March 24, 2026
March 24, 2026
Last week, I argued that the Yukon will continue to be left out of Arctic security investments because our government and business leaders have yet to define our value proposition.
They are not short on analysis or momentum to draw from, however. The previous premier’s Arctic Security Advisory Council mapped out recommendations for defence, infrastructure, and partnerships back in 2024. Last year, Yukon First Nations brought governments, defence officials, academics, and industry together at a defence and security conference. New institutional pieces are taking shape too. The Council of Yukon First Nations announced a security partnership table last month, and the Yukon-based Canadian Institute for Arctic Security continues to grow.
What’s missing is coordination – and a clear, shared articulation of what the Yukon is offering Canada in the defence space.
Canada is not allocating defence dollars based on geography alone. It is investing where there is readiness, operational relevance, and credible partnerships. The Yukon needs to define its role in those terms – not simply as “part of the North,” but as a place that can deliver specific capabilities.
That starts with a reality check. The Yukon is an unlikely candidate for military bases, radar sites, or frontline operations. Those initiatives will continue to concentrate in locations with much more direct Arctic Ocean access and proximity to key maritime and air corridors.
But that does not make the Yukon peripheral. It just makes its role different.
The Yukon’s value lies in what it enables. Transportation corridors linking southern Canada with the Western Arctic. A staging and support environment for northern operations. In that sense, the Alaska Highway, the Dempster corridor, and the territory’s aviation network are not just transportation assets. They are part of the logistical system that supports continental defence.
The focus, then, should not be on whether the Yukon hosts major bases. It should be on positioning the territory as indispensable to the systems that support them.
Few places in Canada have a governance landscape like the Yukon, where 11 of 14 First Nations have signed Final and Self-Government Agreements with federal and territorial governments. That is another structural advantage that remains underutilized in this space.
Yukon First Nations are not stakeholders. They are governments, with authority and jurisdiction grounded in the Constitution and, for most, in those agreements. The Yukon has an established a co-governance framework that enables strong federal-territorial-First Nation partnerships.
This matters because federal defence spending – like other major project funding – is increasingly tied to Indigenous partnership and participation.
Elsewhere in the North, governments and Indigenous partners are already moving in this direction. They are aligning infrastructure priorities with defence needs (in practical, not overstated, terms), positioning Indigenous corporations within supply chains, and structuring partnerships before contracts are on the table.
The Yukon is not yet doing this in a coordinated way. Governments, chambers of commerce, and territorial organizations have not built the structures needed to prepare Yukon First Nations, development corporations, and businesses for defence procurement.
The issue is not that the Yukon is being overlooked. It is that others are showing up better prepared.
Right now, efforts are moving in parallel. Yukon Government is advancing its priorities. Yukon First Nations are leading their own engagements on this file. Businesses and development corporations remain largely on the margins of both.
What’s needed is a jointly led effort, grounded in Modern Treaties, that brings all of this together into a single credible offer. Not more signals of interest, but a clear demonstration of the Yukon’s strategic infrastructure, coordinated partnerships, and capacity to deliver.
Without that, the Yukon will remain adjacent to Arctic security – rather than central to it.