks sufficient metrics to control errors, is there a workflow management in place which place accountabilities for staff in each step of the process, whether workflows have critical control points identified and these critical controls are tested from time to time for the effectiveness, whether policies framed commensurate with the latest regulatory requirements, is there a training team in place to train and decipher new updates to the team, whether standard operating procedures (SOP’s) are updated from time to time and at minimum once in a year, whether an independent body such as business risk checks for the controls and critical controls in place from time to time and regular audit is conducted for cases processed by the processing team. If the answer to all the questions above is yes then only bank is considered to have strong internal process controls in place. Management should be informed for all the lacuna’s/gaps from time to time and each gap should have an action plan attached to it.
II. Regulatory Requirements:
In today's global marketplace, banks have greatly expanded the scope and complexity of their activities and face an ever changing and increasingly complex regulatory environment. Each compliance failure can result in litigation, financial penalties, regulatory constraints, and reputational damage that can strategically affect the bank. Hence, banks are required to be abreast of all the regulatory changes and update their SOP’s from time to time as per the new regulation. The new regulation should also find a place in the organization wide procedures and policies. Every bank should have a regulatory team who explore regulatory websites, liaise with regulators and collect latest information which may affect their process and make changes in the policies and procedures accordingly.
III. Customer Requirements:
Customers are becoming more tech-savvy from time to time. Hence, banks should invest sufficient new technologies in-order to face increased competition that influence on the banking products and pricing, and technology improvements that affects the distribution channels of selling and the operating cost on the banking activities. However, each new development that bank is making to make customers life better comes with a risk e.g. a new product floated in market should have following controls in place:
a. The banking product is acceptable as per the local and other country regulatory norms.
b. The new banking product is not paving path to new kinds of frauds.
c. The new banking product does not meddle with client confidentiality?
IV. External Factors:
External factors are those factors for a bank which are beyond the control of management of banks such as political environment, economic environment, changes in interest rates, and changes in inflation. Each of the external factors should have proper controls in place. For instance, in the phase of inflation, banks should have alternative investments which counter the inflation, banks should exactly estimate the present governments strategies and update their marketing models as per the changes in the interest rates, so on and so forth.
Beginning in 2012, an international investigation into the London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor, revealed a widespread plot by multiple banks notably Deutsche Bank, Barclays, UBS, Rabobank, and the Royal Bank of Scotland to manipulate these interest rates for profit starting as far back as 2003. Regulators in the United States, the UK, and the European Union have fined banks more than $9 billion for rigging Libor, which underpins over $300 trillion worth of loans worldwide. Since 2015, authorities in both the UK and the United States have brought criminal charges against individual traders and brokers for their role in manipulating rates, though the success of these prosecutions has been mixed. The scandal has sparked calls for deeper reform of the entire Libor rate-setting system, as well as harsher penalties for offending individuals and institutions.
To understand this case study lets understand what a Libor is? Libor is a benchmark interest rate based on the rates at which banks lend unsecured funds to each other on the London interbank market. Published daily, the rate was previously administered by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA). But in the aftermath of the scandal, Britain’s primary financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), shifted supervision of Libor to a new entity, the ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA), an independent UK subsidiary of the private U.S.-based exchange operator Intercontinental Exchange, or ICE.
To calculate the Libor rate, a representative panel of global banks submits an estimate of their borrowing costs to the Thomson Reuters data collection service each morning at 11:00 a.m. The calculation agent throws out the highest and lowest 25 percent of submissions and then averages the remaining rates to determine Libor. Calculated for five different currencies, the U.S. dollar, the euro, the British pound sterling, the Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc, at seven different maturity lengths from overnight to one year, Libor is the most relied upon global benchmark for short-term interest rates. The rate for each currency is set by panels of between eleven and eighteen banks.
Many banks worldwide use Libor as a base rate for setting interest rates on consumer and corporate loans. Indeed, hundreds of trillions of dollars in securities and loans are linked to Libor, including government and corporate debt, as well as auto, student, and home loans, including over half of the United States’ flexible-rate mortgages. When Libor rises, rates and payments on loans often increase; likewise, they fall when Libor goes down. Libor is also used to “provide private-sector economists and central bankers with insights into market expectations of economic performance and interest rate developments”.
Barclays and fifteen other global financial institutions came under investigation by a handful of regulatory authorities including those of the United States, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK for colluding to manipulate the Libor rate beginning in 2003. Barclays reportedly first manipulated Libor during the global economic upswing of 2005–2007 so that its traders could make profits on derivatives pegged to the base rate. During that period, “swaps traders often asked the Barclays employees who submitted the rates to provide figures that would benefit the traders, instead of submitting the rates the bank would actually pay to borrow money. Moreover, certain traders at Barclays coordinated with other banks to alter their rates as well. During this period, Libor was maneuvered both upward and downward based entirely on a trader’s position. Hundreds of trillions of dollars in securities and loans are linked to Libor.
The investigation into the Swiss bank UBS focused on the UK trader Thomas Hayes, who was the first person convicted for rigging Libor. Prosecutors argued that this allowed him to post profits in the hundreds of millions for the bank over his three-year stint, after which he moved to the U.S.-based Citigroup. After Hayes was arrested in December 2012, UK politicians criticized UBS executives for “negligence” after the bank’s leadership denied knowledge of the traders’ schemes due to the complexity of the bank’s operations. At the same time, most of the fraudulent collusion occurred between Hayes and traders at Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), which is majority owned by UK taxpayers, to affect submissions across multiple institutions.
Many experts say that the Libor scandal has eroded public trust in the marketplace. Indeed, securities broker and investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods estimated that the banks being investigated for Libor manipulation could end up paying $35 billion in private legal settlements separate from any fines to regulators. These sums could pose new challenges for financial institutions that are increasingly required to maintain higher reserves to guard against another systemic crisis. It will be another blow to the banks’ ability to hold enough capital to satisfy higher regulatory requirements in the wake of the financial crisis.
A wave of Libor-related prosecutions, led by U.S. and European regulatory bodies, has led to multiple major settlements. All told, global banks have paid over $9 billion in fines. The UK’s Barclays settled a case with U.S. and UK authorities for $435 million in July 2012, and in 2016 agreed to pay an additional $100 million to forty-four U.S. states for its role in manipulating the dollar-denominated Libor rate. In December 2012, Swiss banking giant UBS was slapped with the biggest Libor-related fine up to that point, paying global regulators a combined $1.5 billion in penalties. The complaint, led by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), cited over two thousand instances of wrongdoing committed by dozens of UBS employees.
In early 2013, U.S. and UK authorities fined RBS $612 million for rate rigging. Then, in December 2013, EU regulatory authorities settled their investigation into Barclays, Deutsche Bank, RBS, and Société Générale, fining the latter three banks a combined total of 1.7 billion euros, or over $2 billion. They were all found guilty of colluding to manipulate market rates between 2005 and 2008. In exchange for revealing the cartel to regulators, Barclay’s was not fined by the EU. JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup also became the first U.S. institutions fined, albeit with much smaller penalties. (In 2016, a separate investigation by U.S. authorities fined Citigroup $425 million after finding that senior managers at the bank knew about Libor trader Tom Hayes’ illicit manipulation of the rate.) Also in 2013, Dutch Rabobank settled charges against it for over $1 billion. In April 2015, Germany’s Deutsche Bank agreed to the largest single settlement in the Libor case, paying $2.5 billion to U.S. and European regulators and entering a guilty plea for its London-based branch. It brings the total amount of fines paid by Deutsche Bank to $3.5 billion, more than twice that of any other institution.
Lessons:
1. Base rates and interbank offer rates needs to be under scrutiny by respective regulators of the countries.
2. Banks should play their part effectively towards world banking and avoid tax payers’ inconvenience.
3. Trading desks are required to be monitored effectively by the senior management of the banks.
4. Central bankers should have insights into market expectations of economic performance and interest rate developments.
5. Financial Institutions should maintain higher reserves to guard against systemic crisis.
Risk Mitigation plans are the mandatory requirements for today’s banking. Some of the mitigations for smooth running of banks are:
1. Credit Risk Mitigation:
For credit risk mitigation, the bank must have a strong client base over a long period. It can be used in the behavioural models that estimate the probability of the default of the client, based on their credit history and scoring models according to the application (client demographic information, information about client’s workplace, loan parameters, etc.). Some of the common methodologies that can be used are data mining techniques and scoring models such as logistic and linear regression, decision trees, segmentation using K-means, neural network. The set of scoring models according to the application, credit bureaus and information (obtained from systems to prevent fraud) can determine which customer segments can be approved.
2. Market Risk Mitigation:
Market risk is a specific part of the financial risks caused by the emergence of investment and financial activities. Market risk is caused by the influence of the market factors that affect the value of assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items. There are different methodologies for evaluating the losses of financial instruments. Most common is the method of quantifying the market risk value of trading positions (Value at Risk – VaR). The basis for the VaR evaluation is the price tools dynamics for a specified time period in the past. Classical methods of volatility estimation, such as the parametric method, the Monte Carlo method, historical simulation, are used to assess the potential market risk level.
3. Operational Risk Mitigation:
Operational Risk is constantly growing with the increase in business and banking, as well as with the globalization of banking services. Some of the mitigations for operations risks are
Task segregation
Curtailing complexities in business processes
Reinforcing organizational ethics
The right people for the right job
Monitoring and evaluations at regular intervals
Periodic risk assessment and
Look back and learn
The risks to which a bank is particularly exposed in its operations are Financial risks and Non- financial risks as given below:
4. Liquidity Risk Management:
Banks should use a range of liquidity metrics for the measurement and analysis of their liquidity risk. These metrics should enable the management of a bank to understand its day-to-day liquidity positions and structural liquidity mismatches, as well as its resilience under stressed conditions. In particular, these metrics should perform the functions of:
Cash flow forecasting i.e., projecting the banks future cash flows and identifying potential funding gaps and mismatches under both normal and stressed conditions.
Liquidity risks that may arise from contingent exposures or events.
Assessing the banks’ capability to generate funding
Identifying the banks’ vulnerabilities to foreign currency movements.
Business resiliency is the ability of a business to spring back from a disruption to its operations. Business resilience begins with an understanding that workflows must be preserved in order for organizations to survive unexpected events. An often-overlooked challenge of business resilience planning is the human element, whereby individuals in a chaotic situation must be prepared and educated on how to respond accordingly. Business resilience planning is also referred to as business continuity planning. Effective business continuity measures are critical for any banking entity. Every bank should be committed to protecting its staff and ensuring the continuity of critical businesses and functions in order to protect its revenues and sustain a stable financial market and customer confidence. The development, implementation, testing and maintenance of an effective global Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Program (DRP) are required to sustain these objectives. The business resiliency and continuity plans should cover the following in case of disruption:
Data back-up and recovery
Alternate communications mode between customers & Bank and Bank & employees
Alternate physical location
Alternatives to regulatory compliance reporting
Alternatives methods to provide continuous services to business customers
Minimum requirements for Resiliency Plans:
Banks are exposed to disruptive events, some of which may be severe and result in an inability to fulfil some or all of their business obligations. Incidents that damage or render inaccessible the bank’s facilities, telecommunication or information technology infrastructures, or a pandemic event that affects human resources, can result in significant financial losses to the bank, as well as broader disruptions to the financial system.
To provide resiliency against risk, a bank should establish business continuity plans commensurate with the nature, size and complexity of their operations. Such plans should take into account different types of likely or plausible scenarios to which the bank may be vulnerable.
Continuity management should incorporate business impact analysis, recovery strategies, testing, training and awareness programs, and communication and crisis management programs. A bank should identify critical business operations, key internal and external dependencies, and appropriate resilience levels.
Plausible disruptive scenarios should be assessed for their financial, operational and reputational impact, and the resulting risk assessment should be the foundation for recovery priorities and objectives. Continuity plans should establish contingency strategies, recovery and resumption procedures, and communication plans for informing management, employees, regulatory authorities, customer, suppliers, and where appropriate civil authorities.
A bank should periodically review its continuity plans to ensure contingency strategies remain consistent with current operations, risks and threats, resiliency requirements, and recovery priorities. Training and awareness programs should be implemented to ensure that staff can effectively execute contingency plans.
Plans should be tested periodically to ensure that recovery and resumption objectives and timeframes can be met. Where possible, a bank should participate in disaster recovery and business continuity testing with key service providers. Results of formal testing activity should be reported to management and the board.
What is Business Continuity Planning (BCP)?
Business continuity planning is the process whereby financial institutions ensure the maintenance or recovery of operations, including services to customers, when confronted with adverse events such as natural disasters, technological failures, human error, or terrorism. The objectives of a business continuity plan (BCP) are to minimize financial loss to the institution; continue to serve customers and financial market participants; and mitigate the negative effects disruptions can have on an institution's strategic plans, reputation, operations, liquidity, credit quality, market position, and ability to remain in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Changing business processes (internally to the institution and externally among interdependent financial services companies) and new threat scenarios require financial institutions to maintain updated and viable BCPs.
What is the responsibility of banks board and Sr. Management for BCP?
A Bank's board of directors and senior management are responsible for:
Support budget allocations for the BCP program
Allocating sufficient resources and knowledgeable personnel to develop the BCP
Appoint key personnel to lead the program
Ensure the BCP team is staffed and fully trained to implement the plan
Provide support and resources to implement the BCP process and recovery strategies
Setting policy by determining how the institution will manage and control identified Risks
Review BCP test results
Approving the BCP on an annual basis
Ensuring the BCP is kept up-to-date and employees are trained and aware of their role in its implementation
What is the Objective of banks business continuity planning process?
Business continuity planning is about maintaining, resuming, and recovering the business, not just the recovery of the technology. The planning process should be conducted on an enterprise-wide basis.
A thorough business impact analysis and risk assessment is the foundation of an effective BCP and should consider following points:
The effectiveness of a BCP can only be validated through testing or practical application.
The BCP and test results should be subjected to an independent audit and reviewed by the board of directors.
A BCP should be periodically updated to reflect and respond to changes in the financial institution or its service provider(s).
What is Business Impact Analysis?
Business impact analysis (BIA) is a systematic process to determine and evaluate the potential effects of an interruption to critical business operations as a result of a disaster, accident or emergency. It should include:
Identification of the potential impact of uncontrolled, non-specific events on the bank's business processes and its customers
Consideration of all departments and business functions, not just data processing
Estimation of maximum allowable downtime and acceptable levels of data, operations, and financial losses
Each department should document the mission critical functions performed and should consider the following questions:
What specialized equipment is required and how it is used?
How would the department function if mainframe, network and/or Internet access were not available?
What single points of failure exist and how significant are those risks?
What are the critical outsourced relationships and dependencies?
What is the minimum number of staff and space that would be required at a recovery site?
What special forms or supplies would be needed at a recovery site?
What communication devices would be needed at a recovery site?
What critical operational or security controls require implementation prior to recovery?
Is there any potential impact from common recovery sites serving multiple lines of business or departments?
Have employees received cross training and has the department defined back-up functions/roles employees should perform if key personnel are not available?
Are emotional support and family care needs adequately considered?
What may be the Business Continuity vulnerabilities that may affect a bank?
At any time, unforeseen circumstances beyond a Bank’s control can influence the operational status of a business unit. Hence, departmental managers should regularly monitor incidents that may cause a business disruption and/or have a serious impact to operations. Following are scenarios to identify any vulnerability that may affect operational continuity.
a. Human errors or failures:
Lack of training or policy guidance
Inadequate supervision
Intentional or unintentional disruptive practices
b. Human resource limitations:
Strike
Inaccessibility to site
Pandemic outbreak
c. Supply chain dependencies:
Transport
Internet
IT
Vendor unavailability
d. Technology-related failures:
Cyber-attacks
Data fraud/theft
Critical system or network failures
Communication network failure
e. Infrastructure failures:
Power failure
Improper site maintenance
Water supply crisis
f. Failure of regulatory compliance:
Fines
Mandated shutdowns
Reporting obligations
g. Natural disasters:
Fires
Earthquake
Severe flooding
Hurricane/typhoon
Tornado
Volcanic eruption
Tsunami
Landslides
h. Regional and civil disturbances
Terrorism
Corruption
Religious fanaticism
Protests
i. Economic:
Price fluctuations in critical commodities and/or natural resources
Dependence on central and/or commercial banks
Political influences
Who are Business Continuity Coordinators?
Business Continuity Coordinators are typically responsible for the development and maintenance of business continuity plans. They must work closely with critical business units to understand their processes, identify risks, and provide solutions to help manage and minimize those risks. Their roles are as given below:
Draft work plan necessary to develop the BCP.
Compile BIA for all departments.
Send out periodic emails to all staff providing project updates.
Compile information of critical staff and critical processes in a bank.
From time to time conduct call tree tests to determine availability of staff.
Create emergency response team by choosing at least one member from each department.
Develop recovery strategies and communicate those strategies with department leaders.
What is Recovery Time Objective (RTO)?
The Recovery Time Objective (RTO) is one of the main components in BIA which is the targeted duration of time and a service level within which a business process must be restored after a disaster (or disruption).
What is Recovery Point Objective (RPO)?
The recovery point objective (RPO) is the age of files that must be recovered from backup storage for normal operations to resume if a computer, system, or network goes down as a result of a hardware, program, or communications failure.
What is crisis management?
While definition of crisis management and business continuity are closely related, they are not one and the same. Crisis Management is a strategic management process which begins long before the triggering event and continues after the triggering event has been brought under control. Some of the aspects of crisis management as given below:
Identifying and proactively managing potential crisis issues before they happen
Getting ready for when a crisis does happen
Responding effectively to the event
Restoring business as usual
Responding to the highly damaging risks which often arise after the event has happened
Learning from what happened and incorporating it into future planning
What are the Business Continuity Recovery Solutions?
The goal of business continuity is to limit risk and get a bank running as close to normal as possible after an unexpected interruption. To do this some of the continuity recovery solutions recommended are as given below:
1. Alternate Sites: Alternate Site is a facility to be occupied in the event that access to the primary site is prevented or simply called disaster recovery site
2. Technology Disaster Recovery: Technology disaster recovery strategies mean restore hardware, applications and data in time to meet the needs of the business recovery.
3. Reciprocal Agreements: Agreement between two organizations (or two internal business groups) with similar equipment/environment that allows each one to recover at the others.
4. Displacement Strategy: To displace staff to alternative site or other branch that is operational
5. Remote Access: Remote access is the ability to access a computer or a network remotely through a network connection e.g. Work from home facilities provided by banks through VPN (Virtual Private Network).
A bank’s public disclosures should allow stakeholders to assess its approach to risk management. A bank’s public disclosure of relevant risk management information can lead to transparency and the development of better industry practice through market discipline.
The amount and type of disclosure should be commensurate with the size, risk profile and complexity of a bank’s operations, and evolving industry practice.
A bank should disclose its risk management framework in a manner that will allow stakeholders to determine whether the bank identifies, assesses, monitors and controls/mitigates operational risk effectively.
A bank’s disclosures should be consistent with how senior management and the board of directors assess and manage the operational risk of the bank.
A bank should have a formal disclosure policy approved by the board of directors that addresses the bank’s approach for determining what operational risk disclosures it will make and the internal controls over the disclosure process.
In addition, banks should implement a process for assessing the appropriateness of their disclosures, including the verification and frequency of them.
Risk communication is any purposeful exchange of information about risks between senior managers in the bank and banking staff (up to the junior most staff in the bank).
Risk communication components include explanation of the following:
Levels of risks in banks.
The significance of each of the risks in banks
The decisions, actions or policies aimed at managing or controlling these risks.
Incident management strategies to timely mitigate risks.
A key consideration of risk communication is that the target will rarely be a single audience, but usually a variety of audiences, and as such messages must be tailored to consider the different audiences that are likely to have different interests, values, levels of intelligence, education and understanding.
Banks provide a vast variety of services to both the retail sector as well as to the corporate sector. Due to the vast variety of products and services provided by banks there are a myriad of risks involved in its transactions too hence, it is crucial to minimize these risks in order for the banks to function well. The Major risks for banks include credit risk, operational risk, market risk, liquidity risk and Systemic Risk.
Taking risks is said to be the business of bank management. However, taking balanced risks is the new mantra for banks as avoiding all risks will make them stagnant and on the other hand, a bank that takes excessive risks is likely to run into difficulties. Many banking risks arise from the common cause of mismatching. If banks had perfectly matched assets and liabilities (i.e. identical maturities, interest rate conditions and currencies) it is said to be perfect bank. However, this is not possible, hence, banks take calculated risks.
Credit risk, or the risk that money owed is not repaid, has been prevalent in banking history. It is a principal and perhaps the most important risk type that has been present in finance, commerce and trade transactions from ancient cultures till today. Numerous small and large failures, combined with the corresponding economic and social impact, further accelerated the importance of credit risk management throughout history. Credit risk management is a process that involves the identification of potential risks, the measurement of these risks, the appropriate treatment, and the actual implementation of risk models.
Efficient credit risk management tools have been vital in allowing the phenomenal growth in consumer credit during the last 50years. Without accurate automated decision tools, credit lending would not have allowed banks to expand the loan book with the speed they have. Nowadays, effective credit risk measurement and management is recognized by many economic actors, not in the least because of financial failures of banks themselves. The recent Basel II capital accord articulates new market standards for credit risk management and capital adequacy for banks. The level of capital, a cushion to absorb credit and other losses, is matched to the portfolio risk depending on the risk characteristics of individual transactions, their concentration and correlation. All organizations, including banks, need to optimally allocate capital in relation to the selective investments made. Hence, efficient tools and techniques for risk measurement are a key cornerstone of a good credit risk management.
a. Definition: Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. The goal of credit risk management is to maximise a bank's risk-adjusted rate of return by maintaining credit risk exposure within acceptable parameters. Banks need to manage the credit risk inherent in the entire portfolio as well as the risk in individual credits or transactions. Banks should also consider the relationships between credit risk and other risks. The effective management of credit risk is a critical component of a comprehensive approach to risk management and essential to the long-term success of any banking organisation.
b. Example: For most banks, loans are the largest and most obvious source of credit risk; however, other sources of credit risk exist throughout the activities of a bank, including in the banking book and in the trading book, and both on and off the balance sheet. Banks are increasingly facing credit risk (or counterparty risk) in various financial instruments other than loans, including acceptances, interbank transactions, trade financing, foreign exchange transactions, financial futures, swaps, bonds, equities, options, and in the extension of commitments and guarantees, and the settlement of transactions.
Credit risk is typically calculated by means of three factors: Probability of default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD):
Expected loss=PD*LGD*EAD.
1. Default Risk (PD):
Probability of default (PD) is a financial term describing the likelihood of a default over a particular time horizon. It provides an estimate of the likelihood that a borrower will be unable to meet its debt obligations. PD is used in a variety of credit analyses and risk management frameworks. The default risk is the probability that a default event occurs. There are many definitions of a default event. The most common definition of a default event is a payment delay of at least 3 months. Other definitions may add specific events. The default risk depends on many factors. Counterparts with a weak financial situation, high debt burden, low and unstable incomes have a higher default probability. Apart from quantitative factors, qualitative factors like sector information and management quality also allow discriminating between counterparts with high and low default risk. In markets with increased competition, reducing industry margins, and a macroeconomic downturn, the default rates are expected to be higher than on average. The continuous default probability is typically represented on an internal rating scale with an ordinal ranking of the risk and discrete, increasing default probabilities. There also exist external rating agencies that provide an independent and external assessment of the default risk for investors in debt and other products. In most cases, default risk is defined on a counterpart, not on a product.
2. Loss Risk (LGD):
Loss given default (LGD) is the amount of funds that is lost by a bank or other financial institution when a borrower defaults on a loan. Academics suggest that there are several methods for calculating the loss given default, but the most frequently used method compares actual total losses to the total potential exposure at the time of default. Of course, most banks don't simply calculate the LGD for one loan. Instead, they review their entire portfolio and determine LGD based on cumulative losses and exposure. The loss risk determines the loss as a fraction of the exposure in the case of default. In the Basel II terminology, this parameter is known as the loss given default (LGD). In the case of no loss, the LGD is equal to zero. When one loses the full exposure amount, the LGD is equal to 100%. A negative LGD indicates a profit (e.g., due to penalty fees and interest rate). In some cases, the LGD can be above 100%, e.g., due to litigation costs and almost zero recovery from the defaulted counterpart. In practice, the LGD values are observed to vary quite a lot and depend upon the type of default and its resolution as given below:
Cure: The financial health of the defaulted counterpart is cured shortly after the default event, e.g., because of an additional income or a shareholder intervention. The counterpart continues to fulfil its contractual obligations. There is no significant loss for the bank and the relation with the customer is not impacted.
Restructuring: The defaulted counterpart is able to recover from default after a debt restructuring, e.g., debt renegotiations resulting in a longer maturity and partial debt forgiveness. The bank–customer relation is damaged, but is often maintained. The bank accepts a medium loss to avoid higher losses in a liquidation or bankruptcy procedure.
Liquidation: The customer’s facilities are liquidated, collateral is seized. The relationship with the customer is ended. Liquidation procedures may involve high legal costs and losses are typically high. It is difficult to predict the resolution type before default. On average, liquidation is expected to occur more for the weakest counterparts for which investors and banks are less eager to reinvest. In the cases of high default and loss risk, the bank will try to reduce the loss risk by requiring collateral or guarantees. In the case of a default event, the bank will try to recover the outstanding debt and delayed payments from the collateral, guarantees and the counterpart.
3. Exposure Risk (EAD):
Exposure at default (EAD) is the total value that a bank is exposed to at the time of default. Each underlying exposure that a bank has is given an EAD value and is identified within the bank's internal system. Using the internal ratings board (IRB) approach, financial institutions will often use their own risk management default models to calculate their respective EAD systems. The exposure at the time of default (EAD) may not be known beforehand. For some products like a bond or a straight loan, the amount is a fixed amount. For credit cards or overdraft facilities, the amount varies with the liquidity needs of the borrower. The counterpart can take cash up to a negotiated credit limit. The credit limit bounds the commitment of the bank. Other products have no explicit limit, but each additional drawing needs approval of the bank. Exposure at default - along with loss given default (LGD) and probability of default (PD) - is used to calculate the credit risk capital of financial institutions. The expected loss that will arise at default is often measured over one year. The calculation of EAD is done by multiplying each credit obligation by an appropriate percentage. Each percentage used coincides with the specifics of each respective credit obligation.
Counterparty risk is the probability that one of those involved in a transaction might default on its contractual obligation. Let us see at what stages it could happen:
Pre-Settlement Risk: Pre-settlement risk can exist over long periods, often years, starting from the time a loan/bond/derivative contracted until settlement. Pre-settlement risk is either the counterparty defaults before the payment is due or the financial intermediary responsible for the settlement declares bankruptcy before the transaction is settled. In addition to the counterpart default risk, there is also a risk that the counterpart is prohibited to pay when it’s country of domicile defaults and blocks all foreign payments. This risk is called sovereign transfer risk.
Settlement Risk: Settlement risk is the risk that counterparty does not deliver a security or its value in cash as per agreement when the security was traded after the other counterparty or counterparties have already delivered security or cash value as per the trade agreement. Settlement risk is the possibility your counter party will never pay you. Settlement risk was a problem in the forex market up until the creation of continuously linked settlement (CLS), which is facilitated by CLS Bank International, which eliminates time differences in settlement, providing a safer forex market. Settlement risk is sometimes called "Herstatt risk", named after the well-known failure of the German bank Herstatt.
Herstatt Bank was a privately owned bank in the German city of Cologne. The bank collapsed in June of 1974 because of over-trading on the foreign currency markets. While the bank itself was not large, its failure became synonymous with foreign exchange settlement risk, and its lessons served as the impetus for work over the subsequent three decades to implement real-time settlement systems now used the world over. The Herstatt bank case is so vital to understand the settlement risk as it caused chain reaction across financial centres as banks in different countries delayed settling their payments to each other. Herstatt got into trouble because of its large and risky foreign exchange business. In September 1973, Herstatt became over-indebted as the bank suffered losses four times higher than the size of its own capital. The losses resulted from an unanticipated appreciation of the dollar. For some time, Herstatt had speculated on a depreciation of the dollar. Only late in 1973 did the foreign exchange department change its strategy. The strategy of the bank to speculate on the appreciation of the dollar worked until mid-January 1974, but then the direction of the dollar movement changed again. The mistrust of other banks aggravated Herstatt’s problems. In March 1974, a special audit authorised by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (BAKred) discovered that Herstatt’s open exchange positions amounted to DM (Deutschmarks) 2 billion, eighty times the bank’s limit of DM 25 million. The foreign exchange risk was thus three times as large as the amount of its capital. The special audit prompted the management of the bank to close its open foreign exchange positions. When the severity of the situation became obvious, the failure of the bank could not be avoided. In June 1974, Herstatt’s losses on its foreign exchange operations amounted to DM 470 million. On 26 June 1974, BAKred withdrew Herstatt's licence to conduct banking activities. It became obvious that the bank's assets, amounting to DM 1 billion, were more than offset by its DM 2.2 billion liabilities. As the bank was closed in the middle of the day by regulators, it left the dollars that it owed on its foreign-exchange deals unpaid what we call today as settlement risk. Shortly after this event, Peter Cooke from the Bank of England proposed setting up a committee of central banks and banking supervisory authorities, which became known as the Basel Committee. In 1988, this committee issued a set of guidelines known as the Basel I recommendations. In particular these featured the Cooke ratio, which set financial institutions an 8% target minimum ratio for capital to loans granted.
It focuses on the risk inherent in certain lines of business and loans to certain industries. Commercial real estate construction loans are inherently more risky than consumer loans. Intrinsic risk addresses the susceptibility to historic, predictive, and lending risk factors that characterize an industry or line of business. Historic elements address prior performance and stability of the industry or line of business. Predictive elements focus on characteristics that are subject to change and could positively or negatively affect future performance. Lending elements focus on how the collateral and terms offered in the industry or line of business affect the intrinsic risk.
Concentration risk is the risk posed to a financial institution by any single or group of exposures which have the potential to produce losses large enough to threaten the ability of the institution to continue operating as a going concern. In other words, it's the opposite of a diversified portfolio. For example, an institution may have a concentration of loans in a certain geographic area. If that area experienced an economic downturn an unexpected volume of defaults might occur, which could result in significant losses to or failure of the institution. Or an institution may have a concentration in a certain type of lending, for example construction lending. If construction slows unexpectedly, the impact to the institution could be significant. By their very nature community banks and credit unions have some degree of concentration risk; geographically, within their customer/member base, and by products they specialize in and offer. The smaller the geographic area served, the more limited the customer base is, and the fewer number of products offered all lead to increased concentration risk. Concentrations can also exist in asset categories, such as residential real estate, automobiles, business loans, etc.), within asset categories, such as junior position home equity lines of credit within a residential category, indirect auto loans within an automobile category, or SBA loans within a business loans category, or as loan quality rating categories, such as a concentration of lower quality credits (loans). Lastly, concentrations can exist in seemingly unrelated categories. A classic example is a financial institution that invests in mortgage back securities in its investment portfolio, while at the same time investing in mortgage loans in its loan portfolio.
A diversified portfolio tends to be harder to achieve than simply following the mantra: don't put all your investment eggs in one basket.
It is the risk of loss due to a customer's non re-payment (default) on a consumer credit product such as a mortgage, unsecured personal loan, credit card, overdraft etc. Not all decisions can be made automatically for giving consumer credit as insufficient data, regulatory requirements etc., are hinderances. Hence, in banks, highly trained professionals called underwriters manually review the case and make a decision. To turn an application score into a Yes/No decision, "cut-offs" are generally used. A cut-off is a score (also called application score) at and above which customers have their application accepted and below which applications are declined. Application score is also used as a factor in deciding such things as an overdraft or credit card limit. Banks are generally happier to extend a larger limit to higher scoring customers than to lower scoring customers, because they are more likely to pay borrowings back.
A credit derivative consists of privately held negotiable bilateral contracts that allow users to manage their exposure to credit risk. Credit derivatives are financial assets such as forward contracts, swaps and options for which the price is driven by the credit risk of economic agents, such as private investors or governments. For example, a bank concerned that one of its customers may not be able to repay a loan can protect itself against loss by transferring the credit risk to another party while keeping the loan on its books.
I. Establishing an appropriate credit risk environment:
The board of directors should have responsibility for approving and periodically reviewing the credit risk strategy and significant credit risk policies of the bank. The strategy should reflect the bank’s tolerance for risk and the level of profitability the bank expects to achieve for incurring various credit risks. Senior management should have responsibility for implementing the credit risk strategy approved by the board of directors and for developing policies and procedures for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling credit risk. Such policies and procedures should address credit risk in all of the bank’s activities and at both the individual credit and portfolio levels. Banks should identify and manage credit risk inherent in all products and activities. Banks should ensure that the risks of products and activities new to them are subject to adequate procedures and controls before being introduced or undertaken, and approved in advance by the board of directors or its appropriate committee.
II. Operating under a sound credit granting process:
Banks must operate under sound, well-defined credit-granting criteria. These criteria should include a thorough understanding of the borrower or counterparty, as well as the purpose and structure of the credit, and its source of repayment. Banks should establish overall credit limits at the level of individual borrowers and counterparties, and groups of connected counterparties that aggregate in a comparable and meaningful manner different types of exposures, both in the banking and trading book and on and off the balance sheet. Banks should have a clearly established process in place for approving new credits as well as the extension of existing credits.
All extensions of credit must be made on an arm’s-length basis. In particular, credits to related companies and individuals must be monitored with particular care and other appropriate steps taken to control or mitigate the risks of connected lending.
III. Maintaining an appropriate credit administration, measurement and monitoring process:
Banks should have in place a system for the on-going administration of their various credit risk-bearing portfolios. Banks must have in place a system for monitoring the condition of individual credits, including determining the adequacy of provisions and reserves. Banks should develop and utilise internal risk rating systems in managing credit risk. The rating system should be consistent with the nature, size and complexity of a bank’s activities. Banks must have information systems and analytical techniques that enable management to measure the credit risk inherent in all on- and off-balance sheet activities. The management information system should provide adequate information on the composition of the credit portfolio, including identification of any concentrations of risk. Banks must have in place a system for monitoring the overall composition and quality of the credit portfolio. Banks should take into consideration potential future changes in economic conditions when assessing individual credits and their credit portfolios, and should assess their credit risk exposures under stressful conditions.
IV. Ensuring adequate controls over credit risk:
Banks should establish a system of independent, on-going credit review and the results of such reviews should be communicated directly to the board of directors and senior management. Banks must ensure that the credit-granting function is being properly managed and that credit exposures are within levels consistent with prudential standards and internal limits. Banks should establish and enforce internal controls and other practices to ensure that exceptions to policies, procedures and limits are reported in a timely manner to the appropriate level of management. Banks must have a system in place for managing problem credits and various other workout situations.
V. The role of supervisors:
Supervisors should require that banks have an effective system in place to identify measure, monitor and control credit risk as part of an overall approach to risk management. Supervisors should conduct an independent evaluation of a bank’s strategies, policies, practices and procedures related to the granting of credit and the on-going management of the portfolio. Supervisors should consider setting prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single borrow
Credit Risk Management in today’s deregulated market is a big challenge. Increased market volatility has brought with it the need for smart analysis and specialized applications in managing credit risk. A well-defined policy framework is needed to help the operating staff identify the risk-event, assign a probability to each, quantify the likely loss, assess the acceptability of the exposure, price the risk and monitor them right to the point where they are paid off. The management of banks should strive to embrace the notion of ‘ uncertainty and risk’ in their balance sheet and instils the need for approaching credit administration from a ‘risk-perspective’ across the system by placing well drafted strategies in the hands of the operating staff with due material support for its successful implementation. The principal difficulties with CRM models are obtaining sufficient hard data for estimating the model parameters such as ratings, default probabilities and loss given default and identifying the risk factors that influence the parameter, as well as the correlation between risk factors. Because of these difficulties one should be aware that credit system.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision defines market risk as the risk of losses in on- or off-balance sheet positions that arise from movement in market prices. Market risk is the most prominent for banks present in investment banking. To manage market risk, banks deploy a number of highly sophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques. Chief among these is value-at-risk (VAR) analysis, which over the past 15 years has become established as the industry and regulatory standard in measuring market risk. The imposition of higher capital requirements may make the financial system safer, but from a modelling perspective this is a fairly blunt instrument. The on-going refinements in stress testing are a welcome complement to the main work on VAR, but almost all banks would agree that risk models need more work. Banks are curious about the design choices entailed in simulation and valuation; they are probing for the right balance between sophistication and accuracy, on the one hand, and simplicity, transparency, and speed on the other. Having high-quality market data turns out to be just as critical as the models themselves, but many banks are uncertain about where to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable levels of quality. Valuation models have become increasingly complex. And most banks are now in the process of integrating new stress-testing analytics that can anticipate a broad spectrum of macroeconomic changes. Banks want from the market-risk management group; primarily they want to understand their market-risk profile, including both short-term profit-and-loss (P&L) volatilities and long-term economic risk. They want to know how much risk they have accumulated and how the total compares with the bank’s stated risk appetite. And they want the group to develop and win regulatory approval of a fair treatment of RWAs (Risk Weighted Averages), allowing the bank to get maximum efficiency out of its capital.
Interest rate risk is the probability that variations in the interest rates will have a negative influence on the quality of a given financial instrument or portfolio, as well as on the institution's condition as a whole. Assuming of that risk is a normal aspect of the bank's activity and can be an important source of profit and share value. However, excess interest rate risk can significantly jeopardize the bank's incomes and capital base. Variations in the interest rates influence the bank's incomes and change its net interest revenues and the level of other interest-sensitive earnings and operative costs. Interest rate variations also affect the basic value of the bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance instruments, because the present value of the future cash flows (and in some cases the cash flows themselves) alters when interest rates change. Interest rates variations can also influence the level of credit risk and the ability to retain the attracted resources. That is why the effective interest risk management that keeps risk in reasonable limits is of vital importance for bank stability.
Sources of interest rate risk
A) Re-pricing Risk:
Banks in their capacity as financial brokers face interest rate risk every day. The most common and debated form of interest rate risk originates from the time differences of maturity (for fixed rate), and changes in the interest rates (for floating rate) of the bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance items. Although these discrepancies are fundamental for the bank's activity, they can expose the bank's income and basic economic value to unexpected fluctuations when interest rates vary. For example, a bank which finances a longterm credit with a fixed interest rate with a short-term deposit can experience a decrease in the future revenues and in its basic value if the interest rates rise. This decrease happens because the cash flows are fixed for the credit period while the interests paid on the funding are variable and the interest rates' increase takes place after the short-term deposit matures (respectively, the interest-related costs increase).
B) Yield Curve Risk
The re-pricing discrepancies can also expose the bank to changes of the yield curve tilt and shape. The yield curve risk arises when unexpected changes of the yield curve have an adverse effect on the bank's returns or basic economic value. The yield curve risk results from a change in the percentage ratios of identical instruments with different maturities. For example, the 30-year government bond' profitability can change by 200 basis points, while the profitability of a 3-year government promissory note can change by only 50 basis points for the same time period (one basis point is defined as one hundredth of a percent, i.e. 100 basis points are equal to 1%). Or, the basic economic value of a long position in 10-year government bonds, which is hedged with a short position in 5-year government promissory notes, can abruptly drop if the yield curve steepens even if the position is hedged against parallel changes of the yield curve.
C) Basis Risk:
The basis risk is a result from a weak correlation adjustment of the interest rates which are received and paid on various instruments otherwise having the same re-pricing characteristics. When the interest rates change, that absence of correlation can cause unexpected alterations in the cash flow and the spread between assets, liabilities and off-balance instruments with similar maturities. For example, three-month interest rates are paid on three-month inter-bank deposits, three-month Euro-dollar deposits and three-month treasury bills. However, these three-month rates do not form ideal ratios among each other and their profitability margins can change over time. As a result, three-month treasury bills financed by three-month Euro-dollar deposits represent an improperly balanced or hedged position which can cost the bank a lot when interest rates change.
D) Option Risk:
An additional source of interest rate risk with increasing significance is the risk arising from options imbedded in many bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance portfolios. Formally, these options provide their holder with the right, but not the obligation to buy, sell or change in a certain way the cash flow of a given instrument or financial contract. Instruments with imbedded options include various types of bonds and promissory notes with call or put option, credits which provide the borrowers with the right to premature repayment, as well as various types of undated deposit instruments which entitle the depositors to withdrawing their money at any time, often without any penalties. This type of risk can have an adverse impact on the profit or economic value of the bank's own capital via a decrease in the assets' profitability, increase in the attracted funds' price or decrease in the expected cash flow's net present value. For example, if a client repays their credit earlier during a period of decreasing interest rates, the bank will not receive the initially expected cash flow. And thus it will have to re-invest the sum at a lower interest rate.
E. Reinvested Risk:
Reinvestment risk is the risk arising out of uncertainty with regard to interest rate at which the future cash flows could be reinvested. Any mismatches in cash flows i.e., inflow and outflow would expose the banks to variation in Net Interest Income. This is because market interest received on loan and to be paid on deposits move in different directions.
F. Net Interest Position Risk:
Net Interest Position Risk arises when the market interest rates adjust downwards and where banks have more earning assets than paying liabilities. Such banks will experience a reduction in NII as the market interest rate declines and the NII increases when interest rate rises. Its impact is on the earnings of the bank or its impact is on the economic value of the banks’ assets, liabilities and OBS positions.
Equity risk is the potential losses involved in holding equity in a particular investment due to fluctuations in stock price. A lot of people tend to believe that mitigating equity risk is as simple as holding a few dozen stocks or a handful of mutual funds. Although these practices are conceptually true, they are wholly incomplete methods of diversification and only touch the surface of what can be done. Mitigating equity risk to the fullest extent possible involves holding multitudes of stocks and asset classes, and doing so in meaningful allocations across the spectrum of equity opportunities. Recently, some experts have been coming out with a more extreme call for diversification, urging the average investor to own at least 30 or more stocks.
Another way to avoid equity risk is in more specific diversification of the types of equities that the investor owns. For example, holding stock in various “sectors” like energy, technology, retail, or agriculture, helps with lowering equity risk. All of these methods help investors to balance out their stock purchases and lower the risk that their total values will experience sudden price drops. Investors can also use various types of modern funds to help with equity risks. Mutual funds and exchange traded funds are some specific kinds of financial products that can help traders get into more stocks quickly and easily. Many of these funds are a more appealing substitute for all of the tedious single purchases that would go into broader diversification of a stock portfolio.
Foreign-exchange risk is the risk that an asset or investment denominated in a foreign currency will lose value as a result of unfavourable exchange rate fluctuations between the investment's foreign currency and the investment holder's domestic currency. Foreign-exchange risk is an additional dimension of risk which offshore investors must accept. Though foreign-exchange risk specifically addresses undesirable movements that might result in losses, it is possible to benefit from favourable fluctuations with the potential for additional value above and beyond that of an already-stable investment.
Types of foreign exchange risk:
1. Transaction Risk
This is the risk of an exchange rate changing between the transaction date and the subsequent settlement date, i.e. it is the gain or loss arising on conversion. This type of risk is primarily associated with imports and exports. If a company exports goods on credit then it has a figure for debtors in its accounts. The amount it will finally receive depends on the foreign exchange movement from the transaction date to the settlement date. As transaction risk has a potential impact on the cash flows of a company, most companies choose to hedge against such exposure.
2. Economic Risk
Transaction exposure focuses on relatively short-term cash flows effects; economic exposure encompasses these plus the longer-term effects of changes in exchange rates on the market value of a company. Basically this means a change in the present value of the future after tax cash flows due to changes in exchange rates. There are two ways in which a company is exposed to economic risk.
Directly: If your firm's home currency strengthens then foreign competitors are able to gain sales at your expense because your products have become more expensive (or you have reduced your margins) in the eyes of customers both abroad and at home.
Indirectly: Even if your home currency does not move vis-a -vis your customer's currency you may lose competitive position. For example suppose a South African firm is selling into Hong Kong and its main competitor is a New Zealand firm. If the New Zealand dollar weakens against the Hong Kong dollar the South African firm has lost some competitive position.
Economic risk is difficult to quantify but a favoured strategy to manage it is to diversify internationally, in terms of sales, location of production facilities, raw materials and financing. Such diversification is likely to significantly reduce the impact of economic exposure relative to a purely domestic company, and provide much greater flexibility to react to real exchange rate changes.
3. Translation Risk
The financial statements of overseas subsidiaries are usually translated into the home currency in order that they can be consolidated into the group's financial statements. Note that this is purely a paper-based exercise - it is the translation not the conversion of real money from one currency to another. The reported performance of an overseas subsidiary in home-based currency terms can be severely distorted if there has been a significant foreign exchange movement.
Commodity risk is the risk that a business’s financial performance or position will be adversely affected by fluctuations in the prices of commodities. Producers of commodities, for example in the minerals (gold, coal etc.), agricultural (wheat, cotton, sugar etc.) and energy sectors (oil, gas and electricity), are primarily exposed to price falls, which mean they will receive less revenue for the commodities they produce. Consumers of commodities, such as airlines, transport companies, clothing manufacturers and food manufacturers, are primarily exposed to rising prices, which will increase the cost of the commodities they purchase. Commodities generally fall into three categories:
Soft commodities include agriculture products such as wheat, coffee, sugar and fruit.
Metals include gold, silver, copper and aluminium.
Energy commodities include gas, oil and coal.
A business should consider managing commodity risks where fluctuations in commodity pricing and/or supply may impact on the business’s profitability. In an organisation in which the core operations are anything other than financial services, such risk should be appropriately managed so that the focus of the organisation is on providing the core goods or services without exposing the business to unnecessary risks.
Types of commodity risk:
There are four types of commodity risk to which an organisation may be exposed:
Price Risk: arises from an adverse movement in the price of a commodity as determined by forces outside the control of the organisation
Quantity Risk: arises from changes in the availability of commodities
Cost (input) Risk: arises when adverse movements in the price of commodities impact business costs
Political Risk: arises from compliance or regulation impacts on price or supply of commodities.
Generally, there are three groups that will be exposed to commodity risk:
Producers: Can include farmers, other agricultural producers and miners. They can be exposed to all of the types of risks noted above.
