I study the impact of the 2018 U.S. steel tariffs on bidding in highway procurement auctions. The requirement to use domestically produced steel did not insulate procurement spending from the effects of tariffs in import-reliant coastal states. I find that bids on steel inputs saw a significant increase in these states but were unaffected in the Midwest, where most domestic steel is produced. Using a structural model of bidding and entry, I show that bidders in California faced higher costs but also earned higher markups as fewer bidders participated in steel-intensive projects. I estimate that California incurred an additional $100 million (a 6.8% increase) to construct highway projects, with one-third of the increase driven by the decline in competition. These effects are absent in Michigan.

We study the strategic procurement of prescription opioids by retail pharmacies during the prescription opioid epidemic in the United States. The Drug Enforcement Authority (DEA) relies on drug distributors to monitor their pharmacy customers for suspicious purchasing behavior in order to prevent the diversion of opioids to illicit users. Using a theoretical model of pharmacy procurement, we formalize a key flaw in relying on distributors to monitor for diversion: distributors cannot perfectly observe pharmacies' purchases from rival distributors. This incentivizes pharmacies engaged in diversion to select into contracts with multiple distributors, which allows them to spread out their total demand over smaller orders that are less likely to be flagged as suspicious. We test the predictions of our model using administrative data from the Drug Enforcement Administration on shipments of opioids from distributors to pharmacies. We leverage the introduction of an abuse-deterrent reformulation of OxyContin to identify pharmacies involved in opioid diversion and to measure the magnitude of each pharmacy's illicit demand. Illicit OxyContin demand is highly predictive of distributor ``multi-homing'': pharmacies in the top decile of illicit OxyContin demand were 61% more likely to purchase from multiple distributors than pharmacies in the bottom decile. We estimate that nearly half of the OxyContin procured by multi-homing pharmacies during the first wave of the opioid crisis was diverted to illicit users. Our findings highlight the risks of relying on suppliers to monitor for illicit behavior in the presence of strategic customers and competing suppliers.

I aim to examine how trade policy interacts with and amplifies market distortions arising from imperfect competition. In industries characterized by imperfect competition, import tariffs reduce foreign competition and increase the pricing power of domestic producers. Does this rise in pricing power, in turn, enable domestic producers to operate at a larger scale? Are increases in scale driven mainly by mergers and acquisitions, or by capacity expansions within existing firms? What are the resulting implications of this for prices paid by downstream consumers? Is there an optimal tariff rate that balances the benefits of protecting domestic producers against the potential costs arising from increased market concentration and higher prices? I aim to answer the above questions by examining the extent to which the 2018 U.S. steel tariffs led to scale expansions among domestic steel producers and the resulting implications for consumers. To identify the various channels through which tariffs can amplify the pricing power of domestic steel producers, I plan to develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of producers’ capacity expansion and pricing decisions using plant-level data. In the model, domestic steel producers respond to the tariff-induced increase in demand for domestic steel by making costly capacity expansion decisions either by increasing capacity in their own plants, which reduces costs in subsequent periods, or by purchasing plants from other competitors, which additionally reduces competitive pressure in subsequent periods. Using the model-implied estimates and a set of counterfactual exercises, I aim to assess how the steel tariffs amplified preexisting distortions arising from imperfect competition and the extent to which these effects contributed to higher prices for downstream consumers.

We examine how the shift of streaming platforms to an advertiser-supported revenue model affects their content offerings and consumers. This shift forces platforms to adjust their content strategies, though the direction is unclear. Platforms may aim to increase ad impressions by offering content that appeals to a broad audience, thereby driving up viewership. Alternatively, they may seek to increase the value of impressions by targeting niche audiences, who are typically more valuable to advertisers. These changes also impact consumers: while they generally dislike ads, consumers might benefit from adjusted content offerings if aligning with their preferences. We plan to answer this question using data on content offerings of platforms and consumer viewership.