I'm a philosopher with wide-ranging interests, which I would rank in descending yet unstable order as follows : logical methods in philosophy, proof-theory and its applications, computation theory, the philosophy of logic and mathematics, epistemology, and ancient philosophy (with a particular focus on Plato).
My research has been published in many academic journals, including:
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, The Review of Symbolic Logic, Journal of Logic and Computation, Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, Journal of Logic Language and Information, Studia Logica, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Applied Logic, The Logic Journal of IGPL, Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Synthese, Erkenntnis, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Foundations of Science, The Cambridge Classical Journal, The Journal of Philosophy, The Australasian Journal of Logic, ACM Transactions on Computational Logic.
Some recent publications
(You can follow my previous work on ResearchGate)
Non-monotonic and defaults logics; normative reasoning
A logic for default deontic reasoning (with A. Sabatini), under review.
Modal logic with exceptions: taming epistemic possibilities (with M. Tesi), under review.
Venn diagrams and belief revision (with R. Bhattacharjee), under review.
A unified framework for input/output and default logics via hypersequents (with A. Sabatini), Journal of Logic and Computation, 36, (2) 2026, pp. 1-36.
Logical reasoning in social settings (edited book with M. Tesi and P. Vigiani ), Edizioni della Normale, 2025.
Exception and typicality, logically framed (with M. Tesi), Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 34, 2025, pp. 341-369.
Hypersequent calculi for propositional default logics (with A. Sabatini), ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 26 (3), 2025, pp. 1-36.
Fractional semantics and many-valued logics
An intrinsic additive quotient for classical propositional logic, draft, 2026.
An MV-algebra of classical tautologies, draft, 2026.
Branch-counting conditionals: De Finetti vs. Cooper–Cantwell via fractional semantics, under review.
A proof system for Riesz Łukasiewicz logic (with G. Lenzi), under review.
Infinite proofs and arithmetical truth (with G. Massas, M. Tesi), under review.
Inside classical logic: truth, contradictions, fractionality (with M. Tesi), Studia Logica, 2025.
Fractional-valued modal logic and soft bilateralism (with G. Pulcini and M. Tesi), Bulletin of the Section of Logic, (52/3), 2023, pp. 275–299.
Fractional-valued modal logic (with G. Pulcini, M. Tesi), The Review of Symbolic Logic, 16 (4), 2023, pp. 1033-1052.
Fractional semantics for classical logic (with G. Pulcini), The Review of Symbolic Logic, 13 (4), 2020, pp. 810-828.
Refutation calculi and applications
On anticut rules: classical, FDE-based and intuitionistic logics (with A. Sabatini), The Australasian Journal of Logic, 23 (2) 2026, pp. 109-147.
Linear logic in a refutational setting (with G. Pulcini and M. Tesi), Journal of Logic and Computation, 34 (7) 2024, pp. 1249–1273.
Abduction as deductive saturation: a proof-theoretic inquiry (with G. Pulcini and A. Sabatini), Journal of Philosophical Logic, 52 (6) 2023, pp. 1575–1602.
Proof-theoretic varia
Analyticity with extra-logical information (with M. Tesi), Journal of Logic and Computation, 2024 , pp. 1-31.
Non-contractive logics, paradoxes, and multiplicative quantifiers (with C. Nicolai and M. Tesi), The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2023, pp. 1-22.
Optimal reduction for non-deterministic lambda calculus (with M. Pedicini), draft, 2024.
Abstract machines, optimal reduction, and streams (with A. Lai, M. Pedicini), Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 29(9), Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 1379-1410.
From Proofs to the Chessboard: Poincaré and Mathematical Understanding, under review, 2026.
A Reflection Principle for Kripke-Feferman Truth (with M. Fischer and C. Nicolai), The Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
The implicit commitment of arithmetical theories and its semantic core (with C. Nicolai), Erkenntnis, 84 (4), 2019, pp. 913–937.
Truth, Existence and Explanation (ed. with G. Pulcini), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer, 2018.
Why isn't enough, draft, 2026.
What Arrow's information paradox says (to philosophers) (with M. Pedicini), in V. d’Alfonso and D. Berkich, On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2019, pp. 83-94.