Buyers: Can include cooperatives, commercial traders and manufacturers who consume commodities in their production processes. Such
Time Lag: Organisations can be exposed to commodity risk through the time lag between order and receipt of goods.
Exporters: Face risk from the time lag between order and receipt from sales, as well as political risk where compliance, regulation or availability can adversely impact sales price.
Commodity risk is the risk that a business’s financial performance or position will be adversely affected by fluctuations in the prices of commodities. Producers of commodities, for example in the minerals (gold, coal etc.), agricultural (wheat, cotton, sugar etc.) and energy sectors (oil, gas and electricity), are primarily exposed to price falls, which mean they will receive less revenue for the commodities they produce. Consumers of commodities, such as airlines, transport companies, clothing manufacturers and food manufacturers, are primarily exposed to rising prices, which will increase the cost of the commodities they purchase. Commodities generally fall into three categories:
Soft commodities include agriculture products such as wheat, coffee, sugar and fruit.
Metals include gold, silver, copper and aluminium.
Energy commodities include gas, oil and coal.
A business should consider managing commodity risks where fluctuations in commodity pricing and/or supply may impact on the business’s profitability. In an organisation in which the core operations are anything other than financial services, such risk should be appropriately managed so that the focus of the organisation is on providing the core goods or services without exposing the business to unnecessary risks.
Types of commodity risk:
There are four types of commodity risk to which an organisation may be exposed:
Price Risk: arises from an adverse movement in the price of a commodity as determined by forces outside the control of the organisation
Quantity Risk: arises from changes in the availability of commodities
Cost (input) Risk: arises when adverse movements in the price of commodities impact business costs
Political Risk: arises from compliance or regulation impacts on price or supply of commodities.
Generally, there are three groups that will be exposed to commodity risk:
Producers: Can include farmers, other agricultural producers and miners. They can be exposed to all of the types of risks noted above.
Buyers: Can include cooperatives, commercial traders and manufacturers who consume commodities in their production processes. Such
Time Lag: Organisations can be exposed to commodity risk through the time lag between order and receipt of goods.
Exporters: Face risk from the time lag between order and receipt from sales, as well as political risk where compliance, regulation or availability can adversely impact sales price.
Derivative Definition:
Derivatives have become important to the overall risk profile and profitability of banks throughout the world. Broadly defined, a derivatives instrument is a financial contract whose value depends on the values of one or more underlying assets or indexes. Derivatives transactions include financial contracts, including forwards, futures, swaps and options. While some derivatives instruments may have very complex structures, all of them can be divided into the basic building blocks of options, forward contracts or some combination thereof. The use of these basic building blocks in structuring derivatives instruments allows the transfer of various financial risks to parties who are more willing or better suited, to take or manage them.
Exchange Traded Derivative vs. OTC Derivative:
Derivatives contracts are entered into throughout the world on organized exchanges and through over-the-counter (OTC) arrangements. Exchange-traded contracts are typically standardized as to maturity, contract size and delivery terms. OTC contracts are custom-tailored to an institution’s needs and often specify commodities, instruments and/or maturities that are not offered on any exchange.
Derivate a risk management tool or a revenue generator:
Derivatives are used by banks both as risk management tools and as a source of revenue. From a risk management perspective, they allow financial institutions and other participants to identify, isolate and manage separately the market risks in financial instruments and commodities. When used prudently, derivatives can offer managers efficient and effective methods for reducing certain risks through hedging. Derivatives may also be used to reduce financing costs and to increase the yield of certain assets. For a growing number of banks, derivatives activities are becoming a direct source of revenue through "market-making" functions, position taking and risk arbitrage:
Market-Making vs. Position-Taking
“Market-Making” functions involve entering into derivatives transactions with customers and with other market-makers while maintaining a generally balanced portfolio with the expectation of earning fees generated by a bid/offer spread; “Position-Taking”, on the other hand, represents efforts to profit by accepting the risk that stems from taking outright positions in anticipation of price movements.
Participants of Derivatives Markets:
Participants of derivatives markets are a broad range of financial institutions such as banks, securities firms and insurance companies; institutional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds and specialized investment partnerships; and corporations, local and state governments, government agencies and international agencies.
Role of Intermediaries:
Intermediaries sometimes referred to as "dealers", cater to the needs of end-users by "making markets" in OTC derivatives instruments. In doing so, they expect to generate income from transaction fees, bid/offer spreads and their own trading positions. Important intermediaries, or derivative dealers, include major banks and securities firms around the world. As intermediaries, banks have traditionally offered foreign exchange and interest rate risk management products to their customers and generally view derivatives products as a financial risk management service.
Basic Risks Associated with Derivatives:
The basic risks associated with derivatives transactions are not new to banking organizations. In general, these risks are credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operations risk and legal risk. Because they facilitate the specific identification and management of these risks, derivatives have the potential to enhance the safety and soundness of banks and to produce a more efficient allocation of financial risks. However, since derivatives also repackage these basic risks in combinations that can be quite complex, they can also threaten the safety and soundness of institutions if they are not clearly understood and properly managed.
Sound Risk Management to use Derivatives:
Appropriate oversight by boards of directors and senior management;
An adequate risk management process that integrates prudent risk limits, sound measurement procedures and information systems:
Continuous risk monitoring and frequent management reporting;
Comprehensive internal controls and audit procedures.
Standard Practices for Sound Risk Management in banks:
As is standard practice for most banking activities, an institution should maintain written policies and procedures that clearly outline its risk management guidance for derivatives activities.
At a minimum these policies should identify the risk tolerances of the board of directors and should clearly delineate lines of authority and responsibility for managing the risk of these activities.
The board of directors should approve all significant policies relating to the management of risks throughout the institution. These policies, which should include those related to derivatives activities, should be consistent with the organization’s broader business strategies, capital strength, management expertise and overall willingness to take risk.
Before engaging in derivatives activities, management should ensure that all appropriate approvals are obtained and that adequate operational procedures and risk control systems are in place.
In Banks Proposals to undertake derivatives activities should include:
Description of the relevant financial products, markets and business strategies
The resources required to establish sound and effective risk management systems and to attract and retain professionals with specific expertise in derivatives transactions
An analysis of the reasonableness of the proposed activities in relation to the bank’s overall financial condition and capital levels
An analysis of the risks that may arise from the activities
The procedures the bank will use to measure monitor and control risks
The relevant accounting guidelines
The relevant tax treatment; and
An analysis of any legal restrictions and whether the activities are permissible.
Liquidity risk is a financial risk that for a certain period of time at a given financial asset, security or commodity cannot be traded quickly enough in the market without impacting the market price. Market liquidity is a market's ability to purchase or sell an asset without causing drastic change in the asset's price. Equivalently, an asset's market liquidity (or simply "an asset's liquidity") describes the asset's ability to sell quickly without having to reduce its price to a significant degree. Liquidity is about how big the trade-off is between the speed of the sale and the price it can be sold for. In a liquid market, the trade-off is mild: selling quickly will not reduce the price much. In a relatively illiquid market, selling it quickly will require cutting its price by some amount
Market liquidity can be categorized into two types. The first is the liquidity in the inter-bank market, where liquidity is being traded among banks, while the second is the liquidity in the asset market, where assets are being traded among financial agents. These two types of liquidity are the main sources for any financial institution/bank to acquire funding liquidity from the markets and thereby explain the interactions between various liquidity types.
A. Funding Liquidity Risk:
Funding Liquidity risk is driven by the possibility that over a specific period of time, the bank is unable to settle obligations when due. The nature of bank is to borrow short that is, taking on customer deposits and lending long, that is, issuing loans/mortgages. This exposes the bank to funding liquidity risk. In simple terms, it is the risk that the bank cannot meet the demand of customers wishing to withdraw their deposits.
For banks to pay their liabilities as they fall due, they need to be able to meet expected levels of withdrawals, plus have additional liquidity resources to meet unexpected withdrawals. Liquidity resources include:
Deposits at the central bank
Short dated liquid assets such as treasury bills that provide liquidity on maturity
Longer-dated liquid assets such as gilts that can be pledged as collateral in sale and repurchase (repo) transactions
Contingency funding lines (interbank lending)
Assets available for sale. E.g., books of mortgages that can be securitised.
The first four do not require an asset to be sold, and hence are not subject to market liquidity risk. Banks must find a balance between holding enough liquid assets to meet unexpected funding needs versus the higher yield available from less liquid assets. The liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR), published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, specifies the type of assets that the bank can classify as high quality liquid assets (HQLA) and sets the minimum amount of liquid assets that must be held enough to cover net cash outflows for 30 days under stressed market conditions.
B. Contingency Liquidity Risk:
The risk that future events may require a significantly larger amount of cash than the bank’s projections allow. This can arise due to unusual deviations of timing of cash flows. Having a “Contingency Financial Plan” in place will help banks to avoid this risk.
C. Market Liquidity Risk:
Market liquidity risk is the loss incurred when a Bank wants to execute a trade or to liquidate a position immediately while not hitting the best price. In simple terms, an asset becomes illiquid when Bank cannot find a buyer to buy that asset and consequently the market liquidity risk increases.
Margining risk is a financial risk that future cash flows are smaller than expected due to the payment of margins. Margin payments ensure that each investor is serious about buying or selling shares.
Margins in the cash market segment comprise of the following three types:
Value at Risk (VaR) Margin: VaR is a technique used to estimate the probability of loss of value of an asset or group of assets (for example a share or a portfolio of a few shares), based on the statistical analysis of historical price trends and volatilities.
Extreme Loss Margin: The extreme loss margin aims at covering the losses that could occur outside the coverage of VaR margins.
Mark to Market Margin (MTM): MTM is calculated at the end of the day on all open positions by comparing transaction price with the closing price of the share for the day.
Risk when the fair value or future cash flows of capital and debt financial instruments (stocks, bonds, indexes and derivatives connected with them) fluctuate as a result from market prices' changes, no matter whether these changes are caused by factors typical for individual instruments or for their issuer (counterparty), or by factors related to all the instruments traded on the market. The risk connected with the commodity exchange prices is the probability of unfavorable changes in the value of commodities traded by the bank. Price risks associated with commodities differ significantly from interest rate and currency risks, and require careful monitoring and management as most of the commodities are traded on markets where the supply concentration can increase the price volatility. What is more, changes in the market liquidity are often accompanied by significant price volatility. That is why the commodities' prices are in broad lines more unstable than those of most financial assets commonly traded. The risk assessment associated with commodities prices should be performed market by market and it should include not only analysis of historical price movements, but also assessment of the supply and demand structure on the market, so that the probability for unusually large price movements can be assessed.
Primarily, banks want to understand their market-risk profile, including both short-term profit-and-loss (P&L) volatilities and long-term economic risk. They want to know how much risk they have accumulated and how the total compares with the bank’s stated risk appetite. And they want to develop and win regulatory approval of a fair treatment of RWAs (Risk-weighted asset is a bank's assets or off-balance-sheet exposures, weighted according to risk. This sort of asset calculation is used in determining the capital requirement or Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for a financial institution.) allowing the bank to get maximum efficiency out of its capital. These needs are supported by risk models. But while the requirements for market-risk modelling are quite consistent among banks, actual practices vary substantially.
To manage market risk, banks deploy a number of highly sophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques. Chief among these is value-at-risk (VAR) analysis, which over the past 15 years has become established as the industry and regulatory standard in measuring market risk. The demands placed on VAR and other similar techniques have grown tremendously, driven by new products such as correlation trading, multi-asset options, power-reverse dual currency swaps, and other such innovations.
The number of risk factors required to price the trading book at a global institution has now grown to several thousand, and sometimes as many as 10,000. Valuation models have become increasingly complex. And most banks are now in the process of integrating new stress-testing analytics that can anticipate a broad spectrum of macroeconomic changes. Despite these accomplishments, VAR and other risk models have continually come up short.
The 1998 crisis at Long Term Capital Management demonstrated the limitations of risk modeling. In the violent market upheavals of 2007–08, many banks reported more than 30 days when losses exceeded VAR, a span in which 3 to 5 such days would be the norm. In 2011, just before the European sovereign crisis got under way, many banks’ risk models treated eurozone government bonds as virtually risk free. Indeed, the perceived limitations of VAR are bringing the industry under severe scrutiny.
Simple meaning of exposure is risk of suffering a loss in a transaction, or uncertainty by concentrating in single business type or group. In short, the three factors deciding exposure to bank are as given below:
1) Total amount of unsecured loans.
2) Total amount of loans advanced to a single borrower, group, industry, or country.
3) Probability of loss from devaluation, revaluation, or foreign exchange fluctuations.
Definition: An unsecured loan is issued to the borrower's based on creditworthiness rather than by any type of security (such as property). Hence, borrowers must generally have high credit ratings to be approved for certain unsecured loans.
Types of Unsecured Loans given by banks:
Credit Card
Personal Loans
Small Business Loans
Payday Loan
Line of Credit
Cash Advance
Signature Loans
Student Loans
Peer to Peer Loans
Term Loans
1. Credit Cards:
A Credit Card is an unsecured loan since money is borrowed from the credit card company to make a purchase with the intention of paying them back at a later date. As the technology used by criminals gets cheaper, so does the cost of hacking to credit card accounts. Moreover, “Card-Not-Present” the fraudulent transactions that occur when the card isn’t physically present is more vulnerable to Banks exposure as credit card is unsecured loan. If any customer’s credit card is compromised, the potential harm to the customer is relatively small as they can contact the issuer bank to report any false charges and they have to do some basic paperwork that’s all. But no money leaves from their hands. Since a credit card charge is essentially a loan from the bank, it’s not customers own money, hence, the exposure is on bank that has issued that card. Also, the bank has full accountability of investigating the report which is time bound and lead to manpower loss.
Risks: Credit Cards have the largest number of defaults compared with other revolving retail credit products. Hence, Banks should ensure that their exposure to credit cards should account for only five per cent of the banks total consumer loan portfolios. The small relative exposure to credit card debt should always dull the impact of the expected fallout such as economy failing or severe job cuts or especially in times of recession.
2. Personal Loans:
Personal loans help the households meet any shortfall they experience in buying a house or a car, in children's higher education, or even in cases of medical contingencies, among other things. It is provided on the basis of key criteria such as income level, credit exposure, employment history, repayment capacity, etc.
The credit standing of an applicant for a personal loan is investigated intensively because it indicates, within reasonable limits, the likelihood of repayment. It should not be assumed, however, that a bank officer can foretell with certainty how faithfully a borrower will meet his obligations few applicants have economic prospects so bad that there is not some small chance of repayment, and few are so well situated that there is not some possibility of delinquency or even default. The selection of borrowers must therefore rest on probabilities. On the basis of experience, and to some extent intuition, the loan officer decides which applicants are more likely to default than others.
Risks: The risk with personal loans is involvement of collection costs. Hence, Banks should ensure that their exposure to personal loans should account for lower than eight per cent of the banks total consumer loan portfolios.
3. Small Business Loans:
An unsecured small/SME (Small and Medium Scale Enterprises) business loan is a loan that requires no collateral but is rather based solely upon the creditworthiness of the business borrower. Banks usually apply a general lien (a right to keep possession of property belonging to another person until a debt owed by that person is discharged) on business assets until the loan balance is paid in full.
Risks: Banks usually face the below risks with this type of loan:
Small businesses are inherently riskier than their larger counterparts, which makes banks think twice before extending them credit.
Underwriting (Evaluation of Risk) costs for a large loan is same as a small loan
4. Payday Loan:
A pay day loan (also known as payroll loan/salary loan) is given to wagers who are employed with some employers. A relatively small amount of money lent at a high rate of interest on the agreement that it will be repaid when the borrower receives their next pay-check/salary.
Risks: Although the concept is not new however, the business is in nascent stage with banks.
5. Line of Credit:
A line of credit is an agreement between a bank and a customer that establishes maximum amount of a loan that the customer can borrow. The borrower can access funds from the line of credit at any time as long as the customer does not exceed the maximum amount set in the agreement and makes timely minimum payments. As this arrangement allows borrowers to spend the money, repay it and spend it again in a virtually never-ending revolving cycle, hence, it is also called as revolving line of credit.
Banks have only recently begun to market these products to any significant extent. This may be a by-product of an economy that has reduced loan demand and new regulations that have restricted fee-based sources of income.
Risks: Lines of credit tend to be lower-risk revenue sources relative to credit card loans, but they do complicate a bank's earning somewhat, as the outstanding balances can't really be controlled once the line of credit has been approved.
6. Cash Advances:
A cash advance allows customer to use credit card to get a short-term cash loan at a bank or ATM. Theft of credit cards are used for cash advances hence, this is a risky product to a bank. Teller based on confirmations from issuer bank should not give cash advances to its customers. Also, default risk plays a major role for banks issuing cash advances.
Risks: The most risky part of this product is that it can be availed through ATM services if the credit card is a chip based card. Hence, a new avenue of money for hackers and thief’s relying on cards.
7. Signature Loans:
A signature loan is a fixed rate, fixed term personal loan. Banks will require that applicants satisfy their requirements for creditworthiness.
Risks: It is not of much of a riskier product offered by banks.
8. Student Loans:
A student loan is provided to help students pay for tuition fees, books and living expenses. But it is noteworthy that of late, repayment and recovery of student loans has become a cause of serious concern to the banks.
Risks: It is believed that due to slowed down economy and fewer job prospects, students have been defaulting on their loans. Banks have been facing a problem of rising Non-Performing Assets (NPAs), and are finding it difficult to recover dues.
9. Peer to Peer Loans:
Internet companies are challenging one of a bank’s most traditional roles lending. The peer-to-peer lending uses digital technology to match lenders to borrowers. P2P websites robotically match lenders to borrowers. Banks are also pairing up with these lending sites in order to increase their reach. For e.g., In 2014 USA-based Union Bank and Lending Club partnered on personal loans, followed shortly by Europe-based Bank Santander teaming with Funding Circle on small-business credits. The Royal Bank of Scotland also paired up with Funding Circle in 2015.
Risks: P2P Lenders are un-regulated and are riskier.
10. Term Loans:
It’s an asset-based loan payable in a fixed number of equal instalments over the term of the loan. The loan usually last between one and ten years, but can last as long as 30 years in some cases. Term loans are generally provided as working capital for acquiring income producing assets (machinery, equipment, inventory…) that generate the cash flows for repayment of the loan. The loan carries a fixed or variable interest rate, monthly or quarterly repayment schedule, and set maturity date.
Risk: Default risk is the most possible risk for these kinds of loans.
Loan portfolio is essentially the largest asset base for banks and it is the predominantly greatest source of income. Effective management of loan portfolio and credit function is fundamental to a bank’s safety and soundness. Unsecured loans require more attention as they are the riskiest loan portfolios and % of defaulters are high. Hence, for unsecured loans banks should have strong loan portfolio management process in place. The definition of a good loan manager is to have concentrated effort on prudently approving loans and carefully monitoring loan performance. Loan managers of the banks from time to time have to repackage their services and products to satisfy the needs of the customers and not only retain their market share but in the process reduce the bad loans. The value of an unsecured loan portfolio not only depends on the interest rates earned on the loans, but also on the quality or like hood that interest and principal will be paid. Good loan performance will ensure that the existing loans are repaid together with the accrued interest which will avail funds to the bank.
The total amount of unsecured loan needs to be decided on what % of repayment the bank is able to collect. For example, a bank having Rs.X in unsecured debt is a red flag if bank is only making Rs.X+10% a year owing to high number of defaulters. But, X in unsecured loan portfolio isn't a problem if the bank is bringing in X+20% a year. Banks should always have an eye on debt-to-income ratio in mind.
Concentration risk usually arise from large credits to single borrower, related borrowers, borrowers having high risk ratings, borrowers from the same country, geographic region, economic sector, the same type of collateral, maturity, currency of denomination, the same type of credit product, etc. Types of above type of risks are:
Single Name Concentration Risk;
Sectorial Concentration Risk;
Contagion Risk;
Concentration in Currency Risk.
a. Single Name Concentration Risk:
Single Name Concentration is a form of credit risk concentration describing a condition in which a Credit Portfolio has a material share allocated to a single counterparty or a group of related counterparties linked by specific ties (e.g., corporate group). Single Name Concentration risk comprises the risks resulting from the potential default of a single borrower or a legally connected group of borrowers. The term “single-name concentration risk” is used if the exposures to large individual borrowers account for the bulk of all loans in a portfolio.
b. Sectorial Concentration:
Sectorial concentration risk arises from uneven distribution of exposures to particular sectors or geographical regions or industries or products which are capable of generating losses large enough leading to an institution’s solvency. For example, if leather industry is in its down turn session, their loss possibility/default is increasing.
c. Contagion Risk:
Contagion risk is defined as the probability that the instability of the given institution (instrument, market, infrastructure, financial system sector) will spread to other parts of the financial system with negative effects, leading to a system-wide crisis.
d. Concentration in Currency Risk:
Currency concentration risk, commonly referred to as exchange-rate risk arises from the change in price of one currency in relation to another. A bank holding assets or liabilities in a single foreign currency impacts the earnings and capital of bank due to the fluctuations in the exchange rates.
1. Loss from devaluation:
Devaluation is a deliberate downward adjustment to the value of a country's currency relative to another currency, group of currencies or standard. In general terms, a weaker currency will stimulate exports and make imports more expensive, thereby decreasing a nation's trade deficit (or increasing surplus) over time. The devaluation of the currency will hurt banking sector capitalisation, as banks have large numbers of foreign-currency denominated loans and are exposed to losses on short FX positions.
2. Loss from revaluation:
Revaluation of a currency is a calculated adjustment to a country's official exchange rate relative to a chosen baseline. The baseline could in principle be anything from wage rates to the price of gold to a foreign currency. Revaluations affect not just the currency being examined but can also affect the valuation of assets held by banks in that particular currency.
3. Foreign exchange fluctuations:
Foreign exchange rate fluctuations affect banks both directly and indirectly. The direct effect comes from banks' holdings of assets (or liabilities) with net payment streams denominated in a foreign currency.
Exposure risks should be managed by bank in a more holistic approach identifying where it resides and how one kind of risk can potentially affect others. Banks need to determine their exposures to other markets that can easily come under pressure. Decisions must also be made on the methods and instruments available to manage exposure risks e.g., a bank having exposure to foreign currency can borrow in the same foreign currency to avoid foreign currency fluctuations.
When considering loss probability, banks usually divide risk into two categories
a. Pure Risk: Pure risks are categories of risk that are beyond anyone's control, such as natural disasters/epidemic/sudden change in govt. policy without intimation to banks.
b. Speculative Risk: Types of speculative risk include financial investments or any activities that will result in either a profit or a loss for the bank. Speculative risks carry an uncertain outcome.
To calculate risk exposure, variables are determined to calculate the probability of the risk occurring. These are then multiplied by the total potential loss of the risk. To determine the variables, banks must know the total loss in currency that might occur, as well as a percentage depicting the probability of the risk occurring. The objective of the risk exposure calculation is to determine the overall level of risk that the bank can tolerate for the given situation, based on the benefits and costs involved.
Investment risk can be defined as the probability or likelihood of occurrence of losses relative to the expected return on any particular investments made by the banks. Hence, for modern day banks the essence of investment should be management of risks and not the management of returns. The Banks inorder to manage investment risks should ask itself the following questions from time to time.
Was there any event happened or going to happen which can effect the bank's investments? If that event can effect, what extent is the damage to the bank?
Which investments may decline due to change in government policies?
Does investments will get effected because of economic developments?
What is the extent of risk that the investments can be sold immediately at a fair price?
Is banks investments concentrated or well diversified?
How much returns will get eroded due to inflation?
What is the extent of loss/profit for investments made by the banks overseas?
A. Market Risk:
Market risk for banks in terms of definition is simple “Performance of a particular security”. Otherwise defined as, the risk that the value of an investment by bank will decrease due to changes in market factors such as government decisions, international transactions, speculation/expectation, and supply and demand.
The main types of market risks for banks are
Equity Risk
Interest rate risk
Currency Risk
1. Equity Risks for the banks:
Equity risk applies to an investment in shares. The market price of shares varies all the time depending on demand and supply. Equity risk is the risk of loss because of a drop in the market price of shares. Usually for banks equity risk is understood to be the risk of losses arising from negative changes in the fair value of that portion of the long-term equity investments portfolio in which the risks are not included in other types of risk. Equity risks are generally taken care by departments such as strategy and control or International Markets or Accounting and Legal Affairs or Investment Planning and Control departments.
The monitoring and measurement of equity risk is the responsibility of the relevant planning and control departments as mentioned above who must then submit reports on the results of their activities to the Board and Managing Directors responsible for supporting these investments.
2. Interest Rate Risk:
For Banks Interest rate risk is most relevant to fixed-income securities whereby a potential increase in market interest rates is a risk to the value of fixed-income securities. Meaning, interest rate applies to debt investments such as bonds. It is the risk of losing money because of a change in the interest rate. For example, if the interest rate goes up, the market value of bonds will drop.
3. Currency Risk:
Currency or exchange rate risk for a bank is risk that arises from the change in price of one currency against another. The constant fluctuations in the foreign currency in which an investment is denominated may add risk to the value of a security.
B. Liquidity Risk:
Liquidity is a bank’s capacity to fund increase in assets and meet both expected and unexpected cash and collateral obligations at reasonable cost and without incurring unacceptable losses. Liquidity risk in terms of investments for a bank is being unable to sell its investment at a fair price and get money out when it wants. To sell its investment, bank may need to accept a lower price. Banks regularly find imbalances (gaps) between the asset and the liability side that need to be equalized because, by nature, banks accept liquid liabilities but invest in illiquid.
C. Business Risk
In terms of investment Business Risk is the measure of risk associated with a particular security also known as unsystematic risk. Business risk refers to the possibility that the issuer of a stock or a bond may go bankrupt or be unable to pay the interest or principal in the case of bonds.
Country risk covers the various risks that can arise from the economic, social and political environment of a given foreign country, which could have favorable or adverse consequences for foreign banks debt and/or equity investments in that country.
Types of Country Risks:
a. Macro-economic risk:
Macro-Economic risk is financial risk for a bank that is associated with macroeconomic (such as economic output, unemployment, inflation, savings and investment) or political factors. Macro risk can also refer to types of economic factors which influence the volatility of investments, assets and portfolios.
b. Transfer risk:
Transfer risk is the risk that a borrower may not be able to secure foreign exchange to service its external obligation. Where a country suffers economic, political or social problems, leading to a drain in its foreign currency reserves, the borrowers in that country may not be able to convert their funds from local currency to foreign currency to repay their external obligations. Hence, banks should be extra careful while lending to countries where it has transfer risk problems. The borrowers of the bank from those countries may not able to repay their obligations owing to non-conversion of currency that will directly affect the balance sheets of that lending bank.
c: Sovereign risk:
Sovereign risk refers to the risk that a sovereign entity will fail to honour its debt obligations. This risk is increasing because sovereign credit quality has declined on the back of increased public indebtedness arising from long-term structural deficits and fiscal stimulus in response to the global credit crisis. The sovereign risk affects to those banks which holds sovereign debts such as sovereign bonds with them.
Country Risk Management:
Every bank should develop country risk management program by appropriate senior managers at the bank and should be duly adopted by the board of directors. The board is also responsible to review the country risk on at least an annual basis. Regulators usually look for Programs, Policies and Procedures during examination of the bank. Hence, banks should have minimum program, policies and procedures to cover country risks such as:
Bank’s plan for its international investments and operations
Products and transactional support that will be offered internationally
Criteria for choosing to enter a new country and what due diligence will be conducted to uncover the various risks of doing business in that new country
Bank’s methodologies to know bank’s exposure in each country in which it operates
Type of legal vehicles that the bank will operate in a foreign country such as direct offices, separate subsidiaries, or may be a joint venture
Types of businesses or customers banks target internationally
Dilution risk is the possibility of occurrence of adverse effects on the bank’s financial result and capital due to the reduced value of purchased corporate and retail receivables as a result of cash or non-cash liabilities. Banks shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts for dilution risk of purchased corporate and retail receivables. Dilution risk is mostly applicable to securitization processes that banks are involved. Some of the factors of dilutions risks are:
Discounts: Discounts offered to customers for faster repayment can increase dilution rate for banks.
Collection costs: The greater the fees directly paid to collect on banks receivables, the less of receivables balance banks will realize.
Bad debt: Receivables not collected due to the default or other negligence of the customer.
Offsets: A banking vendor not giving enough expected value to the bank.
Residual risk is the risk that remains after efforts to identify and eliminate some or all types of risk have been made. Example, Residual risk is the likelihood of occurrence of adverse effects on financial result and bank’s capital due to the fact that credit risk mitigation techniques are less efficient than anticipated or their implementation does not have sufficient influence on the reduction of risks to which the bank is exposed. In short, residual risk is something banks might need to live with based on choices they've made regarding risk mitigation. The best way to deal with residual risks are to identify them timely and transfer them to a third party. There is a slight difference between inherent risks and residual risks, inherent risks have already been accepted by the banks and only the remains are known to form the residual risks. In short, residual risks are inherent risks subtracted by the negative impact of the failed risk controls. Apart from transferring the risk, banks can also try mitigate the residual risks by doing the following:
1. Bank identifies that the Residual risk is below the acceptable level.
2. Put in some more controls which can be effective.
3. Keep a tap on risk appetite in the banks.
4. Check on the mitigation costs if it is more than that of the residual risk cost, drop it.
Banks face paramount risks on electronic-Payments (e-payments) support it gives to its customers. E-payment risks come in several forms such as loss due to a default on a contract, risk of loss due to payment not delivered on time, frauds, Money laundering etc. Banks handle a high volume and also value payments online where blocking of payments and especially bulk frauds which hamper its reputation. Banks are forced to bring new focus and drive to their payment risk management strategies. Let's see some of the major risks of E-payments below:
1. Money Laundering Risk:
All transactions through the electronic payments channel are done remotely and banking systems allow it to be straight through without manual intervention. Therefore, it is difficult for banks to detect and prevent criminal activities and laundering of money. The banks need to have robust controls in making payments such as questioning the source of funds, having records of audit trials of repeated transactions, transactions below threshold levels etc., to avoid Laundering of money.
2. Fraud Risk:
The banking systems use protocols such as passwords and security questions to establish the identity of the person authorizing a payment, which are not foolproof in determining the identity of a person. As long as the password and the answers to the security questions are correct, the banking systems make the payments through and it doesn’t know who’s on the other side. If someone gains access to password or the answers to security questions of a customer, they will have gained access to customer’s money and can steal it easily. Banks to avoid frauds have begun multi-factor authentication or multi-layered security structure. Some banks are moving towards face recognition technology and biometrics or finger prints authentications to frauds.
3. Cross-border Risks:
The core idea of e-payments is to extend the geographical reach of its customers leading to several cross-border risks such as payments going to sensitive countries (such as a sanctioned country), tax heavens and to third parties who are not known customers of the banks leading to legal and regulatory risks. With banks outsourcing its activities rapidly, operational risk of a service provider (especially located in a different country) exists. Also, the e-payments are indirectly encouraging credit risk through cross border transactions as banks are playing intermediary roles facilitating payments. Hence to avoid all these, banks should have strong filter mechanisms during initiation of payment built inside electronic systems. Now days, the banks are encouraging to fill in forms electronically before the payment is executed to avoid any cross border risks.
4. Tax Evasion:
Businesses should declare their financial transactions and provide paper records of them so that tax compliance can be verified. However, the electronic systems allow payments straight through without investigating the supporting documents for any transactions. Hence, encourage tax evaders to use more and more electronic systems for payments. Even the transaction monitoring processes in banks are not so cumbersome that they can catch such evaders. Hence, it is making difficult for revenue services across countries to collect appropriate tax. To avoid these some countries have woke up and are encouraging digital buying and selling so that all the transactions and related taxations are known. From banking side, at present is restricted to only reporting the suspicion, hope technological advances bring in some changes in future.
5. Legal Risk:
Whenever there is a violation of laws, regulations, or prescribed practices, or when the legal rights and obligations of any of the parties to a transaction are not established, then there is a legal risk involved. Electronic payment is relatively new especially to the developing countries hence; there is a lot of uncertainty and ambiguity about certain laws and rules in other jurisdictions causing increase in the legal risk. Every bank should have SOP's developed with inclusion of special treatments (if any) for those countries with stringent laws. Also, banks are required to be careful from onboarding the client, till the complete details of customer transactions are known.
The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events is called operation risk. Errors in data entry, miscommunication, deadline misses, accounting errors, inaccurate reports, incorrect client records, negligent loss of client assets and vendor disputes are some of the common examples for operational risk events for a bank. Operational risk is in-built in all activities, processes and systems and the effective management of operational risk has always been a fundamental element of a bank’s risk management programme. Strong internal governance forms the foundation of an effective operational risk management framework overseen by the senior managers in the bank. All the heads of three lines of defence namely “The business line management” (Responsible for identifying and managing the risks inherent in the products, activities, processes and systems for which it is accountable), “The Business Risk and Control Management” function and an independent review by “The audit” (who are responsible to challenge the bank’s operational risk management controls, processes and systems in a bank) are equally responsible for operational risk. That does not mean that Analysts and officers have no roles, they have major roles in identification of risks and reporting to the above heads.
The board of directors should take the lead in establishing a strong risk management culture. The board of directors and senior management should establish a corporate culture that is guided by strong risk management and that supports and provides appropriate standards and incentives for professional and responsible behaviour. In this regard, it is the responsibility of the board of directors to ensure that a strong operational risk management culture exists throughout the whole organisation.
Banks should develop, implement and maintain a framework that is fully integrated into the bank’s overall risk management processes. The framework for operational risk management chosen by an individual bank will depend on a range of factors, including its nature, size, complexity and risk profile.
Identify the governance structures used to manage operational risk, including reporting lines and accountabilities
Describe the risk assessment tools and how they are used
Describe the bank’s accepted operational risk appetite and tolerance, as well as thresholds or limits for inherent and residual risk, and approved risk mitigation strategies and instruments
Describe the bank’s approach to establishing and monitoring thresholds or limits for inherent and residual risk exposure;
Establish risk reporting and Management Information Systems (MIS);
Provide for a common taxonomy of operational risk terms to ensure consistency of risk identification, exposure rating and risk management objectives
Provide for appropriate independent review and assessment of operational risk; and
Require the policies to be reviewed whenever a material change in the operational risk profile of the bank occurs, and revised as appropriate.
The following lists the seven official Basel II event types for operational risk with some examples for each category:
Internal Fraud – misappropriation of assets, tax evasion, intentional mismarking of positions, bribery.
External Fraud – theft of information, hacking damage, third-party theft and forgery.
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety – discrimination, workers compensation, employee health and safety.
Clients, Products, and Business Practice – market manipulation, antitrust, improper trade, product defects, fiduciary breaches, account churning.
Damage to Physical Assets – natural disasters, terrorism, vandalism.
Business Disruption and Systems Failures – utility disruptions, software failures, hardware failures.
Execution, Delivery, and Process Management – data entry errors, accounting errors, failed mandatory reporting, negligent loss of client assets.
Detailed explanation of some of above aspects of operational risks are as given below.
Internal frauds happen usually in banks due to the misuse of authority given to its employees. Some of the examples are as given below:
i) Access to Accounts:
Insiders have exclusive access to accounts payable or suspense accounts, which are used to temporarily record items such as loans in process, interdepartmental transfers, or currency in transit. This makes it easier for insiders to move funds between accounts. An employee who has the authority to create an accounts payable record for a vendor, for instance, could also create a fake company in the system and issue payments to that company/transfer funds to his/her account by debiting suspense account/ a personal banker allegedly opened both fictitious accounts and accounts with the names and identifying information of bank customers. The employee used these accounts to funnel money from these general ledger accounts.
ii) Stolen Accounts:
Employees within banks can steel personal information of customers to create bank accounts or credit accounts and transfer the funds from credit account to his/her personal account.
iii) Takeover accounts/Account Theft:
A bank employee may open a deposit account for a customer and later set up online banking on the account without the customer's knowledge. The employee may then make unauthorized withdrawals from the account.
To avoid above, banks should have maker checker concept for every transaction and a third eye or quality check should be in place to avoid frauds.
External Fraud is the risk of unexpected financial, material or reputational loss as the result of fraudulent action of persons external to the bank. Types of external fraud can vary by business line in a bank. Some of the indicative list is as below:
Corporate Finance: Loan Fraud, Client Misrepresentation of Information, Theft
Trading and Sales: Cybercrime, Forgery
Retail Banking: Cybercrime, Check Fraud, Theft of Information, Theft of Assets
Commercial Banking: Fraudulent Transfer of Funds, Credit Product Fraud (loans, letters of credit, guarantees)
Payment & Settlement: Payment Fraud
External fraud is mitigated with strong internal controls comprising both of systems and processes and supported by the firm's risk culture embedded in employees.
The best employment practices should be well placed within the bank for the best interest of the bank and its employees to avoid operational risk. Some of the aspects of employment practices are as given below:
Regular Communication with employees describing code of conduct
Regular Training on AML, frauds, malpractices
Raising a Risk Culture
Educating from time to time to staff regarding compensation and benefits
Decipher of ethics and compliance procedures to all employees
Easy access to top management for conflict management
Absence of best employment practices will lead to confusion, chaos and miscommunication to the employees of the bank which may result in operational risk.
Its duty of the bank to ensure safety of its employees with respect to working environment, transport, health, safety measures in buildings etc. Safety in modern banking has now included psychological safety to its employees i.e. responsibilities of identifying workplace hazards such as work related stress, bullying, aggression and violence that generates psychological symptoms. Absence of workplace safety can lead to operational risk and sometimes even de-moral to the employees working in banks.
Losses incurred by damages to physical assets caused due to natural disasters such as earth quakes or Tsunami and events like terrorism and vandalism by mobs due to some political issues causing damages to assets. Unexpected changes in climatic and political conditions have been a constant cause of concern in the banking business world.
Every bank should have a Damage Control department independently taking charge in case of such calamities or unexpected events saving banks assets as much as possible.
Hardware failure or slowdown, Software enhancements or malfunction such as data vanish, Telecommunications problems and Utility outage usually lead to operational losses or failures.
Every bank should have a BCP (Business Continuity Planning) department exclusively created with nominated members who assess the risk, prepare recovery time objectives and identify critical functions and related back up recovery plans.
Failure to execute can lead to operational risk. In this stage a step-wise execution of process is necessary for every department. Each step should be well defined and delay or downtime or shrinkage needs to be calculated in advance to avoid operational risk.
Below are some of the challenges processes faces during execution stage.
a. Execution while creation:
When a process is in beginning stage the process if awaits information either from external or internal sources. Execution in this stage if have too many embedded and related dependencies may lead to more lead time or waiting time for the resources, leading to an inability to meet process deadlines. Hence, every bank should ensure that each beginning of the process should have minimal dependencies. If dependencies are unavoidable, ensure that the data required for the beginning of the process is reached to the first assembly line of process well before creation stage (a difference of minimum 1 hour buffer is recommended). Just in time concept for beginning/creation stage may fail.
b. Execution in the assembly line:
In a process assembly line only one process can be executed at one time, and all other "concurrently executing" processes will be waiting for execution. Processes which are kept in a queue to get processed may lead to operational risk. Hence, every bank needs a back-up plan for waiting resources and cross training plans should be in place to avoid congestion in process.
c. Execution at the end stage:
Processes reaching end stage require at-most focus by every bank. Absence of a final “Quality Check” or absence of maker checker (also called 4 eye concepts) may lead to operational risk. Some banks proactively use their supervisors to do sample quality checking (also called 6 eye concept) to enable smooth delivery of the process and it helps supervisors to understand loopholes in the process.
Banks are experiencing unprecedented pressure to deliver process/products/projects on time for better client experience. However, factors such as high-demand environment, increasing congestion, reduced work periods, workforce issues, management pressure and severe revenue pressures may be the reasons for blockade of effective delivery management leading to operational risks. Banks are seeking ways to deliver process/products/projects in the most efficient and expeditious manner possible. Two type of known delivery management are
On time delivery to process
On time delivery to client
A. On time delivery to process:
Every process in the banks needs to get evaluated on the below criterion for better delivery to process.
Process size
Work complexity
Metrics systems
1. Process Size:
Every process in the bank is not alike and requires different delivery treatments as per its size. The meaning of process size is simple, the number of steps involved in the process from start till end. Identification of apt size of resources, building up process steps, controls in place for execution and delivery risk analysis are some of the controls that banks should have in place for good delivery management. The delivery management becomes more effective if teams do not work in silo’s and has combination of below traits especially if the process size is huge:
The team resources working for the process are composed of interconnected team members and communicate well among themselves.
Roles and responsibilities must be clearly understood by the resources and there should be centralized controlling management in place with effective measurement/metrics tools in place.
Successful hand offs from one division or discipline to another and from one work phase to another.
Accountability program should be in place for supervisors managing the process.
Resource continuous training should be in place with curriculum shared to resources as per new developments or upgrades or updates in the process.
Consultants or internal SME’s may be used to streamline the process and identify the non-value-added items in a process and its elimination.
2. Work Complexity:
Work complexity is defined by the below factors:
Number of activities in a process
Number of controls in a process
Number of decisions to be made in a process
Number of people involved in the process
Number of organizations/departments involved in the process
The number of IT systems or IT services required to fulfil the process
Level of uncertainty and potential change in any of the process activities
One single factor mentioned above cannot define a work to be complex. Combination of few or all of the above factors associated together makes a work complex. Depends from bank to bank how they want to define complexity.
Work Complexity requires strong process controls and time and motion analysis for each of the major steps in process. Delivery time will get affected if and only if stepwise analysis and gap analysis is not in place by the banks. Usually complex processes require strong lean management programs. A key idea in Lean is that there are two different types of efficiencies which can be saved namely “Resource Efficiency” and “Flow Efficiency”. Resource efficiency can be developed as time passes by sharing best practices, errors analysis and continuous training on updates received. However, flow efficiency is time consuming process and requires going through process flow diagrams followed by identification of non-value added works, cutting steps and streamlining in a way to encourage straight through process.
3. Metrics System:
The goal of tracking and analysing process metrics is to determine the quality of the current process. On a more granular level, process development managers are trying to reach the below goals through continuous metrics analysis:
Increase return on investment (ROI) for the bank
Identify areas of improvement
Manage workloads
Reduce overtime and
Reduce costs
These goals can be achieved by providing information and clarity throughout the organization about complex processes. Metrics are an important component of quality assurance, management awareness, measure of performance and estimating costs.
Absence of Metrics will directly affect the delivery of the process/product/project as managers will not be able to identify, prioritize, track and communicate any issues to foster better team productivity/delivery. Metrics enables effective management and allows assessment and prioritization of problems within process development. The sooner managers can detect process problems, the easier and less-expensive the troubleshooting process. Process managers can use process metrics to communicate the status of process development projects, pinpoint and address issues, and monitor, improve on, and better manage their workflow. Process metrics offer an assessment of the impact of decisions made during process development phases. This helps managers assess and prioritize objectives and performance goals.
B. On time delivery to client:
Banking customers have become choosy; they like to compare the products and quick delivery of those products. No banking customer wants to stand in queues to deposit their monies, customer want a simple procedure when it comes to getting loans at the time, they most need it, customer want to see all their consolidated statements in one single page, customer wants banking at its door step and that too free of cost, customer wants to repatriate monies in foreign countries without banks intervention (such as filling forms and getting them executed) so on and so forth. Each of the above expectation of customer can be met by banks only by correcting their delivery channels and delivery management. Only those banks will be successful who are able to deliver customer expectations first. Banks somewhere needs to understand that they need to invest big in data analytics, new software and new innovations to understand delivery management in better way. Banks also needs to understand that they will get both data and improvement ideas by listening to customers’ experience. The next generation of banking is dependent on speedy delivery. Any delays in delivery will directly impact operational losses and will lead to operational risk. Hence, banks have no choice to automate most of their processes which are manual in nature. Two of the simple steps in delivery management to avoid any operational losses are as given below:
1) Be Available even before customer ask: Availability and accountability are two simple traits that customer expects from the banking industry. Customer should not be given a chance to inquire about status of any receivable that belongs to him/her rather, delivery of services or products should be so smooth that customer is made aware of every step-in delivery; customer is informed about the status in advance; customer is aware about the delay’s; customer is aware about time lags and suitable reasons for those lags.
2) Superior Services: Banking customers expect instant delivery solutions from the bank. They expect superior services in terms of say alternatives which a banking customer can use before delivery of original service. E.g., can a debit card/credit card be embedded in phone for instant access and not waiting for them and for pins to be delivered separately?
Basel II classified legal risk as a subset of operational risk in 2003. Legal risk is the risk of loss to a bank which is primarily caused by:
a) A defective transaction; or
b) A claim (including a defence to a claim or a counterclaim) being made or some other event occurring which results in a liability for the institution or other loss (for example, as a result of the termination of a contract) or
c) Failing to take appropriate measures to protect assets (for example, intellectual property) owned by the institution; or
d) Change in Law.
In simple language, legal risk is the risk of financial or reputational loss that can result from lack of awareness or misunderstanding or ambiguity in or reckless indifference to or the way law and regulation apply to the banking business, its relationships, processes, products and services.
Legal risk management can be broken down into identification, assessment, monitoring and control/mitigation. For any of these functions to be effective, it is important that legal risk, as part of a firm-wide definition of operational risk, is appropriately defined. Some banks, for example, may feel that certain kinds of legal risk are so unlikely to affect them that they feel it appropriate to discount them in their risk management procedures.
This ultimately must be a matter of judgment for the management of the bank.
Identification of legal risks is a by-product of how banks define legal risks. Legal risk identification is an issue spotting exercise. The objective is to compile a broad list of risks. There are three steps to identify legal risks:
1. Sources of legal risk: The primary sources of legal risk are as given below:
A. Legal and governance structure: Whether bank has set correct tone foundation for processes around taxation, liability, required documentation and how management and operational decisions made can affect the legality. Senior Management need to understand the pros and cons of each legal structure, and need to adopt strong corporate governance that promotes ethical business practices throughout the entire bank. Once a legal and governance structure has been defined, it’s important to identify the bank risks such as fraud or unethical business practices, and implement controls, like audits and awareness programs, to manage these risks.
