Research
My research focuses on the relationship between mind and value. In particular, I am interested in the nature and value of mental states such as pleasure, and the connection between mental states like desire and what is of ultimate benefit and harm to beings like us. Current projects include a paper explaining what it is to be a welfare subject; a paper defending the hedonic tone theory of pleasure; and a monograph in which I defend a novel formulation of the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare. Below is a list of my published papers as well as works in progress at various stages of preparation.
"A Theory of Prudential Alienation" (draft available here)
Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics
The concept of alienation plays a central role in our philosophical theorizing about well-being. One of the most important and widely held doctrines about well-being is the alienation constraint, which says that a person cannot be alienated from that which is basically good for her. Indeed, one of the central objections to objective theories like an Aristotelian perfectionism is that they violate the constraint, and one of the central attractions of subjective theories like Chris Heathwood's desire satisfactionism is that they respect it. It is therefore surprising that there has been so little explicit discussion of what it is for a person to be alienated from a state of affairs in a way that would rule it out as a basic welfare good for her. My main aim in this paper is to sketch the first theory of this pivotal concept. What I call prudential alienation—that is, the kind of alienation that figures in the alienation constraint—is properly analyzed as a normative distance or estrangement between a state of affairs and a subject's evaluative perspective. The view offered here suggests radical modifications to extant theories of welfare provided that we wish to bring them into compliance with the alienation constraint.
"The New Internalism about Prudential Value" (draft available here)
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
According to internalism about prudential value, the token states of affairs of basic benefit to you must be suitably connected, under the proper conditions, to your positive attitudes. It is commonly thought that any theory of welfare that implies internalism is thereby guaranteed to respect the alienation constraint, the doctrine that you cannot be alienated from that which is basically good for you. The assumption is that because internalism requires a necessary connection between a subject's positive attitudes and each state of basic benefit to that subject, theories that imply internalism will only postulate basic goods that resonate with the subject. In this paper, I show that extant formulations of internalism do not have this desirable feature. The central defect of traditional formulations is that they do not respect a basic truth about alienation: namely, that even if a state of affairs is suitably connected to your positive attitudes, your negative attitudes can nonetheless render you alienated from it. By taking into account the relevance of the negative attitudes, I propose the new internalism—the view that x is basically good for you only if you have a net positive attitude towards it—as a way to advance our thinking about what is required to avoid alienating theories of welfare.
"What Should the Desire Theorist Say About Ill-Being?" (draft available here)
Forthcoming in Perspectives on Ill-Being, eds. Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet
Both proponents and critics of the desire theory of welfare have narrowly focused on the positive side of the theory while virtually ignoring its negative side. On the positive side, the desire theorist says that getting what you want is good for you. But what should the desire theorist say is bad for you? A common and plausible-sounding answer is that if getting what you want is good for you, then surely not getting what you want is bad for you. I argue that this answer is a mistake that would commit desire theorists to a claim that is implausible by their own lights, namely that something could be bad for you even if you were not at all bothered by it. The desire theorist should instead say that getting what you are averse to is bad for you. If desire satisfaction is good for you, then aversion satisfaction, not desire frustration, is bad for you.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 46 (2022): 109-135
According to subjective theories of ill-being, the token states of affairs that are basically bad for you must be suitably connected, under the proper conditions, to your negative attitudes. This article explores the prospects for this family of theories and addresses some of its challenges. This article (i) shows that subjectivism about ill-being can be derived from a more general doctrine that requires a negatively valenced relationship between any welfare subject and the token states that are of basic harm to that subject and (ii) responds to some objections, including the objection that subjectivists about ill-being cannot plausibly explain the badness of pain.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 3, (2021): 291-310
Judgment subjectivism is the view that x is good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that S believes, under the proper conditions, that x is good for S. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the welfare of welfare nihilists, people who believe there are no welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihilists can be benefited and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise.
"The Hedonic Tone Theory of Pleasure" (early stage project)
This paper explains what I call the attitudinal hedonic tone theory of pleasure, which includes doctrines concerning both the nature and value of pleasure. The theory says that a sensation is a pleasure in virtue of how it feels and in particular in virtue of its hedonic tone. The theory also says that a token sensory pleasure is good for you just in case you have a net desire for it. I also defend the theory from objections, including the objection that there is no common phenomenal character among pleasurable experiences and the objection that the theory cannot accommodate the common-sense datum that pleasure is good because of how it feels.
"Welfare Subjectivity" (early stage project)
Welfare subjects are beings capable of being benefited and harmed and are thus the proper objects of our moral concern. How we treat them matters for their own sake and not just because of how our treatment of them affects the welfare of others. But what is it to be a welfare subject? I argue that the capacity for hedonically toned experiences—that is, the capacity to have experiences that feel good or feel bad—is both necessary and sufficient for being a welfare subject.
Getting What You Want: A Theory of Welfare (early stage project)
What is of ultimate benefit and harm to beings like us? What is it like for a life to go well for the person who lives it? These questions concerning the nature of human flourishing are some of the most basic and yet most perplexing questions of human existence. The right answers will give us insight into how to live a good life, how to treat others when acting out of a concern for their welfare, and how to craft laws in a well-ordered and just society. This book explains and defends a novel formulation of the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare according to which you are better off to the extent that you get what you want.