Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) can serve as powerful protectionist tools, yet it remains unclear whether or not they benefit domestic firms. This paper studies one such key regulation, in terms of mandatory testing and certification for all parts and components of new vehicles, targeting the automotive sector introduced by India in 2001, and examines how domestic firms responded to that. Using detailed data on technology adoption, inputs used, products produced from 1997–-2005 and exploiting exogenous variation in exposure across industries, we document three main effects for automotive firms: (i) TBTs increased technology adoption expenditures, driven by both R&D and technology transfer; (ii) firms upgraded their input mix using high-quality inputs, but continue producing existing product lines of higher value; and (iii) all these adjustments led to higher market share for domestic firms in the home market, expansion in both extensive and intensive margin of exports, and increase in Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of that sector at the global level. Overall, we underscore that TBTs can generate industrial policy-like effects, stimulating firm upgrading and structural transformation.
Presentation: Università Milano-Bicocca (2026), 14th Conference on Economics of Global Interactions (University of Bari, 2025), Università della Svizzera Italiana, Brown Bag Seminar Series (Lugano, 2025), European Trade Study Group Conference (Athens School of Economics, 2024)
Anecdotal evidence suggests that intellectual property recognition is often a politically driven mechanism. This paper studies the impact of political support on the provision of intellectual protection. Using novel data from the Fascist period in Italy, I investigate how local support for the regime influenced the granting of patents and trademarks by the central government.
To gauge local Fascist support, I leverage the spatial distribution of political activists associated with parties historically opposed to Fascism, as documented by Italian police prior to Mussolini's rise to power. I employ different econometric techniques, using both a cross-sectional and difference-in-differences approach. Estimates provide robust evidence of the political manipulation in favor of firms located in provinces where the opposition to the regime was initially stronger. The effect holds regardless of the local level of development and industrialization. My results indicate that the regime favoured the granting of patents and trademarks in areas that could have represented potential sources of political instability. More broadly, these findings suggest that authoritarian leaders may strategically manipulate the allocation of these intangible assets to pursue their political objectives.
Presentation: REFLEX Meeting (Lugano, 2023); InsTED Workshop 2023; Glasgow RES Conference 2023; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (Budapest, 2023); USI Lugano (2023); HEC Lausanne (2023); Lancaster University Management School (2022); 12th Conference on Economics of Global Interactions (University of Bari, 2022); 3rd PhD Summer School on Economics and Finance (Universita’ degli Studi Federico II, 2022); NWSSDTP Conference (University of Manchester, 2022)
We identify a new channel behind suboptimal private investment in innovation: the risk that a superior design reduces product differentiation. In a model with endogenous variety choice and imperfect appropriability, a cost-reducing innovation in one variety initially benefits the innovator but, once adopted by rivals, induces convergence toward a single dominant product, intensifying competition. When the cost advantage is large enough to trigger convergence but insufficient to offset the resulting loss of market power, firms’ post-innovation profits fall below their pre-innovation level. We label this mechanism an “innovation curse.” Although innovation raises consumer surplus, private incentives to invest in R&D are weakened, creating a wedge between private and social returns that cannot always be closed by subsidies. We illustrate the mechanism with a case study of the U.S. shrimp industry following the adoption of a dominant production variety.
Presentation: Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (ETH Zurich, 2025); Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (Budapest, 2023), European Economic Association (Bocconi University, 2022); XXXVI Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2022); PhD Symposium in Industrial Economics (Loughborough University, 2022); Lancaster University Management School (2021)
Who leads firms matters for economic performance, but whether institutions select the most capable individuals into leadership remains an open question. We identify two channels through which institutions can distort the allocation of managerial talent. First, non-meritocratic selection at the top: factors other than ability--such as political connections--may determine who reaches leadership positions. Second, negative selection into education: when institutions distort the returns to different fields, individuals may sort into fields that do not maximize their potential contribution. We provide evidence on both channels using Hungary's transition from socialism to capitalism, linking biographical data on 65,000 individuals to firm outcomes. We find that individuals most likely to become CEOs lead firms with lower sales, and that individuals who chose economics education were negatively selected on factors correlated with CEO probability--consistent with rational sorting into technical fields that offered higher returns under socialism. Both distortions attenuate for cohorts educated after socialism's decline, suggesting that in this context, institutional reform corrected the misallocation of managerial talent.
(Draft coming soon!)
Presentation: Junior Research Day (Queen Mary University, London, 2025)
Recent events have posed considerable challenges to supply chain, as demonstrated by trade data. Yet, firm-level information on the recent challenges remains scarce. The Supply Chain Disruption Survey addresses this gap by generating insights into companies’ experiences and expectations regarding their supplier relationships, with a special focus on the role of intangibles and changes over time. Conducted as part of the RETHINK-GSC Horizon research project, the survey was carried out in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Hungary between mid-2023 and spring 2024. The survey focused on medium-sized and large firms operating in various manufacturing industries. This paper has two main objectives: first, it provides information about the survey's background, design, questionnaire, and implementation; and second, it presents the key patterns visible in the survey.
Using data on WTO disputes from 1995–2018, I show a strong “China effect”: post-WTO accession, countries are over three times more likely to target China, with disputes shaped by trade tensions, strategic retaliation, and shifts in regime-similarity patterns. (Draft available upon request).
Presentation: 12th Conference on Economics of Global Interactions (University of Bari, 2021); European Trade Study Group Conference (Ghent University, 2021); The International Political Economy of Trade Graduate Conference (Yale University, 2021); Global Economic Policy Group (jointly organized by FernUniversitat and University of Westminster, 2021)