B. Assets: Senior Management in banks need to understand is the risk to assets. The value of both tangible assets, like buildings, and intangible assets, like human capital and intellectual property, need to be protected. To protect the rights and obligations related to the legal assets owned by a business, Senior Management require a clear picture of all the company’s assets so that they can identify and manage risk to avoid negative result.
C. Contracts: Contract risk is often defined as the possibility of financial loss either due to a buyer defaulting on the contract or a failure by the bank to adequately manage the contractual benefits or obligations. However, when looking at contract risk it’s equally important to look at the contract management process to fully understand banks risk exposure. Poor contract processes, such as manual mistakes, non-compliant terms and/or an inability to close a contract on time, can put a bank at risk.
D. Disputes: Legal disputes include any dispute in which a legal claim is made, including employee misconduct, accidents, product liability, etc. Senior management responsibilities are to limit the risk of disputes. Even if disputes don’t end in litigation, they can damage business relationships, reputations and cost bank valuable time and resources. To reduce the risk of disputes and litigation, Senior Management can take proactive steps like using risk transfer agreements, ensuring compliance, maintaining accurate records and using legal management software that can alert potential dispute risks.
E. Regulatory: Regulatory risks is the risk of having your company’s license to operate withdrawn by a regulator or having conditions applied that adversely impact the economic value of the bank. Banks are always subject to regulations from government institutions, commissions and/or agencies. It’s important to understand the specific regulations that apply to banks activities and the related rules, such as specifications, policies, standards or laws, bank must follow to avoid penalties and/or litigation. It’s also important to know when changes are made so that bank is not at risk of non-compliance. Proactive regulatory risk management requires implementing specific policies, procedures and protocols to ensure that bank is in compliance well in advance of regulatory changes.
2. Recognize potential vs. actual risks:
The concept of legal risk is generally understood to refer to the combination of the probability and magnitude of some future harm. According to this understanding, risks are considered "high" or "low" depending on whether they are more (or less) likely to occur, and whether the harm is more (or less) serious. Uncertainties with legal consequences can arise from “hazards” (Biological such as unsafe work place encouraging viruses and bacteria to germinate, Chemical such as vicinity of the office nearer to industrial areas releasing toxic gases and ergonomic such as improper set up of work stations, loose wirings etc.), “events” (such as employees engaged in political agitations), situations (such as entering international market with wrong combination of products without understanding local regulations), and scenarios (counterparties suing the bank).
3. Record risks in a risk register:
Every bank is required to maintain risk register having separate categorization for those events which may lead to legal risk and with action plans/mitigation factors.
Legal risk management is a strategy having application throughout the bank and is one of the key factors where banks’ decisions can be impacted and overall business planning has to factor legal risk. Legal Risk analysis is about understanding the risks in the risk register. Analysis of legal risk begins with an assessment of controls. Once you have gauged the effectiveness of risk controls, analyse the likelihood and consequences of each risk. The likelihood of a legal risk is the combination of the chance of discovery (will a claimant or regulator identify the problem) and the chance of an adverse decision. Similarly, consequences are the product of damages (usually in financial terms) and frequency (the number of incidents).
Banks need to meet certain minimum standards in order to sell their services (quality assurance) or their products (quality control). From a legal perspective, quality assurance and quality control are also great methods for preventing breach of contract (by meeting quality standards or specifications) and for avoiding negligence, especially professional malpractice (by making sure professionals are, and remain, qualified).
Compliance planning has become a legal necessity for all banks. It is all about making sure that the bank complies with state and federal law, particularly the regulations of agencies that license, certify, or otherwise have the authority to seriously affect the bank. Aspects of compliance planning are similar to enterprise risk management, but the two are different. Compliance planning is strictly about developing a plan to ensure the bank complies with the law on particular issues. The steps in analysing legal risks are as given below:
Which areas of business and its activities have major legal impacts?
Focusing this information into identifying where risk exists.
Quantifying or giving weight to the risk.
Making choices based on most to least risky, or whatever method the bank chooses; the risk areas will be quantified, and the drivers or root causes of the legal risk in the various activities will be determined.
Evaluating legal risks is quite different from the analysis of risks. To evaluate a legal risk is to prioritize the response to the risk. At the core of risk evaluation is bank's risk tolerance. Legal risks that are above the line or intolerable need risk treatment. The idea behind risk treatment is to modify the risk so that it becomes tolerable. Some of the techniques of risk treatments are as given below:
Avoid the risk by not starting or continuing the activity that can create the uncertainty
Remove the source of the risk
Change the likelihood and/or consequence of the risk
Share the risk through contracting or insurance
Bring in legal professionals closer to the operations.
Further, Once legal risks are inventoried and analysed in the risk register, it is important to communicate the results to the broader senior management in the bank. Each risk identified needs to contain priority of managing those risks also, methods to manage those risks.
Definition by Basel Committee (2001):
Reputation risk is the potential that adverse publicity regarding a bank’s business practices and associations, whether accurate or not, will cause a loss of confidence in the integrity of the institution.
Definition by Basel Committee (2009):
Reputation risk is the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding.
The vast majority reputation risks stem from malfunctioning of policies and procedures, compliance, anti-money laundering and fraud preventives. Bad sales strategies, services not provided in time and products not functioning as per the prescribed features or have many faults can also cause damage to the reputation of the banks. Banks should also be careful the way their staffs behave to customers or, how the bank itself behaves in public. Some of the sources of reputation risk are included below:
Product or service faults or shortcomings which also sometimes include wrong advertisement messaging, or perceived negative advertisement by the public.
Failure to meet the higher standards of governance imposed by regulators
Failure to meet legal or contractual obligations
Security breaches, particularly “Information Technology” related
Default by a third party upon which the company depends effecting banking services
Dissemination of ‘negative news’ through news and media channels
Exposure of staff mistakes or misdeeds in media
Detrimental policies, exposure of unethical practices, bad planning or mishandling of a crisis by a bank
Failure to achieve promised growth targets or declared strategy milestones.
Reputation risk can be avoided by the below strategies of the banks:
Strategic Alignment: Banks having effective board oversight, integration of risk as a strategy while business planning and have built in plans for image and brand building.
Innovation: Banks which differentiate themselves from their competitors through innovative processes and products tend to have recognition and high reputation value.
Quality commitment: Commitment on quality in bank wide policies procedures and actions.
Ethics and Integrity: Firms with strong ethical policies are more trustworthy in the eyes of stakeholders.
Crisis response: Banks that respond quickly on difficult situations and assess them in advance/takes strong action during a crisis situation are safe from reputational risk.
Safety: Strong safety policies affirm that the bank has strong commitment for the protection of the health and safety of employees hence, considered to be value creators.
Cultural alignment: Strong corporate values and culture regarding compliance with laws and regulations supported by appropriate performance incentives.
Resiliency: Business recoveries strategies are in place for continual business.
Strategic Risk is failure of business plan of a bank meaning failure to identify or assess uncertainties, affected by internal and external events or scenarios that could inhibit banks’ ability to achieve its strategy and strategic objectives with the ultimate goal of creating and protecting shareholder and stakeholder value.
Basel II related definition:
Strategic risk is identified as a potentially significant risk in Pillar II of the Basel II framework, but no definition is provided. In its Pillar II guidelines, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) suggests the following: strategic risk is “the current or prospective risk to earnings and capital arising from changes in the business environment and from adverse business decisions, improper implementation of decisions or lack of responsiveness to changes in the business environment”.
1. Strategic Governance Risk:
Governance in a bank determines the allocation of authority and responsibilities by which the business and affairs of a bank are carried out by its board and senior management, including how they:
Set the bank’s strategy and objectives
Select and oversee personnel
Operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis;
Protect the interests of depositors, meet shareholder obligations, and take into account the interests of other recognised stakeholders;
Align corporate culture, corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that the bank will operate in a safe and sound manner, with integrity and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations
Establish control functions.
Absence of governance lead to strategies getting failed as there would be no accountability.
2. Strategic Execution Risk:
Execution of strategy is simply the successful implementation of a strategic plan. The risk of execution of strategy comes into picture when strategic ambition of the bank is poorly translated downstream or bank fails to appropriately adapt the strategy when conditions change or its capabilities are not properly churned.
3. Strategic Change Management Risk:
Change management is a systematic approach to dealing with the transition or transformation of banks’ goals, processes or technologies. Strategic Change management should gauge for risk that employees will resist the change resulting in process disruptions and mitigate the risk by engaging employees early on in the planning process.
4. Strategic Program Risk:
Large projects are undertaken by banks. To have centralized control over these projects, programs are created. The strategy involves a large scale program with dozens of projects that have inter dependencies. Due to its overall complexity, the program has a large risk of failures such as cost overruns and schedule misses. The bank reduces the risk by hiring an accomplished program management team.
5. Strategic Competitive Risk:
Strategic competitive risk is the risk that competitive forces will prevent banks from achieving their strategies by putting better products or innovation in market or collectively with other forces stop execution of banks strategies. It is often associated with the risk of declining business revenue or margins due to the actions of a competitor.
6. Strategic Regulatory Risk:
Regulatory risk is the risk of a change in regulations and law that might affect banking business. Such changes in regulations can make significant changes in the framework of the bank and in its cost-structure. Strategically business plan might be correct however, anticipated regulatory risks should be a part of such strategies and business plan should also be flexible to imbed any changes as per changed regulations.
7. Strategic Marketing Risk:
Marketing risk is the potential for losses and failures of marketing. This includes risks related to pricing, product development, promotion, distribution, branding, customer experience and sales. A bank while launching new products should have as a strategy risk element noted and tested in simulated environment prior to launching them.
8. Strategic Innovation Risk:
Innovation risk is considered a special category of risk whereby a bank expects regular failures as it tries many newer things to see what works. Innovation is an approach to change that seeks revolution over improvement. Banks that innovate are able to advance the competition by creating designs, technologies, processes, capabilities and experiences that are an order of magnitude better than the current state of the art. Innovation in itself presents challenges to banks that strategize to gain more market share or to stimulate growth. As sr. executives of banks seek to produce innovative products or offer innovative services, they often run into problems of finding an optimal means for effectively managing innovation risk as the risks are not known already. Hence, strategically, the innovation plans should have adjustment fields in order to accommodate regulatory requirements, client expectation and market changes.
9. Strategic Merger & Acquisition Risk:
Mergers and acquisitions come with inherent risks of technology platforms being different, cultural difference, marketing difference, branding difference, price model difference and lastly strategy difference. Banks do take these risks because they believe the risk/reward ratio is attractive as they seek to dominate the market. Hence, banks should have a integration model (such as integration of technology platform, integration of marketing and branding strategies, integration of price models etc.) in place to avoid failure of mergers and acquisitions.
10. Strategic Security Risk:
Strategic Security risk is failure to identify cyber threats, scams and other vulnerabilities resulting in breach of confidential information of the bank to others. Data driven security, asset identification and security inventory, threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, securities embedded in policies and procedures, physical security assessments, in some cases, forensic securities should all be covered in banking security strategy.
11. Strategic Compliance Risk:
Strategic Compliance Risk is the risk of breach of contractual arrangements, legal or regulatory norms, sanctions, complying with its internal regulations, AML/KYC laws and local laws. All banks should have a compliance manual in place which is updated from time to time or at least once in every ½ year to accommodate latest developments in compliance related matters such as changes in regulations and its effects.
12. Strategic Economic Risk
Economic risk centres on macroeconomic circumstances and conditions which include inflation, exchange rates, new government regulations and other decisions that may adversely affect banks’ profits. For the most effective economic risk management strategy, banks should understand and gauge the variety of economic threats to it business.
13. Strategic Design Risk
The concept is the first step in producing product designs and is a basis for evaluating, judging, and gauging the design. Strategy of design should include the bank's values and the design should be new, innovative, easy to use and easily marketable with existing supply chain to avoid strategic design risk.
14. Strategic Procurement Risk
Banks in its strategy should answer the below questions pertaining to their supply chains to avoid procurement risks:
Operational risk, arising in the event of a disaster or supply contingencies.
Information security risk, attributable to data, physical and network security, and the use of public cloud technologies.
Risk arising due to non-performance, third-party frauds and negative brand perception.
Geographical risk due to volatile political or economic climates.
Regulatory risk, arising due to non-compliance to regulations, such as anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws.
Financial risk emanating from financial instability and a lack of creditworthiness of the supplier.
Managing strategic risk involves steps which must be integrated within the strategic planning and execution process of bank in order to be effective:
1. Integrating risk and strategy:
Most of forward-looking bank entities are connecting risk more closely with strategy. They mix/ connect risk discussions along with strategy conversations. Banks have started understanding that every strategy, every strategic choice, carries risk hence, they tend to scan and monitor strategic risk on an on-going basis and create regular, high-quality reporting.
2. Integrating risk frameworks while defining business strategy and objectives:
Banks should integrate risk frameworks such as from simple SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat) analysis to creation of Balanced Scorecard to plan out strategy.
3. Key Performance Indicators:
Banks should establish key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure results of the strategies in place. The best KPIs identify risks that can drive variability in performance.
4. Scenario Planning:
It is one of the methods that can help banks see a set of both risks and opportunities more broadly, to imagine potential futures that might challenge their current strategic assumptions, and to spot potential sources of risk that may not surface in other ways. There have been a number of advances over the last few years in data analytics and the ability to scan, search and analyse huge sets of structured and unstructured data for a variety of risks, both internal and external.
5. Key Risk Indicators:
Establish key risk indicators (KRIs) and tolerance levels for critical risks while executing the strategy. Whereas KPIs measure historical performance, KRIs are forward-looking leading indicators intended to anticipate potential roadblocks. Tolerance levels serve as triggers for action.
The Compliance Risk is defined as the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organisation standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its banking activities (together, “compliance laws, rules and standards”).
II. Sources of Compliance Risk:
Compliance Data such as Surveillance Findings
Internal audit findings such as SOX testing results
External reviews and settlements such as results of examinations done by regulators available publicly having full details of inquiries, investigations and settlements done by the regulators
Customer Data such as customer complaints
Business Data such as failure of new product launches
Regulatory Data such as regulatory changes, areas of regulatory focus, results of scrutiny by regulators available in regulatory sites
Every bank should have a compliance-risk management program which is an essential for sound and vibrant banking system contains the following elements:
1. Compliance Program: The responsibilities of the compliance function should be carried out under a compliance program that sets out its planned activities, such as the implementation and review of specific policies and procedures, compliance risk assessment, compliance testing, and educating staff on compliance matters. The compliance program should be risk based and subject to oversight by the head of compliance to ensure appropriate coverage across businesses and co-ordination among risk management functions.
2. Integration of Compliance Function with Audit: Compliance risk should be included in the risk assessment methodology of the internal audit function, and an audit programme that covers the adequacy and effectiveness of the bank’s compliance function should be established, including testing of controls commensurate with the perceived level of risk.
3. Active Board and Senior Management Oversight: An effective board and senior management oversight is the cornerstone of an effective compliance risk management process.
4. Training: Effective training on Compliance laws, rules and standards covering matters such as observing proper standards of market conduct, managing conflicts of interest, treating customers fairly, and ensuring the suitability of customer advice should be in place with the bank. The coverage of topics should also include specific areas such as the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, and may extend to tax laws that are relevant to the structuring of banking products.
5. Effective Policies and Procedures: Compliance risk management policies and procedures should be clearly defined, aligned to company’s governance structure, maintained by dedicated compliance office, and consistent with the nature and complexity of a banking institution’s activities.
6. Cross Jurisdictional Business: Banks that choose to conduct business in a particular jurisdiction should comply with local laws and regulations. For example, banks operating in subsidiary form must satisfy the legal and regulatory requirements of the host jurisdiction. Certain jurisdictions may also have special requirements in the case of foreign bank branches. It is for local businesses to ensure that compliance responsibilities specific to each jurisdiction are carried out by individuals with the appropriate local knowledge and expertise, with oversight from the head of compliance in co-operation with the bank’s other risk management functions.
7. Compliance Risk Analysis and Comprehensive Controls: Banking organizations should use appropriate tools in compliance risk analysis like self-assessment, risk maps, process flows, key indicators and audit reports; which enables establishing an effective system of internal controls.
8. Outsourcing: A bank should ensure that any outsourcing arrangements do not impede effective supervision by its supervisors. Regardless of the extent to which specific tasks of the compliance function are outsourced, the board of directors and senior management remain responsible for compliance by the bank with all applicable laws, rules and standards.
9. Compliance Culture: Compliance should be part of the culture of the organization and should not be just the responsibility of specialist compliance staff.
10. Effective Compliance Monitoring and Reporting: Banking organizations should ensure that they have adequate management information systems that provide management with timely reports on compliance like training, effective complaint system and certifications.
11. Testing: Independent testing should be conducted to verify that compliance-risk mitigation activities are in place and functioning as intended throughout the organization.
12. Independent Compliance Function: Regardless of how the compliance function is organized within a bank, it should be independent and sufficiently resourced, its responsibilities should be clearly specified, and its activities should be subject to periodic and independent review by the internal audit function.
13. Compliance Assessment: At least once a year, banks should identify and assess the main compliance risk issues facing the bank and the plans to manage them. Such plans should address any shortfalls in policy, procedures, implementation or execution related to how effectively existing compliance risks have been managed, as well as the need for any additional policies or procedures to deal with new compliance risks identified as a result of the annual compliance risk assessment.
14. Reporting: Banks should have a mechanism for reporting promptly to the board of directors or a committee of the board on any material compliance failures e.g. failures that may attract a significant risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation.
Moral hazard happens when a bank has the opportunity to take advantage of a situation by taking risks that others will pay for. In those cases, the consequences of risk-taking don’t fall on the risk-taker i.e., bank in this instance, but the benefits do. The situation creates a temptation to ignore the moral implications of a choice; instead of doing right, a bank does what benefits them. The financial crisis of 2007-09 was the result of numerous market inefficiencies, bad practices and a lack of transparency in the banking sector. Banks knowingly participated and encouraged collateralization of questionable assets consequently, putting the banking and financial system on the brink of collapse.
Avoiding Moral Hazard is more to do with self-control and maintenance by banks following the concept of safe banking. Some of aspects to avoid or manage moral hazard risk is as given below:
1. Control over Trading Desks: Trading desks are where traders are allowed to take maximum risk for maximum returns. Traders are often compensated the highest in the market even though they might lose while trading. Traders who do not work in controlled environment meaning matching their own expectations with bank’s expectation, often go overboard and falls prey to moral hazard. Hence, banks should have written rules and trading policies, put certain limits for their trading ability, audit function should separately gauge all the trade transaction done and the traders are asked appropriate questions for the trading activities done by them, Senior management should have oversight over trades done through metrics report and constantly interact with traders based on these metrics, the risk functions should be integrated in trading processes identifying risks and having controls in place so on and so forth.
2. Practice Ethical values:
There are several ethical values that bankers are expected to uphold to avoid Moral hazard risks which are:
Honest – Be forthright in dealings and offer value and integrity.
Responsibility – Accept consequences of mistakes while being good stewards in services
Treat Customer fairly– Avoid manipulation in all forms while protecting the information of the customers.
Respect – Acknowledge basic human dignity of all the people involved through efforts to communicate, understand and meet needs and appreciate contributions of others.
3. Continual assessment of Risks:
Non-compliance or practices knowingly that it may lead to Moral Hazard risk should be avoided by the banks. Bankers especially the senior management should and must assess risk in every practice that bank follows. Some of the risks associated to moral hazard and mitigation factors are discussed as below:
a. Investment Strategies: Building Risky investment strategies with such funds who are known for mal-practices in market. If the fund fails, the risk is on the fund and not on the bank. To avoid such moral hazard risk, every bank should have KYD process in place meaning know your distributor and having strong policies of not to build strategies with those companies or funds who are inappropriate and un-ethical.
b. Compliance: Selling of structured products by the subsidiary of bank in foreign market to the targeted audience whom these products should not have been marketed as per the local regulations. If the practice is known to the regulators, the risk is on the subsidiary and not on the bank. To avoid such moral hazards, banks policy should be embedded in subsidiary policies also, bank must know local regulations and have a policy in place where local regulations supersede the global regulations for doing business in that local market.
c. Bail outs: Banks are aware that in case of losses government would bail out. This implicit guarantee to bailout to banks does not mean that banks can take risks left right and centre as they know that they are still safe even-though they are eating away customers money’s in risky investments. The transfer of risk here is to the government which should be avoided by the banks.
4. Transparency:
Moral Hazard is causes due to information asymmetry meaning bank holds more information than the customer and bank is trying to transfer the risk of its products deficiencies to customers which is un-ethical.
Hence, transparency is the concept required by banks to create a spirit of openness in the practice of banking through communication, action and disclosure.
5. Policies avoiding Ponzi schemes:
Below are some of the indications of Ponzi schemes which banks should avoid in practise and also by putting strong ethical values in the firm-wide policies and procedures:
Guaranteeing high profits with very low risk.
Putting too many conditions for customer to withdraw money.
Banks do not tell their customer “What they invest into?”
Ponzi schemes typically award people with profits in case they bring in new people into the system or a network.
6. Principal agent transparency:
In the terminology of principal-agent theory transparency is a means by which the 'principal' controls its 'agent' by being transparent. Every bank should ensure that agents pursue principals’ policies and do not promote its own interests rather than the interests of the principal.
Systemic risk also called contagion risk is the possibility that an event at a bank level could trigger severe instability or collapse of an entire banking industry and effect economy. The banking system is a network of interconnected balance sheets. As a result, an increasingly complex web of daily transactions means that a shock hitting one bank can spread to the other banks that are connected to it and become systemic. Because of settlement and interbank linkages, the failure of each of these specific banks threatened wider problems for connected banks that were otherwise sound. Systemic risk can even collapse big banks which are known as “too big to fail”.
Banks which are immune with any external triggers or shocks and have wide spread business across borders with diversified products are safe from Systemic risks. Some of the indicators for immunity against Systemic risk are as given below:
1. Capital and Liquidity:
Systemic risk affects capital and liquidity of the banks and hence, banks need to ensure that proper buffers are in place and banks will be required to hold a sufficient amount of liquid assets with a high quality to obviate at least short-term disruptions.
2. Information across intertwined bodies:
Systemic risks arise mainly due to financial panics created in the market. If all the intertwined banks come together and analyse the problem in deep, understand the gravity of the situation and come to a common understanding of how to tackle the crisis, the systemic risk can be averse to a greater extent. The banks should also take responsibility to manage the crisis with its counterparts such as broker dealers, prime brokers; insurance agents so on and so forth.
3. Disclosure:
Banks should properly disclose the risks related to offers and keeping them transparent to all market players to reduce asymmetry of information thus eliminating ambiguities.
4. Imposing Exposure Limits.
Imposing tighter limits on interbank exposures thus avoiding contagion effect, policies of banks containing clear definitions of permissible exposure, business models created considering exposure limits, diversify business in case analysis is prompting towards group or single counterparty (/ies) exposure etc., can prevent banks to manage Systemic risk.
5. Uniform Policies across bank:
Too big to fail banks have failed due to lack of internal controls in their branches and subsidiaries especially those which were merged or acquired. Global policies should be rolled out and should be common for all branches and subsidiaries. Any violations should have strong penalties imposed.
AML/CFT risk is the risk faced by banks where individuals who are involved in Money Laundering or Terrorist financing are its customers. To combat this risk, banks must have a robust AML/CFT program and advanced technology that can support the bank’s AML/CFT compliance function to better identify, measure, monitor, control, and report on Money Laundering/Financing of Terrorism (ML/FT) risks. A strong risk management framework sets the foundation for establishing a robust AML/CFT program. Regardless of size and complexity, a bank must have effective risk management programs appropriately designed to the banking organization’s products, services, customers and overall risk profile. Adequate risk management frameworks can vary considerably in sophistication based on the bank’s business strategy, markets, and risk profile but are ultimately judged by their effectiveness in managing risk across all a bank’s operations.
All banks should be required to have adequate policies and processes, including strict customer due diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional standards in the banking sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities.
Sound risk management requires the identification and analysis of ML/FT risks present within the bank and the design and effective implementation of policies and procedures that are commensurate with the identified risks. In conducting a comprehensive risk assessment to evaluate ML/FT risks, a bank should consider all the relevant inherent and residual risk factors at the country, sectorial, bank and business relationship level, among others, in order to determine its risk profile and the appropriate level of mitigation to be applied.
A bank should develop a thorough understanding of the inherent ML/FT risks present in its customer base, products, delivery channels and services offered (including products under development or to be launched) and the jurisdictions within which it or its customers do business.
The board of directors should have a clear understanding of ML/FT risks. Information about ML/FT risk assessment should be communicated to the board in a timely, complete, understandable and accurate manner so that it is equipped to make informed decisions.
As a general rule and in the context of AML/CFT, the business units (eg front office, customer facing activity) are the first line of defence in charge of identifying, assessing and controlling the risks of their business. They should know and carry out the policies and procedures and be allotted sufficient resources to do this effectively. The second line of defence includes the chief officer in charge of AML/CFT, the compliance function but also human resources or technology. The third line of defence is ensured by the internal audit function.
A bank should have adequate policies and processes for screening prospective and existing staff to ensure high ethical and professional standards. All banks should implement on-going employee training programmes so that bank staff is adequately trained to implement the bank’s AML/CFT policies and procedures.
A bank should have a monitoring system in place that is adequate with respect to its size, its activities and complexity as well as the risks present in the bank. For most banks, especially those which are internationally active, effective monitoring is likely to necessitate the automation of the monitoring process.
The IT monitoring system should enable a bank to determine its own criteria for additional monitoring, filing a suspicious transaction report (STR) or taking other steps in order to minimise the risk.
A bank should develop and implement clear customer acceptance policies and procedures to identify the types of customer that are likely to pose a higher risk of ML and FT pursuant to the bank’s risk assessment.
Where the risks are higher, banks should take enhanced measures to mitigate and manage those risks. Enhanced due diligence may be essential for an individual planning to maintain a large account balance and conduct regular cross-border wire transfers or an individual who is a politically exposed person (PEP).
The identity of customers, beneficial owners, as well as persons acting on their behalf, should be verified by using reliable, independent source documents, data or information.
Banks should oversee the coordination of information-sharing. Subsidiaries and branches should be required to proactively provide the head office with information concerning higher-risk customers and activities relevant to the global AML/CFT standards, and respond to requests for account information from the head office or parent bank in a timely manner.
Denmark’s largest bank was under investigation in the United States, Denmark, Estonia, France and Britain over 200 billion euros ($226 billion) in payments that were found to have flowed through its Estonian branch from Russia, former Soviet states and elsewhere between 2007 and 2015. A confidential EU document, seen by Reuters, showed that Russia’s central bank sent warnings to Estonian and Danish regulators in 2007 and 2013 about suspect transactions at Danske Bank’s Estonian branch, but they were largely ignored. The investigation covers some 15,000 customers with a total of 9.5 million transactions between them.
Until the end of 2015, Danske Bank had a portfolio of foreign customers in Estonia. These were so-called non-residents i.e. customers not residing in or conducting business from Estonia. For a large number of these customers, it was possible during the period from 2007 to 2015 to use Danske Bank’s branch in Estonia for suspicious payments, and according to the investigations led by Bruun & Hjejle, many of them appear to have been suspicious customers. In other words, Danske had a large number of customers that should never have been customers and they made payments that should never have been made.
This took place because the Estonian branch had insufficient focus on compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) rules, that the branch operated too independently of the rest of the Group (it had its own IT platform, for example), and there were major deficiencies in the branch’s control systems and monitoring. At the same time, Danske also suspect that employees in Estonia actively participated in suspicious activities or colluded with customers. When Danske itself investigated in September 2018, they had examined the 6,200 customers found to have hit the most risk indicators as part of the portfolio investigation. Of these, the vast majority have been reported to the authorities.
Danske overlooked the suspicious activities because they did not focus enough on and knew too little about that part of the business and the risk associated with it. Large transaction volumes are not necessarily a problem in themselves if AML procedures are in place. And in that respect, Danske Bank’s management in Copenhagen had the wrong impression that allowance had been made for the large risks associated with the portfolio. Furthermore, the Estonian branch was using its own IT systems, which impeded the Group’s insight into and control of the transactions. The total number of transactions has taken the bank by surprise.
There are indications that one or more employees at the Estonian branch have tried to conceal what was going on or have in some way taken part in suspicious activities. On the basis of the investigation, they have found reason to report 42 employees to the Estonian authorities, of which eight have been reported directly to the police. A number of employees have subsequently been charged by the Estonian police.
Lessons:
The bank's management should ensure that standard rules are applicable to all its branches and subsidiaries.
Employee KYC should be done at least every couple of years.
Every Branch should have an independent auditor reporting directly to management.
All the branches should have standard systems used not separate from its parent and SOP’s should be revised and updated at least every year.
Indicators given by regulators and central banks should not be ignored and Sr. management should investigate deeply on the reports received.
Non-resident customers need special screening and transaction monitoring rules.
There are several products like CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligation), CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation), RMBS (Residential Mortgage Back Securities), ABCP and CMBS (Commercial Mortgage Back Securities) which are very lucrative but if not handled properly can lead even to Recession. The housing Bubble was a perfect example for UBLB risk. Let’s try and understand each of these products:
1. CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligation): CDOs are a particular kind of derivative. As its name implies, a derivative is any financial product that derives its value from another underlying asset. CDOs, or collateralized debt obligations, are financial tools that banks use to repackage individual loans (auto loans, credit card debt, and mortgage) and sell it as securities in secondary markets.
2. CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation): Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) similar to CDO are also a derivative. They are a form of securitization where payments from middle sized and large business loans are pooled together and passed on to different classes of owners in various tranches.
3. RMBS (Residential Mortgage Back Securities): Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) are a debt-based security (similar to a bond), backed by the interest paid on loans for residences
4. CMBS (Commercial Mortgage Back Securities): Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are a type of mortgage-backed security backed by commercial mortgages rather than residential real estate
5. ABCP (Asset-Backed Commercial Paper): Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is a short-term money-market security that is issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or conduit, which is set up by a sponsoring Bank.
The recession and fall of too big to fail banks were due to the packaging of subprime loans whose loan takers defaulted due to housing bubble.
The housing market in US experienced steady growth from the period of 1995 to 1999. It all happened when the stock market crashed in 2000 due to '.com bubble', there was a shift in dollars going away from the stock market into housing. To further fuel the housing bubble there was plenty of cheap money available for new loans in the wake of the economic recession. The Federal Reserve and banks praised the housing market for helping to create wealth and provide a secured asset that people could borrow money to help the economy grow.
There was a lot of financial innovation at the time which included all sorts of new lending types such as 'interest adjustable loans', 'interest-only loans' and 'zero down loans' the then types of Mortgage loans. As people saw housing prices going up, they were stepping over each other to buy to get in on the action. Some were flipping homes in an effort to take advantage of market conditions.
With each loan getting into their nerves with the help of investment banks, the lending banks would quickly securitize the loan and pass the risk off to someone else. Rating agencies put AAA ratings on these loans that made them highly desirable to foreign investors and pension funds. The total amount of derivatives held by the banks exploded and the total % cash reserves grew smaller and smaller.
In large areas of California and Florida, there were multiple years of prices going up 20% per year. Some markets like Las Vegas saw the housing market climb up 40% in just one year. In California, over ½ of the new loans were interest only or negative-amortization. From 2003 to 2007 the number of subprime loans had increased a whopping 292% from 332 billion to 1.3 trillion.
The Beginning of the Crash
The housing market peaked somewhere in 2006 and then, early signs of trouble when some types of subprime loans started to go into default. There wasn’t worry at that time since never in history have prices for housing market gone down nationally. Once the credit markets froze in summer 2007, things began to deteriorate rapidly. Subprime credit stopped completely and interest rates for credit for other types of borrowing including corporate loans as well as consumer loans rose dramatically.
Timeline of Events for 2007
February: Freddie Mac announced that they were no longer buying the riskiest subprime.
April: Subprime lender New Century Financial Corporation files for bankruptcy.
June: Bear Stearns announced a loan of 3.2 billion dollars to help bail out one of its funds that invested in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
July: The stock market hit a new all-high over 14,000. On July 31, Bear Stearns liquidates two of its mortgage-back security hedge funds
August: A worldwide credit crunch had begun and there were no subprime loans available. Subprime lender American Home Mortgage files for bankruptcy. This marked the start of the housing market crash
September: The Libor rate rises to its highest level since December of 1998, at 6.8%.
December: The stock market finishes the year at 13,264.
Timeline of Events for 2008
January 11: Bank of America acquired Countrywide financial for 4.1 billion dollars. Countrywide had a total of 1.5 trillion dollars’ worth of loans.
March 16: Bear Stearns on the verge of bankruptcy signs a merger agreement with J.P. Morgan to sell itself for $2 a share which was a fraction of the current trading price.
May 19: The markets had its final day above 13,000 closing at 13028.
September 6: The Treasury announced a takeover of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that had over 5 trillion dollars in mortgages.
September 14: Bank of America signs a deal to acquire Merrill Lynch.
September 15: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy. The Dow drops 400 points closing at 10,917
September 17: The federal lends $85 billion dollars to American International Group (AIG).
September 18: Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary meet with Congress to propose a $700 billion dollar bailout. Bernanke tells Congress “If we don’t do this, we may not have an economy on Monday.”
September 26: Federal regulators seize Washington Mutual and then strike a deal to sell most of it to J.P. Morgan for 1.9 billion dollars. This represents the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
September 29: Congress votes down the $700 billion bailout plan. That same day Citigroup acquires Wachovia.
October 1: The Senate passes the $700 billion bailout bill.
October 3: The house passes the $700 billion bailout plan and the president signs it into law.
October 6: The Fed announces that it will provide $900 billion in short-term loans to banks. The Dow closes below 10,000.
October 7: The fed announced that it will lend around 1.3 trillion dollars directly to companies outside the banking sector.
October 10: The Dow closes at 8451; the stock market has had its worst week ever losing 22% over the past 8 trading days or 8.4 trillion dollars from the market highs in 2007.
October 14: The Treasury taps $250 billion of the bailout fund and uses the money to shore up the nation’s top banks.
December 31: There were over 3 million foreclosures by this year. Florida, Arizona and California had rates of 4% with Nevada at 7.3%
The aftermath:
Even though the financial crisis was resolved by the start of 2009 the housing market continued to decline throughout 2009. There were over 3 million foreclosure filings for 2009. Unemployment rose to over 10% and the housing market crash created the worst recession since the early 1980’s. By the 4th quarter of 2009, the U.S. has experienced significant GDP growth and corporate earnings had increased by over 100%. The Unemployment Rate had stabilized towards the end of 2009 and rest is history.
Mergers and Acquisition of banks are not risk free. Amidst the complex paperwork, deals and logistics that come with all mergers and acquisitions (M&A), it’s easy to forget the chief reasons of M&A. Furthermore, it’s just as easy to forget the dangers that bank mergers or acquisitions pose to parties involved. Below, we explore some of the risks of M&A event.
Cultural Differences: Plenty of prospective bank mergers and acquisitions only look at the two banks on paper without taking their people or culture into account. Failure to assess cultural fit is one reason why many bank mergers ultimately fail.
Banking Platform Mergers: Execution risk is another major danger in bank mergers. In some cases, banking executives don’t commit enough time and resources into bringing the two banking platforms together and the resulting impact on their customers causes the newly merged bank to fail completely.
Customer Impact and Perception: Most of the banks once the acquisition is fully underway, do not consider the impact on customers at every stage. Anything from changing technology platforms to financial products could impact the acquired bank's customers negatively if attention is not paid.
Risk and Compliance Policy Differences: Risk and compliance culture of each bank is different. Every bank handles Compliance functions so differently hence, it’s important that the two merging banks agree on their approach moving forward. When two mismatched risk cultures clash during a bank merger, it negatively affects the profitability of the business down the road if they haven’t come to a working solution.
Washington Mutual Why it failed?
Washington Mutual was a conservative savings and loan bank. In 2008, it became the largest failed bank in U.S. history. By the end of 2007, Washington Mutual had more than 43,000 employees, 2,200 branch offices in 15 states, and $188.3 billion in deposits. Its biggest customers were individuals and small businesses. Nearly 60 percent of its business came from retail banking and 20 percent came from credit cards. Only 14 percent were from home loans, but this was enough to destroy the rest of its business. By the end of 2008, it was bankrupt.
Washington Mutual failed for five reasons:
First, it did a lot of business in California (Concentration Risk).
Second, it expanded its branches too quickly (Mergers and acquisitions Risk). As a result, it was in poor locations in too many markets. As a result, it made too many subprime mortgages to unqualified buyers.
Third, Collapse of the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. Like many other banks, Washington Mutual could not resell these mortgages. Falling home prices (UBLB Risk) meant they were more than the houses were worth. The bank couldn't raise cash.
Fourth, September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers got Bankrupt, Washington Mutual depositors panicked upon hearing this. They withdrew $16.7 billion out of their savings and checking accounts over the next 10 days. It was 9 percent of Washington Mutual total deposits. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation said the bank had insufficient funds to conduct day-to-day business. The government started looking for buyers.
Fifth was Washington Mutual moderate size. It wasn't big enough to be too big to fail. As a result, the U.S. Treasury or the Federal Reserve wouldn't bail it out like they did Bear Stearns or American International Group.
Counterparty risk for a bank is the probability that the other party in an investment, credit, or trading transaction may not fulfil its part of the deal and may default on the contractual obligations. Counterparty risk is especially relevant for banking sector in derivative markets, where notional values can far exceed the size of the underlying securities.
1. Settlement Counterparty Risk: Settlement counterparty risk is the risk of loss when a bank in a transaction pays for a security/currency it sold but does not receive the security/currency it bought or vice versa in RVP/DVP (Receipt vs. Payment/Payment vs. Receipt) transactions. Settlement failures can arise from counterparty default, operational problems, market liquidity constraints and other factors. Settlement risk exists for any traded product but the size of the foreign exchange market makes FX transactions the greatest source of settlement risk for banks involving daily exposures of tens of billions of dollars for the largest banks. Most significantly, for banks of any size, the amount at risk to even a single counterparty could in some cases exceed their capital.
2. Pre-Settlement Counterparty Risk: The pre-settlement risk for a bank is the possibility that other party in a contract will fail to meet its obligations under that contract, resulting in default before the settlement date. This default would prematurely end the contract.
3. Counterparty Credit Risk:
Counterparty credit risk is the risk arising from the possibility that the counterparty may default on amounts owned on a derivative transaction. They may include structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, futures, options, caps, floors, collars, and forwards, either singly or in various combinations.
4. Counterparty Risks in the Derivatives Market:
The Counterparty risk is higher in over-the-counter, or OTC, markets, which are much less regulated than ordinary trading exchanges. Moreover, the exposure of the banks to fail due to counterparty stems from its OTC derivatives that have not been netted under a master netting agreement (e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association) or cross margining agreements. Also, credit default swaps which banks take part into is the most common derivative with counterparty risk, are often traded directly with another party, as opposed to trading on a centralized exchange. This differs from products listed on an exchange. In this case, the exchange is the counterparty, not the single entity on the other side of the trade.
Counterparty risk is an everyday fact of life for Banks. What has proven to work best for banks to tackle counterparty risk is a ‘structured approach’ towards it, which involves three steps namely, ‘Counterparty selection’, ‘Documentation’ and ‘Collateral Management’.
Counterparty Selection: Step one involves the initial selection of counterparties. An in-depth assessment of possible counterparties based on a number of criteria, such as credit rating, credit spread, and experience in trading a particular instrument (in other words, a sizeable and active trading book) is usually required. In addition, the willingness to accept counterparty risk mitigating actions, laid down in legal documentation, can be decisive in selecting Banks counterparty.
Documentation: Having the right documentation in place is crucial for success hence, after shortlist of credible potential counterparties has been made, International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) documentation has to be drafted. The ISDA documentation consists of three parts
1. ‘The Master’
2. ‘The Schedule’ and
3. ‘The Credit Support Annexe (CSA)’.
Each plays its own part in the entire process, but it is the CSA that deserves the most attention in the context of counterparty risk. The CSA specifies the rules of collateral management, which is really the Holy Grail to managing counterparty risk. In the CSA, parties can agree at what levels of exposure collateral needs to be posted (for example, threshold amount and minimum transfer amount), which instruments to use as collateral, what the frequency of posting collateral is going to be, and so on. In addition, parties can decide whether or not collateral has to be physically transferred to an external investor’s account, which is fairly standard in European derivatives markets, or that collateral remains with the counterparty under a pledge agreement.
Collateral Management: After documentation has been drafted and the transactions have been executed, the final step is performance of collateral management itself. Drafting a CSA in appropriate manner, acting on it and managing collateral in an appropriate way is important.
Custody risk is the risk of holding securities/cash in its custody by banks due to complex nature of transactions e.g., RVP/DVP (check glossary for meanings) and accounting standards. To understand custody risk, understanding the role of custodian is necessary and important. The custodian bank performs function of watching over the financial assets of businesses. They settle sales and purchases of bonds and equities and protect the certificates of these assets electronically. Custodians also gather information about income from such assets e.g., when the assets are stocks this means dividends or when the instruments are bonds, they collect the interest from the coupons. They handle any foreign exchange transfers as necessary and manage all cash transactions. Finally, custodians deliver routine reports on their various activities to the customers. Meanwhile performing these duties, custodians face the following risks:
Assets held with custodians: Custodians hold securities in omnibus, nominee and segregated accounts posing them regulatory risk (in-appropriate identification of end user or beneficial owner) and risk of in-correct reconciliation in Omnibus accounts.
Safety of Assets: There are a range of threats such as fraud, insolvency, operational error, embargos, regulations, legal, counterparty, title transfer and market risks to assets at every stage of the custody chain.
Client on-boarding: Requires a complex set of due diligence checks that custodians and their clients must complete at the start of their business relationship to ensure legal and regulatory compliance
Service-related risks: Failure to capture trade details, match or settle trades, notify or execute corporate actions, etc., due to operational mishaps or shortcomings
Credit risks: Potential for loss when advancing intra-day or overnight credit to clients for fund settlements
Liquidity risks: Potential for loss when clients are not able to deliver the cash or securities required to settle their obligations.
Information security risks: Potential loss of confidential information belonging to clients whether it is lost storage or transit, misplaced by employees, stolen from bank systems by intruders or lost to a cyber-attack
Information technology risks: Failure to document system upgrades, maintain up-to-date inventories of technologies, test additions to existing systems, etc, can lead to market, reputational and litigation issues
Vendor and outsourcing risk: Reliance on third parties, such as correspondent banks, providers of transaction processing services, vendors to which custodians have outsourced activities and the potential lack of clear documentation, governance and SLAs
Regulatory risk and compliance risk: Failure to keep up with changes in law and regulation in the jurisdictions where they operate, leading to penalties, fines and sanctions, license withdrawals and reputational damage
Data quality risk is non-availability of accurate data of qualitative and quantitative values; and just in time data affecting overall banking business decisions and delays in implementation of plans. Poor data quality can arise due to a variety of different reasons and sources, such as:
For similar activities, multiple systems are in usage in a bank
Data transfers between incompatible systems
Improper data governance and oversight by senior leaders and senior managers in banks
Absence of responsibility and authority for managing data
Ground staff providing the raw data do not understand the value of information
IT and business processes are not integrated well
Training and Motivation is lacking for data gathering
Inaccurate or incomplete data can be a massive barrier of banks and even cause the demise of your banking business. The number one risk associated with incorrect or incomplete data is non-compliance with government regulations. Other risks of lack of data quality are:
Bad business decisions
Breach of regulatory requirements
Delay in delivery time causing customer inconvenience
Fines and penalties by regulators
Lack of motivation leading to losses and breach of trust among internal employees
Significant risks in banking businesses can happen due to silos. This can happen because:
Data gets stuck because it is only accessible by one department
Data is improperly shared or cannot be shared at all
Data cannot be leveraged across the entire enterprise
Data gets lost because it is not adequately backed up outside of the data silo
Data is compromised because it is improperly secured
Data quality risk management is a structured approach for the identification, assessment, and prioritization of data quality risks followed by planning of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability and impact of undesirable events. Let us check on Drivers of data quality in a bank:
Cost reduction and generate new business for bank to expand.
Regulatory requirements (such as MIFID, FATCA, Basel, CRS, EMIR Etc.).
Growing customer demand for speedy services.
Developments in technology driving new products and improving quality of services.
Quality-assured, standardized data warehouse.
Data reporting and risk control.
Data with root causes, analyses and forecasts for risk mitigations.
Banking failures have been numerous in the past. Banks try to minimize their losses by managing risks with risk measurements for supporting decisions. Risk measurement is not a conceptual challenge but a practical challenge. Risk measures are statistical measures that help a bank to understand the extent of volatility, changes in interest rate and other market parameters. A risk measure is also used to determine the amount of assets or set of assets to be kept in reserve. Some of the risk measures are the alpha, beta, R-squared, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio.
Value at Risk is the methodology used to estimate the market risk to which a bank is exposed, and also for determining, the banks’ minimum capital required to cover this risk. It measures the maximum loss likely to be lost in a portfolio in a given period, and for a given confidence interval. VaR methodology was born in 1994, when the President of „J.P. Morgan Investment Bank”, Dennis Weatherstone, asked employees to submit a report every day about the bank’s degree of risk together with a corresponding risk measure. Thus, in October 1994, the well-known department of Risk Metrics was established within the bank, specialized in the risk study and analysis. The risk measure used has become known under the name of VaR. It is currently used worldwide by many banks, investment funds, brokerage firms, and nonfinancial companies. Value at Risk is the final step in the evolution of risk management instruments, combining the relationship between price and performance with the probability of unanticipated market movements. It takes into account the correlations between financial assets of the portfolio and the advantage effect. This has a dual role, both for measuring market risk on an integrated basis, and determining the minimum capital required to cover the banks' market risk. In a model based on VaR, data on bank positions, prices, volatility, and risk factors are introduced. Risks covered by the model must include all items of interest, shares, commodities, options and foreign exchange positions, balance sheet and off-balance sheets.
VAR answers the question, "What is my worst-case scenario?" or "How much could the bank lose?” A VAR statistic has three components: a time period, a confidence level and a loss amount (or loss percentage).
1. Historical Method:
The historical method simply re-organizes actual historical returns, putting them in order from worst to best. It then assumes that history will repeat itself, from a risk perspective.
