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Barbieri, A., D. Bordini., A. Tacca (eds.), Argumenta, Special issue on Perceiving High-Level Properties.
Bordini, D. "Introspection and the Transparency of Experience." In: A. Giustina (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Introspection. London: Routledge.
Bordini, D., A. Dewalque & A. Giustina, "Inner Awareness: Past and Present." In: D. Bordini, A. Dewalque, A. Giustina (eds.), Consciousness and Inner Awareness. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Voltolini, A. "Against Seeing in Mirrors Without Seeing-In", Philosophia.
2026
Voltolini, A. “The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for A Higher-Level Property to Be Perceivable”, Argumenta 1–16. DOI 10.14275/2465-2334/20260.vol
2025
Barbero, C. “Literature and Perspective”, Syzetesis XII, 229-253, https://doi.org/10.53242/syzetesis/117 .
Di Bona, E. “Amodal completion in vision and audition. A relationship between perception and mental imagery, Analysis, anaf006, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf006.
Di Bona, E. “Kinds of Noise: On the Objective and Subjective Conceptions of Noise,” In: Vassilicos, B., Torre, G., Pellizzer, F.T. eds., The Experience of Noise. Palgrave Macmillan, 33-53. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-82802-7_2.
Sacchi, E., Barbieri, A. “In Defence of a Sui Generis Disjunctivistic Account of the Mark of the Mental”. In A. Voltolini (ed.), Marking the Mark of the Mental, Springer, Synthese Library, pp. 155-185.
Sacchi, E. “The Representational and Phenomenal Richness of Perceptual Experience”. Theoria 39(3), 289–314. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.25523.
Sacchi, E. "Against the Conceptualist Argument against Sensory Liberalism." Argumenta: 1-15. (Early View) https://www.argumenta.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Argumenta-Elisabetta-Sacchi-Against-the-Conceptualist-Argument-against-Sensory-Liberalism.pdf.
Voltolini, A. (ed.), Marking the Mark of the Mental. Synthese Library, volume 511. Springer.
Voltolini, A., “Presentational Character, Feeling of Presence and Presentification: Affinities and Differences between Imaginative and Perceptual Experiences”, Analysis, DOI :10.1093/analys/anae103.
Voltolini, A., “Seeing in Shadows”, Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00855-4.
2024
Barbero, C. and Voltolini, A., "How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine", Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1.
Bordini, D. “Something about the Question of Aboutness: Comments on Crane”. Australasian Philosophical Review, 8(1): 31-41, https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2024.2485187.
Calzavarini, F. and Voltolini, A. “A Supramodal Thorough Account of the Molyneux Question”. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.11573.
Calzavarini, F. and Voltolini, A. “The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15, 621–644.
Di Bona, E.. “Perception and Cognition of Music Components”, De Musica https://doi.org/10.54103/2465-0137/22569
Voltolini, A., "Perceptual Experiences of (Depicted) Absence", JoLMA 5 (2), 459-476.
Voltolini, A. “Amodal Completion: Imaginative or Perceptual?” In I. Vendrell-Ferran, C. Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations, London: Routledge, 158-170.
Voltolini, A. “Is What We See in the Picture the Same As What the Picture Presents?”, Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics 47, 145-155.
2023
Voltolini, A. “Pictures as Supramodal Sensory Individuals”, in A. Mroczko- Wąsowicz and R. Grush (eds.), Sensory Individuals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 403-418.
Voltolini, A. “Perceiving Aesthetic Properties”, British Journal of Aesthetics 63, 417–434.