[Link to Paper]

Abstract: We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate freeriding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight.

Presentation (by one of the authors): Bocconi University, CERGE-EI, University of Chicago, Collegio Alberto, Essex University, HKUST, Kelley School of Business, Northwestern University, Oxford University, Penn State University, Princeton University, Stony Brook Game Theory meeting, SITE Political Economy, Toulouse School of Economics, University College London, University of Warwick, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Yale University