[Opening Lecture] - Claudio Majolino (University of Lille): "From one crisis (1831) to another (1935): Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: A Prequel To A Story Never Told "

Moderator: Julia Jansen (KU Leuven)

Franz Brentano, the father of descriptive phenomenology, was a careful interpreter of Aristotle. On several occasions, Edmund Husserl found himself presenting his own transcendental phenomenology as a form of Platonism, while reconnecting the apophantic side of his formal logic to the Stoic doctrine of the lekton. Not to mention Martin Heidegger, whose relationship to the Greeks in general and the Presocratics in particular barely needs to be mentioned. In short, each of the three major figures of phenomenology as well as most of their respective heirs (Carl Stumpf, Adolf Reinach, Gerhard Krüger, Jacob Klein, Eugen Fink, Emmanuel Lévinas, Roman Ingarden, just to name a few) have often elaborated their most original conceptions in a constant confrontation with the ancient philosophical tradition. How to understand this fact? How and why has phenomenology, in its various forms, been thought of in relation to the philosophers and to the great philosophical currents of antiquity? In this lecture I would like to begin sketching a tentative map of the territory to be explored. This map should be, at the same time, theoretical and historical. From a theoretical standpoint, I will try to specify in what sense the concept of "phenomenology" is to be understood and how the different ways of conceiving phenomenology produce different ways of confronting ancient philosophy. From a historical standpoint, I will try to identify the conditions of emergence of the first and most important encounter between phenomenology and ancient philosophy. The coordinates of such an encounter are marked by two crises. The first crisis corresponds to what has been called "the era of the great discredit of philosophy" that followed Hegel's death (1831), the second is nothing but the famous "crisis of the European sciences” described by Husserl in his last work (1936).

[Presentation] - Margot Sonneville (University of Lille): "Back From Ourselves (zurück von uns selbst): Krüger's Platonism" 

Respondent: Rayane Boussad (University of Lille)

Moderator: Dr. Andrea Cimino (KU Leuven)

How should we read and interpret Plato? What could unify Plato’s work? What is philosophy for Plato? Motivated by the theme of the erotic life, Gerhard Krüger was able to provide an answer to all three questions above. In my presentation, I will try to grasp the meaning of that motivation and in order to do so I will focus on both the concept of passion (Leidenschaft) and insight (Einsicht). By the end of my talk, I will present the specific answer to the three questions. In his work Einsicht und Leidenschaft. Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens (1939), Krüger proposes that if we want to seek an answer to those questions, we should begin by taking “the erotic life” (''erotische'' Leben)” as a “pre-philosophical starting point (vorphilosophischen Ausgangspunkte)” (p.X). In this way, Krüger studies and thematizes the mythical figure of Eros discussed by the interlocutors of Plato’s Symposium. Krüger’s strategy will be to contend that the Symposium is a dialogue which stands on its own feet. In doing so, Krüger seems to be inspired by some significant phenomenological frameworks. On the one hand, we can understand his hermeneutics as following the Heideggerian notion of unveiling: the Symposium opens a space that gives a perspective on Plato's whole philosophy. On the other hand, Krüger might be seen as an unorthodox “Husserlian” insofar as he would modify Husserl’s well-known "zurück" motto into a new motto, that of “back from ourselves (zurück von uns selbst)” (p.23), and, above all,  insofar as he would renew the understanding of ideation. 

[Presentation] - Dashan Xu  (KU Leuven): "The Moment Of Decision: Aristotle On The Beginning Of Action"

Respondent: Nicola Spano (KU Leuven) 

Moderator: Dr. Saskia Aerts (KU Leuven)

It seems that the quality of action is more discernable than the quality of its agent. We can not easily infer from an virtuous action that the agent is also virtuous because an virtuous action can be a pretension only. But we do form judgements on people's character or personality (including our own) based on our experience with them. Aristotle thinks of one's character or personality as virtues, (specifically as states of the non-rational part of the soul). Therefore, the discernment of virtue, such as courage or temperance, is a indispensable part of one's shared life with others. Moreover, the discernment of virtue could have a emotional component to it, that is, we form friendships with people we live with according to how we discern them. And according to Aristotle, in a complete friendship, we recognise and love each other as who we really are. And in the domain of arts, the discernment of virtue is also necessary for the emotional arousal in tragedy and music. However, the ethical virtues (since they are qualities of the soul), are not as perceptible as virtues of the body such as strength or health. The question is, therefore, how Aristotle accounts for the discernment of virtue in a way that rings true to our experience. However, what that means, is that we need to take on board his framework that might not be familiar to us, specially that of the quality of the soul and how it manifests in passions and actions in us and how it is discerned. In order to make this way of thinking concrete, we will look at the discernment of virtue as Aristotle analyses it in our experience of friendship, (NE. VIII&IX), tragedy (Poetics) and music (Politics, VIII).