2. The Variance-Covariance Method:
The variance-covariance method to calculate the value at risk calculates the mean, or expected value, and standard deviation of an investment portfolio.
The variance-covariance looks at the price movements of investments over a look-back period and uses probability theory to compute a portfolio's maximum loss. The variance-covariance method for the value at risk calculates the standard deviation of price movements of an investment or security. Assuming stock price returns and volatility follow a normal distribution, the maximum loss within the specified confidence level is calculated.
3. Monte Carlo Simulation:
Monte Carlo simulation is a computerized mathematical technique that allows bank to account for risk in quantitative analysis and decision making. Monte Carlo simulation furnishes the decision-maker with a range of possible outcomes and the probabilities they will occur for any choice of action. It shows the extreme possibilities i.e., the outcomes of going for broke and for the most conservative decision along with all possible consequences for middle-of-the-road decisions.
CVaR is designed to measure the risk of extreme losses; CVaR is an extension of VaR that gives the total amount of loss given a loss event. CVaR is calculated as a portfolio’s VaR plus the probability-weighted average loss expected in excess of VaR. A CVaR estimate cannot be lower than a VaR estimate. CVaR is also known as mean excess loss, mean shortfall, tail Var, average value at risk or expected shortfall.
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is an international standard that measures a bank’s risk of insolvency from excessive losses. The capital adequacy ratio is calculated by dividing a bank's capital by its risk-weighted assets. The capital used to calculate the capital adequacy ratio is divided into two tiers. Tier one capital, or core capital, comprises equity capital, ordinary share capital, intangible assets and audited revenue reserves. Tier one capital is used to absorb losses and does not require a bank to cease operations. Tier two capital comprises unaudited retained earnings, unaudited reserves and general loss reserves. This capital absorbs losses in the event of a company winding up or liquidating. The two capital tiers are added together and divided by risk-weighted assets to calculate a bank's capital adequacy ratio. Risk-weighted assets are calculated by looking at a bank's loans, evaluating the risk and then given a weight. Currently, the minimum ratio of capital to risk weight assets is 8% under Basel II and 10.5% under Basel I.
Capital adequacy ratio = (Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) ÷ Risk-weighted assets.
Beta is a measure of the volatility, or systematic risk, of a security or a portfolio in comparison to the market as a whole. Beta is used in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which calculates the expected return of an asset based on its beta and expected market returns. Beta is a statistical measure of the volatility of a stock versus the overall market. It's generally used as both a measure of systematic risk and a performance measure. The market is described as having a beta of 1. The beta for a stock describes how much the stock’s price moves in relation to the market. If a stock has a beta above 1, it's more volatile than the overall market. As an example, if an asset has a beta of 1.3, it's theoretically 30% more volatile than the market. Stocks generally have a positive beta since they are correlated to the market.
If the beta is below 1, the stock either has lower volatility than the market or it's a volatile asset whose price movements are not highly correlated with the overall market.
The beta coefficient is calculated by dividing the covariance of the stock return versus the market return by the variance of the market. Beta is used in the calculation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This model calculates the required return for an asset versus its risk. The required return is calculated by taking the risk-free rate plus the risk premium. The risk premium is found by taking the market return minus the risk-free rate and multiplying it by the beta.
It measures the dispersion of data from its expected value. The standard deviation is used in making an investment decision to measure the amount of historical volatility, or risk, associated with an investment relative to its annual rate of return. It indicates how much the current return is deviating from its expected historical normal returns. For example, a stock that has a high standard deviation experiences higher volatility, and therefore, a higher level of risk is associated with the stock.
The credit value-at-risk (CVAR) of a portfolio is the worst loss expected due to counterparty default over a given period of time with a given probability. It is rather simple; the relationship between a loss level and its probability of occurrence is called the loss probability distribution. The goal is to estimate the loss level that is going to occur in a small fraction of the cases. If the losses are larger than this threshold, the bank defaults. The cornerstone of this methodology is the knowledge of the probability distribution of the bank’s portfolio. This means that the probability that the bank’s portfolio suffers losses larger than the sum of expected and unexpected losses is equal to the confidence level, let’s say 99.9%. This is precisely the definition of Credit Value at Risk (CvaR).
P[L ≤ CVaR99 9. % ] = 99 9. %
The 99.9% threshold is interpreted as the survival probability of the bank upon the time horizon considered, meaning that its default probability is 0.1%. This threshold depends of course on the rating aimed by the bank. The following table gives an indication of the confidence level required for a given rating target with the assumption of 2 years and a half portfolio maturity :
Rating target Confidence level:
AAA 99,97% AA+ 99,95% AA 99,93% AA- 99,90% A+ 99,87% A 99,83% A- 99,73%
BBB+ 99,48% BBB 99,16% BBB- 98,25% BB+ 96,60% BB 94,10% BB- 91,33%
Capital requirement (also known as regulatory capital or capital adequacy) is the amount of capital a bank or other financial institution has to hold as required by its financial regulator. Under the Basel II guidelines, banks are allowed to use their own estimated risk parameters for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital. This is known as the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to capital requirements for credit risk. Only banks meeting certain minimum conditions, disclosure requirements and approval from their national supervisor are allowed to use this approach in estimating capital for various exposures.
The term Advanced IRB or A-IRB is an abbreviation of advanced internal ratings-based approach. Under this approach the banks are allowed to develop their own empirical model to quantify required capital for credit risk. Banks can use this approach only subject to approval from their local regulators. Under A-IRB banks are supposed to use their own quantitative models to estimate PD (probability of default), EAD (exposure at default), LGD (loss given default) and other parameters required for calculating the RWA (risk-weighted asset). Then total required capital is calculated as a fixed percentage of the estimated RWA.
1. LCR and NSFR key metrics of Liquidity Risk management:
Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) ensures that bank have sufficient high quality liquid assets to survive a significant stress scenario lasting 30 days. Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requires bank to maintain a stable funding profile in relation to composition of their assets and off balance sheet activities.
2. Texas Ratio:
The Texas ratio takes the amount of a bank's non-performing assets and divides this number by the sum of the bank's tangible common equity and its loan loss reserves. A ratio of more than 100 (or 1:1) indicates that non-performing assets are greater than the resources the bank may need to cover potential losses on those assets.
3. Provisioning Coverage Ratio (PCR):
Provisioning Coverage Ratio (PCR) is the percentage of funds that a bank sets aside for covering losses due to bad debts. A high PCR ratio (ideally above 70%) means most asset quality issues have been taken care of and the bank is not vulnerable.
4. Credit Default Swap Spreads:
A CDS contract written by a bank to insure against the default of another bank is exposed to the risk that both banks default. Since the bank that sells the CDS contract can default, the buyer of the CDS is exposed to counterparty risk. CDS spreads exposes a banks distress level.
5. Price-to-Earnings Ratio (P/E):
P/E Ratio is calculated by dividing the market price of a share by the earnings per share. P/E is easy to calculate when companies are making profits.
6. Systemic Risk Measure:
Systemic risk measure involves measuring the firm's expected capital shortfall in a crisis. This can be done in simulated environments by a bank.
Effective internal controls are the foundation of safe and sound banking. A properly designed and consistently enforced system of internal control helps a bank to safeguard its resources, produce reliable financial reports, and comply with laws and regulations.
A. Definition:
Internal control is defined as a process for assuring achievement of an organization's objectives in operational effectiveness and efficiency, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with laws, regulations and policies.
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations:
Effectiveness means to achieve the entity's objectives
Efficiency means to do so using the least amount of resources.
Reliability of internal and external financial and non-financial reporting:
Reliable financial and non-financial reporting ensures that financial statements as well as management reports are prepared and presented in accordance with applicable guidelines, be those internal or external.
Compliance with applicable laws and regulations to which the entity is subject:
Compliance ensures that applicable local, state and federal laws and regulations are followed.
Performance objectives for internal controls pertain to the effectiveness and efficiency of the bank in using its assets and other resources and protecting the bank from loss. The internal control process seeks to ensure that personnel throughout the organisation are working to achieve its goals with efficiency and integrity, without unintended or excessive cost or placing other interests (such as an employee’s, vendor’s or customer’s interest) before those of the bank. Recorded transactions are accurate.
Information objectives address the preparation of timely, reliable, relevant reports needed for decision-making within the banking organization. They also address the need for reliable annual accounts, other financial statements and other financial-related disclosures and reports to shareholders, supervisors, and other external parties. The information received by management, the board of directors, shareholders and supervisors should be of sufficient quality and integrity that recipients can rely on the information in making decisions. The term reliable, as it relates to financial statements, refers to the preparation of statements that are presented fairly and based on comprehensive and well-defined accounting principles and rules.
Risk management systems are effective.
Compliance objectives ensure that all banking business complies with applicable laws and regulations, supervisory requirements, and the organisation’s policies and procedures. This objective must be met in order to protect the bank’s franchise and reputation. Internal Control systems can help bank managers measure performance, make decisions, evaluate processes, and limit risks.
Help a bank achieve its objectives and avoid surprises.
Detect mistakes caused by personal distraction, carelessness, fatigue, errors in judgment, or unclear instructions in addition to fraud or deliberate noncompliance with policies.
Up to €55.2bn has been lost to tax fraud by the EU’s top banks. Styled as “the biggest tax robbery in European history”, it included some of the EU’s largest banks. The fraud was executed via the “cum-ex” purchases of bonds and shares, a method by which banks can hide the identities of their clients.
The clients are then able to claim multiple, tax breaks on the trades. It is estimated to have costs taxpayers in Germany alone €31.8bn between 2001 and 2016.
German authorities have been investigating hundreds of the tax fraud cases, where banks and stockbrokers rapidly traded shares with ("cum") and without ("ex") dividend rights, with the aim of being able to conceal the identity of the actual owner and allow both parties to claim tax rebates on capital gains tax that had only been paid once.
The scandal came to light in 2016 when it emerged that several German banks had exploited a legal loophole which allowed two parties simultaneously to claim ownership of the same shares. This contrived "dual ownership" allowed both parties to then claim tax rebates even though both were not entitled to it. With the process having gone undetected for years, billions in tax went uncollected by the German state, mostly in the form of rebates which should never have been paid out at all.
"A bank would agree to sell a company stock, for example to a pension fund, before the dividend payout but delivered it after it had been paid. The bank and the fund would both reclaim withholding tax. "Sometimes banks sold shares they did not own and agreed to buy them later in a practice known as short selling. The stock was traded rapidly around a syndicate of banks, investors and hedge funds to create the impression of numerous owners. The profits from the deals were shared."
According to the research on the more than 180,000 pages of confidential files provided to 19 media organizations from a total of 12 countries, as much as €55.2 billion was lost to state treasuries through the tax evasion practices.
Although Germany was hit the most, the coffers of France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Norway and Switzerland have also been adversely affected.
Lessons:
1. The banks should not involve themselves in malpractices and known loopholes in the law. This would not only deplete their reputation but affect the economy of a country as a whole.
2. Banks should avoid short selling as much as possible as they are risky in nature.
3. Banks should not work for personal profits rather are working for ethics and values that create a good brand image for them.
4. Every bank should have a Whistle blower policy and Banks should encourage employees to use the platform.
5. It is dangerous for economy of a country if banks syndicate together for meager profits. Banks should have healthy competition among themselves to sustain long term in the market.
I. Preventive Controls:
The meaning of prevention is the action of stopping something from happening or arising. Preventive Controls mean key controls that are in place designed to discourage irregularities or errors from occurring. Preventive measures are proactive controls that save banks from mitigating risks such as fraud or regulatory breaches. Preventative controls are generally superior to detective controls. The reason being it is usually easier to correct a situation before a problem occurs than to correct a problem after detection. Examples of preventive controls are:
Having Maker Checker concept in place.
Having independent Quality Assurance (QA) department in place.
II. Detective Controls:
Detective controls attempt to detect errors, irregularities, or other undesirable events that have already occurred and ask for prompt corrective action. Detective controls provide evidence after-the-fact that a loss or error has occurred, but do not prevent occurrence. Examples of detective controls are variance analyses, supervisory reviews of account activity, reconciliations, physical inventories, monitoring activities and review of performance and results.
III. Corrective Controls:
As the name suggests, corrective internal controls are put into place to correct any errors that were found by the detective internal controls. When an error is made, employees should follow whatever procedures have been put into place to correct the error, such as reporting the problem to a supervisor. Training programs and progressive discipline for errors are other examples of corrective internal controls.
1. Management oversight and the control culture:
The board of directors should have responsibility for approving and periodically reviewing the overall business strategies and significant policies of the bank; understanding the major risks run by the bank, setting acceptable levels for these risks and ensuring that senior management takes the steps necessary to identify, measure, monitor and control these risks; approving the organizational structure; and ensuring that senior management is monitoring the effectiveness of the internal control system. The board of directors is ultimately responsible for ensuring that an adequate and effective system of internal controls is established and maintained.
Senior management should have responsibility for implementing strategies and policies approved by the board; developing processes that identify, measure, monitor and control risks incurred by the bank; maintaining an organizational structure that clearly assigns responsibility, authority and reporting relationships; ensuring that delegated responsibilities are effectively carried out; setting appropriate internal control policies; and monitoring the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control system.
The board of directors and senior management are responsible for promoting high ethical and integrity standards, and for establishing a culture within the organization that emphasizes and demonstrates to all levels of personnel the importance of internal controls. All personnel at a banking organization need to understand their role in the internal controls process and be fully engaged in the process.
2. Risk Recognition and Assessment:
An effective internal control system requires that the material risks that could adversely affect the achievement of the bank’s goals are being recognised and continually assessed. This assessment should cover all risks facing the bank and the consolidated banking organisation (that is, credit risk, country and transfer risk, market risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputational risk). Internal controls may need to be revised to appropriately address any new or previously uncontrolled risks.
3. Control Activities and Segregation of Duties:
Control activities should be an integral part of the daily activities of a bank. An effective internal control system requires that an appropriate control structure is set up, with control activities defined at every business level. These should include: top level reviews; appropriate activity controls for different departments or divisions; physical controls; checking for compliance with exposure limits and follow-up on non-compliance; a system of approvals and authorizations; and, a system of verification and reconciliation.
An effective internal control system requires that there is appropriate segregation of duties and personnel are not assigned conflicting responsibilities. Areas of potential conflicts of interest should be identified, minimized, and subject to careful, independent monitoring.
An effective internal control system requires that there are adequate and comprehensive internal financial, operational and compliance data, as well as external market information about events and conditions that are relevant to decision making. Information should be reliable, timely, accessible, and provided in a consistent format.
An effective internal control system requires that there are reliable information systems in place that cover all significant activities of the bank. These systems, including those that hold and use data in an electronic form, must be secure, monitored independently and supported by adequate contingency arrangements.
An effective internal control system requires effective channels of communication to ensure that all staff fully understand and adhere to policies and procedures affecting their duties and responsibilities and that other relevant information is reaching the appropriate personnel.
4. Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies:
The overall effectiveness of the bank’s internal controls should be monitored on an on-going basis. Monitoring of key risks should be part of the daily activities of the bank as well as periodic evaluations by the business lines and internal audit.
There should be an effective and comprehensive internal audit of the internal control system carried out by operationally independent, appropriately trained and competent staff. The internal audit function, as part of the monitoring of the system of internal controls, should report directly to the board of directors or its audit committee, and to senior management.
Internal control deficiencies, whether identified by business line, internal audit, or other control personnel, should be reported in a timely manner to the appropriate management level and addressed promptly. Material internal control deficiencies should be reported to senior management and the board of directors.
Supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective system of internal controls that is consistent with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent in their on- and off-balance-sheet activities and that responds to changes in the bank’s environment and conditions. In those instances where supervisors determine that a bank's internal control system is not adequate or effective for that bank’s specific risk profile, they should take appropriate action.
Although external auditors are not, by definition, part of a banking organisation and therefore, are not part of its internal control system, they have an important impact on the quality of internal controls through their audit activities, including discussions with management and recommendations for improvement to internal controls. The external auditors provide important feedback on the effectiveness of the internal control system.
While the primary purpose of the external audit function is to give an opinion on the annual accounts of a bank, the external auditor must choose whether to rely on the effectiveness of the bank’s internal control system. For this reason, the external auditors have to obtain an understanding of the internal control system in order to assess the extent to which they can rely on the system in determining the nature, timing and scope of their own audit procedures.
The exact role of external auditors and the processes they use vary from country to country. Professional auditing standards in many countries require that audits be planned and performed to obtain reasonable assurance that financial statements are free of material misstatement. Auditors also examine, underlying transactions and records supporting financial statement balances and disclosures. An auditor assesses the accounting principles and policies used and significant estimates made by management and evaluates the overall financial statement presentation. In some countries, external auditors are required by the supervisory authorities to provide a specific assessment of the scope, adequacy and effectiveness of a bank’s internal controls.
One consistency among countries, however, is the expectation that external auditors will gain an understanding of a bank’s internal control process to the extent that it relates to the accuracy of the bank’s financial statements. The extent of attention given to the internal control system varies by auditor and by bank; however, it is generally expected that material weaknesses identified by the auditors would be reported to management in confidential management letters and, in many countries, to the supervisory authority. Furthermore, in many countries external auditors may be subject to special supervisory requirements that specify the way that they evaluate and report on internal controls.
An effective internal audit function provides independent assurance to the board of directors and senior management on the quality and effectiveness of a bank’s internal control, risk management and governance systems and processes, thereby helping the board and senior management protect their organization and its reputation.
The bank's internal audit function must be independent of the audited activities, which requires the internal audit function to have sufficient standing and authority within the bank, thereby enabling internal auditors to carry out their assignments with objectivity.
Professional competence, including the knowledge and experience of each internal auditor and of internal auditors collectively, is essential to the effectiveness of the bank’s internal audit function. Internal auditors must act with integrity. Principle
Each bank should have an internal audit charter that articulates the purpose, standing and authority of the internal audit function within the bank in a manner that promotes an effective internal audit function.
Every activity (including outsourced activities) and every entity of the bank should fall within the overall scope of the internal audit function. The scope of the internal audit function’s activities should ensure adequate coverage of matters of regulatory interest within the audit plan.
Each bank should have a permanent internal audit function, which should be structured consistent with banking group or holding company.
Risk intelligence is a concept that generally means "beyond risk management". Risk intelligence is the ability of bank to gather information that will successfully identify uncertainties. An important goal of risk intelligence is to help the bank achieve a competitive advantage. Banks with high-risk intelligence tend to make more informed business and security decisions than those with low-risk intelligence. Risk intelligence demands that every individual in a bank take responsibility for managing risks in the day-to-day operations. Leveraging technology to create a centralized framework for capturing risks and organizing data elements will strengthen the risk intelligence. A risk intelligence framework should speak a common language that is well understood throughout the organization, including stakeholders. Developing a technically assisted risk intelligence strategy will eliminate the most common challenges faced by a bank. A centralized data model will aid in managing risks that may arise due to external and internal events. It will also give the bank a top-down view of the business goals, global risks and controls associated with it.
Below are the elements of Risk Intelligence:
Risk infrastructure is the process to evaluate the banks environment, strategic objectives, culture, and risk tolerance. Risk managers in the bank should look beyond known risks and ways to mitigate them meaning they should look out for factors that are risky by nature e.g. competitive threats, political situations and new government regulations that could impact the business. Following are foundation for Governance infrastructure for risk:
Banks should have strong risk infrastructure programme in place with appropriate strategic planning.
Every bank risk infrastructure should have these elements in place:
Methodologies to identify Risks
Assessing risks ahead of time and evaluate its components and impact
Integrate risk as a culture across organization
Response strategies in place to address un-foreseen risks
Design and implementation of Test controls such as Sox (Sarbanes Oxley)
Monitor mechanism and escalation procedures for risk
A bank’s board and senior management should promote the identification, assessment and eliminating or managing of risks as part of its overall risk management framework. The framework should include agreed service level standards for both outsourced and in-house risk data-related processes.
Senior Management should have full visibility on critical data and crucial assets. Especially, coverage of security controls on assets.
Bank’s risk reporting practices should be fully documented and subject to high standards of validation. This validation should be independent. The primary purpose of the independent validation is to ensure that a bank's risk data collection and reporting processes are functioning as intended and are appropriate for the bank's risk profile.
As part of any new initiatives, including mergers or acquisitions, new product development, broader process changes and IT change initiatives a bank’s due diligence process should assess the risk reporting practices of the acquired entity, as well as the impact on its own risk capabilities and risk reporting practices.
Risk infrastructure should have dimensions such as security, resource availability, performance, resilience, data centre services, operations and scalability of all types of risks in a bank.
Senior management should be fully aware of risk coverage (e.g. risks which comes with impacts or risks from business models of subsidiaries), in technical terms (e.g. risks associated with both manual and automated processes) or in legal terms (e.g. legal impediments to data sharing across jurisdictions).
A bank’s board is responsible for determining its own risk reporting requirements and should be aware of limitations that prevent full risk data aggregation in the reports it receives.
To ensure the effectiveness of an organisation’s risk management framework, the board and senior management need to be able to rely on adequate line functions including monitoring and assurance functions within the bank. The 'Three Lines of Defence' model is a way of explaining the relationship between risk functions and how responsibilities should be divided:
1. The first line of defence – functions that own and manage risk
2. The second line of defence – functions that oversee or specialise in risk management, compliance
3. The third line of defence – functions that provide independent assurance, above all internal audits.
The first line of Defence:
The revenue-generating business units form the basis of the model and are referred to as the first line of defence (e.g., front office). These units may include the provision of financial services such as trading, asset management, sales and client relationships. The intention of the model is to assign the basic control and risk management responsibilities to this first line of defence (i.e., staff and managers working in those revenue generating units). The model assumes that controls in this first line are very granular and based on individual transactions as staff are involved in processes on a daily basis and are familiar with the workflow and possible control weaknesses. Therefore, it is easier for them to implement controls that target more granular processes and detect weaknesses early on. This allows them to provide immediate notification to the appropriate management levels and ensures a timely implementation of necessary measures.
The second line of defence:
If the control systems outlined in the first line of defence become ineffective, or are absent, the second line of defence becomes important. It comprises various risk management and compliance functions (i.e., support functions) such as finance, compliance, risk control and back office, whose key duties are to monitor and report risk-related practices and information, and to oversee all types of compliance and financial controlling issues. With the introduction of a middle office, compliance duties (the introduction of effective market, credit and operational risk management functions, the implementation of an independent price verification function) appear to have expanded exponentially. In response to tighter regulatory requirements and more complex products and processes, organisations have added additional staff and functions in the second line. Without thorough organisation and coordination of responsibilities, financial entities sometimes exhibit considerable control gaps that may call into question their financial soundness. As such, the second line of defence defines preventive and detective control requirements, and ensures that such requirements are embedded in the policies and procedures of the first line. The second line must be independent of the first line and apply controls either on an on-going (e.g., daily) or periodical basis. It must also be based on clear risk assessment criteria (e.g., detailed review of transactions of specific business units that exhibit a higher than usual staff turnover or unusually large number of errors or corrections).
The third line of defence: The third line of defence, which represents the next level of control, comprises the internal audit function that is responsible for efficiency and effectiveness of operations, safeguarding of assets, reliability and integrity of reporting processes and compliance with laws and regulations. For the function to be effective, it needs to be based on the highest level of independence and objectivity. In practice, the audit function has to conduct at least annually a risk assessment of the organisation and identify business units or processes that exhibit a high level of residual risk (i.e. risk remaining after consideration of the internal control environment). As such, the third line can only ensure a periodic risk-based assessment rather than a granular and ongoing monitoring that is typical of the first line of defence.
Creating an information risk management program consists of designing and implementing practices to protect confidential information, critical business processes and information assets across the bank. IRM program believe that internal and external threats are mostly predictable, with some pockets of uncertainty. However, these unknowns are concerning enough to prompt attention to the problem of forecasting emerging risks. IRM programs have data-level technical controls such as data loss prevention. Effective IRM Program produces the following internal benefits:
Threat, Vulnerability, and Business Impact Identification: Ensures the greatest risks to business operations are identified and addressed on a continuous basis.
Decision Support: IRM provides decision makers (i.e., management and leadership) with information needed to understand factors that can negatively influence operations and outcomes and make informed judgments concerning the extent of actions needed to reduce risk.
Justification of Expenditures: Risk assessment enables the identification of areas that may need improvement, which could help justify expenditures for information gathering and security improvements.
Increased Awareness: Increases understanding of risks throughout the bank by helping better understand risk and avoid risky practices, such as disclosing passwords or other sensitive information.
Improved Internal Controls: IRM provides a mechanism for reaching consensus on controls necessary to reduce risk. The facilitated nature of risk assessments help business partners understand the need for agreed-upon controls, feel the controls align with business goals, and support the effective implementation of controls.
Means for Communicating Results: Standard risk assessment report formats, and the periodic nature of risk assessments, provide leadership with a means of readily understanding reported information and comparing results over time.
Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) is a risk adjusted advanced return on investment (ROI) measuring tool that presents risk-oriented view for the revenues in the perspective of magnitude of risks taken to generate those revenues. RAROC is simply return on investment (ROI) figure that takes elements of risk into account.
RAROC is used in financial analysis to calculate a rate of return, where projects and investments with higher levels of risk are evaluated based on the amount of capital at risk. The basic aim of the RAROC model is to adjust returns by expected losses and to provide an Unexpected Loss based capital buffer. RAROC is seen as a substitute for other performance measurement tools, provided it is applied correctly.
RAROC= r−e−el+ifc/c
**
RAROC=Risk-adjusted return on capital
r=Revenue
e=Expenses
el=Expected loss which equals average loss expected over a specified period of time.
ifc=Income from capital which equals (capital charges) × (the risk-free rate)
c=Capital
**
Large sized banks across the world have already put in place Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) framework for pricing of loans, which calls for data on portfolio behaviour and allocation of capital commensurate with credit risk inherent in loan proposals. Under RAROC framework, lender begins by charging an interest mark-up to cover the expected loss expected default rate of the rating category of the borrower. The lender then allocates enough capital to the prospective loan to cover some amount of unexpected loss- variability of default rates. Generally, international banks allocate enough capital so that the expected loan loss reserve or provision plus allocated capital covers 99% of the loan loss outcomes.
Investment banks use RAROC for M&A deals as Risk-adjusted return on capital is a useful tool in assessing potential mergers and acquisitions. The general underlying assumption of RAROC is higher levels of risk offer substantially higher returns. Also, RAROC is useful for investment banks while making comparisons if there are two or more deals in hand. The more the RAROC of a deal, the most profitable it is.
The birth of the Basel banking norms is attributed to the incorporation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), established by the central bank of the G-10 countries in 1974. This came into being under the patronage of Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Basel, Switzerland. The Committee formulates guidelines and provides recommendations on banking regulation based on capital risk, market risk and operational risk. The Committee was formed in response to the chaotic liquidation of Herstatt Bank, based in Cologne, Germany in 1974. The incident illustrated the presence of settlement risk in international finance. Historically, in 1973, the sudden failure of the Bretton Woods System resulted in the occurrence of casualties in 1974 such as withdrawal of banking license of Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany, and shut down of Franklin National Bank in New York. In 1975, three months after the closing of Franklin National Bank and other similar disruptions, the central bank governors of the G-10 countries took the initiative to establish a committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices in order to address such issues. This committee was later renamed as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Committee acts as a forum where regular cooperation between the member countries takes place regarding banking regulations and supervisory practices. The Committee aims at improving supervisory knowhow and the quality of banking supervision quality worldwide. Currently there are 27 member countries in the Committee since 2009. These member countries are being represented in the Committee by the central bank and the authority for the prudential supervision of banking business. Apart from banking regulations and supervisory practices, the Committee also focuses on closing the gaps in international supervisory coverage.
Basel I set out the minimum capital requirements of financial institutions with the goal of minimizing credit risk. Banks that operate internationally are required to maintain a minimum amount (8%) of capital based on a % of risk-weighted assets.
The Basel I classification system groups a bank's assets into five risk categories carrying risk weights classified as percentages: 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100%. A bank's assets are placed into a category based on the nature of the debtor. The 0% risk category is comprised of cash, central bank and government debt, and any Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) government debt. Public sector debt can be placed in the 0%, 10%, 20% or 50% category, depending on the debtor. Development bank debt, OECD bank debt, OECD securities firm debt, non-OECD bank debt (under one year of maturity), non-OECD public sector debt and cash in collection comprise the 20% category. The 50% category is residential mortgages, and the 100% category is represented by private sector debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity over a year), real estate, plant and equipment, and capital instruments issued at other banks.
The Basel II Accord was introduced following substantial losses in the international markets since 1992, which were attributed to poor risk management practices. The Basel II Accord makes it mandatory for financial institutions to use standardized measurements for credit, market risk, and operational risk. However, different levels of compliance allow financial institutions to pursue advanced risk management approaches to free up capital for investment.
Basel II uses a three-pillar concept:
Pillar 1: Minimum capital requirements:
The first pillar deals with on-going maintenance of regulatory capital that is required to safeguard against the three major components of risk in the bank namely:
a. Credit Risk
b. Operational Risk, and
c. Market Risk
Credit Risk component can be calculated in three different ways of varying degree of sophistication, namely
Standardized Approach
Foundation Internal Rating-Based (IRB) Approach, and
Advanced IRB Approach.
Operational Risk, the three different approaches are:
Basic Indicator Approach (BIA)
Standardized Approach (STA)
Internal Measurement Approach, an advanced form of which is the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)
For Market Risk, Basel II allows for
Standardized and Internal approaches or
Value at Risk (VaR).
Pillar 2: Supervisory Review:
This is a regulatory response to the first pillar, giving regulators better 'tools' over those previously available. It also provides a framework for dealing with Pension Risk, Systemic Risk, Concentration Risk, Strategic Risk, Reputational Risk, Liquidity Risk, and Legal Risk, which the accord combines under the title of Residual Risk.
Pillar 3: Market Discipline:
This pillar aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements, which allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. Market Discipline supplements regulation, as sharing of information facilitates assessment of the bank by others (including investors, analysts, customers, other banks, and rating agencies) which leads to good corporate governance. By providing disclosures that are based on a common framework, the market is effectively informed about a bank’s exposure to those risks, and provides a consistent and understandable disclosure framework that enhances comparability. These disclosures are required to be made at least twice a year, apart from qualitative disclosures that provide a summary of the general risk management objectives and policies, which can be made annually. Institutions are also required to create a formal policy on what will be disclosed and controls around them along with the validation and frequency of these disclosures. In general, the disclosures under Pillar 3 apply to the top consolidated level of the banking group to which the Basel II framework applies.
Basel III is an internationally agreed set of measures developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in response to the financial crisis of 2007-09. The measures aim to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of banks. Like all Basel Committee standards, Basel III standards are minimum requirements which apply to internationally active banks. Members are committed to implementing and applying standards in their jurisdictions within the time frame established by the Committee.
Pillar 1:
I. The Quality and level of capital has been revised as given under:
Raising minimum common equity to 4.5% of risk weighted assets, after deductions.
A capital conservation buffer comprising common equity of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets brings the total common equity standard to 7%. Constraints on a bank’s discretionary distributions will be imposed when it falls into the buffer range.
A countercyclical buffer within a range of 0–2.5% comprising common equity will apply when credit growth is judged to result in an unacceptable build-up of systematic risk.
Capital loss absorption at the point of non-viability Allowing capital instruments to be written off or converted to common shares if the bank is judged to be non-viable. This will reduce moral hazard by increasing the private sector’s contribution to resolving future banking crises.
II. Revisions in Risk Coverage:
Revisions to the standardised approaches for calculating below meaning greater risk-sensitivity and comparability.
Credit risk;
Market risk;
Credit valuation adjustment risk; and
Operational risk
Constraints on using internal models aim to reduce unwarranted variability in banks’ calculations of risk-weighted assets.
Counterparty Credit Risk: More stringent requirements for measuring exposure; capital incentives to use central counterparties for derivatives; a new standardised approach; and higher capital for inter-financial sector exposures.
Securitizations: Reducing reliance on external ratings, simplifying and limiting the number of approaches for calculating capital charges and increasing requirements for riskier exposures.
Capital requirements for exposures to central counterparties (CCPs) and equity investments in funds to ensure adequate capitalisation and support a resilient financial system.
III. Containing Leverage:
A non-risk-based leverage ratio including off-balance sheet exposures is meant to serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital requirement. It also helps contain system wide build-up.
Pillar 2:
Risk Management and Supervision: Supplemental Pillar 2 requirements address firm-wide governance and risk management, including the risk of off-balance sheet exposures and securitization activities, sound compensation practices, valuation practices, stress testing, corporate governance and supervisory colleges. Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) Extensive guidance on expectations for a bank’s IRRBB management process: enhanced disclosure requirements; stricter threshold for identifying outlier banks; updated standardized approach.
Pillar 3:
Revised Pillar 3 (disclosure requirements):
Consolidated and enhanced framework, covering all the reforms to the Basel framework.
Introduces a dashboard of banks’ key prudential metrics.
BCBS proposed additional measures in 2016-17 to continue and complement the Basel III reforms. Although these measures are referred to as ‘finalised reforms’ by the BCBS, given the scale of change, they are more commonly referred to as the Fourth Basel Accord (Basel IV) or Basel 3.1. Like Basel III, the new requirements aim to create a more robust capital framework and increase confidence in the banking sector. Some of the new measures that Basel IV introduces include the standardising of the risk-weighted asset (RWA) calculations used by banks and limiting the use of internal ratings-based (IRB) models. By doing so, the BCBS aims to reduce variations resulting from banks’ internal models. Most of the changes introduced by Basel IV take effect in January 2023 (delayed from January 2022) to give banks time to adapt their internal risk models, operations and reporting, and work with their customers to understand the impact on their solutions and, in turn, pricing.
Banking and Financial Services Institutions across the globe are struggling to keep pace with regulatory changes and quite often, struggling with volume and the complexity of updates. It can be a laborious process; the need of hour for banks is to develop a robust and technologically reinforced regulatory change management and risk framework to help manage the next wave of regulatory reforms. A wait and watch approach is no longer sustainable, and organizations would need to proactively address this challenge before it gets too late. Organizations have to keep track of regulatory content from global as well as regional regulators from a multitude of sources including regulatory publications, industry associations, national and local media, and specialized content providers such as LexisNexis. With so many sources to keep track of and high volumes of relevant content to analyse, organizations may find this exercise time consuming and resource incentive.
Once the changes are known and the details of who will be affected by this new regulation known, it’s time to start communicating with the people who will be responsible for implementing the changes. Depending on the complexity of the change, this could range from issuing a relatively simple instruction to providing training interventions. Affected employees also need to know why the change is so important and what risks lie in store should the business fail to comply. Without this information, they may see the changes as inconvenient and trivial. Each person who will contribute towards achieving compliance must know his or her area of responsibility in the process and must be held accountable.
A cloud-based content platform which serves as a one-stop shop for regulatory content from various sources is always convenient to a bank. Using this platform, compliance professionals can subscribe to curated content based on predefined rules and keywords. Such a tool would also allow organization to set pre-defined rules on a variety of regulatory attributes including industry, jurisdiction, topic, state, due-date, etc., thereby ensuring relevant information reaches subscribers in real time.
The regulatory risk framework must contain the following:
The regulatory risk framework must contain the following:
1. Regulatory Intelligence:
Regulatory intelligence is banks source of getting the local and international regulatory information through screening of regulatory portals, sites, companies profiling the information either or fee basis or free.
Preparedness and planning for future regulation changes.
Manual or system-based analysis of changes.
Inventory of recent compliance breaches published in the media.
Data on all enforcement actions.
Reforms information of the country where the bank has its offices.
Political information that may change the regulatory environment in a country.
Accountability of the risk:
Assigning officers accountable to tackle risks owing to regulatory changes
Decision making and proliferation of information to the appropriate staff or to the whole organization as necessary
Estimation of development of new systems or incorporation of charges of regulations in the current systems.
Time to time reporting to Sr. Management about changes and strategies to implement the changes
2. Risk Mapping:
Categorizing the new developments and assigning risks (High/Medium/Low) to bank accordingly
Identification of affected areas in the banking
Identification of loopholes if any that might affect the current business
Impact Assessment of Risk:
Appropriate plans in place for the risks due to regulatory changes
List of actionable by each of the department is available
Resource allocations as per the known changes for proliferation and training staff
Updating policies procedures and deciding on timeframes
3. Test Controls:
Even before the release of regulatory change test the effectiveness of controls in place.
Note down the challenges of implementation
Assess the mind set of employees adopting the changed scenarios
Regulatory Reporting:
Regulatory risk reporting is the submission of raw or summary data needed by regulators to evaluate a bank's operations and its overall health, thereby determining the status of compliance with applicable regulatory provisions.
Regulatory Risk reporting is the vehicle for communicating the value that the Risk function brings to a bank. It allows for proactive risk management as bank identify and escalate issues either as they arise, or before they are realised to take a proactive approach to managing risks.
Regulatory reporting risk, is the risk arising from violations of laws, rules or regulations, or from noncompliance with internal policies or procedures or with the bank's business standards. Certain regulatory report information is used for public disclosure so investors, depositors, and creditors can better assess the financial condition of the reporting banks. An effective risk report is about focus and structure, in addition to content.
Enterprise-wide risk management is a process of coordinated risk management that places greater emphasis on co-operation among departments to manage banks range of risks as a whole. ERM offers a framework to effectively manage uncertainty, respond to risk and exploit opportunities as they arise. The framework comprises of policies, processes, tools, reports and ideal governance structure.
Risk Management Structure begins with appointment of Chief Risk Officer.
I. Chief Risk Officer:
The chief risk officer (CRO) is the corporate executive tasked with assessing and mitigating risks in a bank especially the regulatory ones and identifies technological threats to banks capital and earnings. The position is sometimes called chief risk management officer or simply risk management officer. His roles and responsibilities include:
1. Create an integrated risk framework: CRO’s primarily build an integrated risk management approach to create significant strategic advantage by bridging the gap between strategy and risk related threats.
2. Master plans to mitigate risks: A risk management master plan is a document or a Standard operating procedure to foresee risks, estimate impacts, and define responses to risks.
3. Disseminate risk analysis and progress reports to Bank Board: This is the opportunity of a successful CRO where he details all the possible risks and mitigants to board’s attention to enable them to take a decision.
4. Evaluate operational risk stemming from employee errors or system failures: Operational risk is un-avoidable but can be minimised. CRO’s need not be master minds to do this. Rather an eye to details such as Employee engagement, Statistical approaches, Scenario analysis and Scorecards will give fair idea to CRO's for minimizing the operational risks.
5. Define Risk Appetite of a bank: CRO needs to take part in deciding the amount and type of risk that bank is willing to take in order to meet their strategic objectives.
6. Conduct Risk Due Diligence: CRO has to involve himself in due diligence of different work streams of risks such as operational, credit, legal, tax, financial and other risks and residual risks.
7. Risk Data Analytics: CRO's responsibility is to transform risk with Predictive Analytics. Every task involves some amount of risk, and banks CRO needs to focus on managing these risks in a way so that they can avoid these threats and minimize the losses.
8. Develop risk maps: CRO should have the framework for whole risk map meaning identify, understand, evaluate, prioritize, manage and revisit the risks in a bank.
9. Execute Risk Transfer Strategies: CRO must identify the elements in a bank which require transfer of risk especially those with low probability of occurring, but has a large financial impact. The best response is to transfer a portion or all of the risk to a third party by outsourcing, purchasing insurance, hedging, or entering into partnerships.
10. Setting risk governance and culture: Risk management is a mind-set which alone CRO cannot manage. Instead CRO needs to continually spread the essence of risk into mind-set of not only bank staff but, from time to time to Sr. Management also.
11. Improving Strategic Risk Management: CRO needs to make Sr. Management understand that every business strategy needs initial risk assessment from his end to avoid fines or losses.
12. Maintain a Risk Register: CRO should maintain, the Risk Register which should list the risks that are identified through risk reports. CRO should describe each risk, the required actions to avoid or mitigate the risk, and which party is responsible for carrying out each action.
13. Design Controls Catalogue: The CRO with the help of departmental heads must design controls on process maps, identify critical risks and make the departmental head write a formal methodology to mitigate these risks.
14. Controls Testing: The best methodology for control testing is SOX control tests which the CRO can directly implement or create own banks control testing methodology to understand whether mitigants are actually working for the identified risks.
II. Risk Management Department:
Usually, risk management is a part of all banks but, all banks would not have risk management department. It is always recommended that all banks should set up dedicated risk management departments to monitor, manage, and measure all risks to the bank. The department is headed by the CRO and the staffs include Risk managers who work with bank to assess and identify the potential risks that may hinder the reputation, safety, security and financial prosperity of the bank.
III. Fiduciary Officer:
Fiduciary officer can be a part of risk structure or legal department. But it is recommended to include Fiduciary officer in the risk department as the officer usually have technical expertise in areas of fiduciary, planning, tax, regulatory, legal and compliance and can best identify the risks.
IV. Technology Risk Officer:
Technology risk officer directly reports to CRO who is accountable to identify key technology risks in a bank. The officer support reporting of IT-related risk events and escalate as needed to CRO. The officer also serves as technology risk advisor to key stakeholders for Business units and is expected to stay abreast of relevant technology risk and regulatory requirements.
V. Risk Observers:
Every department of the bank should have a risk observer (/S) who is responsible to whistle blow the risks to the risk management department of the bank.
Risk-based pricing is often recommended as a better way to set prices on consumer credit products. Risk-based pricing is not a new concept and has been around for many years. It is a way for businesses to compensate for the risk of different customer segments. The theory is relatively simple, with fixed pricing; the cost of risk is not evenly distributed among customer segments. Risk-based pricing is a strategy banks use to determine customer risk before assigning interest rates on their loans, whether retail, commercial or wholesale. By measuring the probability that a potential lender will default on a loan, banks can determine whether or not to issue the loan and, if so, the best interest rate possible. The below are the reasons why banks should follow Risk Based Pricing approach:
1. One size does not fit all: Banks need to think beyond 'one-size-fits-all' strategy to cater its customers. Banks should look at products and pricing based upon a total customer view and respond to the value that customers bring to the bank across the spectrum of rates, fees, features and services.
2. Optimizing Capital: One overall benefit of effective loan pricing is that it is one of the many ways a financial institution can optimize capital. Optimizing capital is important because it provides institutions with the ability and freedom to deploy capital for developing new products and new markets, addressing regulatory issues or navigating shifts in the macroeconomic environment.
3. Protection for Price Change: Risk based pricing provides the institution with defensible measures for justifying pricing changes and for avoiding charges of discriminatory pricing.
Standard Policies related to risk is a must for all banks. The document not only serves uniqueness of operations across the bank, its branches and subsidiaries but also, regulatory requirements during examinations from regulators. The policy should have the following minimum framework:
The risk policy document serves as a guideline for respective components of risk which have a common resonance across the bank.
Risk Management policy should cover processes/documentation to identify, assess and manage potential risks. It should provide a way for managers to make appropriate management decisions.
The Risk Management Policy should cover risk guidelines encompassing all key risk areas such as Business Risk, Operational Risk, technology risk, Strategic risk and Reputation risk.
The risk policy document should define the risk strategy and risk appetite for the bank.
The risk policy should detail internal controls which are effective in managing risks in accordance with the Board’s policies.
The risk policy should have time frame where senior management should monitor the effectiveness of internal control system.
The risk management document should have details on how bank will train and communicate organizational policy and information about the risk management programme to all staff.
The risk policy should define the roles and responsibilities of risk owners to ensure that the risk management processes are implemented in accordance with agreed risk management policy and strategy.
The risk policy should not only contain the risk of things going wrong, but also should have details of the impact of not taking opportunities or not capitalizing on banking strengths.
The risk policy should contain risk governance structure and well-defined roles and responsibilities.
The risk policy should and must contain risk management architecture for Sr. managers and Board of Directors (BOD) to manage banking risks.
Risk Library is a bouquet of all risk information in a single cloud/database. The risk library contains all risk frameworks and risk statements. Risk frameworks are used to group risk statements into manageable categories, while risk statements group the individual risks. The library helps to facilitate discussions of risks and their definitions, and it promotes both consistency and a culture of risk awareness. Like a library has racks, the risk library of the banks should minimum have the following racks (*the more the merrier):
Near Miss Data: Minimum 2-year data of near miss meaning those operational errors which could have impacted customer but were identified internally.
Risk RCA’s: Minimum 2-year data of all the route cause analysis for the risk breaches happened in the bank.
Checklist of Risk and exposures: Each departmental risk checklist along with the details of mitigations of these risks.
Exposure details: Banks risk exposure details to all financial and non-financial risks should be at one place:
Risk Calculations: All the details along with the details of methods for calculating the risk.
Risk policies and governance models.
Risk indicators and data analytics supporting those indicators.
Risk Impact details
Details of internal controls of risks and tests conducted (minimum for two years) to check the effectiveness of these internal controls.
Details of frauds done against the bank and details of internal mis-appropriation or lack of controls leading to fines from regulators.
A risk profile is an evaluation of a banks willingness and ability to take risks. It also refers to the threats to which the bank is exposed. The Risk Profile Assessment (RPA) is a tool that calculates the inherent risk of a project or programme that a bank wishes to take up. RPA is based on calculation of risk in each of the milestones in a project or decision of investment by the bank. An RPA must be completed no later than during development of a bank’s strategy. If a project’s scope or cost later changes significantly, another RPA must be completed as soon as possible and necessary Sr. Management approval accompanied by CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) needs to be re looked. Interim RPA while the project is in implementation stage also helps the banks to understand the change in the risk profile.
The risk score model is used in two areas of bank A. ‘While Credit Scoring’ and B. ‘While performing KYC’. The risk score model is a tool that is typically used in the decision-making process of accepting or rejecting a loan in case of 1 and risk assignment (High, Medium or Low) of a customer profile in case of 2. Both the risk scoring models should typically be a result of statistical inference based on the available information with the bank.
Risk Model Validation consists of assessing the risk of whether any model used by bank to ascertain a decision, to check whether the model contain any issue or is improperly build say the best practices guidelines and/or regulatory requirements are absent in these models. Model issues are due to flaws in design or technical implementation, while misuses are typically driven by an inadequate understanding of model assumptions or limitations. In all cases, these issues or misuses can lead to adverse banking decisions with potentially severe financial damage for the bank. It is recommended that the model validation is outsourced or to be performed by an independent party inside bank.
