have been caused by older generations (see Chapter 3, Pandemials). Loss of plurality, erosion of diverse representation in positions of power, financial hardship and intergenerational frictions—which will continue worsening if profound inequalities are unaddressed—risk exacerbating societal divisiveness and severely weakening communities’ resilience. Heightened instability Domestic political challenges, growing fragmentation in many societies and geopolitical tensions left the world woefully underprepared for a crisis of the magnitude of COVID-19 and amplified its impacts (see Hindsight). Flashpoints that are likely to hamper national and international stability would deteriorate multilateral capacity to respond to future global shocks. Further polarization generated by the outcome of the US elections may create domestic obstacles for the new administration, hindering financial, political, technical and international cooperation commitments on global issues such as climate change, digital governance, free trade and international security. The formalization of Brexit, rising euro-scepticism and damage from subsequent waves of COVID-19 may weaken support among EU members for a coordinated green recovery and threaten the European Union’s consolidation as a balancing third power. Increasing tensions between China and India—with the former expanding its regional economic interests through the recently signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—could weaken regional and global trade and growth.52 In Africa, worsening employment and investment trends threaten the anticipated benefits of the delayed African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA),53 which could catalyse civil unrest and aggravate humanitarian crises.54 Regional alliances are likely to form out of economic expediency and tightening Citizens now know the power political leaders can wield when the challenge demands it The Global Risks Report 2021 23 relations with superpowers, but the changing relationship between them is creating uncertainty for other nations around international rules and norms— from cybersecurity and 5G technology to climate action, natural resources and trade (see Chapter 4, Middle Power Morass). Public health is becoming a new frontier for geopolitical rivalry. Vaccine diplomacy and conflicts over other critical supplies are likely to create further tensions and require complex negotiations, impeding international coordination and the effectiveness of the multilateral system to address global concerns (see Hindsight). No vaccine for environmental degradation Without societal cohesion and stable international platforms, future transboundary crises will have greater impacts. The GRPS draws attention to blind spots in collective responses to a range of risks—such as “debt crises”, “mental health deterioration”, “tech governance failure” and “youth disillusionment” (see Appendix B, Figure B.1 Global Risk Response)—but foremost among these blind spots are “climate action failure” and “biodiversity loss”. Last year, for the first time in 15 years of the GRPS, the five most likely longterm risks were environmental— analysed in last year’s Global Risks Report chapters A Decade Left and Save the Axolotl. The World Economic Forum’s COVID-19 Risks Outlook, published in May 2020,55 analysed how the crisis could stall progress on climate action. This year, GRPS respondents ranked environmental risks as four of the top five by likelihood—“infectious diseases” is fourth. Global CO2 emissions fell by 9% in the first half of 2020, when COVID-19 forced most economies to shut down for weeks.56 A similar decrease is required every year for the next decade Loss, Trauma, and Human Resilience Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity to Thrive After Extremely Aversive Events? George A. Bonanno Teachers College, Columbia University Many people are exposed to loss or potentially traumatic events at some point in their lives, and yet they continue to have positive emotional experiences and show only minor and transient disruptions in their ability to function. Unfortunately, because much of psychology’s knowledge about how adults cope with loss or trauma has come from individuals who sought treatment or exhibited great distress, loss and trauma theorists have often viewed this type of resilience as either rare or pathological. The author challenges these assumptions by reviewing evidence that resilience represents a distinct trajectory from the process of recovery, that resilience in the face of loss or potential trauma is more common than is often believed, and that there are multiple and sometimes unexpected pathways to resilience. Most people are exposed to at least one violent or life-threatening situation during the course of their lives (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). As people progress through the life cycle, they are also increasingly confronted with the deaths of close friends and relatives. Not everyone copes with these potentially disturbing events in the same way. Some people experience acute distress from which they are unable to recover. Others suffer less intensely and for a much shorter period of time. Some people seem to recover quickly but then begin to experience unexpected health problems or difficulties concentrating or enjoying life the way they used to.