Research

Long-lived political parties bring a novel effect to political competition: the incumbent's incentives to prioritize reelection today increase when it expects its rival party to prioritze reelection in the future. 

[Paper] 

Presented: Best Paper Nomination in Winter School of the Delhi School of Economics and The Econometric Society (Winter 2020)

Does an heir’s path to succession require cooperation with their leader? Can leaders take advantage of their heirs’ ambition to increase their leeway as agenda setters? 

[Paper] [Twitter] 

Presented: SIOE, MPSA (Spring 2024), University of Bern, Harris School of Public Policy (Autumn 2023)

How does a lobby walk its way through the uncertainty of politics? Does it prefer to side always with the current incumbent? Or does it prefer a relationship that features path dependence?

[Paper] [Online Appendix] [Blog] [Twitter] 

Presented: Yale Political Economy Theory (Spring 2025), Relational contracts workshop, SITE, EPSA, Copenhagen BS (Summer 2023), Stanford GSB (Winter 2023), Harris School of Public Policy, SAEe, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Virtual Formal Theory Seminar, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Naples School of Economics (Autumn 2022), Harris School of Public Policy (Spring 2022), SAEe, Stockholm University, ENTER Jamboree (Autumn 2021), Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Oligo workshop (Summer 2021) 

Groups in an organization compete about the who and the how. A third party can influence the who and has its own vested interests about the how. Which group should it support?

[Paper] [Twitter] 

Presented: Uppsala Univesity, Makris Symposium in Economic Theory (Spring 2025), Harris School of Public Policy (Winter 2025), Relational contracts workshop (Autumn 2024), SIOE, Barcelona Summer Forum, EAYE, Nordic Theory Meeting (Spring 2024), Bocconi, ETH Zürich (Autumn 2023), SITE, SAET (Summer 2023), Universities of Bern, Konstanz, Carlos III de Madrid, and Mannheim (Spring 2023)

When is the promise of a repeal by the opposition a salutary filter against the incumbent's partisan policies, and when is it a cynical electoral strategy?

[Paper] [Online Appendix] [Blog]

Presented: SAEe, UniBZ Workshop. (Autumn 2023),  Barcelona School of Economics, Aix-Marseille School of Economics (Summer 2023), Université Libre de Bruxelles, Harris School of Public Policy (Spring 2023), CUNEF, Virtual Formal Theory Seminar (Winter 2023)

When agents choose to either cooperate to expand a ''collective pie'' or compete to own a greater share of it, the pie's growth eventually halts and conflict ensues forever.

[Paper] (submitted)

Presented: Alghero Political Economy. (Spring 2025), Ca’Foscari University (Autumn 2024), Chicago Booth, Carlos III Micro Retreat (Summer 2024) 

You have a profitable relationship with a partner that you learn to be corrupt. How long should you keep that relationship ongoing?

Presented:  Barcelona Summer Forum, UK Polecon seminar (Spring 2024)

The educational level of the cadres of several ideological dictatorships follows a pattern: it falls in the decades immediately after the seizure of power and after recovers accompanied by generational turnover.