Risk assessment is a term used to describe the overall process or method where you Identify risk factors that have the potential to cause harm to the bank, analyse and evaluate the risk and determine appropriate ways to eliminate the risk or control the risk when the risk cannot be eliminated completely.
1. Goals of Risk Assessment:
Determine whether a control program is required for a particular risk or can be eliminated completely
What are the possible consequences of taking particular risks?
Determine if existing control measures are adequate or if more should be done.
2. Importance of Risk Assessment:
Create awareness of risks
Identify which department is at risk
To understand regulatory and legal requirements where applicable
Reasons a risk assessment is needed:
Before new processes or activities are introduced
Before changes are introduced to existing processes or activities
When high risks are identified
Planning a risk assessment:
Determine scope of risk assessment
Jurisdictions and department where the work activity takes place
The resources needed
List of stakeholders involved
What policies and procedures, relevant laws, regulations, codes, or standards should apply while doing assessment?
3. Risk Assessment Process:
Look at end to end aspects of the Job where assessment needs to be done and include non-routine activities too.
Study of complete the lifecycle of the product, process and services involving the risk.
Look at near miss, Error Logs and frauds (if any) in the records.
Include managers of all sites where this work is done.
Look at the process flows or back and forth in the process
Determine the access levels of employees and rights given to alter a product or instructions in core banking systems and other systems used
Review all of the phases of the process lifecycle.
Look at the balance of the groups working for the process such as fresher’s, experienced, in-experienced, persons with disabilities so on...
Determine the re-occurrence or likelihood of the risk identified and its severity.
Determine all the situations including system shrinkages, shutdowns, power outages, exigencies etc.
Review all available policies, procedures and SOP's governing the process
Identify actions necessary to eliminate the risk or control the risk using risk control methods.
Timely monitor to make sure the control continues to be effective.
The methods and procedures of storage and record retention of the data in a process
The duration and frequency of the task
Any possible interactions with other activities in the area done by other departments and if this risk could percolate or affect other dependent departments.
The education and training that the staffs have received.
Risk assessment is a term used to describe the overall process or method where you Identify risk factors that have the potential to cause harm to the bank, analyse and evaluate the risk and determine appropriate ways to eliminate the risk or control the risk when the risk cannot be eliminated completely.
1. Goals of Risk Assessment:
Determine whether a control program is required for a particular risk or can be eliminated completely
What are the possible consequences of taking particular risks?
Determine if existing control measures are adequate or if more should be done.
2. Importance of Risk Assessment:
Create awareness of risks
Identify which department is at risk
To understand regulatory and legal requirements where applicable
Reasons a risk assessment is needed:
Before new processes or activities are introduced
Before changes are introduced to existing processes or activities
When high risks are identified
Planning a risk assessment:
Determine scope of risk assessment
Jurisdictions and department where the work activity takes place
The resources needed
List of stakeholders involved
What policies and procedures, relevant laws, regulations, codes, or standards should apply while doing assessment?
3. Risk Assessment Process:
Look at end to end aspects of the Job where assessment needs to be done and include non-routine activities too.
Study of complete the lifecycle of the product, process and services involving the risk.
Look at near miss, Error Logs and frauds (if any) in the records.
Include managers of all sites where this work is done.
Look at the process flows or back and forth in the process
Determine the access levels of employees and rights given to alter a product or instructions in core banking systems and other systems used
Review all of the phases of the process lifecycle.
Look at the balance of the groups working for the process such as fresher’s, experienced, in-experienced, persons with disabilities so on...
Determine the re-occurrence or likelihood of the risk identified and its severity.
Determine all the situations including system shrinkages, shutdowns, power outages, exigencies etc.
Review all available policies, procedures and SOP's governing the process
Identify actions necessary to eliminate the risk or control the risk using risk control methods.
Timely monitor to make sure the control continues to be effective.
The methods and procedures of storage and record retention of the data in a process
The duration and frequency of the task
Any possible interactions with other activities in the area done by other departments and if this risk could percolate or affect other dependent departments.
The education and training that the staffs have received.
RCAP is a collection of corrective actions put together so that the aggregate plan will eliminate the causes of the process non-conformances in a bank.
The plan includes: ‘the corrective actions’, ‘who is responsible for the entire plan’, and ‘criteria to measure effectiveness of the plan’. The RCAP process starts once an incident occurs and is reported, investigated and determined to possess a ‘significant’ risk potential.
Corrective action steps are developed to reduce or minimize the specific causal factors that resulted in the exposure. In the RCAP process, events are analysed based on banks’ exposure, actual or potential cost and probability of reoccurrence.
In a large and diverse organization, the challenge of managing the various aspects of a Risk Management corrective action process (RCAP) can be tremendous. To understand the scope and depth of the RCAP process, one must understand that ‘ RCA (Root Cause Analysis)’ and ‘Incident Investigation’ in a large and diverse organization can yield a magnitude of data, and there must be competent staff available to interpret the data and make evaluations of trends and causal factors in order to start the RCAP process.
The some of the important data that bank receives for preparation of RCAP is as given below:
Complaints (Internal/External Customer)
Surveys
Internal Audit
Service Breaches
SLA Breaches
Internal Control Testing
Whistle Blower information
Code of Conduct Escalations
Fraud Detections
Losses
File Suits
Regulators Information
Vendor information
Major Incidents Report
IT Flaws Report
Every bank should have a minimum design of risk or a Master framework which needs to be drilled down and kept in records. A snapshot of model master design is given below:
a. Investments:
Measure Concentration Risk on all Assets
Measure Inflations Risk
Managing Interest Rate Risk
b. Credit:
Collaterals on all Loans
Security Deposits
Letter of Undertaking (LOU) with Collateral
Letter of Credit only to long related customers and certain reliable customers.
Counter Party (Screened for all risks)
Default (Genuine customers who can repay)
Country (Abide by local requirements)
Settlement (Risk of Counterparty not settling the transactions)
c. Operations:
Unable to meet Regulatory Requirements
Std. Rules Policies and regulations not available
Adherence to local laws
Malpractices
Reporting gaps
Compliance
Frauds
Breaches
Business Continuity
No Back-up plans
Errors (No Controls in place)
Size and Type (No control over branches and expansion)
Responding to an identified risk is the biggest challenge in a bank. Usually war-rooms are created to respond the risks and action points are put forth to Sr. Management and Board. There can be several responses to the risks such as:
Reduce: Action plan to reduce the likelihood or impact related to the risk.
Alternatives: List down the activities which can be alternatives to mitigate the identified risks such as Insure or Outsource or transfer the risk.
Accept: There are no alternatives and the bank has to stay with these risks. Negotiations can help to reduce such risks.
Avoid: Not doing something whose result is definitely negative or exiting the activities giving rise to such risks.
Risk communication in banks includes the range of communications required for Risk Preparedness, Risk Responses and Risk Recovery plans.
Risk communication is used primarily as the dissemination of information to the banking staff about risk events, such as IT disruption, Data Compromise or cyber theft, Regulatory changes, attempts to theft and fraud, Mis-selling, Un-authorized trading, Organizational Change, etc.
There can be difficulty in risk communications due to:
1. Complexity of Regulatory Prescriptions: These are those communications which does not come with great clarity as there are always interpretation differences in regulatory prescriptions.
2. Communication to only right to know staff or to all: Every risk communication usually is not for all staff but limited to only “Right to know information” staff only. The decision needs to be diligently taken by risk managers as what information should be percolated to some (right to know staff) and to the whole staff.
3. Fragmentation of Opinions: Risk communications usually raises several questions from staff and generally staff opinions differ with each other. Alignment of management expectations with staff opinion is what risk managers should know.
4. Credibility of information: Risk information cannot be proliferated just like that, however, required to be investigated that the information is credible and received from credible or trusted sources.
In today’s changing banking, risk communication is recognized as two-way communication and engagement with affected population is so important. Most appropriate and trusted channels of communication and engagement are the requirement of the day for banks. The literature on the purposes of risk communication generally takes a management perspective.
Accordingly, risk communication serves to:
Communicate to raise awareness
Communicate to Encourage Protective Behaviour
Communicate to build up knowledge on risks
Communicate to promote acceptance of risks and management measures
Communicate on how to behave during events
Communicate to reassure the audience (to reduce anxiety)
Communicate to Improve relationships (build trust, cooperation, networks)
Communicate to enable mutual dialogue and understanding
Communicate Involving actors of decision making
Risk communications require regular monitoring as it may become mechanical, meaningless, and do not help manage and control banks Sr. Management or board with its vision to control the risks. Unmonitored for outcome risk communications, consumes and wastes valuable resources, are ineffective and create a false sense of achievement.
In risk communication, trust is the currency of transaction but, usually banks do the mistake of communicating the risk via e-mails without explanation. Banking Risk communication should imply willingness to disclose information which they can generate by appropriate training followed by the risk communication or at least a discussion session with risk managers.
Most banking organizations assess risk through previous experience or business acumen, which is not based on a precise science and hence, this method of risk assessment will not be accurate. Quantifying risk is a vital part of making important business decisions for banks.
Mistakes can lead to an increase in production costs, delays in deliveries, and non-compliance with regulatory norms. Therefore, it is very essential for banking businesses to perform a risk assessment with Data Analytics. Some of the features of data analytics are as given below:
If a bank wants to design the most effective data model for risk assessment, Bank should know the internal and external data flow of the organization. Only then it can check for security lapses or intentional violations.
It is very necessary to classify the data so that it can be checked for sensitivity. This will help bank to set the parameters of Risk algorithm to carry out the risk assessment in a more aggressive manner.
The data analytics process must have a number of iterations so that risk data model achieves a high level of accuracy.
A risk data model should successfully handle structured, semi-structured, and unstructured data.
Integration of risk data with AI is needed to validate the data and identify anomalies.
The machine learning model used by banks must be capable of cognitive behaviour so that it can carry out predictive analysis and produce reliable outputs.
Cyber risk can be defined as operational risks to information and technology assets that have consequences affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information or information systems. Confidentiality issues arise when private information within a firm is disclosed to third parties as in the case of data breaches. Integrity issues relate to misuse of the systems, as is the case for fraud. Finally, availability issues are linked to business disruptions. The three types of cyber-attacks have different direct impacts on the targets. More generally, the risk of a loss of confidence following cyber-attacks could be high for the banks, given the reliance of banks on the trust of their customers. Among cyber-attacks, fraud and data breaches are more prevalent, keeping in mind that the banking business disruption cannot be taken lightly. In banks, business disruption is mainly associated with DDoS attacks (details discussed below) which typically impact the website of the target (when a very large number of requests are sent to the targeted servers, overloading the system and making it unable to operate), data breaches are linked with credit card information, and fraud is associated with money transfers. Banks are particularly exposed to cyber risk due to their reliance on critical infrastructures and their dependence on highly interconnected networks. Critical financial market infrastructures include payment and settlement systems, trading platforms, central securities depositories, and central counterparties. The critical infrastructures represent a 'Single Point of Failure' and any successful attack could have wide-ranging consequence. Cyber-attacks on retail banking activities are most affected with approximately 40% of the total and credit cards services approximately 25% were the main business lines targeted.
Cyber-attacks can be used for fraudulent purposes, such as theft using SWIFT
Access to confidential information, including clients’ credentials used for online payment can be used by cyber-criminals.
Cyber-attacks can be used to undermine customers’ confidence in an institution. For example, on June 27, 2014, Bulgaria’s largest domestic bank FIB experienced a depositor run, amid heightened uncertainty due to the resolution of another bank following phishing emails indicating that FIB was experiencing a liquidity shortage. Deposits outflows on that day amounted to 10% of the banks’ total deposits and the bank had to use a liquidity assistance scheme provided by the authorities.
Cyber-attacks can target multiple financial institutions to disrupt the financial sector. Several countries have been exposed to coordinated cyber-attacks on the banking sector using DDoS, although no significant damages have been reported so far.
Technological innovations may increase vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks, as specialized firms might have fewer controls.
Greater use of technology could also expand the range and numbers of entry points into the banking system, which hackers could target.
Banking activities could also increase third-party reliance, where firms outsource activities to a few concentrated providers. In this case, the disruption of a provider could increase systemic risk due to the centrality of the service provider.
Banks should know that no bank is safe from a data breach. Everyone is aware through media that millions of banking records were stolen, banking sites were hacked, banking dealings exposed. These all constitute banks to develop best of cyber security strategies. Banks have no choice but to create updated cyber security plans and data breach prevention strategies. Some of the strategies that banks should and must have are:
1. Encrypt all Sensitive Information:
Banks should encrypt every sensitive file, no matter if it’s in transit to a recipient or stored on a server, is critical to avoiding a data breach. This strategy should be one of the most important practices in banks cyber security. This is a must as even if a cyber-attack is successful at getting into banking network, it will not be able to read the information in the files.
2. Incident Response Plan:
Incident response plan in place can help, a compromised system vulnerability dealt quickly and efficiently. An incident response plan is a systematic and documented method of approaching and managing situations resulting from IT security incidents or breaches. It is used in banking IT environments and facilities to identify, respond, limit and counteract security incidents as they occur.
3. Abide Security Laws:
There are several security laws laid by international community and regulators and local community and regulators both have to be taken into consideration and an effective document having details of abiding by these laws should form one of the cyber strategies in a bank. Some of the laws are:
1. SOX: The Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) Act of 2002 is a crucial piece of legislation aimed at protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that impacts a corporation's stakeholders.
2. PCI DSS: The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is an information security standard for banks.
3. GDPR: The General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 ("GDPR") is a regulation in EU law on data protection and privacy.
4. Staff Training on Cyber Security and retention of talent:
Banks should have full-fledged at least one day training for all staff on cyber-security and just not rely on e-learning modules which is rarely read by the staff. Also, banks should have strong retention plans for highly talented cyber security professionals and should train them with latest on cyber-security from time to time.
5. Cyber Security Health Check-ups:
Cyber Security Health Check-up is identifying where the vulnerabilities exist and the risk exposures these systems may pose.
6. Build Cyber Security Operating Models:
The cyber security operating model in a bank should minimum have the following:
Bank Security Governance Model
Security Control Framework
Critical Security Functions
Security Metrics
Management Oversight
A cyber-attack is an intentional exploitation of computer systems, networks, and technology-dependent enterprises. These attacks use malicious code to modify computer code, data, or logic culminating into destructive consequences that can compromise a banks data and promulgate cybercrimes such as information and identity theft. Cyber-attacks are of two types one, those banks that know they have been hacked, and other banks those who don’t yet know they have been hacked. The second type of cyber-attack on banks is dangerous. In 2015, the banking industry discovered a startling new type of threat; a massive cybercriminal ring was targeting banks using Carbanak malware. The machines infected with this malware operated under the radar of banking security systems for two years, attacking the banks’ internal money-processing services and automated teller machines (ATMs). By the time they were uncovered by Kaspersky Labs, the attacks had already infiltrated over 100 banks in 30 countries, with thieves making off with as much as $1 billion. Hence, regular health check-ups on systems are a mandate for all banks.
There are several types of cyber-attacks that a bank can get exposed to let’s learn few important ones as a banker one should know:
1. Phishing: Phishing is a type of social engineering usually employed to steal banks data such as credit card numbers, customer personal information, login credentials etc. Phishing usually happens through mails where a malware (malicious software) is inserted on banks database by sending a link to employees through emails which when opened by any staff of the bank, the malware starts hacking/blocking the systems of the bank.
2. Malware Attack: A malware attack is a type of cyber-attack in which malware or malicious software performs activities on the banks computer systems, usually without banks knowledge.
3. Ransomware: Ransomware is a type of malicious software, or malware, designed to deny access to computer systems or data of a bank until a ransom is paid by the bank.
4. Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks: DOS/DDOS aims at shutting down a banks network or service, causing it to be inaccessible to its intended users. The attacks accomplish this mission by overwhelming the target with traffic or flooding it with information that triggers a crash.
5. Eavesdropping Attack: These attacks target weakened transmissions between the client and server that enable the attacker to receive network transmissions. An attacker can install network monitors such as sniffers on a server or computer to perform an eavesdropping attack and intercept data as it is being transmitted.
6. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack: Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are a type of cyber-security breach that allows an attacker to eavesdrop a communication between two entities. The attack occurs between two legitimate communicating parties, enabling the attacker to intercept communication they should otherwise not be able to access. Thus the name “man-in-the-middle”, the attacker “listens” to the conversation by intercepting the public key message transmission and retransmits the message while interchanging the requested key with middle men’s own key. The two parties seem to communicate as usual, without knowing the message sender is an unknown perpetrator trying to modify and access the message before it is transmitted to the receiver. Thus, the intruder controls the whole communication.
7. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Cross-site scripting (XSS) is where the attacker sends malicious scripts into content from reputable bank websites. It happens when a dubious source is allowed to attach its own code into web applications, and the malicious code is bundled together with dynamic content that is then sent to the victim’s browser. Malicious code is usually sent in the form of pieces of Java script code executed by the target’s browser. The exploits can include malicious executable scripts in many languages including Flash, HTML, Java, and Ajax. XSS attacks can be very devastating; however, alleviating the vulnerabilities that enable these attacks is relatively simple.
8. SQL Injection: SQL Injection (SQLi) is a type of an injection attack that makes it possible to execute malicious SQL statements. These statements control a database server behind a web application. Attackers can use SQL Injection vulnerabilities to bypass application security measures.
9. Zero Day Exploit: Zero-day vulnerability is a software, hardware or firmware flaw unknown to the manufacturer. When hackers leverage that flaw to conduct a cyber-attack, it's called a zero-day exploit. The term “zero-day” comes from the fact that the vulnerability has yet to be fixed by security professionals.
10. Drive by attack: A cyber attacker looks for an insecure website and plants a malicious script into PHP or HTTP in one of the pages. This script can install malware into the computer that visits this website or become an IFRAME that redirects the victim’s browser into a site controlled by the attacker.
11. Trojan attack: A Trojan horse or Trojan is a type of malware that is often disguised as legitimate software. Trojans can be employed by cyber-thieves and hackers trying to gain access to users' systems. Users are typically tricked by some form of social engineering into loading and executing Trojans on their systems.
12. Brute-Force and Dictionary Network Attacks: Dictionary and brute-force attacks are networking attacks whereby the attacker attempts to log into a user’s account by systematically checking and trying all possible passwords until finding the correct one.
Cyber attackers are harsh and smart as well. They take extreme care in developing convincing phishing emails that appear to be legitimate banking communications to trick bank employees or third parties with access to bank systems into handing over their user credentials. Once inside, attackers exploit known vulnerabilities. One phishing campaign drove attackers to steal over $100 million from the Bangladesh central bank account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Attackers spied on the Bangladesh Bank for weeks before the attack, quietly infiltrating dozens of computers with phishing attacks to steal credentials for payment transfers. Gone are the days when bank robbers used to commit physical acts the way they used to. This new generation of cybercriminals have intimate knowledge of banking systems’ inner workings and are using vulnerabilities to their advantage. However, there are steps to stop attackers:
1. Implement an enterprise-wide security policy: A well-defined security policy serves as a crucial road map for any bank IT team to maintain a truly adaptive security architecture.
2. Health check-ups of systems: Organizations must constantly monitor their network for changes to configurations and ensure that these changes are approved and compliant with policy.
3. Sr. Management's awareness: It’s crucial for senior management to have an accurate picture of the organization’s security posture at all times and the ability to act quickly to close any gaps.
4. System Testing: Encourage IT team in a bank to do testing of software in regular intervals of time by assuming that the banks systems have already been compromised.
Cyber risk has emerged as a key threat to banks stability, following recent attacks on banks. It has now become important for the banks to understand where in their whole system of operations, the data was compromised. There is more, cyber risk around the world for banks should analyse the different types of cyber incidents such as data breaches, fraud and business disruption and to identify the patterns using a variety of datasets. But, banks face severe problems even to collect the data on cyber incidents as they are scarce and there have been very few quantitative analyses of cyber risk, also banks have no incentives to report them. The risk arises from a range of external and internal factors at banks such as:
Banking customers moving away from using cash and checks and relying more on electronic banking to complete transactions.
Lack of user privilege segregation
Missing transaction business controls
Poor password policies
Inadequate access controls
Lack of global standards across all business units and divisions
Bank apps and websites can easily be cloned.
Lack of server security
Insecure or ineffective data storage
Inadequate or ineffective encryption
Banks can use cyber risk quant models to assess operational risk assessment for and develop a framework for an analysis of cyber risk. The quant model analysis yields estimates and distribution of aggregate bank losses due to cyber-attacks. The results are particularly important for the banks, since regulators require banks to hold risk capital for operational losses which might result from cyber-attacks. Now a day’s banks employ actuarial science specialists to analyse the statistical properties of cyber-attacks by using tools from actuarial science. Risk measures show how much capital a firm needs to cover the losses with a given confidence level. Some banks calculate aggregated losses computed with Monte Carlo simulations, assuming that the frequency of each cyber event follows a Poisson distribution.
Not only measuring of Cyber risk is important, Banks are also required to set up a structure to report cyber risks. Some of the aspects of cyber security in banks are given below:
1. Cyber Risk Reporting Structure:
In banks the CIOs (chief information officers) or CISOs (chief information security officers) should take responsibility to report Cyber risks with the help of departmental risk managers. Banks Boards and Risk committee in a bank should have reports of Cyber "Key Risk Indicators" (KRIs) handy. The reports should be structured and consistent with minimum words and high level of details. IT and security executives should take help from data analytics team to compile cyber risk data. The report should have clear writings on implications of risk levels for business processes.
2. Real-time Cyber Risk Data:
Banks should have real-time security analytics platform that ingests, normalizes, enriches, triages, and manages application and security data. The banks should have minimal controls for real time data:
Advanced statistical and data science models.
Real-time ingestion and stream processing for threat analysis.
Machine learning models for threat detection.
Over the weekend of February 2016, a group of hackers attempted to steal $951 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank (BCB) in Dhaka. Much of this was eventually recovered, but the thieves still managed to get away with $81 million. The attempt is considered one of the biggest bank heists of all time. The thieves were organized, well networked and well-funded. But their success was, more than anything else; down to weaknesses in the institutions they robbed. Understanding exactly what went wrong in the BCB hack which has been suggested by some to be linked to the WannaCry Ransomware attack of May 2017 can provide banking businesses with invaluable lessons in how to improve their security strategies.
The hack was highly complex, and took place over several lines of attack:
1. The theft involved manipulating the SWIFT system – a digital messaging platform that manages many of the world’s interbank financial transfers – to fool the New York branch of the U.S. Federal Reserve (which holds many international banking assets) into transferring funds to accounts owned by the thieves.
2. Pretending to be the BCB, the thieves sent fake instructions over SWIFT to the New York Fed, asking for some funds to be transferred to bank accounts in Southeast Asia.
3. SWIFT usually notifies banks of transfers by sending the order to a bank’s printers. But in this case, the attackers disabled the BCB’s printers with a piece of malware. This meant the bank’s employees in Bangladesh were not aware that the heist was going on.
4. By the time the BCB reactivated its printer and received the notifications of the transfers – and requests from the New York Fed for clarification — it was already too late and the money had been sent.
5. While a series of spelling and formatting errors in the thieves’ SWIFT instructions halted the vast majority of the transactions, a total of $81 million was transferred to banks in Southeast Asia and quickly laundered through, among other places, the Manila casino system.
It was one of the most audacious and successful bank robberies in history. But what can banks learn from it?
1. Workers who install SWIFT system or any other such software should follow official guidelines to stop security vulnerabilities.
2. The receiving branches of the instructions should be aware of inconsistencies (and that too if found in a series from the same bank) in the fraudulent SWIFT orders
3. Strong controls should be in place in banks so that malware attacks can be sabotaged
4. Beware of self-employees and inside job in a bank especially with the credentials such as swift credentials as in this case study.
5. Every bank must keep an eye on their employees as an employee might pose a risk unconsciously, through carelessness. They could be tricked into clicking on a link or attachment through a spear-phishing campaign.
6. Educating staff about the many ways a computer system can be compromised is critical if a bank is to have the strongest cyber defense possible. It’s also important to learn how to spot the early warning signs of employees who might pose a security risk, whether through malice or error. Companies should assess which employees are accessing what type of information and take the appropriate steps to restrict their access to that information if that person is deemed to pose a risk.
7. Banks should have security protocols and guidelines and these protocols must be continually tested and reviewed, where needed, altered to make sure they can confront the threats posed by an ever-changing risk landscape. Banks need to ensure their staff are properly educated and trained in what to do, how to do it, and educated in the consequences of failing to follow proper processes.
8. Every Banks should have real-time fraud detection system or they need to be built in a way that captures even the most extreme eventualities.
Sound risk governance requires that fundamental risk principles be understood in their depth and applied in spirit. Risk governance principles are, above all, the responsibility of the Board of Directors and its senior executives and management bodies in a banking institution. The members of board and senior executives have to flow the risk management principles in internal policies to communicate them effectively throughout the Bank. They also have to oversee the implementation of Risk principles through management decisions and actions. The design and implementation of a sound risk process is largely the responsibility of Credit Risk Officers (CRO’s) and risk managers. Banks need to determine their appetite for different types and levels of risk, carefully taking into consideration their organizational capacity to manage such risks. The comprehensive understanding of that risk appetite throughout the various levels of a bank should drive the balancing of risk and return, the allocation of capital, product pricing, as well as incentives and remuneration structures for employees, management, and Board members.
Bear Stearns founded in 1923, it became one of the world's largest investment banks, securities trader, and brokerage firm operating globally with headquarters in New York. Bear Stearns was an investment bank that survived the Great Depression only to succumb to the Great Recession. Bear Stearns had a reputation as an aggressive trading bank willing to take risks. The firm was proud of its reputation as a company and Fortune magazine listed the firm as one the most admired securities firms in 2005 through 2007 in its annual survey of most admired from companies. In 2006, it produced $9 billion in revenue, earned $2 billion in profits, and employed over 13,000 employees worldwide. Its stock market capitalization was $20 billion in 2007. This well-respected firm offered a variety of successful financial services.
Bear Stearns sponsored two hedge funds through its subsidiary, Bear Stearns Asset Management. The main fund, the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, was made up of complex derivatives backed by home mortgages. During most of its life it was highly profitable but as the housing market began to stutter in late 2006 the returns suffered. This fund was leveraged at 35 times its invested funds. As the market worsened the returns of the two funds sank. In urging investors to stay put the fund managers promised an eminent turnaround of the market (two Bear Stearns executives were subsequently indicted for misleading investors). In June 2007, Bear Stearns pledged a collateralized loan of around $3.2 billion to arrest the deteriorating value of the High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund. It also was negotiating with other lenders to lend additional money to the other fund – Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leverage Fund. Both funds were invested almost exclusively in very thinly traded collateralized debt obligations. As the market downturn accelerated the funds were left with billions of dollars of money losing securities that were unmarketable. Investors were trying to cut their losses and flee. Lenders, such as Merrill Lynch and J.P Morgan were threatening to seize the collateral. Bear Stearns managers tried to convince investors to allow more time for the situation to turn around and invest more money to plug the widening gap under the theory that the housing market dip was only a temporary blip. The investors attempted to get
Bear Stearns to invest its own money to arrest the losses estimated at the time to be around $1.6 billion which was dismissed out of hand.
Merrill Lynch did eventually seize $850 million of the underlying collateral but was able to sell little of it in the market. This focused the markets’ and investors’ attention to the underlying value of the assets. It sparked fears that the Bear Stearns funds may need to dump assets into an already fragile market driving down the mark to market value of other assets in other portfolios.
In January 2008, Moody's downgraded Bear's mortgage-backed securities to B or below. That was junk bond status. Now Bear was having trouble raising enough capital to stay afloat. On Monday, March 10, 2008, Schwartz thought he had resolved the hedge fund problem. He had worked with Bear's bankers to write down loans. Bear had $18 billion in cash reserves. On March 11, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced its Terms Securities Lending Facility. It gave banks like Bear a credit guarantee. But investors thought this was a veiled attempt to bail out Bear. The same day, Moody's downgraded Bear's MBS to B and C levels. The two events triggered an old-fashioned bank run on Bear Stearns. Its clients pulled out their deposits and investments. At 7:45 p.m. on March 13, Bear Stearns' only had $3.5 billion left in cash. How did that happen so quickly? Like many other Wall Street banks, Bear relied on short-term loans called repurchase agreements. It traded its securities to other banks for cash. The so-called repo agreement lasted anywhere from overnight to a few weeks. When the repo ended, the banks simply reversed the transaction. The lender earned a quick and easy 2-3 percent premium. Bear hemorrhaged cash when the other banks called in their repos and refused to lend more.
No one wanted to get stuck with the Bear's junk securities.
Bear didn't have enough cash to open for business the next morning. It asked its bank, JP Morgan Chase, for a $25 billion overnight loan. Chase CEO Jamie Dimon needed more time to research Bear's real value before making a commitment. He asked the New York Federal Reserve bank to guarantee the loan so Bear could open on Friday. Yet Bear's stock price plummeted when the markets opened the next day. That weekend, Chase realized Bear Stearns was worth only $236 million. That was just one-fifth the value of its headquarters building. To solve the problem, the Federal Reserve held its first emergency weekend meeting in 30 years..
The Fed lent up to $30 billion to Chase to purchase Bear.
Learning’s:
1. Absence of Risk Governance and weak supervision can lead to a bank taking undue risk and failing to maintain sufficient capital against the constellation of risks it faces.
2. Failure of Bank and banking groups to have in place a comprehensive risk management process to identify, evaluate, monitor, and control or mitigate all material risks and to assess their overall capital adequacy in relation to the risk profile.
3. Failure of credit risk management process.
Mechanisms to control, ‘Identification, Assessment, Management’ and ‘Communication’ of risks.
Minimize Risk threats and enhance opportunities.
To improve the effectiveness of risk management and control within Banks.
To enhance standards of risk management within the banking sector, thus raising confidence among the wider shareholders, public and business.
To enhance the competitiveness and financial sustainability of banks by implementing risk governance standards.
Determine Key Risk Indicators (KRI) and Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to align with banks goals.
Planning risk-handling activities.
Governance around entering risk directives in business policy documents.
It is important that management participate in risk policy development and visibly support the policy.
The banks should strategically align risks with business requirements and relevant laws and regulations.
Bank leadership must recognize the value of risk management, invests time in proliferating information of risk among people and processes, Bank leadership must encourage discussion and debate, and treats risk management in the same fashion as every other business requirement.
Governance around correctness of policies so that it can also be used as teaching/influence banking staff behaviour.
Governance around risk tolerance during decision making (such as new product launch, new strategy of the bank etc.) addresses how much deviance from a specific objective the company is willing to allow.
Governance around framing risk tolerance while initiating cost-cutting strategies in the bank
Governance around risk tolerance while issuing loans.
Governance of risk tolerance during analysing and managing important risk issues.
Governance of risk tolerance while doing aggressive investments.
Senior Managers should take responsibility to emphasize bank staff on risk culture
Senior Managers in bank take reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches in the areas for which they are responsible.
Bank should hold individual Senior Managers to account (such as lower remuneration and disciplinary actions) when regulatory breaches and other failures occur due to negligence or ignoring risks.
Senior managers to focus accountability on senior individuals, by specifying which senior managers are responsible for what job tasks and the steps they need to take to prevent any breach occurring in their area of business for which they have responsibility.
Sr. Management should oversee controls laid down for governance structure and avoid concentration of power to one individual.
Sr. Management should bring a balance of required risk expertise to the Board/committees comprising of Credit, Market, Operational, IT, Reputational, Environmental and Social, Strategic risk managers.
Sr. Management should have overall understanding of various roles of the front line units, the risk control units, and the audit functions within a bank
Sr. Management should set-out clear terms of reference and term limits for board members and committee members
Sr. Management should bring effective risk practices to help board approve the bank’s strategy, capital plan, financial plan frameworks
Sr. Management should actively oversee the ‘Risk Appetite Framework’ and insist on stress testing.
Sr. Management should ensure Audit and Risk Committees have overlap and communicate to each other
Sr. Management should meet with Regulators and other authorities at least once in a quarter.
In order to understand this case study, one needs to understand what a Letter of Undertaking is?
Example of LOU is as given below:
“Mr. X is a businessman who wants to buy raw materials from PQR Company which is in Singapore. Now, this PQR Company has to be paid through a Singapore bank, and Mr. X doesn't have any account in any Singapore bank. But Mr. X has an account in ICICI in India. So Mr. X approaches ICICI and asks for a LOU. Mr. X can then show this LOU to a bank in Singapore and get Buyer's Credit from that bank, which he then uses to pay PQR Company. So, in other terms, LOU is like a guarantee or assurance from ICICI to the bank in Singapore, that if things go wrong or Mr. X is unable to pay/settle his credit, ICICI will settle it.”
Fraudulent transactions worth Rs.11400 Crore found at PNB's (Punjab National Bank) Brady House branch in Mumbai. The PNB in its cautionary note to other public and private sector banks said that the suspected fraud was carried out by the perpetrators in collusion with the staff. It went on to explain the modus operandi of the scam and said: "It was found through SWIFT trail that one junior level branch official unauthorized and fraudulently issued Letters of Undertaking (LoU) on behalf of some companies belonging to Nirav Modi Group for availing buyers' credit from overseas branches of Indian Banks." It further said that none of the transactions were routed through the Core Banking Solution or CBS system, thus avoiding early detection of fraudulent activity.
On 29 January, a PNB official from Mumbai filed a criminal complaint with India’s federal investigative agency against three companies and four people, including billionaire jeweller Nirav Modi and Mehul Choksi, the managing director of Gitanjali Gems Ltd, saying they had defrauded the bank and caused a loss of Rs.280 crore ($43.8 million). PNB says that on 16 January the accused firms presented a set of import documents to the Mumbai branch and requested buyers’ credit to pay overseas suppliers. Since they had no pre-arranged credit limit, the branch official asked the companies to put down the full amount as collateral so the bank could issue LoUs to authorize the credit.
When the firms argued that they had used such facilities in the past without keeping any money on margin, PNB scanned through records and found no trace of any transactions, according to the bank’s account. It then found that two junior employees had issued LoUs on the SWIFT interbank messaging system without entering the transactions on the bank’s own system. Such transactions went on for years without detection, PNB said. Banking sources have said in some banks the SWIFT system, which is used for international transactions, and the core banking system work independently of each other. In PNB’s case, it said the outstanding LoUs were not available on its core banking system run on Infosys’s Finacle software, thus the LoUs issued went undetected.
Lessons:
Always there has to be an interface between Core banking solutions (such as finacle in this case study) and other outsourced systems (such as Swift in this case study).
There should be a threshold beyond which Sr. Manager in the bank branch needs to authorize the payments apart from maker and checker.
Management reports and dashboards needs to be maintained monthly in order to have proper controls on processes.
Loans should not be processed without credit limits being set or collateral in place.
Every customer should be treated the same and facilities extended should be the same. If any special considerations are given to Customers, should be authorized at least by two senior managers in the bank.
Action all the complaints and subpoenas/ summons on time.
While framing organization’s ‘Governance Risk Management’ framework, the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Risk Managers should be given a free hand.
Effective CROs, who are concerned with what the institution may not know hence, should be given a chance to offer a ‘contrarian point of view’ and govern the decision-making process in a bank.
CRO’s and Risk managers should be evaluators and approvers of all policy frameworks, compliance implementations, legal works and Complains escalations.
Banks should make mandatory for CRO's and Risk managers to regularly schedule executive sessions including the board.
Risk managers should be independent to give their views on decision-making processes, performance evaluations, compensation decisions and impact of changes in the banking business environment.
While strategy-setting, business planning and forecasting processes risk tools such as stress testing should be baked up to visualize the effect of potential future events on the institution’s revenues, costs, profits, cash flow and market share.
First Line of Defence:
Risk managers should embed risk management framework and sound risk management practices into standard operating procedures.
Risk Managers should monitor risk management performance in operations.
Risk Managers should ensure that all business process models are spic and span.
The internal controls are in place.
Second Line of Defence:
Time to time test risk controls (e.g., Sox testing).
Ensure risk policies and procedures have sufficient detailing of risks in a process design.
Ensure key controls are present for every process.
Third Level of Defence:
Confirm levels of compliance.
Recommend improvements and enforce corrective actions where necessary.
Do Risk Audit and recommend mitigations and improvements.
Ensure Audit recommendations are implemented.
Ultimately, the employees are responsible to identify the risks and report to their supervisors to manage it. Hence, only communication with the staff is not the effective way to manage risks. The management should have regular engagement with their employees. This is how they can make each staff responsible a risk agent in the bank.
1. Alliance- Bank to include Risk as one of its ‘Core Values’:
The senior leadership of the banks should communicate ‘risk’ as one of the core values of the bank. The leadership should articulate the importance of risk management and they show this by ‘living by this value’. Management should communicate to the staff the impact of process risks if rules and regulations are not followed or Standards are breached. Management should coach their staff to be successful risk managers.
2. Competence- Role Clarity:
Coaching engagements with staff should have ‘clarity regarding expectations’ of the bank aligned to the values and goals of the Bank. While giving clarity of the role to its staff, management should also engage and encourage its staff to think risk in every step of process. Each staff through management should be aware of the skills required by them and competencies in the role they are performing with risk in their mind.
3. Risk Tools-Manage Uncertainty:
Risk management tools allow uncertainty to be addressed by identifying and generating metrics, parameterizing, prioritizing, and developing responses, and tracking risk. Management has the responsibility to supply the relevant risk tools to its staff. If this requires investments by bank in terms of training and building IT enabled tools, it is worth for a bank to invest.
4. Motivation-For Great Outcomes:
Through regular engagements, management should facilitate staff with proper motivation to identify risks. Committed staff comes with great outcomes of risk impact and mitigation.
"It was difficult to Wells Fargo to sweep up broken glass as they were finding it all over the place". It started in September 2016, when Wells Fargo shocked the nation and announced it had fired 5,300 workers over several years for creating millions of fake accounts. Beyond opening as many as 3.5 million unauthorized bank and credit card accounts, Wells Fargo has admitted to charging customers for mortgage fees they didn't deserve and forcing them into car insurance they didn't need. Some people even had their cars repossessed as a result. And the bank discovered that some workers altered documents about business customers a finding that reportedly sparked a Justice of Department investigation.
You could describe the fake-accounts scandal not as a scam that Wells Fargo pulled on its customers, but rather as a scam that Wells Fargo’s employees pulled on Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo’s retail bankers were under a lot of pressure to open accounts, so they responded by opening fake accounts. The customers got fake accounts, which in some cases affected their credit scores or cost them money in fees. Meanwhile Wells Fargo wanted to sell more products to make more money, and told its employees to sell more products, and paid those employees because it thought they were selling more products, but in fact those employees were secretly not selling products at all, and were defrauding Wells Fargo by taking paychecks for work they weren’t doing.
Wells Fargo failed to disclose to investors that the success of its cross-sell efforts was built on sales practice misconduct at the bank. Driven by strict and unrealistic sales goals, employees in Wells Fargo’s Community Bank division engaged in fraudulent sales practices, including the opening of millions of fake deposit and credit card accounts without customers’ knowledge. Through a significant incentive compensation program, employees who met these targets were eligible for promotions and bonuses, while employees who did not meet the sales targets faced relentless pressure and even termination.
The point here is not that consumers were harmed when Wells Fargo set up fake accounts for them. It’s that Wells Fargo’s investors were harmed when Wells Fargo told them it was setting up accounts for lots of customers, while in fact those accounts were secretly fake. The shareholders, on this theory, thought that Wells Fargo’s vigorous cross-selling would bring in revenue, but in fact it just brought in fines. Wells Fargo started refunding customers who were charged for products they didn't fully understand. It set aside $285 million to refund foreign-exchange and wealth-management clients for incorrect pricing and fees.
Lessons:
1. Banks should be customer eccentric and more likely, their own customers meaning their own employees.
2. A decent paycheck is what employees expect at the end of the month to run household expenses.
3. The targets of the banks should be realistic.
4. The banks should have specific checks for account opening with a maker checker concept and a 6 eye check for each of the accounts opened independent from the operations opening the account.
5. Customer complaints should not be ignored and need complete investigation to find loopholes in self-regulation.
Too big to fail is a bank that's so essential to the global economy that its failure would be catastrophic. Big doesn't refer to the size of the Bank, instead, it means it's so interconnected with the global economy that its failure would be a big event. The Bush administration popularized this phrase during the 2008 financial crisis. Never did the world believe that “Too big to Fail” banks would actually fail but, they did fail.
Risks with too big to fail banks:
1. Market Distortions: Since the full amount of the deposits and debts of "too big to fail" banks are effectively guaranteed by the government, large depositors and investors view investments with these banks as a safer investment than deposits with smaller banks. Hence, too big to fail banks distorts free markets and creates unfair competitive advantages over small banks hence, creating survival problems for small banks.
2. Disrupt The Whole Economy: When a bank becomes systemically so important its failure can disrupt the financial/banking system and the economy as a whole.
3. Compliance Failures: The most obvious problem for too big to fail banks is a lack of effective oversight by the regulators. Hence, any compliance failures at a system-wide level are the hardest to heal from.
4. Over Ambition and Less Oversight: Over ambitious plans of too big to fail banks make these banks to expand without having complete control over the acquired banks. The acquired banks usually continue the way they have been working and if any of the acquired bank breached sanctions or rules and regulations, it affects the huge too big to fail bank.
5. Savings Under Risk: Most of the savings by depositors are secured in these big to fail banks hence, failure of these banks affect the large society as a whole.
During the mid-2000s, the housing boom was in full force, and Lehman, like many other firms, were becoming more and more heavily involved in issuing mortgage-backed securities, MBSs, and collateral debt obligations, or CDOs. However, Lehman took it to the next level between 2003 and 2004 by extending into loan origination acquiring five mortgage lenders, including subprime lender BNC Mortgage which lent to homeowners with poor credit or heavy debt loads and Aurora Loan Services, which specialized in Alt-A loans made to borrowers without full documentation. Between 2004 and 2006, the capital markets unit surged 56% due to Lehman's real estate businesses causing the firm to become one of the fastest-growing investment banking and asset management businesses than any other. By 2007, Lehman was reporting big numbers - with $19.3 billion in revenues and a record $4.2 billion net income. But things were about to take a drastic turn for the banking giant.
For several reasons, including lenders defaulting on the risky loans and unsustainable subprime mortgages, the housing market began to crash in 2006 but, undeterred, Lehman Brothers continued increasing (doubled, in fact) its share of the real estate pie to the tune of $111 billion in assets and securities in 2007. As it became clearer and clearer, these loans were ill advised and detrimental to the health of the firms Bear Stearns found out the hard way first.
When Lehman Brothers' competitor Bear Stearns went under, being bought out by J.P. Morgan Chase in a Federal Reserve-backed deal in 2008, Lehman's fate was thrown into question. weakened by its reliance on repurchasing agreements ("repos"), which gave them short-term funding for daily operations, Lehman had to bolster the confidence of its investors in a short time and attempted to do so by raising some $6 billion in equity in June of 2008. But this wasn't as convincing as the firm had hoped.
By September, Lehman was announcing an expected $3.9 billion loss in its third quarter, as well as a near $5.6 billion loss in write-downs of so-called "toxic" assets. But in a desperate attempt to keep its head above water, Lehman claimed to have boosted its liquidity to around $45 billion, decreased mortgages by 20%, and reduced its leverage factor by some 7 points. Despite these measures, after the firm announced its intention to spin off $50 billion in toxic assets to a side company in September, ratings agency Moody's considered downgrading Lehman's debt rating, and the Federal Reserve met to consider the firm's future.
In the first week of September, Lehman's stock dropped drastically about 77%. Investors' doubts were growing as CEO Richard Fuld attempted to keep the firm afloat by selling off asset management units, trying to develop a relationship with Korea Development Bank for aid, and spinning off commercial real estate assets. Once it was clear to investors that Lehman was sinking, an upsurge in credit default swaps on its debt of some 66% and the backing-out of hedge fund investors signaled everyone was jumping ship. Once Moody's told Lehman that it would have to give up a majority stake of its company to investors to maintain its ratings, the stock once again plunged around 42% on Sept. 11 - leaving Lehman with only $1 billion in cash when the week was over.
Despite Barclays (BCS) and Bank of America (BAC - Get Report) attempting to throw Lehman a life raft via a takeover, the efforts were fruitless. And by Sept. 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, causing the firm's stock to plummet a final 93% from its standing just three days prior. With the collapse of one of the world's biggest and most successful banks, the markets took an unprecedented beating that is still, in some ways, being felt today.
Fortune magazine declared Lehman Brothers as the No. 1 "most admired securities firm" in 2007 just one year before the firm filed for bankruptcy. So how did Lehman meet its demise after being at the top of its game just one year before?
While there were several factors contributing to its collapse, many experts seem to agree that it was in large part due to a lack of trust, over-leveraging, poor long-term investments, and shaky funding. One of the primary causes for the firm's collapse was due to their overzealous lending during the housing bubble in 2003 to 2004. By acquiring five lending firms that focused primarily in subprime lending, Lehman was investing in a risky enterprise that, although earning a huge market capitalization in 2007 of around $60 billion, soon came crashing down due to a historic high of subprime loan defaults and, despite the firm's assurances to the contrary, inevitably came back to bite them. The firm was over-leveraged, and the value of its mortgage portfolio was no longer compelling. But many have wondered at the role of the federal government's "too big to fail" policy in regard to Lehman. If Lehman Brothers was truly one of the biggest firms around, why wasn't it too big to fail?
According to ‘Fed’ Bear Stearns and AIG had collateral that covered the bailout, while Lehman did not hence, once there was no aid to be provided by the Fed, Lehman had to call it quits.
Too-big-to-fail (TBTF) reforms include:
Standards for additional loss absorbency through capital surcharges and total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements;
Recommendations for enhanced supervision and heightened supervisory expectations;
Policies to put in place effective resolution regimes and resolution planning and to improve the resolvability of banks.
Robust core financial market infrastructures (FMIs) to reduce the risk of contagion arising from the failure of individual institutions.
Other supplementary prudential and other requirements as determined by the national authorities.
Enable a rigorous coordinated assessment of the risks facing the TBTF banks.
