(European Economic Review, 2024, Volume 163)
Long-lived political parties bring a novel effect to political competition: the incumbent's incentives to prioritize reelection today increase when it expects its rival party to prioritze reelection in the future.
(2nd Revision, Journal of Political Economy)
How does a power broker walk its way through the uncertainty of politics? Does it prefer to side always with the current incumbent? Or does it prefer a relationship that features path dependence?
(Revise&Resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior)
When is the promise of a repeal by the opposition a salutary filter against the incumbent's partisan policies, and when is it a cynical electoral strategy?
(Reject&Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Economics)
When agents choose to either cooperate to expand a ''collective pie'' or compete to own a greater share of it, the pie's growth eventually halts and conflict ensues forever.
As a rising great power challenges the incumbent power’s alliance, both court rival states — will those rivals take opposite sides, or can one power keep them both?
You have a profitable relationship with a partner that you learn to be corrupt. How long should you keep that relationship ongoing?
The educational level of the cadres of several ideological dictatorships follows a pattern: it falls in the decades immediately after the seizure of power and after recovers accompanied by generational turnover.