1. Demographics
1. Demographics
Gender
Across the 12 surveys, the percentage of male respondents, ranging from 50.5% to 64.2%, was generally higher than that of female -- except in the June 26 assembly when there were only 42.6% male respondents (See Table).
Age
In general, the majority of respondents belong to the age group 20-24 and 25-29. The proportion of respondents aged 20-24 ranged from 16.3% to 54.2% (See Table), and the proportion aged 25-29 ranged from 11.6% to 34.2% across the surveys (See Table). Meanwhile, there were also younger respondents aged 19 or below, ranging between 6.0% and 15.6% (See Table). In mass rallies (Type I), protesters were more evenly distributed across age groups. In particular, mass rallies often featured higher participation rates of those aged 30 or above: they accounted for 43.1% to 57.3% of all the participants in the rallies (See Table).
However, in the case of fluid demonstrations (Type III), which often involved more confrontations, the proportion of protesters aged 30 or above significantly dropped (between 13.8% and 30.4%, see Table). That is to say, fluid demonstrations were mostly dominated by young people under the age of 30. As for static demonstrations (Type II), the age profile is in between Type I and Type III. Around 23% to 43% of participants in these demonstrations were 30 or above (See Table).
Education level
The education level of survey respondents was generally high. Among the three types of protest, participants of mass rallies were relatively less highly-educated. But still, 68.2% to 76.8% of them have completed tertiary education (See Table). For static demonstrations (Type II) and fluid demonstrations (Type III), however, participants on average were more highly-educated. More than 80% of them reported to have received tertiary education (See Table).
Socio-economic status
As respondents were likely to be reluctant to reveal information about their income, the research team asked respondents to self-report their family’s socio-economic status. The answering options were upper-class, middle-class and lower-class. Overall, only a minimal number of respondents (less than 2%) identified themselves as upper class (See Table). Middle-class and lower-class protesters were the main participants of the anti-extradition bill movement. In the mass rallies (Type I), 46.9% to 54.0% of the respondents identified themselves as middle-class, while 28.1% to 45.0% identified themselves as lower-class (see Table). In static demonstrations (Type II) and fluid demonstrations (Type III), middle class and lower-class participants were more or less equally represented. Lower-class participants even constituted a slight majority in some cases (See Table).
For political orientation, respondents were given the following options: pro-establishment, moderate democrats, radical democrats, localists, centrist, no political affiliation, others and don’t know. In general, moderate democrats were the core participants of the anti-extradition bill movement. They were clearly the majority in mass rallies (type I), where they accounted for 34.9% to 43.2% of the total respondents (See Table). In static demonstrations (type II) and fluid demonstrations (type III), fewer participants identified themselves as moderate democrats, but moderate democrats still accounted for 27.8% to 35.1% of the total respondents (See Table).
Across the 12 surveys, we see a gradual increase in the proportion of respondents identifying themselves as radical democrats over time. They went from 3.2% on June 9 (mass rally) to 7.5% on June 17 (fluid demonstration). Thereafter, the proportion was maintained at a steady level, from 6.6% to 9.7% (See Table). The second most popular political affiliation is localism. Localists can be broadly defined as people who support democracy but place the focus on protecting local interests. The proportion of localist protesters fluctuated between 18% and 28.6% in different kinds of protests. However, in the June 26 assembly, July 27 rally and the two protests on August 4, localist protesters were more active, accounting for 35.1% to 40.2% of the respondents (See Table).
The proportion of respondents who regarded themselves as centrist or having no political affiliation was slightly lower than the localists, but still significant. In the early stage of the movement, the proportion was around 20% -- except in the June 12 assembly when it rose to 38.9%. However, the number of centrists declined over time as the movement continued. For instance, in the three most recent protests took place in the districts, there were only around 10% of the respondents who regarded themselves as centrists.
There were few respondents (from 0.8% to 12.6% of the respondents) who chose “others” as their political affiliation. Also, there were even fewer who regarded themselves as someone supporting the pro-establishment camp. Pro-establishment supporters accounted for no more than 1% of the respondents across the surveys (See Table).
One of the main objectives of the research isto find out why people participated in the movement and the importance of different motivations. As protesters’ demands and the political atmosphere have been changing since the beginning of the large-scale protests in June, the research team kept updating the list of motivations based on new developments. Below are the results showing the percentages of respondents who regarded particular motivations as important.
Across the 12 surveys, “calling for the withdrawal of the extradition bill” has always been one of the most important motivations for protesters to participate in the concerned protest. The percentage of respondents who saw it as “quite important” and “very important” remained at a high-level ranging from 97.0% to 98.8% in June and July. It only decreased to about 95% in August (See Table). That is to say, despite the effort by the Chief Executive Carrie Lam to state that the bill is “suspended” or “dead”, protesters’ demand for the complete withdrawal of the bill remained strong.