Governments had spent considerable amounts of public money in order to prevent a meltdown of markets and mitigate negative consequences for the real economy while TBTF banks failed.
Banks become so large, complex or interconnected that their distress or failure would cause serious harm to the financial system and the economy.
A disorderly insolvency of TBTF banks lead to great destruction of value as a result of the loss of franchise value and the fire-sale liquidation of assets. It will without doubt result in protracted and costly litigation.
As a result of implicit TBTF subsidies, banks do not bear all the downside risk of their actions, and so tend to take on too much risk.
Named for its sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael G. Oxley, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002. The Act was one of the most wide-ranging pieces of legislation since the Securities and Exchange Acts of the 1930s. The provisions of SOX provide regulations for auditors, CEOs and CFOs, boards of directors, investment analysts, and investment banks. The provisions cover issues ranging from auditor independence and financial disclosure to criminal and civil penalties for violations of securities laws. The goal of this legislation is to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. The Act attempts to increase transparency by requiring:
The companies that perform audits are independent of the firm that is being audited;
Key executives, specifically the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer, certify the completeness and accuracy of financial statements;
All the members of the board of directors’ audit committee are to be independent of management;
Financial analysts are relatively independent of the firms they analyze; and
That companies release all important information about their financial condition to the public quickly.
A SOX compliance audit of a Bank’s internal controls takes place once a year. An independent auditor must conduct SOX audits. It is the Bank’s responsibility to find and hire an auditor, and to arrange all necessary meetings prior to when the audit takes place. To avoid a conflict of interest, SOX audits must be separate from other internal audits undertaken by the Bank. Many banks will time the audit so that results are available for inclusion in their annual report, thus satisfying the requirement of making findings easily accessible to stockholders.
The first step in a SOX audit usually involves a meeting between management and the auditing firm. In this meeting, both parties will discuss the specifics of the audit, including when it will take place, what it will look at, what its purposes are and what results management expects to see.
A key portion of a SOX audit will involve a review of Bank’s financials. Auditors will inspect previous financial statements to confirm their accuracy while ultimately it is the auditor’s discretion whether or not a Bank’s financials pass, any variance in the numbers more than 5% either way is likely to set off red flags. An audit will also look at personnel and may interview staff to confirm that their regular duties match their job description, and that they have the training necessary to access financial information safely.
A review of internal controls comprises one of the largest components of a SOX compliance audit. As noted above, internal controls include any process, computer network, hardware and other electronic infrastructure that financial data passes through. A typical audit will look at four important internal controls in the banks:
1. Access Control: Access refers to both the physical and electronic controls that prevent unauthorized users from viewing sensitive information. This includes keeping servers and data centres in secure locations, but also making sure effective password controls, lockout screens and other measures are in place.
2. Security: Security is, of course, a broad topic however; in this case, it means making sure appropriate controls are in place to prevent breaches and having tools to remediate incidents as they occur. Investing smartly in services or appliances that will monitor and protect banks financial database is the best way to avoid compliance and security issues altogether.
3. Change Management: Change management involves you’re a banks departmental processes for adding new users or workstations, updating and installing new software, and making any changes to Active Directory databases or other information architecture components. Having a record of what was changed, in addition to when it was changed and who changed it, simplifies a SOX audit and makes it easier to correct problems when they arise.
4. Backup Procedures: Finally, backup systems should be in place to protect your sensitive data. Data centres containing backed-up data including those stored off site or by a third party are subject to the same SOX compliance requirements as those hosted on-premises.
Many thousands of banks face the task of ensuring their accounting operations are in compliance with the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Auditing departments typically first have a comprehensive external audit by a Sarbanes-Oxley compliance specialist performed to identify areas of risk. Next, specialized software is installed that provides the "electronic paper trails" necessary to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.
The summary highlights of the most important Sarbanes-Oxley sections for compliance are listed below.
1. SOX Section 302 - Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports:
CEO and CFO must review all financial reports.
Financial report does not contain any misrepresentations.
Information in the financial report is "fairly presented".
CEO and CFO are responsible for the internal accounting controls.
CEO and CFO must report any deficiencies in internal accounting controls, or any fraud involving the management of the audit committee.
CEO and CFO must indicate any material changes in internal accounting controls.
2. SOX Section 401: Disclosures in Periodic Reports:
All financial statements and their requirement to be accurate and presented in a manner that does not contain incorrect statements or admit to state material information. Such financial statements should also include all material off-balance sheet liabilities, obligations, and transactions.
3. SOX Section 404: Management Assessment of Internal Controls:
All annual financial reports must include an Internal Control Report stating that management is responsible for an "adequate" internal control structure, and an assessment by management of the effectiveness of the control structure. Any shortcomings in these controls must also be reported. In addition, registered external auditors must attest to the accuracy of the company management’s assertion that internal accounting controls are in place, operational and effective.
4. SOX Section 409 - Real Time Issuer Disclosures:
Banks are required to disclose on almost real-time basis information concerning material changes in its financial condition or operations.
5. SOX Section 802 - Criminal Penalties for Altering Documents:
This section specifies the penalties for knowingly altering documents in an ongoing legal investigation, audit, or bankruptcy proceeding.
6. SOX Section 806 - Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud:
This section deals with whistle-blower protection.
7. SOX Section 902 - Attempts & Conspiracies to Commit Fraud Offenses:
It is a crime for any person to corruptly alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal any document with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.
8. SOX Section 906 - Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports:
Section 906 addresses criminal penalties for certifying a misleading or fraudulent financial report. Under SOX 906, penalties can be upwards of $5 million in fines and 20 years in prison.
In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) developed a model for evaluating internal controls. This model has been adopted as the generally accepted framework for internal control and is widely recognized as the definitive standard against which banks can measure the effectiveness of their systems of internal control.
The COSO model defines internal control as “a process, effected by any Banks board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance of the achievement of objectives in the following categories:
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
Reliability of financial reporting
Compliance with applicable laws and regulations
In an “effective” internal control system, the following five components work to support the achievement of a banks mission, strategies and related business objectives.
An internal controls environment that establishes appropriate roles for everyone, from the board of directors down, that sets the appropriate tone for the bank, and that holds everyone accountable for their internal controls responsibilities. Aspects of internal controls:
1. Integrity and Ethical Values: First, and foremost, is that the bank must have the appropriate tone at the top for a commitment to ethics and doing business in compliance. It also means that bank establishes standards of conduct through the creation of a Code of Conduct or other baseline document. The next step is to demonstrate adherence to this standard of conduct by individual employees and throughout the bank. Finally, if there are any deviations, they would be addressed by the bank in a timely manner. From the auditing perspective, this requires an auditor to be able to assess if bank has the met its requirements to ethics and compliance and whether that commitment can be effectively measured and assessed.
2. Commitment to Competence: The bank hires and retains competent employees to carry-out tasks and provides appropriate internal or external training and evaluations.
3. Board of Directors and Audit Committee: The Audit committee assists the board of directors fulfil its corporate governance and overseeing responsibilities in relation to an banks financial reporting, internal control system, risk management system and internal and external audit functions.
4. Management’s Philosophy and Operating Style: Management's philosophy and operating style include management's attitudes towards the banks objectives, the approaches to minimize the business risks and attitude toward internal controls over financial reporting.
5. Organizational Structure: An effective organizational structure of internal control includes a banks plan, all the procedures and actions it takes to:
· Protect its assets against theft and waste.
· Ensure compliance with company policies and federal law.
· Evaluate the performance of all personnel to promote efficient operations.
· Ensure accurate and reliable operating data and accounting reports.
6. Assignment of Authority and Responsibility: Authority, in simple words, is the right way of management guiding subordinates, towards organizations objective of meeting internal control standards. Responsibility means state of being accountable or answerable for any obligation to complete a job assigned on time and in best way keeping in mind the internal controls in place.
7. Human Resource Policies and Procedures: By establishing internal controls for HR policies and procedures, Banks fulfil its mission while complying with legal requirements.
A risk assessment approach that sets objectives which allow the clear identification of risks specific to the bank, analyses them appropriately, includes the consideration of fraud and identifies and assesses changes that significantly affect internal controls.
1. Company-wide Objectives: At the bank level, internal control objectives relate to the reliability of financial reporting, timely feedback on the achievement of operational or strategic goals, and compliance with laws and regulations.
2. Process-level Objectives: Each process should have a high level process flow along with controls defined in the process flow and highlighted key process controls to meet process level objectives of internal controls in a bank.
3. Risk Identification and Analysis: Every bank should have risk assessment as a part of its internal control and a detailed analysis of the relevant risks along with mitigants should be clearly documented not only to achieve banks objectives but also, for the purpose of determining how those risks should be managed in a controlled environment.
4. Managing Change: Banks need to ensure during the change process risks are identified, assessed and managed.
Establishes control activities that contribute to the mitigation of risks in alignment with the bank’s overall objectives, provides the right activities and supporting technology to meet those objectives, and deploys those activities through appropriate policies and procedures.
1. Policies and Procedures: Internal controls find a place in the written bank’s every policies and procedures.
2. Security (Application and Network): Internal controls are put over the input, processing, and output functions in all banking applications and networks.
3. Application Change Management: Change management is the process that ensures that all changes are processed in a controlled manner, including standard changes and emergency maintenance relating to business processes, applications and infrastructure in a bank.
4. Business Continuity/Backups: Internal controls should be a part of Business Continuity Planning (BCP) in a bank to recover and restore partially or completely interrupted critical functions within a predetermined time after a disaster or disruption.
5. Outsourcing: All the internal controls applicable to the bank should reflect in the outsourcing entities Std. Operating procedures too.
1. Quality of Information: Information is necessary for the Bank to carry out internal control responsibilities to support the achievement of its objectives. Management obtains or generates and uses relevant and quality information from both internal and external sources to support the functioning of components of internal control.
2. Effectiveness of Communication: Communication is the means by which information is disseminated throughout the bank, flowing up, down and across the Bank. Hence, senior management needs to disseminate information in a way that control responsibilities must be taken seriously by the bank staff.
Selects and develops necessary separate evaluations to determine whether internal control components are present and functioning, and timely communicates any deficiencies to the appropriate parties so that corrective action can be made quickly
1. On-going Monitoring: On-going Monitoring is a process of assessing risks in defined time intervals to achieve operational objectives.
2. Separate Evaluations: Separate evaluations are required to ascertain whether each of the five components of internal control is present and functioning.
3. Reporting Deficiencies: Every banks risk committee is responsible to report deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls of a bank that may be less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight. These components work to establish the foundation for sound internal control within the Bank through directed leadership, shared values and a culture that emphasizes accountability for control. The various risks facing the Bank are identified and assessed routinely at all levels and within all functions in the organization. Control activities and other mechanisms are proactively designed to address and mitigate the significant risks. Information critical to identifying risks and meeting business objectives is communicated through established channels up, down and across the Bank. The entire system of internal control is monitored continuously and problems are addressed timely.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) U.S. was implemented in response to the savings and loan crisis to strengthen the power of the FDIC. Federal banking agencies were required to take supervisory actions when capital of an institution declined, and then grade institutions on a one to five scale (CAMELS rating). Prompt corrective action and least cost resolution were also created as a part of this act.
As banks approach the $500 million and $1 billion in assets threshold, processes and procedures should be developed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) are in place. Preparing to meet these requirements can be a huge undertaking, but with early and focused planning, the burden can be reduced. It is critical that bank executives understand the FDICIA requirements for the respective thresholds and plan accordingly. Planning 18-to-24 months ahead of expected required compliance will ensure banks are properly prepared to meet these requirements. If banks delay, emergency preparation can bring chaos, stress, and added costs, and may require banks to take valuable resources away from other important initiatives.
Individually chartered banks reaching $500 million in total assets as of January 1 (measurement date) are required to have an independent financial statement audit, as well as an audit committee comprising mostly of outside directors. Additionally, banks are required to submit an annual report that includes the following, as determined by the FDIC’s Part 363 annual independent audits and reporting requirements:
Audited, comparative financial statements.
Independent auditor’s report on the audited financial statements
Annual management reports, including but not limited to a statement for management’s responsibility for preparing the financial statements and establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure over financial reporting.
Independent auditor’s report to the audit committee, including all annual required communications.
As banks cross $500 million in assets banks’ independent auditor must follow SEC independence standards. Those standards place additional prohibitions on services the independent auditor can provide, such as preparing the financial statements and the annual tax provision, or the support of outsourced internal audit or other risk management activities. Individually chartered banks reaching $1 billion in assets must have a completely independent audit committee and submit all of the above, as well as the following items:
Expansion in the management reporting information, including their assertion on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting based on a recognized internal control framework (COSO framework is almost exclusively used)
Independent auditor’s attestation report on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting as of the end of the year
The most time consuming of all requirements is the enhanced documentation and testing of key financial reporting controls related to management’s assertion on the effectiveness of their Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR), which must be in place for your CEO and CFO to attest to the effectiveness of the internal controls. Likewise, the independent auditor’s attestation report requires the same significant documentation and testing of the key financial reporting controls throughout the bank.
Individually chartered banks reaching $500 million in total assets as of January 1 (measurement date) are required to have an independent financial statement audit, as well as an audit committee comprising mostly of outside directors. Additionally, banks are required to submit an annual report that includes the following, as determined by the FDIC’s Part 363 annual independent audits and reporting requirements:
Audited, comparative financial statements.
Independent auditor’s report on the audited financial statements
Annual management reports, including but not limited to a statement for management’s responsibility for preparing the financial statements and establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure over financial reporting.
Independent auditor’s report to the audit committee, including all annual required communications.
As banks cross $500 million in assets banks’ independent auditor must follow SEC independence standards. Those standards place additional prohibitions on services the independent auditor can provide, such as preparing the financial statements and the annual tax provision, or the support of outsourced internal audit or other risk management activities. Individually chartered banks reaching $1 billion in assets must have a completely independent audit committee and submit all of the above, as well as the following items:
Expansion in the management reporting information, including their assertion on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting based on a recognized internal control framework (COSO framework is almost exclusively used)
Independent auditor’s attestation report on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting as of the end of the year
The most time consuming of all requirements is the enhanced documentation and testing of key financial reporting controls related to management’s assertion on the effectiveness of their Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR), which must be in place for your CEO and CFO to attest to the effectiveness of the internal controls. Likewise, the independent auditor’s attestation report requires the same significant documentation and testing of the key financial reporting controls throughout the bank.
Integration of FDICIA compliance with its internal audit function.
Do not outsource FDICIA to external auditors, it is internal audit to look after FDICIA compliance.
A combination of FDICIA compliance responsibilities with Internal and external auditors is still better.
Audit functions need to read and understand full-scope of FDICIA and try to automate certain functions.
Train all financial report preparation related employees on intricacies connected to FDICIA compliance.
An audit of all known internal controls of financial reporting firmwide will benefit FDICIA examination.
banks should have a Standard Operating Procedures to have controls on hundreds of spreadsheets used to compile reports used to prepare financial statements and footnote disclosures to avoid unauthorized persons from accessing and altering them.
IT generated repots for compiling the financial reports are more reliable than any reporting done manually.
Banks should scrutinize system access and change management to guarantee that data used for compiling financial statements is reliable from a systems standpoint.
Meeting FDICIA requirements requires the banks to do an assessment of the internal control structure that governs the bank’s financial reporting.
Preparedness and commitment are strengths for those banks who are required to be compliance with FDICIA requirements.
Evaluating internal control is fundamental to the OCC’s overall supervisory process. OCC’s internal control assessments, along with its assessments of the bank’s audit programs, help leverage OCC resources, establish the scopes of other examination activities, and contribute to developing strategies for future supervisory activities. Some of the points of considerations for banks during OCC audit or examinations are:
OCC Examiners will base the scope, type, and depth of an internal control review on the bank’s size, complexity, scope of activities, and risk profile, as well as on the OCC’s assessment of the bank’s audit functions.
OCC Examiners review and analyse available information to identify systemic control issues, to gauge changes in the bank’s control environment and overall risk profile, and to evaluate controls in general. Useful sources of information include management discussions, organization charts, procedural manuals, operating instructions, job specifications and descriptions, directives to employees, flow charts, operating losses incurred by the bank, and internal and external audit reports, management letters, and other control and risk assessment material. These materials will assist examiners in reviewing the bank’s operating systems and procedures.
OCC staff will maintain ongoing and clear communications with bank personnel. In large banks, the examiner-in-charge (EIC) or designee should have periodic meetings with bank personnel or committees closely associated with risk control functions (e.g., audit or risk committees, risk managers, control officers, auditors). While this degree of contact may not be practical for all community banks, meetings with control personnel should occur as frequently as necessary. Communication regarding OCC’s internal control supervision and findings should occur throughout an examination or supervisory cycle.
Examination reports and other written communications to a bank will include comments about the adequacy of the bank’s control functions and summarize other appropriate findings and conclusions.
Examiners will also incorporate findings about internal control adequacy in the OCC’s risk assessments.
Examiners prepare documentation in the form of work papers. Work papers, which may be in paper or electronic form, contain essential information to support conclusions about the evaluation of internal control. The level of detail commensurate with the risks facing the Bank and provide an audit trail that supports examination conclusions.
The examiner generates and retain only those documents necessary to support the scope of the review, significant conclusions, ratings changes, or changes in risk profile.
Examiners can reproduce or excerpt readily available bank information and incorporate the information in the examination work papers to avoid duplication of effort.
OCC examiners will assess the adequacy of a bank’s internal control as strong, satisfactory, or weak. Examiners begin their control assessment by reviewing the work of the bank’s internal audit or other control review functions, generally as part of pre-examination planning.
Examiners make a preliminary assessment of internal control reliability and identify control problems, areas of potential or high risk, and areas not recently reviewed. That assessment will influence how much validation work examiners will perform during onsite supervisory activities.
Examiner validates internal control for a specific examination area depends on how much supervisory concern he or she has about that area. Generally, examiners begin with a discussion with a bank’s chief executive officer (CEO) or other person responsible for control management to gain an overall understanding of and insight into the bank’s control system.
Identifying the internal control objectives relevant to the bank, department, business line, or product
Reviewing pertinent policies, procedures, and documentation
Discussing controls with appropriate levels of bank personnel
Observing the control environment
Testing transactions as appropriate
Sharing findings, concerns, and recommendations with the board of directors and senior management; and
Determining that the bank has taken timely corrective action on noted deficiencies.
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity (CAMELS) Rating is the rating system wherein the bank regulators or examiners evaluates an overall performance of the banks and determine their strengths and weaknesses. CAMELS Rating is based on the financial statements of the banks, Viz. Profit and loss account, balance sheet and on-site examination by the bank regulators. In this Rating system, the officers rate the banks on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the best and 5 is the worst. The parameters on the basis of which the ratings are done are represented by an acronym “CAMELS” meaning the following:
Capital Adequacy: The capital adequacy measures the bank’s capacity to handle the losses and meet all its obligations towards the customers without ceasing its operations. This can be met only on the basis of an amount and the quality of capital; a bank can access. A ratio of Capital to Risk Weighted Assets determines the bank’s capital adequacy.
Asset Quality: An asset represents all the assets of the bank, Viz. Current and fixed, loans, investments, real estates and all the off-balance sheet transactions. Through this indicator, the performance of an asset can be evaluated. The ratio of Gross Non-Performing Loans to Gross Advances is one of the criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of credit decisions made by the bankers.
Management Quality: The board of directors and top-level managers are the key persons who are responsible for the successful functioning of the banking operations. Through this parameter, the effectiveness of the management is checked out such as, how well they respond to the changing market conditions, how well the duties and responsibilities are delegated, how well the compensation policies and job descriptions are designed, etc.
Earnings: Income from all the operations, non-traditional and extraordinary sources constitute the earnings of a bank. Through this parameter, the bank’s efficiency is checked with respect to its capital adequacy to cover all the potential losses and the ability to pay off the dividends. Return on Assets Ratio measures the earnings of the banks.
Liquidity: The bank’s ability to convert assets into cash is called as liquidity. The ratio of Cash maintained by Banks and Balance with the Central Bank to Total Assets determines the liquidity of the bank.
Sensitivity to Market Risk: Through this parameter, the bank’s sensitivity towards the changing market conditions is checked, i.e., how adverse changes in the interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, fixed assets will affect the bank and its operations.
Thus, through CAMELS rating, the overall financial position of the bank is evaluated and the corrective actions, if any, are taken accordingly.
Determine whether policies and procedures exist to ensure that decisions are made with appropriate approvals and authorizations for transactions and activities.
Determine whether processes exist to ensure that the performance and integrity of each function (e.g., lending, wire transfer) are independently checked and verified using an appropriate sample of transactions.
Accounts are reconciled continually, independently, and in a timely manner and that outstanding items, both on- and off-balance-sheet, are resolved and cleared.
Policy overrides are minimal and exceptions are reported to management.
Employees in sensitive positions or risk-taking activities do not have absolute control over areas.
Determine whether reporting lines within a business or functional area provide sufficient independence of the control function.
Determine whether internal audit or other control review functions are sufficiently independent.
1. KYC and Risk:
The banks are required to have effective Know Your Customer (KYC) standards as a part of banks’ risk management practices. Banks with inadequate KYC risk management may lead to legal and reputational risk. It is mandatory for all banks to prepare a risk profile of each customer and apply enhanced due diligence measures on higher risk customers. Also, all banks need to put in place policies, systems and procedures for risk management involving transactional accounts. Sound KYC policies and procedures in a bank protect it against the risk of money laundering, terrorist financing and other unlawful activities. A key challenge in implementing sound KYC policies and procedures is how to put in place an effective group-wide approach. Hence, especially for banks (too big to fail and other large banks) should have “Global KYC Risk Management’ program driving each of its Branches and subsidiaries. Policies and procedures at the branch- or subsidiary-level must be consistent with and supportive of the Global KYC standards
2. Elements of KYC and Risk:
The four essential elements of a sound KYC Program namely Customer Acceptance Policy, Customer Identification, On-going Transaction monitoring, and Risk Management should be incorporated into a bank’s risk management and control procedures to ensure that all aspects of KYC risk are identified and can be appropriately mitigated. Hence, a bank should aim to apply the same risk management, customer acceptance policy, procedures for customer identification, and process for monitoring its accounts throughout its branches and subsidiaries around the world. Where the minimum KYC requirements of the home and host countries differ, offices in host jurisdictions should apply the higher standard of the two. KYC risk management Program in a bank should include proper management oversight, systems and controls, segregation of duties, training and other related policies. The risk management program should be implemented on a global basis.
3. Adherence to KYC and Risks:
Banks’ compliance and internal audit staffs, or external auditors, should evaluate adherence to all aspects of their group’s standards for KYC, including the effectiveness of centralised KYC functions and the requirements for sharing information with other group members and responding to queries from head office. Internationally active banking groups need both an internal audit and a global compliance function since these are the principal and, in some circumstances, the only mechanisms for monitoring the application of the bank’s global KYC standards and supporting policies and procedures, including the effectiveness of the procedures for sharing information within the group.
4. Risk Based Approach:
A bank should establish a risk based systematic procedure for verifying the identity of new customers. It should develop standards on what records are to be obtained and retained for customer identification on a global basis, including enhanced due diligence requirements for higher risk customers.
1. Standard for Monitoring:
Banks should have standards for monitoring account activity for potentially suspicious transactions that are implemented by supporting policies and procedures throughout its branches and subsidiaries worldwide. They should be risk-based and emphasize the need to monitor material intra- and inter-country account activity. Each office should maintain and monitor information on its accounts and transactions. The bank’s centralized KYC function should evaluate the potential risk posed by activity reported by its branches and subsidiaries and where appropriate assess its worldwide exposure to a given customer. The bank should have policies and procedures for ascertaining whether other branches or subsidiaries hold accounts for the same party and assessing the group-wide reputational, legal, concentration and operational risks. The bank should also have procedures governing global account relationships that are deemed potentially suspicious, detailing escalation procedures and guidance on restricting activities, including the closing of accounts as appropriate.
2. Banks and Enforcement Authorities:
In addition, banks and their local offices should be responsive to requests from their respective law enforcement authorities for information about account holders that is needed in the authorities' effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Head office should be able to require all offices to search their files against a list of individuals or organizations suspected of aiding and abetting terrorist financing or money laundering, and report matches. Supervisors should verify that appropriate internal controls for KYC are in place and that banks are in compliance with supervisory and regulatory guidance. The supervisory process should include not only a review of policies and procedures but also a review of customer files and the sampling of accounts.
3. Group wide KYC Policies:
In a cross-border context, home country supervisors should face no impediments in verifying a branch or subsidiary’s compliance with group-wide KYC policies and procedures during on-site inspections. This may well require a review of customer files and a sampling of accounts. Home country supervisors should have access to information on sampled individual customer accounts to the extent necessary to enable a proper evaluation of the application of KYC standards and an assessment of risk management practices, and should not be impeded by local bank secrecy laws.
In the case of branches or subsidiaries of international banking groups, the host country supervisor retains responsibility for the supervision of compliance with local KYC regulations. The role of audit is particularly important in the evaluation of adherence to KYC standards on a consolidated basis and home country supervisors should ensure that appropriate frequency, resources and procedures are established in this regard.
Safeguards are needed to ensure that information regarding individual accounts has the same confidentiality threshold afforded other information obtained through the supervisory process. A statement of mutual cooperation to facilitate information sharing between the two supervisors may well be helpful in this regard.
Although gateways are in place in most jurisdictions to enable banks to share information with their head offices for risk management purposes, some countries have rigorous bank secrecy or data protection laws that prevent, or can be interpreted as preventing, the transfer of such information. In such circumstances, banks’ overseas offices may be inclined to take a cautious stance regarding the transfer of customer information to their head offices which may conflict with the consolidated KYC objective.
It is essential that all jurisdictions that host foreign banks provide an appropriate legal framework which allows information for KYC risk management purposes to be passed to the head office/parent bank and home country supervisors. Similarly, there should be no impediments to onsite visits by head office auditors, risk managers, compliance officers or home country supervisors, nor any restrictions on their ability to access all the local office’s records, including customers’ names and balances. This access should be the same for both branches and subsidiaries.
1. Jurisdictional Risk: The risk of domicile of a customer with weak or lax AML/KYC controls. Also, having business relations to high-risk countries and Sanctions (countries or sectors or individuals).
2. High Risk Industry: Cash intensive businesses, Casino’s, third payment processors, Charitable Organizations etc carry extra risk with them because of the type of businesses they do which may be vulnerable to money laundering more than other business types.
3. PEP’s: PEP’s carry risk of corruption and bribery mis-utilizing their prominent public positions.
4. Transactions: There are variety of transactional risks that banks deal the main ones being, Transactions just under threshold of reporting, transaction over and above the business requirements, transactions to high-risk countries or sanction countries, transactions to un-related businesses.
5. Products: All products are not equal. There are some high-risk products like custody products, ACH which affect the customer risk profile.
6. Length of relationship: The more the length of relationship, the more the bank knows its customer and the more comfort it has banking with such customers. In short, as banks do not know the new customers, they are riskier to banks than accounts that have been established for a while.
At banking level, understanding and expressing risk culture is a compliance requirement and also part of corporate governance. Culture is nothing but the values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding, shared by all employees in a banking group with a common purpose. The most important way in which risk culture matters is that it has a critical effect on risk management effectiveness. Risk culture determines the ability to “take the right risks safely” because it influences the effectiveness of risk policies, procedures and practices, Risk culture influences attitudes of banking employees towards identification and assessment of risks, Risk culture helps proper setting of objectives and strategies in a bank. Every catastrophic event for banks over the past few years is a result of enormous risks that banks take every day. Many of them were the result of bad decisions by handful of people. While systemic risk is a very real issue for banks, in many cases the human factor also plays a major role. Even banks with well-established Risk management functions, processes and controls in place have had problems because of lack of cultural differences in different branches and subsidiaries of the same bank.
Q. What is a Risk Culture?
A. Risk culture is the system of values and behaviours of banking staff to appropriately manage risk and risk becomes an intrinsic part of their day-to-day work.
Q. How to develop a Risk Culture?
A. Some of the points for developing a risk culture include:
Role models and Sr. Managers of the bank display the right behaviour in the banks.
Risk Managers are engaged in communicating consistently useful risk-related messages to the Banking staff.
Sr. Management encourages people to discuss risk, and raise concerns at appropriate forums.
Bank rewards and recognize staff for identifying risks.
Effective management of risk becomes an integral part of the Bank staff's performance
Banking staff are clear on the risks and take accountability for each risk.
Management people in banks have right skills to manage risks effectively
Q. What do you mean by Cultural Awareness of Risk?
A. In the cultural awareness of Risk stage the basic expectations for managing risk in the bank and defining relevant roles and responsibilities around risk are set. Clear, consistent and continuous communication from leadership is an important aspect of setting these expectations. Below are the additional points for awareness of risk culture in a bank:
Banking leaders delivering communications around ‘risk management’ during town halls and general meetings with staff and management teams
Sr. Managers of the bank clarify risk management responsibilities and accountabilities
Bank roll out risk management general education and customized training based on role
Establish risk management induction programs to new staff.
Q. What changes should be done in a bank to foster Risk Culture?
A. While designing the risk culture, root cause of any behavioural shortcomings or weaknesses needs to be identified by the bank. Communications and training continually will improve the culture a lot. Some of the points of considerations for Cultural changes required to foster risk culture in a bank are:
Create a culture of challenging risk and reward staff who challenge status quo
Embed risk in performance metrics/performance score cards
Establish risk management considerations in talent management processes
Position individuals with the desired risk orientation in roles where effective risk management is critical
Reinforce behavioural, ethical and compliance standards to all the staff from time to time.
Q. Why is risk culture important?
A. The of Risk Culture is important as:
It drives entrepreneurial, self- motivated culture while taking decisions
Sets in risk thinking while expectations of customers, investors and others are still maintained
It inculcates habit of sharing of knowledge and best practices
It encourages staff towards continuous process improvement
It spreads the message of strong commitment to ethical and responsible business behaviour
Q. Why regulators scrutinise risk culture in a Bank?
A. Scrutiny of risk culture by regulators is important as this pressurizes the banks to tighten internal controls and reduce high-risk behaviour. Some of the other important reasons are:
Regulators scrutinize Risk culture as banks where it is prevalent, the staff act in the best interest of customers either by mitigating the risk or avoiding the risk.
Regulators scrutinize whether the banks are ready for changes and staff accept the changes without resistance.
Regulators ensure that the top executives in a bank are not only aware of the risks but also establish the right tone top to bottom.
Regulator’s check whether a clear risk vision is part of bank's strategy and accordingly risk appetite is satisfied accordingly.
Q. What is the meaning of "Risk-Mature Risk Culture"?
A. The meaning of a bank having “Risk-Mature Risk Culture” is as follows:
Risk management skills are valued, encouraged and developed.
Distinct and consistent tone from the top management in a bank encourages calculated risk among employees.
Each employee of a bank has commitment to ethical principles and practice.
Wide acceptance of importance of managing risk.
Transparent and timely risk information flow up and down.
Risk reporting and whistle-blowing is encouraged.
Active learning from impacted risks and near-misses is encouraged.
Risk-taking behaviours are rewarded.
Properly resourced risk management function.
Regular challenging of status quo from diverse perspectives is encouraged.
1. Deliberate avoidance of knowledge of the facts also called wilful blindness.
2. Someone influencing someone else’s behaviour or actions not to report.
3. Banks not encouraging, keeping mum or discouraging Speak up culture.
4. Absence of whistle blower policies.
5. No forum for reporting unusual activities.
6. Absence of Corporate driven culture or values.
7. No Risk stewards monitoring the effectiveness of risk management processes.
8. Absence of Torchbearer risk leaders in Management or Board.
9. Either no risk department or risk department acting in silos in departments in a bank.
10. Banks discourage Strong and open risk communications.
11. Absence of risk training to banking staff.
12. Chief Risk officer is not an independent job but only a part of other jobs.
Banking risks results from unknown events, circumstances and in-actions that could adversely affect the bank’s ability to achieve its objectives and execute its strategies. Essentially, the success and operability of banking business organization depends on how well the bank manages the risks.
Here, are listed important Risk Management Best Practices:
1. Separate Chief Risk Officer: Every banking organization should have separate Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and not amalgamate Risk with compliance functions. The CRO should and must have a direct reporting line to the CEO. The CEO of the organization should ensure to have regular and active communication with the CRO. And, it is the duty of the CRO to provide warning signals and blow whistle from time to time to the CEO.
2. CRO to have independent team structure: Each banking organization to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to the risk function reporting into the CRO that is independent or all functions in a bank. The team under CRO should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Some examples
3. Separate Risk Officers: The banking organization to ensure that the risk department have risk officers separately assigned to each of Line of Business (LOB) meaning separate Risk officer for financial risk, market management, operational risk etc. These risk officers should have regular interactions with LOB’s and should complement each other to ensure effective communication, reporting and issue resolutions.
The CRO should have representation at the respective board-level committees
The independent risk managers are a part of invitees in LOB lead committees in a bank.
The CRO or one of the risk managers should have representation in key subcommittees (e.g., finance, payroll, ALM (asset liability management), product approval committees etc.), enabling the risk team to provide their inputs for key strategic and business planning decisions.
The board in a bank has a primary responsibility to ensure that senior management develop and implement risk management strategies in their respective field of work and more importantly aware of risks in their respective departments.
Sr. Management are not only aware of their departmental risks but also effectively Communicate throughout their departments.
The board is ready for any kind of regulatory or audit from third party and have sufficient details of risks in the bank along with the list of mitigants to each of the identified risks.
Sr. Management have ensured that risk Assessment policy is clearly documented, the roles and responsibilities are clearly defined for each of the LOB, There are clear policies and procedures defining mitigation of any and all of the identified risks, Business Continuity Plan and an Incident Response Plan is in place that map out how the banking organization will handle and overcome any unforeseen risks and ensure that these policies are communicated effectively to all employees.
Assuming Sr. management have done all initial risk assessments and have put the proper controls in place to mitigate these risks, the next crucial step is monitoring. Clear monitoring processes must be established to ensure that any and all risk mitigation efforts are working and are effective. It is the responsibility of Sr. Management in a bank to do control testing (/SOX testing) for all crucial controls.
Sr. Management to ensure that the material risks are identified and measured, all exposures should be aggregated such that management can focus on the largest exposures. Banking organization should involve all key risk owners in the identification of risk.
Defined risk appetite statements, which are owned by the board, should exist for key risk exposures such as regulatory capital, internal economic capital, liquidity, financial strength and the qualitative business strategy.
Risk management processes require monitoring to be in place such that risks are actively managed and reported. Important reporting tools such as a risk checklist, risk register, risk heat map and risk dashboards should be adopted to ensure timeliness and quality of risk reporting to senior management.
Despite risk procedures and risk tools being in place, the ground staff should be mentally prepared to identify risk and report them through whistle blower as they are the one who are in the front line of the war against risk.
Quantitative risks have traditionally had more focus due to the resources available to assess them. However, banks now need to have greater monitoring in assessing and managing qualitative risks, such as reputational, regulatory, operational, and cyber risks.
Sr. Management to monitor whether focus is being given to emerging risks and where applicable, workshops and forums are created for key staff.
Banks to put special focus on training of current resources to enhance their risk management skill levels, especially IT-related risk skills.
Risk culture forums, discussions, town halls etc., should be happening in the bank from time to time so that the employees become risk minded and
Where ever possible reward employees for identifying risks in their processes.
Banks, should able to communicate risk management as an accepted discipline in their shop floors (/departments)
Bank Policies should include sections on risk management, and their other SOP's should have reference texts specifically devoted to risk management.
Employee pro-activeness towards identifying and mitigating risks are encouraged and rewarded in the bank.
Success stories and details of each risk hurdle that was jumped across to be shared among employees
Whistle blower tool should be made available to all banking employees and employees should be encouraged to use the same.
For a project/product manager in a bank it’s not enough to merely be aware of the risks; to achieve a successful outcome, these leaders must not only identify, assess, prioritize, and manage all of the major risks during development stage but also be aware of the risk such as pricing and timing of launch.
For new products/projects that have time constraint, identify risks and their triggers in advance.
For new products/projects that have cost constraints, classify and prioritize all risks
Pre-written risk mitigations are always advantageous during product/software development stage so that mitigating action can be immediately implemented if any risk materializes.
For new products/projects managers should communicate risk status throughout product/project launch phase.
In order to be effective, each bank should implement the "Three Lines of Defence" model in way that is suitable for its size, operating structure, and approach to risk management.
Every bank should design a governance structure that is consistent with the model so that all three lines of defence function to identify and mitigate risks.
The three lines should share their risk management practices among themselves to help the bank achieve its objectives by the effective management of risk. Senior management along with the board of directors should also communicate the expectation that information be shared and activities are coordinated among each of the three lines to support overall effectiveness.
Project scope purpose and need is well-defined.
Project design and deliverable definition is complete.
Project schedule is clearly defined and understood.
Full control over priorities.
Estimating scheduling delays in advance.
Allocation of Buffer time for any accommodation of additional requirements.
Project charter, project milestones and responsibilities are clearly communicated across stakeholders of the project.
Pressure to arbitrarily reduce task durations and or run tasks in parallel which would increase risk of errors.
Controlled growth of a project scope.
Project conflicts are escalated in a timely manner.
Well defined simulation testing and market testing before launch.
Intellectual property rights are taken care.
Risks such as Compliance breaches, Fraud, NPA monitoring, and Calculating Value at Risk can benefit greatly from data Analytics.
Mobile banking apps can track financial transactions and analyse user data curbing customer complaints.
Virtual RM's can be Chatbots which are AI-enabled conversational interfaces. Chatbots cannot manipulate data and cannot mis-guide.
Machine learning models can be developed to help detect changes in customer behaviour by analysing their transactions.
AI can be used to derive a better understanding of customers spending patterns, which will help banks customize products by adding personalized features.
AI can be used to come up with rules-based know your customer and AML compliance activities.
Cloud is a crucial tool to deal with risks connected to delivery channels.
API (Application Programming Interface) can enable a bank’s services available to other third-party companies via APIs thus reducing most of the banking risks.
Cognitive computing can be used to identify suspicious data patterns and convince banks if the actual source of money is legal or illegal.
Video Collaboration tools help banks to survive non-face to face risks and easy account opening.
Peer-to-peer payment systems allow users to send one another money from their mobile devices through a linked bank account or card. P2P mitigates risk of counterparties or middlemen.
Risks such as Compliance breaches, Fraud, NPA monitoring, and Calculating Value at Risk can benefit greatly from data Analytics.
Mobile banking apps can track financial transactions and analyse user data curbing customer complaints.
Virtual RM's can be Chatbots which are AI-enabled conversational interfaces. Chatbots cannot manipulate data and cannot mis-guide.
Machine learning models can be developed to help detect changes in customer behaviour by analysing their transactions.
AI can be used to derive a better understanding of customers spending patterns, which will help banks customize products by adding personalized features.
AI can be used to come up with rules-based know your customer and AML compliance activities.
Cloud is a crucial tool to deal with risks connected to delivery channels.
API (Application Programming Interface) can enable a bank’s services available to other third-party companies via APIs thus reducing most of the banking risks.
Cognitive computing can be used to identify suspicious data patterns and convince banks if the actual source of money is legal or illegal.
Video Collaboration tools help banks to survive non-face to face risks and easy account opening.
Peer-to-peer payment systems allow users to send one another money from their mobile devices through a linked bank account or card. P2P mitigates risk of counterparties or middlemen.
The risks in banks have proliferated so much that even the best of the controls are becoming in-effective. Hence, the banks risk teams have to address risks on a continual basis. With the evolution of new technologies, the banks are required to come up with products and services which are more convenient to use and when we talk about technology software come into picture. Software’s are not risk free but, come with bundled packages of risks such as hacking, ransom-wares, malwares etc. That does not and should not stop banking organizations to evolve with new products and services. Hence, decision making becomes so crucial for banking organizations now-a-days. The decision to take risks and manage them involves the factors such processing teams acceptance, technology, people, legal, compliance, reputation, strategy, credit, market, liquidity, etc.
The biggest challenge faced by banks is around the data available with the banking executives to come to a conclusion. Hence, accuracy and volume of the data they use for decision making is struggle-some. Not only has the banking environment become more competitive, but the proliferation of mobile technologies, new markets, and products/services has worsened the risk environment and the importance of decision making in the risk environment has become at most important.
Upon the existing problems, the decision making on risks become more complex when CEOs and CFOs, are worried about the impact of, for example, reputational risk or cyber-attacks and other risks that may negatively impacting bank’s reputation and stock price. When it comes to banking risks and exposure, the bank has to take right decisions to adopt right technology and solutions. It creates, among other things, standardization, leading best practices, and the convenience to the relevant end user. Banks are required to create a central repository for risk and control information which acts as a powerful decision-making enabler.
Following are risk decision processes in banks:
In Banks elimination of one risk may increase some other risks. Hence, effective handling of a risk requires its assessment and its subsequent impact on the decision process. The decision process allows the decision-maker to evaluate alternative strategies prior to making any decision. The stepwise decision-making process to risks is as given below:
The problem is defined and all feasible alternatives are considered.
Decision maker then prioritize the alternatives.
The possible risks for each alternative are evaluated by the decision maker
The risks are then discussed based on their monetary gains (Cost Benefit Analysis) in reference to assets and time.
The final step, the risks are quantified in terms of probabilities to make decision.
Prioritizing alternatives is a special skill of risk and operations managers in a bank. The managers have to make choices while prioritizing alternatives:
Choose the best possible alternatives in each decision where risk is known.
Give reasons to those alternatives which were rejected as being the best alternatives.
Risk managers to be cognizant that best alternative can become risky alternative.
Plan B is ready for each of the best possible alternative
The time and cost to be exaggerated a bit while choosing alternatives as certain un-known risks always exists.
Each alternative given a rank or order or prioritization.
After the alternatives have been prioritized it’s time for a bank to attack these risks in the chosen alternative while making decisions:
Note down each of the risk.
Determine at what time intervals these risks will occur.
Jot down whether the risk is going to impact cost or time or both.
Is there a scope of deviation possible such that the risks are either minimized or extinct?
Ensure that Buffer or shrinkages are added in the steps where risks have been identified.
Risk tools and matrices are used as guides while taking decisions. Decision Matrix Analysis is a useful technique to use for making a decision in a bank. It's particularly powerful where you have a number of good alternatives to choose from, and many different factors to take into account. This makes it a great technique to use in almost any important decision where there isn't a clear and obvious preferred option. Further, While risk testing has not entered the world of AI or Data sciences, however, it is unavoidable for the banks to test the risk either quantitatively or qualitatively through available tests such as surveys, probability distribution models and other techniques for making effective decisions.
Risk awareness is the awareness that risks of greatest concern today are more difficult to observe and evaluate than the major risks of the past. Awareness that the sensitivity of the decisions depends on situations (say Pandemic), information available (partially known) and conditions (say market conditions). Awareness that no decision is a good decision and every decision is uncertain (the variabilities affecting the decision). Awareness that “data + mindful decisions” allows a bank to plan well, prevent crisis and fight hardships. Awareness that undesirable results of a decision will give more insight to take a better decision.
This is the process by which bank reduce the risk exposure by avoiding or eliminating the activities. The practice of risk avoidance involves actions to reduce the chances of probable losses by eliminating risks that are surplus to the bank’s business purpose. Common risk avoidance actions are underwriting, hedging, diversification, reinsurance, syndication, due diligence investigation etc. The major steps that banks should take under risk avoidance strategy are as follows:
Business-wise having a strong business continuity planning (BCP) covering IT backup, Data backup, Infrastructure, power backup, natural calamities, alternative sites, work from home etc.
Operations-wise, having checklists for each of the processes, Controls in process flows, Error tracking mechanisms, RCA’s (Route Cause Analysis), RCSA’s (Risk Control Self Assessments), KPI’s (Key Performance Indices) and KRI’s (Key Risk Indicators) etc. in place
People-wise, having strategies to minimise attritions (which once again is a cost to bank), Reward and recognize regularly, Strong code of conduct in place, whistle blower policy in place for employees to share their concerns, regular HR engagements, regular skip levels, regular one-one with employees, right medical-insurances, loans facilities etc. in place.
Regulator-wise, minimal interactions with regulators, incorporating regulatory updates in SOP’s, Co-ordinating with regulatory examinations and providing required information asked in detail for RFI’s (Request for information) raised, responding to subpoenas and co-ordination while investigations from regulators, having prescribed regulatory capital held by banks to avoid liquidity crunches etc.
Marketing-wise, being transparent with information to shareholders and investors, detailed description of all service charges of a banking product (meaning, having no hidden charges), Treat customers fairly (meaning no differentiation between one customer to other), give details of risks in a product to banking customer, transparency with internal and external customers etc.
Risk reduction includes disciplines like risk preparedness, risk management and ultimately risk mitigation. Risk reduction in banking should be based on an understanding of risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, and exposures. Risk reduction is about governance at regional and global levels fostering collaboration and partnership. The other points that banks should note in terms of risk reduction are:
Banking organization has adequate policies around identifying, measuring, monitoring, controlling and mitigating risks.
Banking organization clearly communicate the extent and depth of risks in an easily understandable, but accurate, manner in reports to senior management and the board of directors, as well as in their financial reports.
Banking organization conducts on-going stress testing to identify potential losses and liquidity needs under adverse circumstances.
Set adequate minimum internal standards for allowances or liabilities for losses, capital, and contingency funding.
Banks have comprehensive internal controls in place
Board of directors and senior management should define the bank’s risk appetite
Board of directors and senior management to ensure that the bank’s risk management framework includes detailed policies that set specific bank-wide limits on the bank’s activities, which are consistent with its risk-taking appetite and capacity.
The board and senior management must have an understanding of risk exposures on a bank-wide basis.
The board and senior management must overcome organisational silos between business lines and share information on market developments, risks and risk mitigation techniques. As the banking industry has moved increasingly towards market- based intermediation, there is a greater probability that many areas of a bank may be exposed to a common set of products, risk factors or counterparties.
The board and senior management should establish a risk management process that is not limited to credit, market, liquidity and operational risks, but incorporates all material risks.
Before embarking on new activities or introducing products new to the institution, the board and senior management should identify and review the changes in firm-wide risks arising from these potential new products or activities and ensure that the infrastructure and internal controls necessary to manage the related risks are in place.
