Aleksandra Filimonova

PhD Student in Economics, Bocconi University

Introduction. I am Aleksandra Filimonova, a PhD student in Economics at Bocconi University. My research is in development and political economics, with a particular interest in how political and judicial institutions shape economic development.

Research Agenda. During my PhD, I hope to study how states acquire capacity, how political and legal institutions allocate power, and why weak institutions persist. My current work examines the organization of the state and how new technologies can change the capacity and behavior of public institutions. My current work-in-progress studies political influence and the institutions through which organized interests shape policy, including work on the role of Israeli lobbying in U.S. politics and foreign policy. I am also very interested in studying the interaction of conflict, state weakness, and economic development, including research on foreign military actors and their consequences for conflict, political order, and development. Across these projects, my broader goal is to understand how state institutions, political influence, and coercive power interact to shape long-run development, and why societies can remain trapped in weak institutional equilibria even when the economic costs are large.

CV

aleksandra.filimonova@phd.unibocconi.it

Working Papers

Technology and the Production of Justice: System-wide Effects of Indonesia's e-court Reform with Sultan Mehmood and Resuf Ahmed

Abstract

Delays in judicial proceedings are a pervasive institutional challenge. We study how technology changes judicial production using Indonesia's e-court reform, which introduced e-filing, e-payments, and virtual hearings for civil but not criminal cases. Using case-level data linking trial decisions to appeals, we compare civil and criminal cases handled by the same judge in the same court before and after reform. E-courts reduced case duration by about 7 days, or 15 percent, while preserving judicial quality. If anything, appeals and reversals fell, judgments became more concise, and readability and statutory citations were unchanged. The gains extended through the judicial system: case duration in untreated appellate courts fell by about 9 days, or 20 percent. The pattern is consistent with the reform freeing judicial capacity for more complex disputes, highlighting the potential for technology to expand capacity by reorganizing judicial production and relieving system-wide congestion.

Work-in-Progress

Delegating the State: Foreign Force and the Geography of Order

Abstract

Who provides security when the state cannot? Foreign powers have often shaped political order abroad through channels beyond conventional military intervention, from CIA covert operations to private military contractors such as Blackwater. I study this evolving form of foreign influence through the expansion of Russia's Wagner mercenaries across conflict-affected Africa. Combining the geography of their operations with local data on political violence, economic activity, and development outcomes, I investigate whether outsourced coercion restores public order, how it reshapes local economic activity and development, or whether it merely redistributes violence and economic opportunities across space.

Israel Lobby with Sultan Mehmood, Saad Gulzar and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra

Abstract

Why does public policy sometimes diverge sharply from the preferences of the broader electorate? We study this question through U.S. policy toward Israel. In 2024, 55 percent of Americans opposed Israel’s conduct in Gaza, yet 86 percent of House members voted for additional military aid. This divergence coincided with the rapid expansion of organized pro-Israel political finance. Between 2020 and 2024, spending by pro-Israel PACs and Super PACs rose from approximately $31 million to $141 million. In the 2024 cycle, AIPAC’s PAC alone directed $54 million to candidates, nearly twice the amount of the second- largest candidate-contributing PAC in the United States. We first locate these organizations within the broader structure of U.S. political finance, documenting their scale, growth, organizational diversity, and policy focus. We then examine how campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures shape congressional voting, political speech, and electoral competition, and construct counterfactual estimates of legislative behavior under alternative funding environments. The results suggest how concentrated preferences, organizational capacity, and targeted political finance can sustain a persistent divergence between public opinion and political representation.

Foreign State Media and Protest: Evidence from Russian Broadcasting in Europe with Mikhail Ivanov and Alena Gorbuntsova

Abstract

Why does public policy sometimes diverge sharply from the preferences of the broader electorate? We study this question through U.S. policy toward Israel. In 2024, 55 percent of Americans opposed Israel’s conduct in Gaza, yet 86 percent of House members voted for additional military aid. This divergence coincided with the rapid expansion of organized pro-Israel political finance. Between 2020 and 2024, spending by pro-Israel PACs and Super PACs rose from approximately $31 million to $141 million. In the 2024 cycle, AIPAC’s PAC alone directed $54 million to candidates, nearly twice the amount of the second- largest candidate-contributing PAC in the United States. We first locate these organizations within the broader structure of U.S. political finance, documenting their scale, growth, organizational diversity, and policy focus. We then examine how campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures shape congressional voting, political speech, and electoral competition, and construct counterfactual estimates of legislative behavior under alternative funding environments. The results suggest how concentrated preferences, organizational capacity, and targeted political finance can sustain a persistent divergence between public opinion and political representation.