workshops, SEMINARS AND TALKS

WORKSHOPS

Mind, Art & Artifacts

June 10-11, 2024

An extensive debate on artefacts and scaffolds has characterised and still characterises cognitive science, in its classical and post-classical 4E strands. Recently, this discussion has been extended to the realm of affectivite properties, in the framework of situated affectivity. And from affectivity – understood both as expressive and arousal properties of the artifacts – the discussion further expanded to the realm of aesthetics broadly conceived: from the nature of sensory properties to those of artistic objects. In this workshop, we would like to discuss these issues, bringing together philosophy of mind and cognition, philosophy of technology, philosophy of perception and aesthetics.

Invited speakers:

Marta Benenti (University of Murcia), "The Perceptual Learning of Affective Properties. An Aesthetic Proposal"

Elvira Di Bona (University of Torino),  "Listening to Atmospheres"

Jussi A. Saarinen (University of Jyvaskyla), "How Paintings Scaffold Their Makers' Affectivity"

Enrico Terrone (University of Genova), "Experiential Artifacts and the System of the Arts"

SEMINARS

IUSS Philosophy Seminars

Philosophy of Mind

Linguistics & Philosophy IUSS Center

Spring 2025

12/02/2025, 14:30-16:30 Alberto Voltolini (Univerisity of Turin), "Awareness of Awareness"

25/02/2025, 16:00-18:00 Roberto Casati (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), "The Point of View of the Ocean"

09/07/2025, 11:00-13:00 Joulia Smortchkova (University of Grenoble), "The affective core of first impressions"

Spring 2024

04/04/2024, 14:00-16:00 Sam Coleman (Univerisity of Herfortshire), "Panpsychism's Problem with Suffering"

ABSTRACT. According to panpsychism consciousness is special: so special that the only way humans can have it is if all the matter composing them also has it. But panpsychists have struggled with the 'combination problem' - the challenge to make it intelligible how many conscious micro-subjects can form into a single unified human subject with a single conscious point of view. In response, panpsychists increasingly opt for a view that parallels universalism in mereology: they argue that any and every clump of matter has a corresponding conscious mind. This entails lots of overlapping minds within human organisms. As well as our overall consciousness, corresponding to the whole organism, our organs, and brain sub-regions, e.g. the visual system, would each have their own consciousness as well. I argue that, given how special panpsychists make consciousness (it has properties like 'for-me-ness', constitutes acquaintance knowledge, and such, and apparently has intrinsic moral value), if our organs have this sort of consciousness they are very likely suffering and living a life not worth living— i.e. a life not befitting this sort of sentient lifeform. In that case, our persisting organismic consciousness arguably comes at a morally unacceptable price - the suffering of the conscious organ-beings sustaining our life. On the other hand, if panpsychists scale consciousness down, making it less special, then it becomes far less plausible that it is physically irreducible. So, it seems that either panpsychism is ill-motivated, or it entails an unacceptable moral cost. This problem is especially pressing in light of recent attempts by panpsychists to ground a moralistic approach to nature and the environment in their metaphysics. 

16/04/2024, 14:00-16:00 Maja Spener (Univerisity of Birmingham), "Can We Calibrate Introspective Measures of Consciousness?" 

23/04/2024, 11:00-13:00 Gianfranco Soldati (University of Fribourg), "Inner Perception and the First Person

ABSTRACT. Self-knowledge (SK) is first personal reflexive knowledge: S knows that S is F & S judges ‘I am F’.  If F can be any property, then we obtain a large variety of knowledge, ranging from knowing one's experiences and one's intentions, to knowing one's weight and one's memories.  Is there anything all those cases of knowledge have in common, or should we think that there are radically different forms of SK, such that only some of them ought to be considered as genuine cases of SK? Many philosophers, including Brentano, have concentrated on SK of conscious experiences, what based on what we shall call self-awareness (what Brentano called inner perception). My paper is motivated by three questions:Is there anything philosophically significant in the relation between inner perception and the usage of the first person in SK? Does this play a role for our understanding of all forms of SK? Is this relevant for our understanding of the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity?

08/05/2024, 14:00-16:00 Pii Telakivi (University of Helsinki), "From Extended Cognition to Extended Consciousness"

ABSTRACT. According to the 4E-framework, the mind is not confined to the brain alone – it is also based on interactions between the rest of the body, the environment and the tools in it, and on intersubjective and cultural relations. Notably, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argued that the material basis of cognitive states can extend to the tools and instruments we use. However, they limit the scope of the extension rigidly to cognition and exclude consciousness. Most philosophers who are sympathetic towards cognitive extension have agreed with them, and claimed that even if cognition were extended, conscious experience would still remain in the head, and be explainable in fully internalist terms. I argue for a broader position, according to which not only the material basis of cognition, but also the material basis of conscious experience can be spread beyond the head and the body. The extension of conscious experience happens with tools that are incorporated into bodily functions (e.g. a blind person and her cane or sensory substitution devices) in a way that they become integral parts of the subject’s transparent perspective. 

22/05/2024, 15:00-17:00 Davide Dalla Rosa (University of Frankfurt), "Two arguments against a Property-Dependent Account of Perceptual Demonstrative Thought"

ABSTRACT. The talk analyses the theoretical relationship between the object-dependent (ODT) and property-dependent (PDT) theory of perceptual demonstrative thoughts set out by Crawford (2020). Crawford argues for the explanatory superiority of PDT over ODT. I argue that  further examination of ODT calls into question at least in part the theoretical strength of PDT. I argue that this is the case if (i) PDT is supplemented with a metaphysics of properties that includes tropes, and if (ii) certain features of Fregean thought contents in ODT theories are re-evaluated. In the first case, PDT would become coincident with ODT. In the second case, ODT, while remaining conceptually distinct, would include the same explanatory advantages as PDT.

14/06/2024, 11:00-13:00 Jussi A. Saarinen (University of Jyväskylä), "Situated Mind and Artistic Creativity"

26/06/2024, 11:00-13:00 Guido Cassinadri (Scuola Universitaria Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa), "Extending the Mind and Self with a Brain-Computer Interface: Some Ethical Implications" (paper co-authored with Marcello Ienca)

02/07/2024, 11:00-13:00 Simone Gozzano (University of L’Aquila), "Panpsychism"

04/07/2024, 14:00-16:00 Monima Chadha (University of Oxford), "Memory and the Narrative Self"

Memory and the narrative sel

All the events are co-funded by: PRIN 2022 PNRR Higher-Order Perceivable Properties (HOPP); Philosophy of Mind IUSS Project.

Venue: Palazzo del Broletto, Piazza della Vittoria, 15 IUSS, 27100 Pavia.

Online Venue: Zoom links will be circulated in advance.

Organizers: Giulia Piredda (giulia.piredda@iusspavia.it), Alfredo Tomasetta (alfredo.tomasetta@iusspavia.it).