Meanwhile, the research team also provided a range of options regarding political accountability. In the mass rally on June 9, 95.8% of the respondents said that “expressing dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of the bill” (See Table) was an important motivation for participation. On June 16, 99% of the respondents maintained that “continuing to pressure the government to withdraw the bill” was the main reason for them to participate. Also, 98.5% of the respondents hoped to “express their dissatisfaction over the failure of the government to heed public opinion” (See Table). However, “calling for the resignation of Carrie Lam or major officials” was not the main reason for the respondents to participate in the protests. The percentage of respondents who treated it as important was kept within 72.8% to 79.3% (See Table) -- except on June 16, when 84.5% considered it an important motivation (See Table).
We also found that “expressing dissatisfaction with the police’s handling of the protesters” was another key reason of why the participants joined the protests. The percentage of respondents who regarded it as “important” or “very important” ranged from 97.2% to 99.1%. Since mid-July, it had actually become the most important motivation for people to participate in the protests. Over time the survey also included options related to more specific actions of the police. Proportions of respondents who chose “important” and “very important” in the following options were: “protesting against arbitrary arrest by the police” (June 16, 97.8%) (See Table) and “expressing the dissatisfaction with the riot charges imposed by the police against the 7.28 protesters” (August 4 TKO, 97.1%; SW, 96.5%) (See Table). The high percentages reflected the concerns of respondents over police abuse of power.
To gauge the support for other items among the five demands, the research team included the options of “demanding the government to retract its characterization of the June 12 protest as a riot” and “calling for the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry” in the later protests. The percentages of respondents ranking these reasons as “important” or “very important” were all high: 95.5% to 97.6% for the former (See Table) and 95.2% to 98.1% for the latter (See Table). The positive response shows that these two demands were also crucial to the participants of the movement. Besides, “striving for Hong Kong’s democracy” was another new option we added in later protests. Around 94.3% to 98.0% of the respondents said that it was “important” or “very important” for their participation (See Table). Similarly, “striving for dual universal suffrage”, an option added on July 17, received high approval as well: 94.3% of respondents that day thought that motivated them to participate.
In the early stage of this series of large-scale protests, we also found that many respondents participated in order to “boost the number of participants” and “raise international attention”. Percentages of respondents rating these motivations as “important” or “very important” ranged from 83.1% to 90.6% and 94.0% to 95.8% (See Table) respectively. It showed that participants believed that gaining attention from the world would be important to the movement. As the movement evolved, the research team added new options that would correspond to a particular protest and the events preceding it. For instance, as there were deaths and suicides linked to the protests in late June, the research team added “mourning the deaths of people involved in the movement” as a new option on July 1. 90.2% of the respondents saw it as an “important” or “very important” reason for their participation. For the July 14 Shatin rally, we added “demanding the government to attend to community problems in Shatin”, because it was the first time in the movement when a protest was held in a residential neighbourhood. A total of 63.1% of the respondents saw it as an important reason to participate. Although demonstrating against the extradition bill was still the mainstay in the July 14 rally, there were quite some respondents who wanted to bring attention to community problems.
The research team asked the respondents to rank their “motivations” on June 17’s fluid demonstration in the area outside the Legislative Council Complex and the office of the Chief Executive. Respondents were asked to choose two among four motivations. From the data, police’s excessive use of force and the refusal of the government to completely withdraw the bill were the two major reasons for the protesters to participate on that day. However, the team decided to revert to the previous set of questions in later surveys.
Our data supported the widely held perception that young people were the major participants in the anti-extradition bill movement. In recent years, Hong Kong has experienced several large-scale social movements such as the anti-national education movement of 2012 and the Umbrella Movement of 2014. Participants in the current movement may have also participated in these previous movements. The research team is interested in knowing: (1) whether previous protest experiences would affect the participants in this movement and (2) how many of the participants are actually “amateurs” who had no protest experience. Hence, the team included two questions in the surveys, including “whether you have participated in the Occupy Movement/Umbrella Movement in 2014” and “what is the first time you joined a protest”.
One of the major findings is that many participants in the anti-extradition bill movement had participated in the Umbrella Movement of 2014. Across the 12 surveys, the percentage of respondents who participated in the Umbrella Movement ranged from 44.3% to 76.6% (See Table). For the mass rallies (Type I), the percentage of respondents who had joined the Umbrella Movement was lower, ranging from 44.3% to 67.2% (See Table). As for the static demonstrations (Type II) and fluid demonstrations (Type III), the percentage of respondents who had joined the Umbrella Movement was higher, ranging from 60.3% to 76.6% (See Table).
To investigate the protest participation history of the participants, the team provided a list of major social movements and protests in post-handover Hong Kong for the respondents to choose from. The options included the annual June-Fourth vigil, the annual July 1 rally, the July 1 rally of 2019, the anti-XRL movement of 2009-2010, the anti-national education movement in 2012, the Umbrella Movement of 2014, the Liberate Protests during 2015, the Mongkok civil unrest of 2016, and the anti-extradition bill movement of 2019.
