My research interests lie in environmental economics, behavioral economics and the economics of uncertainty/information. You can read my research statement here.
Publications
"An Artefactual Field Experiment of Group Discrimination between Sports Fans" (with Adam Hoffer and Craig A. Depken, II) - Economics of Governance
This paper describes the outcome of an artefactual field experiment of group discrimination using sports fans. The behavior of individuals whose identity is deeply tied to a larger group or popular institution is politically important, particularly when it comes to crafting public policy. Sports fans provide a unique opportunity to study individuals who openly identify their in-group and rival groups. The study identifies within-subject group-based discrimination by quantifying the difference in dictator game takes (out of a possible $10) between fans of an individual’s self-professed team and fans of an individual’s self-professed rival. Fifty-two sports fans each participated in nine separate power-to-take dictator games with group identification spanning three levels (NCAA Division III, NCAA Division I, and professional) of football fandom. The results suggest that individuals discriminate between in-group and out-group members. The average takings ratio with same-team fans is 0.657 while the average takings ratio with other-team fans is 0.848 and the difference of 0.190 is statistically different from zero. We discuss the results in the context of team and league governance focusing on fan interactions.
"Higher-Order Risk Attitudes in the Time of COVID-19: An Experimental Study" (with Irene Mussio and Maximiliano Sosa Andrés) - Oxford Economic Papers
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) represents a large increase in background risk for individuals. Like the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme events (e.g. financial downturns, natural disasters, war and conflict) have been shown to change attitudes towards risk. In this study, we examine whether COVID-19 impacts risk aversion as well as higher order risk attitudes (prudence and temperance) using a risk apportionment approach. This methodology allows us to measure model-free higher order risk attitudes. We include prudence and temperance as higher order measures, as these two have been largely understudied under extreme events but are determinants of decisions related to the health and financial domains. Once we account for socio-demographic characteristics, we find an overall increase in risk aversion during COVID-19. We also find similar results using a hypothetical survey question which measures willingness to take risks. We do not find changes in prudence and temperance using the risk apportionment methodology. However, we do find that individuals in our sample have implemented prudent, health-related behaviors in response to the pandemic.
"Ours, Not Yours: Property Rights, Poaching and Deterrence in Common-Pool Resources" (with Lawrence R. De Geest and Javier Portillo) - Journal of Economic Psychology
Policymakers often use property-rights approaches such as Territorial User Rights Fisheries (TURFs) to protect common-pool resources (CPR) from over-harvesting and poaching. However, the method by which property rights are distributed may affect CPR outcomes. We use a laboratory experiment to determine whether earned or assigned property rights improve harvest levels and deter poaching, with and without punishment. In our treatment, subjects competed in a real-effort task to earn the property right to a CPR. In our control, the property right was randomly allocated. We also vary the property-right holders’ (“insiders”) ability to use punishment to deter non-holders (“outsiders”) who poach the CPR. We find that insiders who earned the property right were more likely to defend the CPR and impose significantly more deterrence, significantly reducing extreme poaching. However, lower levels of poaching often went unpunished under both earned and assigned rights. Insiders harvested close to the socially optimal level in both settings. Our results suggest that earned property rights improve coordination to deter extreme poaching relative to assigned property rights. We corroborate previous findings on the limited ability of decentralized groups to coordinate deterrence, suggesting that alternative approaches to protecting CPRs from poachers should be explored.
"Threshold and Group Size Uncertainty in Common-Pool Resources: An Experimental Study" (with Angela C.M. de Oliveira) - Public Finance Review - Special Issue on Insights from Experiments for Public Economics and Public Policy
Threshold common pool resource dilemmas, such as fisheries or groundwater reserves, are important topic for policy-makers. Uncertainty about the threshold for sustainable use or number of resource users may exacerbate the overconsumption problem. We are first to investigate the joint impact of threshold and group size uncertainty in this setting. Overall, we find that threshold uncertainty increases the likelihood of the resource being destroyed and reduces earnings from it. Group size uncertainty makes it more likely that the resource will survive and increases earnings. We find a heterogeneous interaction effect of threshold and group size uncertainty. This highlights the importance of joint analysis. The main policy implication is that a one size fits all approach to tackling uncertainty is not suitable.
Working Papers
"Uncertain Returns in Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Investigation" (with Angela C.M. de Oliveira)
For a variety of public goods projects, the exact return from provision is not known. We design an experiment to test the impact of an uncertain return on voluntary contributions. An uncertain return may be caused by either nature (the benefits of building a dyke depend on the frequency and intensity of floods) or third-party action (the effort exerted by the project manager affects the quality of the dyke). We find that the key determinant of contributions is a positive relationship with the expected return. An uncertain return, either caused by nature or third-party action, does not reduce contributions in our setting. We also find that the mechanism of voluntary provision is well suited for high value projects.
"Risk and Ambiguity in Threshold Common-Pool Resources: An Experiment"
A number of environmental resources, such as fisheries and groundwater reserves, are characterized by thresholds. If withdrawals from these resources exceeds the threshold, the resource is destroyed. However, the value of the threshold is often uncertain. We design an experiment where we vary the type of uncertainty on the threshold, risk (the probability distribution is known) vs. ambiguity (the probability distribution is unknown), and we also vary the type of destruction if the threshold is crossed, full vs. partial. We find that ambiguity as compared to risk significantly increases the probability of destroying the resource, for both full and partial destruction scenarios. We also find that an increase in the threshold range (difference between highest and lowest possible value) also significantly increases the probability of destroying the resource.
Work in Progress
"Common-value Public Good with Sequential Contributions: An Experiment" (with Lawrence R. De Geest and Prithvijit Mukherjee) - [Design Stage]
"Elicitation Effects in Stated Preferences Valuations" (with Ewa Zawojska) - [Design Stage]