Research

Published papers:

Persistence in Power of 

Long-lived Parties 

(European Economic Review, 2024, Volume 163)

Long-lived political parties bring a novel effect to political competition: the incumbent's incentives to prioritize reelection today increase when it expects its rival party to prioritze reelection in the future. 

[Paper] 

Presented: Best Paper Nomination in Winter School of the Delhi School of Economics and The Econometric Society (Winter 2020)

Working papers:

Which Side are You on?

Interest Groups and Relational Contracts

(Revise&Resubmit Journal of Political Economy)

How does a lobby walk its way through the uncertainty of politics? Does it prefer to side always with the current incumbent? Or does it prefer a relationship that features path dependence?

[Paper] [Blog] [Twitter] 

Presented: Relational contracts workshop, SITE, EPSA, Copenhagen BS (Summer 2023), Stanford GSB (Winter 2023), Harris School of Public Policy, SAEe, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Virtual Formal Theory Seminar, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Naples School of Economics (Autumn 2022), Harris School of Public Policy (Spring 2022), SAEe, Stockholm University, ENTER Jamboree (Autumn 2021), Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Oligo workshop (Summer 2021) 

Embracing the Enemy

(Joint with Johannes Schneider)

Groups in an organization compete about the who and the how. A third party can influe the who and has its own vested interests about the how. Which group should it support?

[Paper]

Presented: SIOE, EAYE, Nordic Theory Meeting (scheduled), Bocconi, ETH Zürich (Autumn 2023), SITE, SAET (Summer 2023), Universities of Bern, Konstanz, Carlos III de Madrid, and Mannheim (Spring 2023)

The Politics of Repeal

When is the promise of a repeal by the opposition a salutary filter against the incumbent's partisan policies, and when is it a cynical electoral strategy?

[Paper] [Online Appendix] (submitted)

Presented: SAEe, UniBZ Workshop. (Autumn 2023),  Barcelona School of Economics, Aix-Marseille School of Economics (Summer 2023), Université Libre de Bruxelles, Harris School of Public Policy (Spring 2023), CUNEF, Virtual Formal Theory Seminar (Winter 2023)

A Model of Succession

(Joint with Benjamin Shaver)

Does the prospect of succession induce an heir-apparent to sabotage her leader? How does this threat impact the leader's policy agenda?

[Paper](New!)

Presented: SIOE (scheduled), MPSA, University of Bern, Harris School of Public Policy (Autumn 2023)


Work in Progress:

The Dynamic Politics of Adaptation and Mitigation

(Joint with Antoine Loeper)

Does political turnover bring path-dependence to the mix of adaptation and mitigation policies employed to cope with climate change? 

Dangerous Liaisons. A Model of Reputation Building and Fallout

You have a profitable relationship with a partner that you learn to be corrupt. How long should you keep that relationship ongoing?


Becoming Technocratic: Political Recruitment in Autocracies

The educational level of the cadres of several ideological dictatorships follows a pattern: it falls in the decades immediately after the seizure of power and after recovers accompanied by generational turnover.