I am an Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Indian School of Business. I am also a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Economics at the University of Essex. My broad area of interest is microeconomic theory. Primarily, I work in dynamic games, organizational economics, and market design.
I received my PhD in Economics from NYU in 2017. Here is my CV.
Email: aditya_kuvalekar@isb.edu
8) Similarity of Information and Collective Action (with Deepal Basak and Joyee Deb) American Economic Review, 2026 (Lead article)
When people consume more similar information, it can help people coordinate, but it can also exacerbate a free-rider problem. Which effect dominates? And when?
7) Fostering Collaboration (with Joyee Deb and Elliot Lipnowski), Theoretical Economics, 2025
A firm needs to select between two agents' preferred projects. Competition enables it to learn, collaboration improves the projects. How does it balance the two?
6) Buying from a Group (with Nima Haghpanah and Elliot Lipnowski), American Economic Review, 2024, Abstract in EC 2021.
A group of sellers collectively sell a jointly owned good with sellers' valuations being heterogeneous. What is the buyer's optimal mechanism?
5) A Fair Procedure in a Marriage Market (with Antonio Romero-Medina) (subsumes the 2015 version), Review of Economic Design, 2024
Gale-Shapley algorithm treats one side of the market unfavourably. We propose a Gale-Shapley like algorithm where both sides propose.
4) The Wrong Kind of Information (with João Ramos and Johannes Schneider), RAND Journal of Economics, June 2023
A bureaucrat decides whether to approve a project based on his information, only a part of which is verifiable in court. Is more precise verifiable information always better?
3) Goodwill in Communication (with Elliot Lipnowski and João Ramos), Journal of Economic Theory, July 2022
A dynamic cheap-talk game between a sender & a receiver. Only feedback is the sender's message. Can it facilitate some communication? If yes, what are the limits?
2) Learning in Relational Contracts (with Rumen Kostadinov), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2022
Relational contracts between a firm and a worker with unknown match quality. Can they achieve efficiency? How do the optimal relational contracts look like?
1) Job Insecurity (with Elliot Lipnowski), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2020
A fixed wage firm-worker relationship with unknown match quality. The firm can fire the worker at any moment. What should the worker do?
When the return to skill rises, does everyone invest more in acquiring it? Not necessarily. In a marriage market with search frictions: a gender-neutral rise in the skill premium can lead one gender to invest more and the other less, with no underlying difference between them.
Reputational Spillovers (with Anna Sanktjohanser) (New Paper) (Accepted at EC'26.)
A central player bargains simultaneously with two peripheral players about two separate issues. In bilateral interactions, reputation for being tough is a strength; but not quite when there are "reputational spillovers."
Orders of Similarity: Concentration Along the Diagonal (New Version)(with Deepal Basak and Joyee Deb)
What is a reasonable notion for comparing similarity of information across agents in any Bayesian game? We answer this question by proposing a class of stochastic orders to compare the interdependence of multivariate random variables.
A standard two-sided matching environment with one difference—agents find some alternatives incomparable. What is the right notion of stability and core?
Rewarding Failure (with Nishant Ravi)
A principal-agent relationship of experimentation where the agent can search for a success or a failure. When and how should the principal reward failure?