I am interested in Applied Microeconomics, especially in the field of Industrial Organization. My broad interests include bargaining mechanisms, market regulation, and competition. I use experiments to conduct economic research. Experiments allow for a controlled environment where only the relevant variables are allowed to change. I enjoy the challenge of simplifying a model down to its core mechanics, and using it to build a game. I stress test economic theories, and make observations on subject behavior.
Experiments can be conducted by hand, or they can be coded on a computer. I am comfortable in setting up and maintaining a computer lab, but I can do my research without it if needed. As long as there is a controlled environment, such as a library room, I can run an experiment. More details on my technical abilities in the Skills page.
Beyond my own research, I have assisted in the creation of experiments for two Honors College students at the University of Mississippi. I also gave advice to a fellow graduate student from the department of Management. I can use my knowledge of experimental design to assist in interdisciplinary research with authors from other fields of economics, or related sciences.
Limited Negotiation in Embedded Ultimatum Games (Job Market Paper)
Two players engage in an Embedded Ultimatum Game in a stylized legal framework. This proposal enables bilateral negotiation and renegotiation between the parties. Negotiation is allowed by allowing players to make offer and counter offers to each other in real time. No communication other than a numerical offer or a signal of acceptance/rejection is allowed. This expands on previous work done on signaling/screening take-it-or-leave-it asymmetric information games, where excess disputes occur due to concerns about fairness. Can institutional negotiation rules facilitate settlement? There are three treatments. An open queue where any offer made by the other party can be accepted, a time priority rule, and an offer improvement rule. Conjectures on player behavior and possible deviations from strictly rational game theoretical results are discussed.
Investment under Uncertainty with Endogenous Prices: an Experimental Study
Firms consider the profitability of an investment before undertaking it by using its net present value. Option Value theory posits that a firm can gain increase profit if it waits to observe future output prices. I analyze a simple firm under both models and propose an experiment that tests the behavior of such firms. There is literature on two-period experiments. A simple two-period game tests understanding of the option value theory, while a longer multiple-period game evaluates the ability of firms to apply option value in their investment decision. I create a multiple-period experiment to make observations on behavior.