Long-lived political parties bring a novel effect to political competition: the incumbent's incentives to prioritize reelection today increase when it expects its rival party to prioritze reelection in the future.
(Economic Journal, 2025, forthcoming)
(2nd Revision, Journal of Political Economy)
How does a power broker walk its way through the uncertainty of politics? Does it prefer to side always with the current incumbent? Or does it prefer a relationship that features path dependence?
(Revise&Resubmit Games and Economic Behavior)
When is the promise of a repeal by the opposition a salutary filter against the incumbent's partisan policies, and when is it a cynical electoral strategy?
(Reject&Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Economics)
When agents choose to either cooperate to expand a ''collective pie'' or compete to own a greater share of it, the pie's growth eventually halts and conflict ensues forever.
As a rising great power challenges the incumbent power’s alliance, both court rival states — will those rivals take opposite sides, or can one power keep them both?
You have a profitable relationship with a partner that you learn to be corrupt. How long should you keep that relationship ongoing?
The educational level of the cadres of several ideological dictatorships follows a pattern: it falls in the decades immediately after the seizure of power and after recovers accompanied by generational turnover.