The data shows that the June-Fourth vigil is most likely to be the first-time protest experience for many participants -- 20.8% to 30.2% of the respondents (See Table). The importance of the Umbrella Movement was similar to June Fourth. It was the first-time experience for 17.0% to 28.5% of the respondents (See Table). The anti-national education movement of 2012 and the annual July 1 rally were the first-time protest experience for 5.9% to 11.7% and 11.1% to 20.4% (See Table) of the respondents, respectively. Notably, a significantly high percentage of respondents had not participated in any social movements before. In our onsite surveys, these respondents accounted for 12.7% to 22.5% of the respondents (See Table). Our findings suggested that the anti-extradition bill movement has become a critical event in enlightening the political participation of many participants.
Over the past two months, whether the anti-extradition bill protests would escalate or radicalize was one of the major concerns of the Hong Kong society and the international community. For most of the surveys since June 21, the research team has included the question: “If the government insists only to ‘suspend’ the bill but do not make any further concession, what should be the next step of the movement?”. The options included “escalating the protest”, “sustain the current form of protest and mobilize people to demonstrate from time to time”, and “suspend the movement and leave time for the society to recover”. Except for the July 1 rally, around half of the participants believed they should “escalate the protest”; and the percentage of respondents who picked this option even rose to 54.1% in the Aug 4 mass assembly in Sai Wan (See Table). The percentagesof participants who chose to “sustain the current form” and “escalate the protest” were close to each other across the surveys. This phenomenon over time could be understood as signifying an internal tension between the moderate and radical camps of the movement. But the protesters continued to participate despite their differences. This also served as a proof of the accommodation of diverse protest approaches in the movement.
To study the protesters’ changing views on radicalization, we included statements expressing different purposes and outcomes of radicalization. During the four protests in June, we asked the respondents the extent to which they would agree with the saying that “peaceful, rational, non-violent demonstration is no longer effective”. From June 12 to June 26, the percentage of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement was decreasing, from 57.6% on June 12 to 42.1% on June 26 (See Table). In other words, although the movement has shown signs of radicalization in the early days, protesters were, in fact, less resistant to the “peacefulness, rationality and non-violence” approach, and to some extent more supportive of the approach over time. As for the view regarding “radical approach could alienate the general public from the movement”, the percentage of respondents expressing “agreed” or “strongly agreed” ranged from 47.1% and 61.2% between June 12 and July 1 (See Table). However, a significant drop and consistently low percentages were observed in the four surveys conducted after July 1. The percentage of respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement were 33.1% (July 21), 32.3% (July 28), 35.7% (August 4, Tseung Kwan O), and 33.8% (August 4, Sai Wan) (See Table) Nevertheless, these percentages were still higher than the percentages of respondents who disagreed with the statements. As a key slogan “climbing mountains together, making your own effort” suggests, the colorful diversity of protest repertoire is a key feature of this movement. We asked if the respondents agreed with the saying that “the maximum impact could only be achieved when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together”. The findings from June 17 to August 4 showed that most of the respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with this statement, ranging from 71.0% to 89.0% (See Table).
In addition, the research team looked into how the respondents understand the relationship between government response and radicalization. In seven surveys conducted between June 12 and July 27, the percentage of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the saying “radical protest approach was more effective to make the government heed to public opinion” increased from 38.2% to 65.5% (See Table). However, the percentage decreased to 50.1% (Tseung Kwan O) and 47.3% (Sai Wan) on August 4 (See Table).We also asked the respondents the extent to which they would agree with the saying “the use of violence by protesters is understandable when the government fails to listen”. The percentage of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” significantly increased over time. When the question was first asked on June 16, only 69.1% of the respondents said that they “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with it (See Table); on July 1, it rose to 83.5%. On July 21, July 27, and August 4, the corresponding percentages already exceeded 90% (See Table).
Despite the government’s announcement of the suspension of the bill, the movement has continued to diffuse into different districts and accommodate specific local issues. For example, the protest in Tuen Mun was linked to the noise nuisance in the park, while the rally in Sheung Shui was targeted at parallel traders. With the intensified conflict between the police and the protesters, concerns over police brutality have also unfolded. Given this situation, we began to ask respondents how they think about the change in demands since mid-July. The respondents were asked how much they agree with the shift of demands from “withdraw the extradition bill” to “restart political reform”, “focus on police brutality” and “focus on community issues”.
The percentage of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” to shift the demands to “restart political reform” and “focus on political brutality” has increased over time (See Table). Supporters of the former demand increased from 64.1% on July 21, to 68.1% (Tseung Kwan O) and 73.7% (Sai Wan) on August 4 (See Table); the latter also increased from 79.2% on July 21, to 84.6% (Tseung Kwan O) and 86.4% (Sai Wan) on August 4 (See Table). Meanwhile, respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the shift to community issues increased from 40.2% on July 21 to over 45% on August 4 (See Table). Although all percentages showed an increasing trend, political brutality was ranked higher than political reform or community issues. It has arguably become the major concern of the movement in its current stage.