A bank’s risk function and its chief risk officer or equivalent position should be independent of the individual business lines and report directly to the chief executive officer and the institution’s board of directors.
Bank-wide risk management programmes should include detailed policies that set specific limits on the principal risks relevant to a bank’s activities.
Risk transfer is a risk management and control strategy in a bank that involves the contractual shifting of a pure risk from bank to another party. Some of the strategies are:
Banks should transfer low-frequency and high-severity risks which could impact the net profit or balance sheet to insurance companies e.g. banks should have ‘cyber risk’ insurance programs.
Banks outsource operations to transfer risks to a partner.
Banks to purchase derivatives to hedge risks against inflations.
International risk transfers shift a bank's exposure from one counterparty country to another. They include parent and third-party guarantees, credit derivatives (protection purchased) and collateral.
Securitization of securities to transfer the EMI risks to an SPV.
There are some unavoidable risks that banks face which cannot be eliminated but, can only be accepted and go along. Some of such risks are:
Fluctuations in Stock market
Fluctuations in foreign exchange market
Delays in new product launches
Interest rates risk
The characteristics of risk-based decisions are:
In a risk-based decision-making process, risk characteristics are rated either qualitatively (e.g., low, medium or high) or quantitatively (e.g., number of transactions in a month).
In risk-based decisions, urgent items are put up in the line to that of not so important decisions.
The risk-based decisions rely on ratios, information known, available statistics and extrapolations hence, are safe, compatible, robust and serviceable.
Risk based decision process's sole purpose is to support the decision maker(s) to come up with an optimal solution.
Risk based decisions are reliable decisions coming from past experiences. They are also consistent as they are taken in accordance to the stated values of the bank.
Risk based decisions shield a bank from both number and degree of surprises as they are data driven and not based on assumptions.
Risk based decisions are collective decisions and not one-person’s judgemental decision hence, are dependable.
Risk based decisions are preparatory in nature as they ask the below questions:
What can go wrong?
What are the complications?
What are the ramifications?
In risk-based decisions, risks are prioritized and hence, the bank is aware where and what to monitor first.
Risk based decisions answers:
What, how and where should it be done?
What options are available?
What should be the threshold risk(s) that can be taken.
Accurate and complete data is a foundation for effective risk reporting. However, accuracy and completeness of data alone does not guarantee effectiveness of the information. A timely, information to the board and senior management will make decisions effective about risk. Also, it is not enough that board and senior management are aware of the information, to manage risk effectively, the right information needs to be presented to the right people at the right time (like business heads, LOB managers etc.). A bank’s risk reporting practices should be fully documented and subject to high standards of validation. This validation should be independent and include review of compliance mandatorily. The validation should review the appropriateness and effectiveness of the bank’s risk data collection capabilities and risk reporting practices, and the quality of the governance surrounding the processes. Risk reporting should be mandatory for any new initiatives, including acquisitions and/or divestitures, new product development, as well as broader process and IT change initiatives. A bank’s board and senior management should be fully aware of all limitations that prevent full risk data collection, in terms of coverage (eg risks not captured or subsidiaries not included). A bank’s IT strategy should include improving risk data collection capabilities and risk reporting.
The following are the parameters mandatory for any risk reporting:
It means precision in risk data which reflect risk in an exact manner. To ascertain, accuracy of data the following points needs to be considered:
The data should reflect details of ‘critical decisions’ to be made based on the information provided.
The data should have been validated, tested and reconciled before presentation.
The data to cover all material risks for effective decision making.
Risk management reports should communicate information in a clear and concise manner.
Reports should be easy to understand yet comprehensive enough to facilitate informed decision-making.
Reports should include an appropriate balance between risk data, analysis and interpretation, and qualitative explanations.
Risk management reports should also cover risk-related measures.
Data completeness refers to ‘no gaps’ in the data from what was expected to be collected, and what was actually collected. The major points for completeness of risk data are given below:
The risk data is materially complete, with any exceptions identified and explained in detail
The data should be so available that Sr. management in banks will be satisfied with the choices bank can make in terms of risk coverage, analysis and interpretation, scalability and comparability across group institutions.
Risk report should cover the following information: capital adequacy, regulatory capital, capital and liquidity ratio projections, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, stress testing results, inter- and intra-risk concentrations, and funding positions and plans.
The reports should contain both current and past data.
The reports should contain forecasts or scenarios for key market variables and the effects on the bank so as to inform the board and senior management of the likely trajectory of the bank’s capital and risk profile in the future.
Interpretation and explanations of the data, including observed trends, should be clear.
Timeliness means bank's ability to provide risk data at a predefined point in time not only meeting deadlines but also matching Sr. management expectation. Some of the important points of timeliness of risk reporting are given below:
The precise timing will depend upon the nature and potential volatility of the risk being measured as well as its criticality to the overall risk profile of the bank.
The timeliness should meet bank-established frequency requirements for normal and stress/crisis risk management reporting.
Different types of data will be required at different speeds, depending on the type of risk, and that certain risk data may be needed faster in a crisis situation. Banks need to build their risk systems to be capable of producing aggregated risk data rapidly during times of crisis for all critical risks.
Banks should ensure that Procedures should be in place to allow for rapid collection and analysis of risk data and dissemination of reports to provide for timely presentation.
All the key risk categories and detailed description of each of the below risks are required to be incorporated in a risk report at a minimum:
Financial risks such as credit risk (including default, migration, transaction, settlement, exposure, country, mitigation and concentration risks),
Market risk (including interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, credit spread, commodity and other cross-asset risks),
Liquidity risk,
Business risk (including tax and strategic risk),
Non-financial risks including reputational risk and operational risk (with important sub-categories compliance risk, legal risk, model risk, information security risks, fraud risks, and money laundering risks).
Risk appetite is about the pursuit of risk in a bank, also, a decision-making process on which risks to take on and which to avoid. To do so, banks need to be clear about what they want to achieve. Simply, risk appetite of a bank is the aggregate level and types of risk a Bank is willing to assume within its risk capacity to achieve its strategic objectives and business plan. Banking organisations will have different risk appetites depending on their sector, culture and objectives. A range of appetites exist for different risks and these may change over time.
The risk appetite in a bank follows following steps:
Setting risk appetite goes through the following steps:
For defining the levels of risk banks are willing to assume in pursuit of their strategy and when operationalizing their business objectives what would be the Strategic and tactical tools?
Creation separate platform for addressing all material risks taken ‘at the level of the bank as a whole’ and for ‘different lines of business (LOB)’.
A mechanism to engage the Board and Sr. management in a bank while developing a risk-conscious strategy.
A mechanism to engage LOB managers at every level of the bank in implementing the bank’s risk-conscious strategy.
The strategies to measure, monitor, and adjust as necessary the risk positions.
A platform for communication among internal and, as necessary, external stakeholders, promoting a shared risk language and fostering a common risk culture.
Risk Appetite Framework is the overall approach, including policies, processes, controls, and systems through which risk appetite is established, communicated, and monitored. It includes a risk appetite statement, risk limits, and an outline of the roles and responsibilities of those overseeing the implementation and monitoring of the Risk Appetite Framework. The Risk Appetite Framework should consider material risks to the Bank, as well as to the Bank’s reputation vis-à-vis policyholders, depositors, investors and customers. The Risk Appetite Framework should be aligned with the business plan, strategy development, capital planning and compensation schemes of the Bank. It should explicitly define the boundaries within which management is expected to operate when pursuing the Bank’s business strategy.
1. Features of an effective RAF:
Establish a process for communicating the Risk appetite of bank not only within the Bank organization but, as well to external stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, depositors, fixed income investors).
Risk Appetite Framework should be driven by both top-down board leadership and bottom-up involvement of management at all levels in a Bank.
Risk appetite needs to go hand in hand with Bank’s risk culture.
Banks should evaluate opportunities for appropriate risk taking and act as a defence against excessive risk-taking.
Allow for the risk appetite statement to be used as a tool to promote robust discussions on risk.
RAF should be adaptable to changing business and market conditions.
RAF should cover overall activities of a bank meaning, operations and systems of the Bank that fall within its risk landscape and outside its direct control including subsidiaries and third-party outsourcing suppliers.
2. Components of RAF:
1. Risk Appetite Statement:
Prepare Risk Appetite Statement containing metrics and measures.
Include Stakeholder expectation.
Governance around known risks.
Risk Communication.
2. Risk Information:
Embedding Risk Appetite limits and thresholds into Business data.
Identification of Risk tools.
Deciding on risk alert mechanism.
Risk data aggregation.
3. Risk Culture:
Tone of the top management to cascade importance of the Risk appetite.
Embed Risk appetite in Risk Culture.
Make banking staff aware of policies, strategies, tools and data of risk appetite.
Working within risk appetite linked to performance management.
4. Risk Decisions:
Cascading risk appetite to Business Units and Lines of Businesses
Ongoing controlling of known risk
Risk mitigation and contingency plans
The risk appetite statement of a bank should be easy to communicate and therefore easy for all stakeholders to understand. It should be directly linked to the Bank’s strategy, address the Bank’s material risks under both normal and stressed market and macroeconomic conditions, and set clear boundaries and expectations by establishing quantitative limits and qualitative statements. Qualitative statements should complement quantitative measures and set the overall tone for Bank’s approach to risk taking and clearly articulate the motivations for taking on or avoiding certain types of risks, products, country/regional exposures, or other categories. Risk appetite should be allocated to the Bank’s business lines, and other related entities as relevant.
Requirements of an effective risk appetite statement:
The statement to include key background information on assumptions made while drafting business plans at the time they were approved.
The statement should link bank’s short- and long-term strategic, capital and financial plans.
The statement should establish the amount of risk the bank is prepared to accept in pursuit of its strategic objectives and business plan.
The statement should determine for each material risk overall maximum level of risk that the bank is willing to operate within its overall risk appetite, risk capacity, and risk profile.
The statement should include quantitative measures that can be translated into risk limits applicable to business lines at group level.
The statement should include qualitative statements that articulate clearly the motivations for taking on or avoiding certain types of risk.
Risk Limits are the allocation of the Banks’ aggregate risk appetite statement to business line, legal entity levels, specific risk categories, concentrations, and as appropriate, other levels. In order to facilitate effective monitoring and reporting the risk limits should be specific and sensitive to the shape of actual portfolios, measurable, frequency based, reportable, and based on forward looking assumptions. Having risk limits that are measurable can prevent a Bank from unknowingly exceeding its risk capacity as market conditions change and be an effective defence against excessive risk-taking. In setting risk limits, Banks need to consider the interaction between risks within and across business lines, and their correlated or compounding impact on exposures and outcomes. As such, stress testing should occur at the banking institution-wide level as well as for legal entities and specific risks.
Risk limits features: Risk limits should be set at a level to constrain risk-taking within risk appetite in a Bank, taking into account the interests of customers and shareholders, business lines and legal entities as relevant and generally expressed relative to earnings, capital, liquidity or other relevant measures. Risk limits should include material “risk concentrations” at the banking institution or group-wide, business line and legal entity levels as relevant.
Liquidity deficit reports including that of bank's subsidiaries and branches are available.
The list of risk exposures and funding needs are available.
Advanced cash flow analysis is done on daily basis.
All relevant Regulatory ratios (such as Leverage Ratio, Capital Ratios) are available.
Regulatory capital has been maintained with the Central Bank.
Key Performance Indices (KPI) is available.
Key Risk Indicators (KRI) is available.
Risk and Compliance Self-Analysis (RCSA) is available.
Route cause analysis available with recommendations.
BCP (Business Continuity Plan) is in place with the bank.
Accuracy data available with the bank.
Error trackers and internal misses’ reports are available.
Threshold limits of that process is known to the Bank.
Credit history of institutional and individual clientele is available with the bank.
Yearly review of capacity to repay of the clientele report is available with bank.
A bank-wide checking or examinations is done whether “conditions put on Loan's” are being complied or not.
Every loan disbursed has associated collateral.
Revision of interest rates on loans goes through CRO and risk managers approvals.
A detail of exposures where bank has lent money is available.
Loan Contracts with clientele is maintained till the end of loan tenor and Risk Manager’s approval is sought before disposal of such reports.
Hedging and monitoring of the credit risk policies are readily available in banking records.
The bank is aware of risk of changes in current value (or periodic profit) of assets and liabilities (including off-balance sheet assets and liabilities) being affected by:
Change in interest rates of its deposits, loans, bonds and financial derivative products.
Change in foreign exchange rates in Assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, Foreign exchange transactions, Derivatives of foreign exchange transactions (forward contracts, futures, swaps, options, etc.) and Assets and liabilities whose cash flow (redemption value, coupon rate, etc.) is determined in reference to foreign exchange rates.
Changes in stock prices and stock index prices of Stocks, Corporate bonds with equity-purchase warrants, Stock derivatives (forward contracts, futures, swaps, options, etc.), Assets and liabilities whose cash flow (redemption value, coupon rate, etc.) is determined in reference to stock prices, stock index prices, etc.
Changes in commodity prices and commodity index prices in Commodity derivatives (forward contracts, futures, swaps, options, etc.), Assets and liabilities whose cash flow (redemption value, coupon rate, etc.) is determined in reference to commodity prices and commodity index prices.
Other market risks being affected by changes in volatility.
Physical copies of documents such as Leases, deeds and mortgages are stored in a secure place also backed up electronically.
Copies of Agency, partnership, association and joint venture agreements are avialable with legal team.
Banking License agreements, Policy statements, Records of insurances are protected against loss or destruction.
Banks constitutional documents correctly reflect how the organization is actually structured and operated.
All new ideas have been patented.
Board decisions and general body meetings MOM’s (Minutes of the Meetings) are recorded at least for five years.
Regulatory RFI's (Request for information) and the action plans have been stored at least for five years.
A set of compliance policies, principles, rules, regulations and guidelines are formulated and available at a common place with common access to all banking staff,
All banking employees are trained on compliance skills, knowledge and insight.
Key risk indicators of all the processes are available in some form like business process maps or SOP’s (standard operating procedures) or in business risk manuals.
Risk recommendations by Internal audit, external audit and RFI’s from regulators with action owners for the examinations done are available at a secured drive or share point or any other form in a cloud.
Compliance Governance structure is in place and is being independently overseen by a designated senior manager in a bank.
Risks in banking do bring in cost, but this cost of risks is worth bearing by the banks to avoid not only reputational risk but also paying hefty penalties/fines to regulators. Banks should be aware that with the development of market economy, the risks increase continually and with that cost increases proportionally. Uncertainty is the basic character of cost of risk where some costs are known and some unknown. Hence, banks in their risk planning should be aware of expected loss cost and keep buffer for un-expected loss cost. On the basis of players in the bank, the risk cost has two versions one internal risk cost (such as cost of attrition, cost of wrong payment/missed payment to clients) and external risk cost (such as Market risk, credit risk etc.).
Usually, Banks do not have a segregated budget kept apart of cost of risks and respective cost centres bear the costs. However, centralization of cost of risks under Chief Risk Officer is always important for a bank. Chief Risk Officer should be given an office account (such as a suspense account) with cost of risks flowing in/out from this account, of-course saying that the cost (/budget) has to come from respective cost centres of lines of businesses and some additional buffer amount should also be provided to CRO’s account for managing contingencies. In this way not only the cost of risks is centralized, but CRO has the control and knowledge of the risks in banks and can give better view to the management.
1. Risk Administration Costs: The cost of managing risks across bank consists of structuring and managing risk team and creation of budget for the team.
2. Risk Mitigation Costs: The cost of implementing risk measures for example, bank purchases specialized software to reduce information security risks.
3. Risk Control Costs: The cost of operational processes designed to reduce risk such as credit checks that are run on customers.
4. Risk Transfer Costs: The cost of transferring risk using techniques such as insurance or financial/derivative instruments.
5. Risk Losses: Losses that occur because of a risk. For example, losses that occur when a customer fails to pay loan instalments.
Further, there are Cost of risks measure models such as measure credit risk based on VaR; William Sharp’s Beta value measure, covariance measure of Markowitz.
When banking business accurately measures the cost of risks, they are effectively managing the risks which reduce costs such as regulatory fines/penalties. Many banking business use cost of risk to realize the following benefits:
Increased productivity, profitability and efficiency of the processes.
Reduced costs across the entire banking business.
A better idea of any inconsistencies in the bank's risk management approach.
When evaluating cost of risk, the banks should ensure following:
Break down costs into component categories such as service provider costs, risk transfer costs safety and health expenses etc.
Identify existing costs for each risk category and extrapolate it by adding newly identified risks
Establish budget for each category of risk.
Cost of risks should include actual losses, probable losses, administrative/service fees, vendor fees etc.
Assign one risk manager to each of the cost of risk category. This helps expose weaknesses in banks risk management program and also helps identify problem areas that need immediate attention.
Consider all components of Costs of risks proportionally, and examine how they’re operating in conjunction with each other. If some category requires more budget than other, adjust the budget accordingly with less risky category of cost of risk.
The mistake that banks do is to expect immediate cost savings by implementing cost of risks approach. However, Cost of risk program tools delivers financial benefits over time.
Total Cost of risk is the overall cost of managing risks and buffer for contingencies. The components of Cost of risks are:
Insurance Premiums: The additional cost payable to insurance companies.
Administration Costs: Administrative costs are expenses of a bank not directly tied to specific core functions in a bank.
Notional Losses: Example, Actual cost of loan -- (minus) Loan recoverable.
Productivity Loss: Losses due to unknown factors (climate, pandemic, failure of IT infra etc.), Losses due to high number of attritions etc which effect daily productivities in a bank.
Additional Taxes or Fees: This cost depends on policies in a country and arrangements of business un-estimated cost accruals.
Risk mapping is a process in banks where various business units/lines of businesses organisational functions or process flows are mapped by risk type. This exercise can reveal areas of weakness and help prioritise subsequent management action. The goal of a risk map is to improve bank's understanding of its risk profile and appetite, clarify thinking on the nature and impact of risks, and improve the bank's risk assessment model. A risk map is often presented as a two-dimensional matrix. For example, the likelihood a risk will occur may be plotted on the x-axis, while the impact of the same risk is plotted on the y-axis. A risk map is considered a critical component of banks risk management because it helps identify risks that need more attention. Identified risks that fall in the high-frequency and high-severity section can then be made a priority by banks. If the bank is dispersed geographically and certain risks are associated with certain geographical areas, risks might be illustrated with a heat map, using colour to illustrate the levels of risk to which individual branch offices are exposed. A risk map also facilitates interdepartmental dialogues about bank's inherent risks and promotes communication about risks throughout the bank. It helps banks visualize risks in relation to each other, and it guides the development of a control assessment of how to deal with the risks and the consequence of those risks.
Step 1: Preparation of risk list: Banks should prepare their own list of risks by taking into consideration specific factors that might affect them financially. Steps in preparation of risk list:
Collect all banking risks identified through different reports such as RCA’s, KPI’s, KRI’s etc.
The history of each risk must be available and new risks identified must find a separate place
Categorize the identified risks into market risk, operational risk, credit risk etc.
Select banks own list by considering the following criteria:
Relevance to the banking activities;
Impact on the banks financial condition and;
Ability to manage separately from other risks.
Conduct brainstorming exercise involving key team members from across the business and come up with final “risk list” which is consistent with the banks business plans and intended risk management processes.
Step 2: Drivers of the risk: Once the risks have been identified, it is necessary to understand what kind of internal or external events are driving the risks. Jot down all the drivers. Some of the drivers of the risks can be:
The risks have arisen were due to manual or automation errors in the banking system
There were regulatory changes which have driven the risks
The bank changed its policies which have driven the risks
Absence of strong internal controls failed the processes hence, risk identified
This is a systemic risk and peers have been affected as well
Step 3: Evaluating the risks: Evaluation involves estimating the frequency, the potential impact and possible control processes to offset the risks. Some of the questions necessary to ask during the evaluation are as given below:
Whether risk frequency, severity and controls are covered under drivers of the risk?
Can the bank get out of this risk fully/partially or the bank has to stay with this risk?
What are the steps should bank take to have proper process controls in place?
How can the work be better organized to reduce the risk exposure?
Have protective tools been supplied to LOB’s to mitigate the risks?
Whether a consultant is required to have further guidance on those controls which failed?
Whether risk identified requires more health and safety measures of employees?
Step 4: Risk prioritization: The most impactful risks are on the top of the list followed by lesser risk items which follow the below steps:
Each risk is given ranking as per frequency, severity and absence of controls
The rankings of the risks are further probed with expected financial losses
The last step involves consideration of severity of regulatory risk
Step 5 Control measures of the risks: The final step is to apply control measures to help lessen their impact/potential occurrence. Following are the steps:
Whether a qualitative or Quantitative or both the measures should be applied to the top-rated risks are decided.
Reporting systems are developed for these most important risks to bring the measures to management’s attention on a timely and regular basis.
The risk-return relationship is defined.
Correlation with other risks is determined.
Consistency of risks with bank strategy is decided.
Risk tolerance levels are driven for the identified risks.
On-going monitoring measures are decided.
What bank CFOs want is their financial exposure today. There’s where the risk analytics comes into picture to give CFOs and others in the C-suite a complete, up-to-date risk map. Risk analytics involves the use of data analysis to obtain insights into various risks in financial, operational and business processes, as well as to monitor risks in ways that can't be achieved through more traditional approaches to risk management. What risk analytics technology can do is to pull data from different LOB's such as HR, Operations, Sales, Billing etc. and cross-reference the information within the risk map. Once the map is in one place, Sr. Managers should be able to easily visualize the data in a risk dashboard that summarizes activity and flags changes in risk.
Asset Liability Management is management of total balance sheet items, its size and quality. It involves conscious decisions with regard to asset liability structure. Asset Liability Management (ALM) is a process in banks to address the risk faced by it due to a mismatch between assets and liabilities. This is mainly caused either due to liquidity problems/crunch or changes in interest rates. Liquidity is bank’s ability to meet its liabilities either by borrowing or converting assets and effect of changes in interest rates as banks typically tend to borrow short term and lend long term. Hence, in short ALM is planning, organising and controlling the asset and liability maturities and yields. Also, micro level management of assets and liabilities is not possible, through ALM, the bank groups the assets and liabilities according to the maturity, rate, risk, and size so as to control mismatches.
1. Check on Interest Rate Movement:
Banks are exposed to adverse movements in interest rates because on average, rates on their long, fixed-term assets are locked in for longer than rates on their liabilities. When the general level of interest rates rises, banks typically experience a loss in economic value because the value of assets decreases more than the value of liabilities. Hence, interest rate risk exposure makes bank lending more sensitive. Hence, objective of the banks should be to have necessary information about interest rates and detailed information about the positions used for hedging against interest rate risk. Also, banks should have constant look out for change in interest rates and try to construct a measure for interest rate risk exposure.
2. Pricing of Assets and Liabilities:
Pricing of assets and liabilities depends on three factors namely, Time value of money, Riskiness of the cash flows, Expected value of the cash flows. Banks should have a proper balance between proper valuation of assets and liabilities considering the volatility in the market and economic policy estimates.
3. Review of Investment Portfolio and Credit Risk:
Banks should clearly lay down the broad investment objectives to be followed while undertaking transactions in securities on their own investment account and on behalf of clients. Banks should also, clearly define the authority to put through deals, various exposure limits and set controls on reporting systems. On Credit risk, banks should have a keen awareness of the need to identify, to measure and to monitor and control credit risk as well as to determine that they hold adequate capital against these risks.
4. Review of Investment of Foreign Exchange Operations:
Banks should have a keen eye on leverage risks, interest rate risks, transactions risks, counterparty risks and country risk for their investment of foreign exchange.
5. Management of Liquidity Risk:
Banks should have procedures and plans in place to:
Identify liquidity risks early
Monitor & control liquidity regularly
Conduct scheduled stress tests and
Contingency Plans
6. Management of NIM and of Balance Sheet Ratios:
Banks should have metric of Net Interest Margin (NIM) which is a measure of the difference between the interest income generated by banks and the amount of interest paid out to their lenders. Also, banks should have measures around their key ratios related to its balance sheet statement which are:
Credit to Deposit Ratio.
Capital Adequacy Ratio.
Non-Performing Asset Ratio.
Provision Coverage Ratio.
Return on Assets Ratio.
The ALM process rests on three pillars namely ALM information systems, ALM organisation and ALM process. Let us understand each of the pillars as given below:
1. Pillar 1: ALM Information System (ALM-IS):
The ALM-IS in banks should have a comprehensive and dynamic framework for measuring, monitoring and managing liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity and commodity price risks. The bank needs to closely integrate ALM -IS with the banks' business strategy. Also, the ALM-IS in banks should generate liquidity gap and interest rate gap reports.
2. Pillar 2: ALM Organisation:
The Board of a bank should have overall responsibility and accountability to decide on the risk management policy of the bank and set limits for liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity price risks. The bank should create “Asset - Liability Committee (ALCO)” consisting of the bank's senior management including CEO for ensuring adherence to the limits set by the Board. The ALM Support Groups consisting of operating staff should be responsible for analysing, monitoring and reporting the risk profiles to the ALCO. The staff should also prepare forecasts showing the effects of various possible changes in market conditions related to the balance sheet and recommend the action needed to adhere to bank's internal limits. The size /number of members of ALCO would depend on the size of each institution, business mix and organisational complexity.
Pillar 3: ALM Process:
ALM process contains the following steps:
Identification of Risk Parameters: Consists of management of Currency, Interest rate and liquidity risk management in banks
Risk Identification: Identify bank wide risks.
Risk Measurement: Usage of risk tools to measure risk
Risk Management: Manage risk through risk strategies (Avoid, reduce, transfer or accept)
Risk policies and tolerance levels: Including risk in all policies of procedures in bank and setting tolerance levels for every risk taken by bank.
The ALM process rests on three pillars namely ALM information systems, ALM organisation and ALM process. Let us understand each of the pillars as given below:
1. Pillar 1: ALM Information System (ALM-IS):
The ALM-IS in banks should have a comprehensive and dynamic framework for measuring, monitoring and managing liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity and commodity price risks. The bank needs to closely integrate ALM -IS with the banks' business strategy. Also, the ALM-IS in banks should generate liquidity gap and interest rate gap reports.
2. Pillar 2: ALM Organisation:
The Board of a bank should have overall responsibility and accountability to decide on the risk management policy of the bank and set limits for liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity price risks. The bank should create “Asset - Liability Committee (ALCO)” consisting of the bank's senior management including CEO for ensuring adherence to the limits set by the Board. The ALM Support Groups consisting of operating staff should be responsible for analysing, monitoring and reporting the risk profiles to the ALCO. The staff should also prepare forecasts showing the effects of various possible changes in market conditions related to the balance sheet and recommend the action needed to adhere to bank's internal limits. The size /number of members of ALCO would depend on the size of each institution, business mix and organisational complexity.
Pillar 3: ALM Process:
ALM process contains the following steps:
Identification of Risk Parameters: Consists of management of Currency, Interest rate and liquidity risk management in banks
Risk Identification: Identify bank wide risks.
Risk Measurement: Usage of risk tools to measure risk
Risk Management: Manage risk through risk strategies (Avoid, reduce, transfer or accept)
Risk policies and tolerance levels: Including risk in all policies of procedures in bank and setting tolerance levels for every risk taken by bank.
The ALM process rests on three pillars namely ALM information systems, ALM organisation and ALM process. Let us understand each of the pillars as given below:
1. Pillar 1: ALM Information System (ALM-IS):
The ALM-IS in banks should have a comprehensive and dynamic framework for measuring, monitoring and managing liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity and commodity price risks. The bank needs to closely integrate ALM -IS with the banks' business strategy. Also, the ALM-IS in banks should generate liquidity gap and interest rate gap reports.
2. Pillar 2: ALM Organisation:
The Board of a bank should have overall responsibility and accountability to decide on the risk management policy of the bank and set limits for liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity price risks. The bank should create “Asset - Liability Committee (ALCO)” consisting of the bank's senior management including CEO for ensuring adherence to the limits set by the Board. The ALM Support Groups consisting of operating staff should be responsible for analysing, monitoring and reporting the risk profiles to the ALCO. The staff should also prepare forecasts showing the effects of various possible changes in market conditions related to the balance sheet and recommend the action needed to adhere to bank's internal limits. The size /number of members of ALCO would depend on the size of each institution, business mix and organisational complexity.
Pillar 3: ALM Process:
ALM process contains the following steps:
Identification of Risk Parameters: Consists of management of Currency, Interest rate and liquidity risk management in banks
Risk Identification: Identify bank wide risks.
Risk Measurement: Usage of risk tools to measure risk
Risk Management: Manage risk through risk strategies (Avoid, reduce, transfer or accept)
Risk policies and tolerance levels: Including risk in all policies of procedures in bank and setting tolerance levels for every risk taken by bank.
Underwriting is the process through which financial institution takes on financial risk for a fee. Underwriting is one of the most important functions in the financial world wherein banks and investment banks undertakes the risk associated with a venture, an investment, or a loan in lieu of a premium. Underwriting is a specialized job where banking professionals are well trained on the extent up to which banks can take on risk free investments or provide loans. Underwriting requires professionals to have some knowledge on analytics too now-a-days as as they deal with systematic computational analysis of data or statistics. Underwriting professionals should also have skills of interpreting, presenting and giving conclusions for their decisions hence, usually banks also train them on concept called "decision tree".
In investment banking, underwriting is the process where a bank raises capital for a client such as corporation, institution, or government from investors in the form of equity or debt securities. Investment banks are middlemen between companies that want to issue new securities and the buying public. When a company wants to issue, say, new bonds or involved in merger/acquisition or new project, the company hires an investment bank. The investment bank then determines the value and riskiness of the business in order to price, underwrite, and then sell the new bonds.
Banks also underwrite other securities (like stocks) through an initial public offering (IPO) or any subsequent secondary (vs. initial) public offering. When an investment bank underwrites stock or bond issues, it also ensures that the buying public primarily institutional investors, such as mutual funds or pension funds, commit to purchasing the issue of stocks or bonds before it actually hits the market. In this sense, investment banks are intermediaries between the issuers of securities and the investing public. In practice, several investment banks will buy the new issue of securities from the issuing company for a negotiated price and promotes the securities to investors.
Underwriting is the process where a bank underwriter checks the borrower’s ‘ability to repay the loan based on an analysis of their credit history, collateral, and capacity to pay back the loan’. Underwriting typically happens behind the scenes, but it is a crucial aspect of loan approvals in a retail bank.
Procedures for underwriting also consist of certain screening processes at initial stages of the underwriting and loan approval process in that they assist in weeding out consumers that may be non-creditworthy in relation to the bank’s risk tolerance level, identified target market, or product type(s) offered.
Compared to other types of lending, the underwriting and loan approval process for credit card lending is generally more streamlined. Increasingly, much of the analytical tasks of underwriting are performed by technology, such as databases and scoring systems. Underwriting and loan approval process for credit cards as said above is generally automated. However, some banks also use combination of judgement and results of automated score to approve the loans. Lastly, the most crucial factor for underwriting a credit card is payment history of the applicant.
GRC means:
1. Governance: A system by which banks are directed and controlled and monitored.
2. Risk: A risk in the bank means “future uncertainty” of earnings. And,
3. Compliance: To comply with applicable laws and regulations in all jurisdictions where a bank conducts business or have its presence.
It is assumed that all the departments in a bank work in silos and don’t either interact to each other or share information to each other. To break this silo approach, the GRC model was developed wherein all the departments work as one group in a bank, share information to each other, do cross training, understand each other’s risks and thus increasing departmental efficiencies and ultimately reduce cost to the bank.
Mounting pressures of regulatory activity, risk in every step of decision making, on-going economic volatility, changes in interest rates, exchange rates etc. calls out for strict governance structure. Governance cannot be seen as silo in any banking organization, rather it has become part and parcel of risk and compliance structures. Hence, banking organizations are combining compliance functions and risk functions under a single enterprise-wide framework known as Governance, Risk and Compliance or GRC function.
GRC is a discipline that aims to synchronize governance structure, risk information and activity with compliance in order to operate more efficiently. With effective governance, risk and compliance (GRC) approach, organizations will be able to multiply the benefits of their automation efforts and at the same time, bank will have accurate and timely insight into the entire enterprise in order to support better decision-making. Effective GRC implementation helps banks to reduce risk and improve control effectiveness, and reduction of the ill effects of organizational silos and redundancies.
Further, GRC is the integrated collection of capabilities that enable a bank to reliably achieve objectives, address uncertainty and act with integrity.
Standardization of risk management principles and by applying BASEL standards in standard operations for managing banking risks.
Safeguard, data management, customer privacy, and Know Your Customer (KYC) details
Abide by SOX Controls and do regular SOX testing.
Integrating risk in Strategies of banks using data science and artificial intelligence.
IT coupled to operational efficiency.
Governance around risk and compliance reports.
Centralization of systems across banking locations in-order to manage, review, evaluate and access risk and compliance information.
1. Governance:
Document processes and risks
Metrics and dashboards of governance
Assess effectiveness of controls
Effectiveness tests of compliance processes
List and mitigate incidents and issues
2. Risk Management:
Identify and categorize risk
Assess Risk
Mitigate risk
Report risks and action points to management
3. Compliance:
Compliance policies should comprise all local and global laws and other regulatory requirements
Adherence by banking staff to internal directives, procedures and requirements, laws, regulations
Designated compliance officer and compliance committee
Effective compliance training and education
Effective lines of communication
Internal monitoring and auditing
4. Who are parts of GRC committee?
Board of directors
Audit committee
IT steering committee
Compliance officer
Risk officers
Operations managers
Audit committee and
Auditors
An Incident is an unplanned, undesired event that adversely affects completion of a task in a bank. In short, an incident is the occurrence of a minor event, which is important enough that, if not properly managed, can lead to serious consequence (/s). Banks are required to actively manage their incidents as series of incidents may lead to the risk of crises. Hence a bank requires to have a specific incident management framework that when implemented can reduce the risk of incidents becoming crises. There are many potential incidents that could directly or indirectly affect /damage the soundness or efficiency of a bank. Examples of these incidents can be ‘Failure of payment and settlement systems, Failure to comply with local regulations while global regulations were adhered to’ etc. Banks are exposed to below types of incidents, namely
1. Incidents as a result of internal causes:
An example of internal incident wrong bulk payments done due by operations
2. Incidents as a result of external causes:
An example of an external incident is failure of another bank where our bank had any exposure.
3. Sudden Incident:
An example of sudden incident can be power failure in the bank.
4. Smouldering Incident:
An example of this can be ‘a broker's wrong deal/speculations have caused losses to bank’. A smouldering incident is not any single event which caused the havoc it's a series of wrong action/decision making.
Incident reporting to be a part of Risk management team.
Incident and crisis management policies and procedures are cl.1early defined.
Incident management structures consist of dedicated personnel as well as specific dedicated systems and facilities.
Training/education on incidents to banking staff.
On-going monitoring of incidents to avoid re-occurrence.
Regular reviews/Tests on control process of major incidents that took place in past.
Deep dive/Investigations of incidents.
1. Purpose of the policy: The purpose of an incident management policy is to define the processes and procedures that will enable the bank to identify and respond to a range of incidents.
2. Scope of the policy: The incident management policy should apply, as minimum, to any employee or contractor of or visitor to the bank whilst present in any premises or facility owned, occupied or managed by the bank, or any incident that might happen in the course of, or as a result of, any occupational, educational, commercial or bank-endorsed activity, whatever its location.
3. Principles upon which the policies are based:
Incident management policies should be standard meaning that the policies should provide a set of standardised procedures, systems and structures to manage incidents.
Incident management policies should be Flexible meaning that the policy should provide a consistent, adjustable framework that applies to the management of incidents in a bank.
4. Roles and responsibilities: The roles and responsibilities of each staff member in the bank should be clearly defined in the incident management policy to ensure effective management of incidents.
5. Description of possible incidents: In the incident management policy, the description of possible incidents could contribute to the effective management of incidents. In this regard, the policy should not be a static document but a “living” document subject to changes if and when they are needed.
6. Incidents outside the scope of the policy: It is of the utmost importance that the policy be confined to the activities/incidents of the bank. A clear description of incidents not covered by the scope of the policy should be included. This will ensure that there is no confusion amongst staff about actions to be taken when an incident occurs.
7. Incident policy training: A bank must provide incident policy training to its staff members at all levels.
8. Incident management framework: The banks incident management framework needs to be detailed in the policy.
9. Reporting requirements: The reporting requirements pertaining to incident management should be incorporated in the incident management policy. Reporting is an integral part of the framework and should provide detailed information on the incident.
10. Statutory reporting requirements if applicable: Depending on the type of incident, in some jurisdictions there could be statutory reporting requirements. The incident management policy should detail these specific requirements to ensure that appropriate information be provided to the relevant authorities on a timely basis.
11. Incident Response Tests: The bank’s plan for testing of the Incident Response Program.
12. Documentation Guidelines: A guideline as how to document incidents and measures taken during the response process.
Incident Management framework should contain the below:
1. Incident Management Training: A bank must provide incident management training to its staff members at all levels of the bank, detailing how to identify and report incidents.
2. Identifying and prioritising types of incidents: A bank should develop and maintain guidelines for identifying and prioritising incidents. In addition, staff from the banks risk department should evaluate the potential for the occurrence of certain types of incidents.
3. Incident monitoring: A bank should develop and maintain guidelines on how to monitor incidents. As part of their risk management programme, bank staff should continuously monitor for incidents according to the guidelines provided.
4. Incident detection: A bank should develop and maintain enterprise-wide procedures for collecting, analysing and reporting data.
5. Documentation: All incidents should be thoroughly documented by a bank with as much detail as possible to describe the incident, time discovered and impacted area.
6. Record retention: Depending on the type of incident and specific statuary requirements, a bank should maintain the incident documentation for a minimum of five years following the incident.
1. During Incident Management Preparation:
Are all banking staff trained on what to do when an incident occurs?
Is incident response plan been approved by a competent authority?
Does the Incident Response Team know their roles and responsibilities?
Do we know the frequency of mock drills?
2. During Incident Identification:
When did the event happen?
Who and how was it discovered?
What areas are impacted?
3. During Incident Containment:
Have all credentials been checked for containment of the incident?
What backups are in place?
Have all security measures been applied properly?
4. During Incident Recovery:
By what time systems be available for production?
How much of restoration is possible from a back-up?
What will be the process for monitoring?
What steps will ensure similar incidents will not reoccur?
Capital Adequacy was the principal message of the Basel II framework. However, a static regulator driven capital adequacy measure was deemed insufficient to manage the risk profile and capital requirements of an active bank in today’s risk environment creating the need for an internal and invasive assessment of the capital profile of a bank. Ideally such a measure would allocate and attribute risk capital to all significant sources of risk, stress test the results and keep the board informed of any expected or projected capital shortfall. Under Pillar 2 of the Basel II Accord, Internal Capital Adequacy and Assessment Process (ICAAP for short) was introduced with exactly the same objectives. The ICAAP is designed to ensure banks assess all risks to which they are or could be exposed; maintain sufficient capital to face these risks; and develop and better use risk management techniques in monitoring and managing these risks. It also allows a bank to fully realise the benefits of sound risk management techniques. Under ICAAP requirements a bank needs to have in place internal procedures and processes to ensure that it possesses adequate capital resources in the long term to cover all of its material risks.
The ICAAP is an integral part of the overall management framework and the Sr. Managers in the bank are responsible for the sound governance of the ICAAP. A bank should perform a careful analysis of its capital instruments and their potential performance during times of stress, including ability to absorb losses and support on-going business operations.
All material risks are identified and taken into account in the ICAAP and internal capital is of high quality and clearly defined. A bank’s ICAAP should address both short and long-term needs and consider the prudence of building excess capital over benign periods of the credit cycle and also to withstand a severe and prolonged market downturn.
ICAAP risk quantification methodologies are adequate, consistent and independently validated. ICAAP should incorporate stress testing to complement and help validate other quantitative and qualitative approaches so that bank management may have a more complete understanding of the bank’s risks and the interaction of those risks under stressed conditions.
ICAAP shall be subject to regular internal review. For this purpose, the bank is expected to have in place adequate policies and processes for internal reviews. The reviews are expected to be conducted by the three lines of defence, consisting of the business lines and the independent internal control functions (risk management, compliance and internal audit), in accordance with their respective roles and responsibilities.
A defined process to be in place in order to ensure proactive adjustment of the ICAAP to any material changes that occur, such as entering new markets, providing new services, offering new products, or changes in the structure of the group.
Economic risk is the changes in macroeconomic conditions like exchange rates, interest rates, government regulations, or political stability in a country directly affecting banking risks. Some major economic factors affecting the Banking Risks are as given below:
1. Trust: The banking industry is based on trust; 'trust between banks to banks', 'trust between banks and end customer', 'trust between banks and central banks'. Hence, when economy is slow or down, it directly affects the confidence levels or trust levels between the above parties. The great depression and recession are the greatest examples of economic risk affecting the banks mainly due to breach of trust.
2. Monetary Policies of a Country: The monetary policy of a country also has direct effect on banks. Financial imbalances and economic fluctuations often trigger banks to adjust their balance sheets according to the country monetary policies (refer to Asset and Liability Management). For e.g., A reduction in the interest rate boosts asset and collateral values, which in turn can modify banks’ estimates of probabilities of default, loss given default and volatilities and stimulate banks to take risk.
3. Government Regulations: Based on the economic conditions, governments in countries or international organizations (such as Basel) come up with various recommendations (especially for banks). Implementation of these recommendations comes with a cost which affect the profitability’s of the banks. Risk of 'Non-Compliance' with regulations lead to fines or penalties.
4. Political In-stability: Political instability is directly related to policy uncertainty; policy uncertainty leads to uncertainty in a bank's planning for future (say of expansion, expanding the credit etc.). Doubts always creeps into the minds of bankers "Whether government plans for 'closed economy' or open up economy for investments, what will be the policies around liberalization? Etc.
What is ‘The Great Depression’?
The Great Depression was the worst economic downturn in the history of the industrialized world, lasting from 1929 to 1939. It began after the stock market crash of October 1929, which sent Wall Street into a panic and wiped-out millions of investors.
Why it happened?
Throughout the 1920s, the U.S. economy expanded rapidly, and the nation’s total wealth more than doubled between 1920 and 1929, a period called “the Roaring Twenties.” The stock market, centered at the New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street in New York City, was the scene of reckless speculation, where everyone from millionaire tycoons to cooks and janitors poured their savings into stocks. As a result, the stock market underwent rapid expansion, reaching its peak in August 1929.
By then, production had already declined and unemployment had risen, leaving stock prices much higher than their actual value. Additionally, wages at that time were low, consumer debt was proliferating, the agricultural sector of the economy was struggling due to ‘drought and food prices coming down’, and banks had an excess of large loans that could not be liquidated.
What is ‘The Black Thursday’?
The American economy entered a mild recession during the summer of 1929, as consumer spending slowed and unsold goods began to pile up, which in turn slowed factory production. Nonetheless, stock prices continued to rise, and by the fall of that year had reached stratospheric levels that could not be justified by expected future earnings. On October 24, 1929, as nervous investors began selling overpriced shares en masse, the stock market crashed (that some had feared happened at last). A record 12.9 million shares were traded that day, known as “Black Thursday.”
What is ‘The Black Tuesday’?
Five days later, on October 29 or “Black Tuesday,” some 16 million shares were traded after another wave of panic swept Wall Street. Millions of shares ended up worthless, and those investors who had bought stocks “on margin” (with borrowed money) were wiped out completely. As consumer confidence vanished in the wake of the stock market crash, the downturn in spending and investment led factories and other businesses to slow down production and begin firing their workers. For those who were lucky enough to remain employed, wages fell and buying power decreased. Many Americans forced to buy on credit fell into debt, and the number of foreclosures and repossessions climbed steadily. The global adherence to the gold standard, which joined countries around the world in a fixed currency exchange, helped spread economic woes from the United States throughout the world, especially Europe.
How did recession start?
Despite assurances from President Herbert Hoover and other leaders that the crisis would run its course, matters continued to get worse over the next three years. By 1930, 4 million Americans looking for work could not find it; that number had risen to 6 million in 1931. Meanwhile, the country’s industrial production had dropped by half. Bread lines, soup kitchens and rising numbers of homeless people became more and more common in America’s towns and cities. Farmers couldn’t afford to harvest their crops, and were forced to leave them rotting in the fields while people elsewhere starved.
What happened to Banks?
In the fall of 1930, the first of four waves of banking panics began, as large numbers of investors lost confidence in the solvency of their banks and demanded deposits in cash, forcing banks to liquidate loans in order to supplement their insufficient cash reserves on hand. Bank runs swept the United States again in the spring and fall of 1931 and the fall of 1932, and by early 1933 thousands of banks had closed their doors. In the face of this dire situation, Hoover’s administration tried supporting failing banks and other institutions with government loans; the idea was that the banks in turn would loan to businesses, which would be able to hire back their employees.
Who came to rescue?
In 1932, however, with the country mired in the depths of the Great Depression and some 15 million people (more than 20 percent of the U.S. population at the time) unemployed, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt won an overwhelming victory in the presidential election. By Inauguration Day (March 4, 1933), every U.S. state had ordered all remaining banks to close at the end of the fourth wave of banking panics, and the U.S. Treasury didn’t have enough cash to pay all government workers. Nonetheless, FDR (as he was known) projected a calm energy and optimism, famously declaring that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”
What is the meaning of “Fireside Chats”?
Roosevelt took immediate action to address the country’s economic woes, first announcing a four-day “bank holiday” during which all banks would close so that Congress could pass reform legislation and reopen those banks determined to be sound. He also began addressing the public directly over the radio in a series of talks, and these so-called “fireside chats” went a long way towards restoring public confidence. During Roosevelt’s first 100 days in office, his administration passed legislation that aimed to stabilize industrial and agricultural production, create jobs and stimulate recovery. In addition, Roosevelt sought to reform the financial system, creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to protect depositors’ accounts and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the stock market and prevent abuses of the kind that led to the 1929 crash.
What is ‘The Great Recession’?
The Great Recession was a global economic downturn that devastated world financial markets as well as the banking and real estate industries. The crisis led to increases in home mortgage foreclosures worldwide and caused millions of people to lose their life savings, their jobs and their homes. It’s generally considered to be the longest period of economic decline since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although its effects were definitely global in nature, the Great Recession was most pronounced in the United States, where it originated as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis and in Western Europe.
