Deepal Basak
Deepal Basak
Associate Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy
Boquist-Meyer Faculty Fellow
Kelley School of Business at Indiana University
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Research
Research
Topic: Don't Panic
A panic is an event in which a crisis occurs not because of weak fundamentals but because of strategic uncertainty (for instance, a bank run or sovereign debt default). In such problems, the players do not always act at the same time, and this can be an effective tool for persuasion. We study this problem from a dynamic adversarial information design perspective and find practical policies to reduce such panics.
Topic: Don't Panic
A panic is an event in which a crisis occurs not because of weak fundamentals but because of strategic uncertainty (for instance, a bank run or sovereign debt default). In such problems, the players do not always act at the same time, and this can be an effective tool for persuasion. We study this problem from a dynamic adversarial information design perspective and find practical policies to reduce such panics.
Panics and Early Warnings (with Zhen Zhou), JPE
How does a timely alert about the impending disaster eliminate panic?
Diffusing Coordination Risk (with Zhen Zhou), AER
How do asynchronous moves help in coordination?
Frequent Stress Tests (with Mayur Choudhary and Zhen Zhou), under review
How does conducting more stress tests help in averting bank runs?
Topic: Bargaining and Commitment
Topic: Bargaining and Commitment
We study bargaining games, in which an underlying state (such as public opinion) determines the cost of commitment for the players and possible uncertainty about the state. We provide rational explanations for some widely observed but unexplained phenomena. We also analyze the efficiency implications.
Gambling over Public Opinion (with Joyee Deb), AER
Why do political parties wait and see which way the public opinion moves before agreeing, and how does it affect welfare?
Does a small probability of being uninformed make a large difference in bargaining?
Does more information about a player improve social welfare in bargaining?
Aspiration and Bargaining (with Urmee Khan), working paper
Why do people lowball or overreach instead of setting consistent aspirations in bargaining?
Topic: Similarity
Topic: Similarity
Algorithms steer different individuals toward different news and video content based on personal characteristics, thereby affecting the similarity of signal realizations among people and their behavior. We propose an order for comparing similarity and study how changes in similarity affect incentives in strategic environments.
Comparing Similarity (with Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar), working paper
When are realizations from one joint probability distribution more similar than those from another?
Similarity of Information and Collective Action (with Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar), AER (Lead Article)
When does information similarity facilitate/impede collective action?
Topic: Property Rights and Corrective Tax
Topic: Property Rights and Corrective Tax
Optimal Tax under Dispersed and Distorted Beliefs (with Yunhui Zhao), JET R&R
How should optimal tax policy account for behavioral overreaction when agents receive private signals unobservable to the planner?
When does financial tranquility call for stringent regulation?
Alliance Acquisition and Excludability (with Krishnamurthy Subramanian), work in progress
When assets are non-excludable, which ownership structure is more efficient - alliance or acquisition?
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