[WORKSHOP] - led by Dr Jan Opsomer (KU Leuven), Dr. Alain Lernould (University of Lille) : "God, the Good and Ideas in Proclus according to Stumpf"

The workshop is devoted to a reading of Carl Stumpf's work Verhältnis von Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten (1869) and particularly to the passages in which the author discusses the Neoplatonic tradition. We will focus especially on Stumpf's description of the manner in  which Plotinus, Porphyry, Giamblicus, Damascius, and Proclus articulate the relationship between the Platonic idea of the Good and the figure of the Demiurge.

[Opening Lecture] - Julia Jansen  (KU Leuven): "Aristotle and Phenomenology"

Moderator: Claudio Majolino (University of Lille)

In a recent article, Pavlos Kantos argues for the central role of Aristotle’s philosophy in phenomenology, asserting: “It is not an overstatement to say that no other figure in the history of philosophy has exercised a stronger influence on phenomenology than Aristotle” (2018, p. 5). However, the nature, scope, and lasting significance of Aristotle’s influence vary in relation to different phenomenologists and can also be examined from various perspectives. This presentation offers a rich overview and a critical assessment of the different ways in which the relation between Aristotle and the phenomenological tradition has been depicted in recent scholarship. In particular, it shows how identifying Aristotelian elements within phenomenology has been instrumental in pursuing two goals: clarifying the historical sources of phenomenology and providing an informed systematic analysis of some phenomenological insights. Moreover, the presentation explores how strategically emphasizing Aristotelian themes in phenomenology opens up new avenues for research that challenge prevailing Kantian and empiricist trends, prompt a reevaluation of the relation between Husserl and Brentano, and aim at fostering a less ideologically constrained use of historical resources in contemporary philosophy.

[Presentation] - Valeria Bizzari (KU Leuven): "Aristotle, Phenomenology and the Mind/Body Problem"

Respondent: Andrea Cimino (KU Leuven)

The mind-body relationship is a fundamental issue that has interested philosophers from very different approaches. Nowadays we can observe several positions about this topic: my aim is to emphasize the phenomenological perspective about the mind-body relationship and, in particular, the role of Aristotelian thought in the contributions of philosophers such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This paper/talk consists of three different parts: in the first part, I will briefly sketch out a phenomenological account of the living body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty; in the second part, I will try to find parallels between phenomenology and Aristotle’s philosophy.  Finally, I will argue for an Aristotelian lecture of schizophrenia, a pathology that seems to be caused by a disruption of the corporeal Self.

[Presentation] - Pietro Braga (KU Leuven): "Simplicity of the Appearing and the παρεμφαινόμενον of what appears."

Respondent: Emanuele Mariani (University of Bologna)

The theme of phenomenology are not beings, but rather and exclusively the appearing of beings. This latter is not, according to Husserl, experienced as such in our pre-philosophical, naïve daily life, since consciousness is foremost directed, in its natural attitude, towards the «factually existing» things of which the world it inhabits is made2. It is only by means of a peculiar change of attitude (the so-called phenomenological reflection) and a series of methodological procedures (ἐποχή, phenomenological reduction), that beings become thematizable according to their way of givenness. In the phenomenological attitude, it is the consciousness itself that becomes, for the first time, visible as such, and revealed as something «simple». The term «simple» does not represent a hapax legomenon in the work of Husserl. Suffice it to say that this word is used in the formulation of the well-known principle of all principles, which is the cornerstone of Husserl’s philosophical method, and that it is further used to characterize the phenomenological reflection5 and the pure Ego underlying every intentional act of consciousness. If these findings suggest that the concept of simplicity may play a central role in Husserl’s thought, it is however difficult to precisely understand its meaning, since—at least according to my knowledge—no clarification of such notion can be found in the writings of Husserl. A philological attempt to reconstruct its meaning is therefore self-defeating. However, history may here come to our aid. There seems to be no idiosyncrasy in the Husserlian use of this notion, but rather the expression of an affinity with many other classical authors of the philosophical Western tradition—namely Plotinus, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes and Hegel—, who also made use of this term to characterize the object of their speculative efforts—respectively the One, God, the mind and the concept. Since the origin of this notion can be traced back to the Aristotelian treatise On the Soul, it may be profitable to investigate its precise meaning in the economy of Aristotle’s philosophy, in order to see if such an elucidation may be of use for a better understanding of the phenomenology of Husserl. Accordingly, in my paper I will offer an interpretation of a passage of Aristotle’s De anima (especially III 4, 429 a 10—22) in which Aristotle, speaking of the intellect (νοῦς), attempts to demonstrate that this is simple (ἁπλοῦν, 429 b 23). My talk will be divided in two parts: 1) I will first show that the Aristotelian νοῦς, which is usually translated as «mind» or «intellect», should not be understood as a psychological faculty, but rather as the pure appearing of what appears, and that simplicity is its essence. My thesis is that the simplicity of the appearing means the essential co-belonging of being and appearing, i.e., it is the idea that what appears, appears as what it is. 2) I will then analyze what is at stake in the Aristotelian institution of the simplicity of the appearing. As Aristotle writes, the appearing must be simple, in order not to constitute the παρεμφαινόμενον of what appears, i.e., in order not to «appear besides what appears». In order to clarify such an obscure formula, I will refer to other passages of the corpus aristotelicum in which the notion of the παρεμφαινόμενον occurs (namely Probl. XXIII 9, 932 b 16-24 and Phys. IV 4, 212 a 7-9) and take into account certain excerpts of the Metaphysics in which Aristotle criticizes the Platonic theory of the ideas, considering them as entities which «appear besides (παρά)» what appears. My thesis is that the Aristotelian institution of the simplicity of the appearing is made possible by the exclusion of the Platonic idea as what constitutes the being of what appears. In my opinion, these two notions—the simplicity of the appearing and the παρεμφαινόμενον of what appears—are of use not only for a better understanding of the essential difference between the fundamental philosophical assumptions of Aristotle and Plato, but also between the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the post-phenomenological approaches of those authors who explicitly criticized his thought (most notably, the later Heidegger and Derrida). As a conclusion of my talk, I will suggest that Aristotle and Husserl may be interpreted as sharing the same fundamental idea of the appearing, namely, that this is simple, and therefore essentially manifestative of what beings are. On the contrary, Heidegger and Derrida, on the footsteps of Plato, advocate for the necessity of taking into account the παρεμφαινόμενον of what appears, which necessarily produces a distortion in the appearing of what appears.