What is a Recession?
A recession is a decline or stagnation in economic growth. Since the Great Recession, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has described a “global recession” as a decline in real per-capita world gross domestic product (GDP), as supported by other macroeconomic indicators such as industrial production, trade, oil consumption and unemployment, for a period of at least two consecutive quarters.
By that definition, in the United States, the Great Recession started in December 2007. From that time, until the event’s end, GDP declined by 4.3 percent and the unemployment rate approached 10 percent.
What were the causes of the recession?
The Great Recession sometimes referred to as the 2008 Recession in the United States and Western Europe has been linked to the so-called “subprime mortgage crisis.” Subprime mortgages are home loans granted to borrowers with poor credit histories. Their home loans are considered high-risk loans.
What is the history of Sub-prime crisis?
With the housing boom in the United States in the early to mid-2000s, mortgage lenders seeking to capitalize on rising home prices were less restrictive in terms of the types of borrowers they approved for loans. And as housing prices continued to rise in North America and Western Europe, other financial institutions acquired thousands of risky mortgages in bulk (typically in the form of mortgage-backed securities) as an investment, in hopes of a quick profit.
What is a Subprime Crisis?
A crisis in the mortgage industry due to subprime borrowers being approved for loans they could not afford to pay back and re-packaging these loans into Asset Backed Securities sold to investors which ultimately derived value from EMI's of the loans taken by subprime borrowers. Also these investments were not only backed by insurance covers given in an arrangement called Credit-Default-Swaps (meaning if Hedge funds are insured by an insurer) by the insurance companies but, also were given ratings by the credit rating agencies to sell quickly in financial markets. Defaults by sub-prime borrowers and significant rise in foreclosures led to the collapse of many banks, insurance companies and hedge funds.
What is the story behind?
Although the U.S. housing market was still fairly robust at the time, the writing was on the wall when subprime mortgage lender New Century Financial declared bankruptcy in April 2007. A couple of months earlier, in February, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced that it would no longer purchase risky subprime mortgages or mortgage-related securities.
With no market for the mortgages it owned, and therefore no way to sell them to recoup their initial investment, New Century Financial collapsed. Just a few months later, in August 2007, American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. became the second major mortgage lender to crack under the pressure of the subprime crisis and the declining housing market when it entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
That summer, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s credit ratings services both announced their intention to reduce the ratings on more than 100 bonds backed by second-lien subprime mortgages. “Standard and Poor’s” also placed more than 600 securities backed by subprime residential mortgages on “credit watch.”
By then, as the subprime crisis continued, housing prices across the country began to fall, due to a glut of new homes on the market, so millions of homeowners and their mortgage lenders were suddenly “underwater,” meaning their homes were valued less than their total loan amounts.
What happened to banks?
Even with Govt. interventions, the country’s economic troubles were far from over. In March 2008, investment banking giant Bear Stearns collapsed after attributing its financial troubles to investments in subprime mortgages, and its assets were acquired by JP Morgan Chase at a cut-rate price. A few months later, financial behemoth Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy for similar reasons, creating the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history. Within days of the Lehman Brothers’ announcement, the Fed agreed to lend insurance and investment company AIG some $85 billion so that it could remain afloat. Political leaders justified the decision, saying AIG was “too big to fail,” and that its collapse would further destabilize the U.S. economy.
Why Dodd-Frank Act came into picture?
The Great Recession also ushered in a new period of financial regulation in the United States and elsewhere. Economists have argued that repeal in the 1990s of the Depression-era regulation known as the Glass-Steagall Act contributed to the problems that caused the recession.
While the truth is probably more complicated than that, repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had been on the books since 1933, did allow many of the country’s larger financial institutions to merge, creating much larger companies. This set the stage for the “too big to fail” bailouts of many of these firms by the government.
The Dodd–Frank Act, which was signed into law by President Obama in 2010, was designed to restore at least some of the U.S. government’s regulatory power over the financial industry. Dodd-Frank enabled the federal government to assume control of banks deemed to be on the brink of financial collapse and by implemented various consumer protections designed to safeguard investments and prevent “predatory lending” banks who provide high-interest loans to borrowers who likely will have difficulty paying.
A Bank is always surrounded by risks such as Market risk, counterparty risk, liquidity risk, operational risk etc. The bank not only need to manage these risks but also let regulators know how effectively they do this. They submit 'Regulatory reporting' a summary data needed by regulators to evaluate a bank's operations and its overall health, thereby determining the status of compliance with applicable regulatory provisions. Certain regulatory report information is also used for public disclosure so investors, depositors, and creditors can better assess the financial condition of the reporting banks.
Risk management departments across banks spend significant time and resources in gathering and monitoring information related to different risks. Technology is crucial to manage reports to regulators however; it has become imperative in banks to have a sizeable team of risk managers dedicated to reporting risks to regulators and monitoring risk as BaU (“Business as Usual”). The central banks and banking regulators across world rely on the timely and accurate filing of report data by domestic and foreign banks. The data collected from these regulatory reports facilitates early identification of problems that can threaten the safety and soundness of reporting banks. Some of the risk related regulatory reporting is as given below:
The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) is an annual exercise by the Federal Reserve is US to ensure that institutions have well-defined and forward-looking capital planning processes that account for their unique risks and sufficient capital to continue operations through times of economic and financial stress. As part of the CCAR, the Federal Reserve evaluates capital adequacy, internal capital adequacy assessment processes, and plans to make capital distributions, such as dividend payments or stock repurchases. The CCAR includes a supervisory stress test to support the Federal Reserve's analysis of the adequacy of capital. Boards of directors are required each year to review and approve capital plans before submitting them to the Federal Reserve. Bank holding companies with at least $50B in total consolidated assets are affected by CCAR.
DFAST is Dodd Frank Annual Stress Testing. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) requires all banks with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion to conduct annual stress tests. The results of the company-run stress tests provide the regulators with forward-looking information that will be used in bank supervision and will assist the agencies in assessing the bank’s risk profile and capital adequacy. These stress test results are also expected to support on-going improvement in a covered bank’s stress testing practices with respect to its internal assessments of capital adequacy and overall capital planning.
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) (covered below) are significant components of the Basel III reforms. Hence, regulators ask these details in their own formats which differs from Jurisdiction to Jurisdiction. The objective of the LCR is to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of banks. It does this by ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily and immediately in private markets into cash to meet their liquidity needs for a 30-calendar day liquidity stress scenario.
Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) refers to the current or prospective risk to the bank’s capital and earnings arising from adverse movements in interest rates that affect the banks banking book positions. When interest rates change, the present value and timing of future cash flows change. This in turn changes the underlying value of a bank’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items and hence its economic value. Changes in interest rates also affect a bank’s earnings by altering interest rate-sensitive income and expenses, affecting its net interest income (NII). Excessive IRRBB can pose a significant threat to a bank’s current capital base and/or future earnings if not managed appropriately. CSRBB (Credit spread risk in the banking book) is a related risk that banks need to monitor and assess in their interest rate risk management framework. CSRBB refers to any kind of asset/liability spread risk of credit-risky instruments that is not explained by IRRBB and by the expected credit/jump to default risk.
It is the ratio of banks total capital supply divided by total capital demand. A ratio of more than 100 % signifies that the total capital supply is sufficient to cover the capital demand determined by the risk positions. The European banks need to follow CRR/CRD 4 capital framework {Credit Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)}. Internal capital adequacy ratio is mainly looked by the regulators to understand ‘how resilient is the bank?’, ‘Whether bank can withstand or be solvent in adverse economic conditions or during recession?’
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced a leverage ratio in the 2010 Basel III package of reforms. The leverage ratio is defined as the capital measure divided by the exposure measure, expressed as a percentage. The capital measure is tier 1 capital and the exposure measure includes both on-balance sheet exposure and off-balance sheet items. The leverage ratio measures a bank's core capital to its total assets. The ratio uses tier 1 capital to judge how leveraged a bank is in relation to its consolidated assets. Tier 1 assets are ones that can be easily liquidated if a bank needs capital in the event of a financial crisis. So, it is basically a ratio to measure a bank's financial health. The higher the tier 1 leverage ratio, the higher the likelihood of the bank withstanding negative shocks to its balance sheet. The leverage ratio is used as a tool by regulators and central monetary authorities to ensure the capital adequacy of banks and place constraints on the degree to which a financial company can leverage its capital base. Basel III established a 3% minimum requirement for the leverage ratio while it left open the possibility of making the threshold even higher for certain systematically important financial institutions. The Formula for the Leverage Ratio is:
(Tier 1 Capital/ Total Consolidated Assets) ×100
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) is a component of Tier 1 capital that consists mostly of common stock held by a bank. It is a capital measure that was introduced in 2014 as a precautionary means to protect the economy from a financial crisis. It is expected that all banks should meet the minimum required CET1 ratio of 4.50%.
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio = Common Equity Tier 1 Capital / Risk-Weighted Assets
The second standard ratio (see above) The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) aims to promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an on-going basis. The NSFR is expressed as a ratio that must equal or exceed 100%. The ratio relates the bank’s available stable funding to its required stable funding, as summarized in the following formula:
Total Available Stable Funding (ASF) /Total Required Stable Funding (RSF) ≥ 100%
Where:
ASF: A bank’s total ASF is the portion of its capital and liabilities that will remain with the institution for more than one year.
RSF: A bank’s total RSF is the amount of stable funding that it is required to hold given the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of its assets and the contingent liquidity risk arising from its off-balance sheet exposures.
Common Reporting (COREP) is the standardized reporting framework issued by the European Banking Authority (EBA) for the Capital Requirements Directive reporting (covering Basel III) consisting Capital Adequacy, Group Solvency, Credit Risk, Operational Risk and Market Risk. This came as a solution to the problems faced by Credit institutions and Investments Firms in taking risk related decisions in a timely manner during the great European financial crisis at an earlier period. COREP was adopted by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) for the UK banking industry from 31 December 2012. While COREP is a capital reporting regime, Financial Reporting Standards (FINREP) is its financial counterpart. It is a framework given by EBA for reporting financial (accounting) information to the regulator which will be applicable to all Credit Institutions in the European Union. Between COREP and FINREP, the latter is narrower in its scope because it applies to Credit Institutions reporting on a consolidated basis applying IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards). COREP, on the other hand requires consolidated reporting as well as solo reporting entity by entity. COREP and FINREP’s main goal is empowering banks with greater capabilities to aggregate risk data and high-quality internal risk reporting practices. The main objectives can be summarized as:
To aid the senior management in banking organisations in improved financial and risk decision making, as well as strategic planning by enhancing the very structure of regulatory reporting.
To facilitate trend predictions and thereby macro and global assessment of risk by creating a common basis for furnishing regulatory information.
To make regulatory reporting faster and more standardised by establishing a central repository for European banking data.
To bring the European reporting requirements onto a single common platform and eliminate the deviations caused by different supervisors in the EU.
Additional Tier 1 or AT1 is addition to a bank’s core capital or Tier 1 which use other additional forms of capital to ensure banks capital adequacy. An example of AT1 capital is a contingent convertible or hybrid security, which has a perpetual term and can be converted into equity when a trigger event occurs. Additional Tier 1 or AT1 consists of capital instruments that are continuous, in that there is no fixed maturity including:
Preferred shares
High contingent convertible securities (CoCos)
Under FATCA reporting Non-U.S. foreign banks are required to comply with this law by disclosing the identities of U.S. citizens and the value of their assets held in their banks to the IRS or the FATCA Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA).
The Common Reporting Standard (CRS) seeks to establish the tax residency of customers. Under the CRS, banks are required to identify customers who appear to be tax resident outside of the country/jurisdiction where they hold their accounts and products, and report certain information.
Effective capital risk management protects the capital of the bank, avoids financial distress and maintains financial performance within the bounds acceptable to shareholders and debt holders. If banks risk management framework is effectively conceived and implemented it will prevent erosion of the financial capability of banking business and allow it to seize opportunities. Organizations such as Basel and the Directives such as Capital Requirements Directive of EU demand levels of sophistication in risk quantification appropriate to the size and complexity of a bank's risk profile. Some of the important points while managing risks with respect to Capital are as given below:
The Group Supervisory Board or Boards in a bank establishes the general principles for risk and capital management as well as for the Group's risk profile, and implements these in the Group by adopting a number of risk policies and instructions.
The Group Risk Committee of the banks is responsible for the Group's capital base, capital requirements, capital and liquidity buffers with related contingency plans including the Group recovery plan and new legislation relating to capital structure or risk management.
The Group risk committee while considering the economic and regulatory environment at all times should monitor and adjust overall capital demand and supply in an effort to achieve an appropriate balance of perspectives which include book equity based on IFRS accounting standards, regulatory and economic capital as well as specific capital requirements from rating agencies.
The Treasury function in a bank not only manage solvency, capital adequacy and leverage ratios at Group level and locally in each region but also, implements banks capital strategy developed by the Group Risk Committee and approved by the Management Board, including issuance and repurchase of shares and capital instruments, hedging of capital ratios against foreign exchange swings, limit setting for key financial resources, design of shareholders’ equity allocation, and regional capital planning.
Treasury Functions to constantly monitor the market for liability management trades, the sensitivity of capital ratios against swings in core currencies, capital invested in currencies to be hedged or not etc.
In 2013, the European Union adopted the ‘CRD IV package’, the third set of amendments to the original capital requirements directive (CRD), following two earlier sets of revisions adopted in 2009 (CRD II) and 2010 (CRD III). The CRD IV package introduces in the EU law the bulk of the international standards agreed by the Basel Committee on Baking Supervision (BCBS) in 2010, known as Basel III framework. The package is comprised of a directive ‘Capital Requirement Directives’ (CRD IV) governing the access to banking activities and a regulation ‘Capital Requirement Regulation’ (CRR) establishing the prudential requirements that banks need to implement.
In particular, the main amendments proposed to CRD IV package set were:
A binding leverage ratio (LR) to prevent credit institutions from using excessive borrowed capital compared to own funds
A harmonised standard for how much stable, long-term sources of funding an institution needs (net stable funding ratio, NSFR)
More risk sensitive capital requirements for baking institutions that extensively trade in securities and derivatives (fundamental review of the trading book, FRTB)
New rules to calculate the maximum exposures that an institution can hold to a single client or a group of connected clients (limit to ‘large exposures’)
Ease the compliance burden for smaller and non-complex banks without compromising their stability
Improve banks' lending capacity to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (revised ‘SME supporting factor).
As per MAS Notice 637, a Reporting Bank shall comply with the capital adequacy ratio requirements at two levels: (a) the bank standalone (“Solo”) level capital adequacy ratio requirements, which measure the capital adequacy of a Reporting Bank based on its standalone capital strength and risk profile; and (b) the consolidated (“Group”) level capital adequacy ratio requirements, which measure the capital adequacy of a Reporting Bank based on its capital strength and risk profile after consolidating the assets and liabilities of its banking group entities, taking into account.
Other important requirements:
A Reporting Bank shall not consolidate its investment in an insurance subsidiary; and account for such investment at cost.
A Reporting Bank may exclude from consolidation its investment in any other subsidiary when preparing the consolidated financial statements of the banking group for the purpose of calculating its capital adequacy ratio requirements at the Group level.
Where the Reporting Bank issues covered bonds (as defined in MAS Notice 648), the Reporting Bank shall continue to hold capital against its exposures in respect of the assets included in a cover pool.
`1Banking examiners broadly check the bank’s commitment towards risk in a bank, they look at whether financial and non-financial risks are properly covered in policies and procedures of the bank, Mitigations of credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, liquidity risk, equity risk, commodity risk, legal risk, regulatory risk, reputational risk, operational risk, etc. are present, whether top management of banks give considerable importance to improve the ability to identify, measure, monitor and control the overall level of risks undertaken etc.
Internal controls are a particularly crucial element of a compliance-risk management program. And hence, examiners will first verify whether the banks have established and implemented an effective system of internal controls, including appropriate reporting lines and separation of duties, as well as positive and negative incentives.
Examiners will carefully assess the scope and quality of the testing of the compliance program. Part of this assessment will include determining whether the testing was performed with appropriate independence. Examiners will also look to understand the specific delineations of responsibilities between the internal audit, compliance, and other independent functions or third parties. Examiners will also look at how well compliance-testing exceptions are reported to senior management and resolved by business-line management. They will assess methods for tracking exceptions until the exceptions are resolved; this assessment will include examining the organization's provisions for escalating unresolved exceptions to higher levels in the organization, including the board of directors.
Examiners will determine whether the banking organization's training program ensures that compliance policies, procedures, and controls are well understood and appropriately communicated throughout the bank. While the depth and breadth of training that an employee receives depends on that employee's role and responsibilities, examiners generally assess whether staff at all levels understand the bank's compliance culture, general compliance-risk issues, and high-level compliance policies and procedures.
The other important categories of risk which examiners are interested in are as given below:
Risk Organizational Structure.
Risk Measurement and Effective Controls.
Bank Has Set Risk Limits (by assessing the bank’s risk and risk-bearing capacity).
Risk Management Policies, Procedures and Manuals.
Comprehensive Risk Reporting framework.
Communication between Audit and Risk Committees.
Roles and Responsibilities of Risk Committees and Risk Managers.
Chief Risk Officer and Responsibilities.
Periodical Reviews and Evaluation of Risks.
Let us study each of the above in deep:
Risk management organization structure is centralized.
Board of Directors are the part of the Risk Committee/Risk and Audit Committee.
Risk Committee headed by Chief Risk Officer (CRO) followed by Risk Managers check the Risk line management responsibility and accountability for the risks under their control.
Risk Managers are responsible for Risk Measurement and Effective Controls.
Asset - Liability Management Committee (ALCO) cover balance sheet and off-balance sheet items.
Credit Policy Committee (CPC) oversees the credit /counterparty risk and country risk.
Credit Exposures are measured to evaluate the impact of potential changes in market conditions.
Liquidity measured through stock or cash flow approaches.
Measurement around bank’s ability to withstand bank-specific or market crisis scenarios.
Interest rate risks are identified and quantified (e.g. IRR) .
Forex risk measurements and exposures such as Value at Risk (VaR) and Cash-Flow-At-Risk (CFaR) estimates.
Operational risks are measured (such as KPI’s, KRI’s etc.).
Availability of standardized measurement framework suggested by Basel Committee.
Banks should benchmark ratios such as current/debt equity, profitability, debt service coverage and other ratios
The loan policy should cover single/group borrower limits
Exposure limits are established
Limits are adjusted when a particular sector or industry faces slowdown
Availability of risk management policies approved by the banks board consistent with the banks business strategies, capital strength and risk appetite
Policies and procedures for market risk are articulated in the ALM policies and credit risk is addressed in Loan Policies and Procedures.
The policies should address the bank’s exposure on a consolidated basis and clearly articulate the risk measurement systems that capture all material sources of market risk and assess the effects on the bank.
Availability of ‘Policies on standards’ around credit proposals, prudential limits on exposures, asset concentrations, loan collaterals, portfolio management, risk concentrations, risk monitoring and evaluation, pricing of loans and products, provisioning, regulatory/legal compliance, Regulatory Capital etc.
Policies with regard to Trading book such as volume, maximum maturity, holding period, duration, stop loss, defeasance period, rating standards, etc.
Reports on the strategic and financial impact of risks are available with bank
Key Risk / Performance Indicators (KRIs/KPIs) for evaluating risk management performance, strategy, processes and controls are in place.
Availability of Analytical tools and techniques to monitor changes to bank’s risks and opportunities
Bank complies with legal, ethical and regulatory requirements in the gathering and recording of risk information
Risk reporting protocols
Ensures that risk reporting systems enable effective decision making and are capable of identifying actual and emerging risks.
Reports recommendations for improvements based on systematic analyses
Reports have highlights on areas of concern, change, emerging threats and opportunities
A repository of all major incidents, errors, complaints from customers are available with risk committee.
Record of risk managers submitting monthly dashboard to risk committee every month
Record of Risk Committee approving on the board’s decisions and regulatory reporting
Record of Risk committee must have assigned risk related trainings across banking organization
Dashboard of risk managers should had discussed within their processes the near misses and came up with action plans.
CRO has created an integrated risk framework for the entire banking organization.
CRO has approved quantitative risk limits.
CRO has developed a blue print of plans to mitigate banking organizations risks.
Documentary evidence of CRO advising on Capital structure in a bank.
CRO’s risk structure is independent of Operations or any other department in a bank.
Documentary evidence that CRO has disseminated risk measurements and reports to Sr. Managers and board.
Risk reviews are periodic in nature and stress tests are conducted at least once in a quarter.
Risks are categorized into “Accept”, “Reduce” and “Prevent” components for easy understanding.
Consequences and probability calculations are available for each of the risk types.
Knowledge base and records of all evaluation of risks are available and are retained for at least 5 years of period.
The logical conclusions of decisions taken by banking institution are available.
1. Operational risk:
Untrained and failure of role suitability of staff in a bank.
Failure to implement appropriate internal controls.
Non-availability of Metrics (such as KPI’s, KRI’s, RCA’s etc.).
No Business Continuity Planning to curb external factors such as power failures, natural disasters, political upheavals, strikes etc.
Lack of continual training and refresher classes to the banking staff.
In efficient error management.
No focus on responsibility and accountability of Sr. leaders and management in a bank.
2. Compliance Risk:
Faulty AML Programs.
Inadequate internal controls testing and training.
In efficient management of documentation.
Unable to hold/control large data.
Robustness of Banks leading to several interfaces between AML operating systems.
Absence of Fraud monitoring.
Weak control and governance across AML processes.
3. Credit Risk:
In-correct evaluation of borrowers.
Choosing defaulting counterparties for banking business.
Inadequate underwriting frameworks.
Unable to gauge Fluctuations in interest rates and currency rates.
Unable to gauge settlement risk.
In-efficient credit risk strategy.
In-appropriate calculations of credit limits.
4. Business/Strategy Risks:
A bank fails to adapt to the changing environment as quickly as their competitors.
Unable to adopt rapid technology changes.
Outdated framework of the core banking systems.
Increasing impatient digital consumers in banking.
Entry of the non-financial tech players in financial services.
5. Cyber Security Risk:
Unable to keep electronic information private and safe from damage, misuse or theft..
Lack of proper access controls.
Password sensitivity not proliferated across banking organization.
Lack of restricted usage of Wi-Fi inside banking premises.
Office laptops susceptible to attacks due to improper implementation of firewalls.
Unencrypted Data Transfers between departments giving chance to hackers to steal data.
End user devices such as cell phones have office credentials, login details and access to office servers.
Third Party services those aren’t secure.
6. Market Risks:
Unable to predict changes in interest rates.
Unable to predict losses due to change in stock prices.
Unable to predict Potential losses due to change in commodity prices.
Unable to predict Potential loss due to fluctuations in exchange rate .
Unable to predict fall in the prices of self-shares.
7. Liquidity Risk:
Unable to curb increase in number of defaulters of loans.
Unable to curb frauds and internal scams in a bank.
Non-compliance with regulations.
Uncertainty of Cash Flow projections.
Wrong estimation of risk-return perceptions.
8. Why Banks face risk of Moral Hazard?
Incomplete counterparty information.
Lack of effective due diligence on the counterparty.
Counterparties with intentions of fraud.
Lack of Control over traders.
Lack of strong accounting principals.
9. Systemic Risk:
Over concentration in single borrower.
Wrong investment policies.
Risk transfer techniques not adopted appropriately.
Treasury departments unable to estimate cash flows.
Improper budget planning and implementation.
Liquidity risks not calculated on time.
Risk Investigators are responsible for a wide range of duties related to the investigation and elimination of AML deficiencies and fraud detection in a bank. There are two types of investigators in bank namely:
1. AML Risk Investigator:
An Anti-Money Laundering (AML) investigator essentially monitors and investigates suspicious financial activity in a bank. AML investigators are routinely required to explain to regulators, examiners and auditors their strategies for monitoring and prioritizing risks. AML analysts must know their clients inside out, document information on clients using a variety of research sources, liaise with compliance teams on specific requirements and review data to ensure AML regulations are met. Responsibilities of AML investigators include, AML investigators collect data on alerts received through transaction monitoring tools such as account information, expected vs. actual transactional data, KYC information and role of politically exposed person (PEP) or adverse media of the party under investigation (if any). After data gathering, investigator infer and writes a detailed case study on the identified red flags of Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/Terrorist Financing of the alert. Investigator then, escalates the red flags to compliance teams for further action and decision making (such as off-boarding a client).
2. Fraud Investigator:
A fraud investigator in a bank determines whether a fraud/scam has actually taken place and gathers evidence to protect the victims involved and trace the fraudsters up to an extent possible. They prepare a detailed case study to make recommendations about future measures. They work for different institutions including law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, professional organizations, peer-banks, etc. while investigating fraud cases (such as fraud involving the use of stolen or lost credit cards). They interview witnesses, complainants, and employers to research transactions and record present investigation results. The roles and responsibility of fraud investigator in a bank include:
Monitor accounts and transactions regularly to identify any fraudulent activities. Perform fraud investigations and submit reports to the risk committee in a bank. Perform end to end product review to identify availability of any vulnerability. Investigate any unusual activities (reported by operational team through whistle-blower or any other form of reporting) and present report to management for action. Interact with external partners such as law enforcement agencies, vendors and peer-banks to validate information on fraudulent activities.
Train firm-wide on prevention and detection of fraud. Identity possible threats to the company such as security lapse, fraud incidents and take appropriate actions to avoid them in a timely manner.
1. Definition: Economic Capital is capital that covers the economic effects on risk-taking activities in a bank.
2. Purpose of Economic Capital in Banks:
Economic capital is a tool for capital allocation and performance assessment.
Economic capital measures are the quantification of the absolute level of internal capital needed by a bank.
Evolution in the use of economic capital has been driven by internal capital management needs of banks and regulatory initiatives
Pillar 2 of the Basel II Framework involves an assessment of a banks’ economic capital framework.
Economic capital models are used in the supervisory dialogue for assessing cumulative risks in a bank.
Sr. Management understands the importance of using economic capital measures in conducting the bank’s business and adequate resources are required to ensure the existence of a strong, credible infrastructure to support the economic capital process.
One of the more challenging aspects of developing an economic capital framework relates to risk aggregation.
3. Calculation of Economic Capital:
Economic capital calculation can be broadly classified into top-down and bottom-up approaches.
1. Top-down Approaches:
Under the top-down approaches, the economic capital can be calculated as below:
a) EC = EaR/k,
EaR is the earnings at risk (i.e., the difference between worst-case earnings and expected earnings).
K: Required rate of return.
Banks should gather enough reliable data to arrive at an appropriate measure of EaR.
b) Use of the Black-Scholes-Model to calculate the market value of capital.
2. Bottom-up Approach:
The bank uses VaR models to calculate individual risks, and then it calculates the capital across these risks. As a common practice, credit risk capital, market risk capital, and operational risk capital are added up.
A bank's capital is simply the difference between its assets and liabilities, i.e., the value of what the bank owners actually own. Because banks use extensive leverage to augment profits, a small decrease in the value of its assets can wipe out the bank's capital, causing it to fail. To lessen the probability of failure, banks must maintain a minimum of capital, which is referred to as regulatory capital. Regulatory Capital is the amount of capital a bank has to have as required by its financial regulator. This is usually expressed as a capital adequacy ratio of equity as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. The minimum amount of capital required by Basel III for assets with some risk is 10.5%, from the previous minimum of 8%. Regulatory capital includes equity, preferred stock, subordinated debt, and general reserves, must be sufficient to repay depositors and debt holders in the event of a bankruptcy. Regulatory Capital according to Basel consists of:
Tier 1 capital: primarily share capital, reserves and certain trust preferred securities,
Tier 2 capital: primarily participatory capital, cumulative preference shares, long-term subordinated debt and unrealized gains on listed securities,
Tier 3 capital: mainly short-term subordinated debt and excess Tier 2 capital.
The purpose of the CAP is to restore confidence throughout the financial system that the US's largest banking institutions have a sufficient capital cushion against larger than expected future losses, should they occur due to a more severe economic environment, and to support lending to creditworthy borrowers. Under CAP, federal banking supervisors will conduct forward-looking assessments to evaluate the capital needs of the major U.S. banking institutions under a more challenging economic environment. Should that assessment indicate that an additional capital buffer is warranted, banks will have an opportunity to turn first to private sources of capital. In light of the current challenging market environment, the Treasury is making government capital available immediately through the CAP to eligible banking institutions to provide this buffer.
CAP's Terms are:
Capital provided under the CAP will be in the form of a preferred security that is convertible into common equity at a 10 percent discount.
CAP securities will carry a 9 percent dividend yield and would be convertible at the issuer's option (subject to the approval of their regulator).
After 7 years, the security would automatically convert into common equity if not redeemed or converted before that date.
With supervisory approval, banks will be able to request capital under the CAP in addition to their existing CPP preferred stock.
With supervisory approval, banks will also be allowed to apply to exchange the existing CPP preferred stock for the new CAP instrument.
Vendors play an important role in banking services industry. Banks rely heavily on third-party service providers to offer specialized services such as consulting, process expertise, transactions monitoring etc., which improve quality for the bank, reduce costs, implement regulatory controls, and sharpen management’s focus on core business functions. In order to perform these objectives of banks, vendors often have access to sensitive information, including customers’ identification information. Hence, cybercriminals find a chance to target and exploit vulnerabilities in third-party service providers instead of directly attacking banks. Therefore, it’s important for all banking businesses, to strengthen their vendor management programs to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data, and minimize the impact in case of data breaches.
Vendor management is important for banks as service providers perform many key functions that can be critical to banking organization. A vendor management program can help a bank mitigate the risks inherent in these relationships. The risks associated with third-party relationships include: operational risk, transaction risk, reputation risk, credit risk, interest rate risk, compliance risk, liquidity risk, and strategic risk. If proper vendor management controls are not in place or are not operating effectively, banks can potentially be exposed to loss of funds, loss of competitive advantage, reputational damage, improper disclosure of information, and regulatory action.
Banks should consider adopting a risk management program for all vendors (IT and non-IT) proportionate with the level of risk of the vendors in order to identify and to be able to take the steps necessary to manage those relationships. Generally, a vendor management program should include the following components:
Risk assessment: A strong vendor management program starts by listing all vendors that conduct businesses with the bank and rank each vendor according to its criticality/risk (access to critical data, operation activities, etc.).
Due Diligence: After the risk assessment is completed, the bank should perform due diligence for critical/significant vendors identified during the assessment. Due diligence should include: reviewing and assessing the vendor’s financial condition and reputation, familiarity with banking regulations, background of company principals, information security controls in place, resilience, etc.
Ongoing Monitoring: Banks should continually monitor relationships with vendors by performing activities such as reviewing service level agreements and comparing them with actual performance; assigning staff with the necessary expertise to oversee and monitor vendors; reviewing the general controls environment of the vendor through onsite visits to the vendor’s facilities and reviewing audit reports.
Proper documentation and reporting: Banks should retain proper documentation to facilitate the accountability and monitoring of the vendor management program. That documentation may include: current inventory of vendors (IT and non IT), due diligence results, contracts, risk management reports, reports to the board of directors, and independent review reports.
Contracts: For data security reasons, banks should store a copy of vendor contracts off-site. Contracts should generally address the following: nature and scope of services, duration of the contract, the right to audit, cost, confidentiality and integrity, and contingency plans.
Procedures for terminating relationship: Banks should also have processes in place regarding the transition or discontinuation of vendor activities when a relationship with a vendor ends.
Nondisclosure/Confidentiality agreements: Lastly, it’s important to have written nondisclosure/confidentiality agreement with vendors, especially if the vendor has access to the bank’s critical data in any form (written, verbal, or electronic).
Vendors play an important role in banking services industry. Banks rely heavily on third-party service providers to offer specialized services such as consulting, process expertise, transactions monitoring etc., which improve quality for the bank, reduce costs, implement regulatory controls, and sharpen management’s focus on core business functions. In order to perform these objectives of banks, vendors often have access to sensitive information, including customers’ identification information. Hence, cybercriminals find a chance to target and exploit vulnerabilities in third-party service providers instead of directly attacking banks. Therefore, it’s important for all banking businesses, to strengthen their vendor management programs to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data, and minimize the impact in case of data breaches.
Vendor management is important for banks as service providers perform many key functions that can be critical to banking organization. A vendor management program can help a bank mitigate the risks inherent in these relationships. The risks associated with third-party relationships include: operational risk, transaction risk, reputation risk, credit risk, interest rate risk, compliance risk, liquidity risk, and strategic risk. If proper vendor management controls are not in place or are not operating effectively, banks can potentially be exposed to loss of funds, loss of competitive advantage, reputational damage, improper disclosure of information, and regulatory action.
Banks should consider adopting a risk management program for all vendors (IT and non-IT) proportionate with the level of risk of the vendors in order to identify and to be able to take the steps necessary to manage those relationships. Generally, a vendor management program should include the following components:
Risk assessment: A strong vendor management program starts by listing all vendors that conduct businesses with the bank and rank each vendor according to its criticality/risk (access to critical data, operation activities, etc.).
Due Diligence: After the risk assessment is completed, the bank should perform due diligence for critical/significant vendors identified during the assessment. Due diligence should include: reviewing and assessing the vendor’s financial condition and reputation, familiarity with banking regulations, background of company principals, information security controls in place, resilience, etc.
Ongoing Monitoring: Banks should continually monitor relationships with vendors by performing activities such as reviewing service level agreements and comparing them with actual performance; assigning staff with the necessary expertise to oversee and monitor vendors; reviewing the general controls environment of the vendor through onsite visits to the vendor’s facilities and reviewing audit reports.
Proper documentation and reporting: Banks should retain proper documentation to facilitate the accountability and monitoring of the vendor management program. That documentation may include: current inventory of vendors (IT and non IT), due diligence results, contracts, risk management reports, reports to the board of directors, and independent review reports.
Contracts: For data security reasons, banks should store a copy of vendor contracts off-site. Contracts should generally address the following: nature and scope of services, duration of the contract, the right to audit, cost, confidentiality and integrity, and contingency plans.
Procedures for terminating relationship: Banks should also have processes in place regarding the transition or discontinuation of vendor activities when a relationship with a vendor ends.
Nondisclosure/Confidentiality agreements: Lastly, it’s important to have written nondisclosure/confidentiality agreement with vendors, especially if the vendor has access to the bank’s critical data in any form (written, verbal, or electronic).
A
ALM: Asset Liability Management (ALM) is a process in the bank to address the risk faced by a bank due to a mismatch between assets and liabilities mainly due to liquidity or changes in interest rates and changes in currency rates.
Asset Backed Securities: Asset-backed securities (/ABS), are securities backed by financial assets. Typically these assets consist of receivables other than mortgage loans, such as credit card receivables, auto loans, home-equity loans etc.
Actuary: A person who projects losses based on exposure and previous loss history.
B
Business Risk: Business risk is the risk of banking organization's strategy not working or failing due to several factors such as competition, unable to adapt fast technology changes, unable to meet customer expectations etc.
Business continuity management (BCM): A holistic management process in a bank that identifies potential impacts threatening bank and provides a framework for building resilience.
Business continuity plan (BCP): A plan for the fast and efficient resumption of business operations in a bank.
Business Impact Analysis: A business impact analysis (BIA) predicts the consequences of disruption of a business function in a bank and gathers information needed to develop recovery strategies.
C
Country risk: Country risk is the risk that economic, social, and political conditions and events in a foreign country will affect the current or projected financial condition or resilience of a bank.
Chief Risk Officer (CRO): A senior manager in a bank with day-to-day oversight of bank-wide risk management.
Consequence: In relation to risk analysis, the outcome or result of a hazard being realized.
Cost of Risk (COR) is a quantitative measurement of the total costs such as losses, risk control costs, risk financing costs, and administration costs associated with the risk management function.
Credit Default Swap: In a credit default swap (CDS), two counterparties exchange the risk of default associated with a loan.
Credit Derivatives: Financial instruments which transfer credit risk connected with loans, bonds or other risk-weighted assets or market risk positions to parties providing protection.
Concentration risk: Probability of loss arising from heavily skewed exposure of a bank to a particular group or counterparty or country.
Compliance Risk: Compliance risk is the potential for losses and legal penalties due to failure to comply with laws or regulations.
Control: A control activity is a banking business process designed to neutralize risks.
COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations) of the Tread way Commission: This organization works with five other private sector organizations to provide frameworks and guidance for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM).
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs): A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is an investment product that bundles loans together and sold to investors in the secondary market.
Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities (CMBS): Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which are backed by commercial mortgage loans.
Compliance Risk: Compliance risk is the potential for losses due to penalties/fines due to failure to comply with native/international laws and regulations.
Confidence Level: In the framework of value-at-risk and economic capital the level of probability that the actual loss will not exceed the potential loss estimated by the value-at-risk or economic capital number.
Comprehensive Risk Measure (“CRM”): It is an estimate of risk in the correlation trading portfolio, taking into account credit spread, correlation, basis, recovery and default risks.
Contingency Plan: A plan for emergency response in a bank to ensure availability of critical system and resources to facilitate continuity of operations in a crisis.
D
Dimensions of risk: The three dimensions of risk are 1) directional (positive/negative), 2) probability (more/less often) and 3) magnitude (major/minor) dimension of risk.
Data Integrity: The data is available only with those have authority to access such data.
Disaster Recovery: Restoring a process/system to full operation after an interruption in service.
E
Enterprise Risk Management: Enterprise risk management (ERM) is the process of planning, organizing, leading, and controlling the activities of bank in order to minimize the effects of risk on bank's capital and earnings.
Event: Occurrence of a circumstance which can be certain or uncertain or of a single occurrence or a series of occurrences.
Economic capital: Economic capital is the capital required by a bank to cover the economic effects of risk-taking activities.
Emerging Markets: Countries and their financial markets with fast growing economies that are on the verge of becoming developed countries.
Exposure: The amount of loss to a bank due to the risks taken by it.
Exposure at default (EAD): It is the total value a bank is exposed to when a loan defaults.
G
Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC): GRC refers to a strategy for managing bank's overall governance, enterprise risk management and compliance with regulations.
Gap Analysis: A gap analysis identifies the difference between the expected vs. actual.
H
Hybrid Security: It is a financial security that includes the features of two or more different security interests. For example, convertible bonds…
High Risk Customer: A customer who poses higher risk to bank.
I
Incident: To record /document any incident those occur within the banking organization. By tracking these incidents the banking organization can spot trends that may point to deficiencies in activities or to areas where more formal procedures need to be put in place.
Inherent risk: The natural level of risk inherent in a process or activity.
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP): Under ICAAP requirements a bank needs to have in place internal procedures and processes to ensure that it possesses adequate capital resources in the long term to cover all of its material risks.
Impact: The unwanted result for a decision taken.
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards, usually called IFRS, are standards issued by the IFRS Foundation and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to provide a common global language for business affairs so that company accounts are understandable and comparable across international boundaries.
K
KPIs (Key performance indicators): Banking KPIs are metrics to measure the performance of process/products/employees.
KRIs (Key risk indicators): Key risk indicators are metrics used by banking organizations to provide an early signal of increasing risk exposures in various areas of the banking enterprise.
L
Leverage Ratio: The leverage ratio is a measure of the bank's core capital to its total assets.
Liquidity risk: Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank may be unable to meet short term financial demands due to inability to convert securities without loss of capital or any investments into instantaneous cash.
Loss Given Default (LGD): Loss given default (LGD) is the amount of money a bank loses when a borrower defaults on a loan.
Letter of indemnity (LOI): A LOI is a contractual document that guarantees certain provisions will be met, between two parties. Such letters are drafted by banks which agree to pay financial restitution to one of the parties, should the other party fail to live up to its obligations.
M
Mitigation: A process implemented to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of one or more risks.
Mortgage-backed Securities (MBS): A mortgage-backed security (MBS) is a type of asset-backed security which is secured by a mortgage or series of mortgages/home loans.
Metrics: The measure of the effectiveness of risk mitigation techniques.
O
Operational Risk: Operational risk is the prospect of loss resulting from inadequate or failed policies, procedures or systems in a bank.
OTC Derivatives: Derivatives which are not traded on a stock exchange, but directly between market participants over-the-counter.
P
Probability of Default (PD): Probability of Default is the probability of a borrower in a bank defaulting on loan repayments and thus, is used to calculate the expected loss.
Q
Quantification: Conversion of qualitative risk data into quantitative data
Qualitative risk analysis: An analysis which uses word form to describe the magnitude of a risk.
Quantitative risk analysis: An analysis based on numerical value of the risk.
R
Risk Criteria: Risk criteria are terms by which the significance of risks is assessed in bank (e.g. financial benefits, legal or regulatory or statutory requirements).
Risk mapping: Risk mapping is the visual representation of risks (which have been identified through a risk assessment exercise) in a way that easily allows priority-ranking them. This representation often takes the form of a two-dimensional grid with frequency (or likelihood of occurrence) on one axis, and severity (or degree of financial impact) on the other axis; the risks that fall in the high-frequency/high-severity quadrant are given priority risk management attention.
Risk Optimization: Process to minimize the negative and to maximize the positive consequences of a risk.
Risk Register: A Risk Register is a tool for documenting risks, and actions to manage each risk.
Residual Risk: Residual risk refers to the risk of loss or harm remaining after all other known threats have been eliminated, factored in, or countered.
Risk Appetite: Risk appetite expresses the aggregate level of risk that a bank is willing to assume to achieve its strategic objectives.
Risk Communication: Risk communication is the process of exchange or sharing of information about banks risk with banking staff.
Risk Level: Defining whether the risk is high, medium, or low based on the likelihood of appearance and bringing with it financial or reputational losses.
Risk Assessment: Risk assessment is the process of analyzing the specifics of different risks faced by the bank.
Root Cause Analysis (RCA): RCA is a process for identifying the causes of problems or events in order to prevent them from recurring.
Revaluation Reserve: Revaluation reserve falls under Tier2 Capital and is a reserve created when a bank has an asset revalued and an increase in value is brought to account.
RWA’s: Risk-weighted assets are the assets held by the bank that are weighted by its credit risk.
Risk Evaluation: Risk analysis to determine whether to accept and manage, transfer (by means such as insurance), a combination of the two, or eliminate the risks altogether.
Risk Mapping: The visual representation of risks which have been identified through a risk assessment exercise is called risk mapping.
Risk Financing: Funding risk mitigation strategy is called risk financing.
RVP/DVP: RVP stands for receipt vs. payment meaning a custodian bank receiving securities by paying cash and DVP stands for delivery vs. payment meaning a custodian bank is ready to deliver securities against cash.
Regulatory Capital: Regulatory Capital is the amount of capital a bank is required to maintain prescribed by its financial regulator.
Risk Reporting: Reporting of risks to internal or external stakeholders or to both.
Risk-weighted Assets (RWA): Risk-weighted assets are positions that carry credit, market and/or operational risk, weighted according to regulatory requirements.
Reputational Risk: Reputational risk of a Bank is defined as the risk of possible damage to its brand and reputation image in the market.
Risk Mitigation: Risk mitigation is the Risk Strategies/Actions which reduce/eliminate a risk or its occurrence.
Risk Treatment: Risk treatment is the process of selecting and implementing measures to modify the risk.
Risk Acceptance: It is a condition or event where no action can be taken to prevent the likelihood of risk happening /acceptance of the known risk.
Risk Analysis: Estimating the impact of each risk on the banking organization, and developing mitigation techniques.
Risk Response: How the senior management in a bank decide to set actions to avoid, accept, reduce, share or transfer risk as per the banks risk appetite and tolerances.
Risk Control: Implementing controls to minimize the frequency or severity of risk conditions or events that threaten the objectives of the bank.
Risk Tolerance: Risk Tolerance is the acceptable level of risk in a bank.
Risk Assessment Tools: The instruments designed to assess and evaluate risks in order to make more decisions.
Risk Monitoring: Monitoring the effectiveness of risk controls and measures in a bank.
Risk Avoidance: Avoiding those practices which give rise to risk.
Risk Center: A division or department or a group in bank who work on risk exposures of a bank.
Risk Prioritization: Ranking of risks on a scale to identify which risks are most important to manage based upon severity.
Risk Recommendation: Risk Recommendation is a suggested recommendation for a risk which will reduce, eliminate or transfer risk.
S
Subordinate Debt: Subordinate debt is any type of security (such as bond or stock) that holds a lower priority interest than another security.
Strategic Risk: Strategic Risk is the risk of failure of bank's strategic plans or business decisions.
Stressed Value-at-Risk: The Stressed VaR is calculated at worse market conditions for the inputs such as volatilities, interest rates FX rates etc.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also known as the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act" is a United States federal law that set new or expanded requirements for all U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting firms. The five major components of Sox are: 1) Transparency of financial reports, 2) Corporate Disclosure, 3) Board Independence, 4) Accountability, and 5) Development of ethical operating standards.
Safeguards: Sound practices of a bank to reduce risk.
T
Tier 1 Capital: Tier 1 capital is the core capital a bank holds in its reserves and exists as the primary source of funds. Tier 1 capital includes common stock, retained earnings, and preferred stock.
Tier 2 Capital: Tier 2 Capital is known as bank's supplementary capital that falls within a bucket which is not a part of Tier 1 Capital. The capital that falls within the definition of Tier 2 is revaluation reserve, undisclosed reserves, hybrid security, and subordinate debt.
Tier 3 Capital: Tier 3 Capital is that capital, which banks hold in order to support their market risk, commodities risk, and foreign currency risk.
U
Underwriting: It is the process that banks use to assess the creditworthiness or risk of a potential borrower. During this stage of the loan process, the underwriter checks the borrower's ability to repay the loan based on an analysis of their credit history, collateral, and capacity.
Undisclosed reserves: These are ‘hidden’ reserves a bank may have created (generally not a part of its balance sheet). For e.g., ‘the value of the assets that banks hold is worth more than what has been disclosed’. Most of the regulators do not accept the concept of undisclosed reserves, but they do exist.
V
Vulnerability: Vulnerability is a weakness or gap in banks protection efforts.
Value-at-risk (VaR): Value-at-risk (VaR) is a statistic measure that quantifies the level of financial risk within a bank such as risk of holding a portfolio or position over a specific time frame.