RESEARCH
Publications
6) Buying from a Group (with Nima Haghpanah and Elliot Lipnowski), accepted @ American Economic Review, Abstract in EC 2021.
A group of sellers collectively sell a jointly owned good with sellers' valuations being heterogeneous. What is the buyer's optimal mechanism?
5) A Fair Procedure in a Marriage Market (with Antonio Romero-Medina) (subsumes the 2015 version) Review of Economic Design, 2024
Gale-Shapley algorithm treats one side of the market unfavourably. We propose a Gale-Shapley like algorithm where both sides propose.
4) The Wrong Kind of Information (with João Ramos and Johannes Schneider) RAND Journal of Economics, June 2023
A bureaucrat decides whether to approve a project based on his information, only a part of which is verifiable in court. Is more precise verifiable information always better?
3) Goodwill in Communication (with Elliot Lipnowski and João Ramos) Journal of Economic Theory, July 2022
A dynamic cheap-talk game between a sender & a receiver. Only feedback is the sender's message. Can it facilitate some communication? If yes, what are the limits?
2) Learning in Relational Contracts (with Rumen Kostadinov), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2022
Relational contracts between a firm and a worker with unknown match quality. Can they achieve efficiency? How do the optimal relational contracts look like?
1) Job Insecurity (with Elliot Lipnowski), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2020
A fixed wage firm-worker relationship with unknown match quality. The firm can fire the worker at any moment. What should the worker do?
WORKING PAPERS
#Change (with Deepal Basak and Joyee Deb)
When people consume more similar information, it can help people coordinate, but it can also exacerbate a free-rider problem. Which effect dominates? And when?
Fostering Collaboration (with Joyee Deb and Elliot Lipnowski) R&R @ Theoretical Economics
A firm needs to select between two agents' preferred projects. Competition enables it to learn, collaboration improves the projects. How does it balance the two?
A standard two-sided matching environment with one difference—agents find some alternatives incomparable. What is the right notion of stability and core?
Rewarding Failure (with Nishant Ravi)
A principal-agent relationship of experimentation where the agent can search for a success or a failure. When and how should the principal reward failure?