[WORKSHOP] - led by Dr Saskia Aerts (KU Leuven), Guilherme Riscali (ULisboa) : "Husserl and Plotinus 's Investigations Into Principle" 

This second workshop is devoted to a reading of Husserl's Notizen zu Lehre des Plotin (1913) and Plotinus' Enneads. On the one hand, we will seek to highlight the relevance and acuity of the Husserlian reading for the history of the reception of Neoplatonism, i.e. the under-determined role of the ''energeia'' in thinking the One (Pierre-José, 1981). Secondly, we will look at how these readings of Plotinus helped Husserl's own reflection during this crucial period. For example, what is the significance of Plotinian readings about the One, the Good and the Divine for thinking about the meanings of "the absolute" in ethics and theology within the framework of transcendental phenomenology?

[Presentation] - Pierre Adam (University of Lille): "Jacob Klein’s Husserlian Anzahl and Plato’s Arithmos"

Respondent: Dr. Emanuela Carta (KU Leuven)

In his bipartite study “Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra”, published in 1934 and 1936, Jacob Klein states that Plato, and probably most of the greek thinkers with him, considered arithmos as a simple collection of units, be they pure or material. This definition of arithmos, due to the indivisibility of the unit and the non-structural character of a collection, certainly prevents any algebraic conception of number from arising into greek classical mathematical thought. In assigning such a conception to Plato, Klein seems to have in mind Euclid’s famous definition of arithmos in book VII of the Elements, but also and even more, Husserl efforts in his Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) to give to this euclidean definition all its psychological deepness and exactness. After having described as precisely as possible the conjunction of Euclide’s, Husserl’s and Klein’s conceptions of arithmos and Anzahl, we will propose some leads which might be followed up inside the dialogues in order to determine more precisely and maybe more diversely what might have been Plato’s conception of arithmos.

[Lecture] -  Margot Sonneville (University of Lille): "Metaphysical Motivation: Notes For A Husserlian Variation On Eros"

Moderator: Dr. Andrea Cimino (KU Leuven)

The Krisis raises the existential ground of all philosophical investigation: «For everything proceeds from us, the living human beings who pose the theoretical questions» (333). All subject-matter is deeply rooted in human existence, and it cannot be otherwise when we regard the question about metaphysics in a phenomenological framework. Why, while a whole nation turns in a situation of war, a whole world turns in a situation of pandemic crisis, men do not just pray?  Why do they still strive to do the best they can? What is that impulse that drive persons, nations, supranational communities to not renounce to make emerge a sense in the world, against the (empty?) possibility that everything is ultimately ''for nothing'' (Umsonst)? More fundamentally, these living human questions are related, in Husserl's phenomenology, to the highest theoretical questions about the teleological sense of the world. My aim in this lecture is looking for a lane in order to investigate into the essence of this "impulse", or motivation. Rather than presenting definitive results, I am looking for some starting points for a future research. I will not answer these questions, but I only seek to consolidate a methodological and conceptual base.

I. As a first step, I will introduce generally the positive conception by Husserl of the transcendental theism in order to explain the concept of teleology.

II. Thus, as a second step, I will recall the general functioning of the law of motivation.

III. Finally, as a last step, I will indicate how the Platonic Eros constitutes a good piece in order to establish the link between the field of transcendental theism and motivation, as metaphysical motivation.