Publications:
"Purchasing Seats in School Choice and Inequality" [pdf] with Tong Wang, Quantitative Economics, Vol. 15, Issue 4, p. 1151-1195 (2024)
For more than 15 years, many Chinese cities gave students the option of paying higher tuition to acquire seats in their preferred schools. Yet real-world matching mechanisms that include an option to purchase seats may yield inefficient and unstable matching outcomes. This paper combines high school admission and survey data from China to estimate students' preferences regarding schools and tuition. The counterfactual experiments indicate that when the number of seats for sell is limited, the change from the deferred acceptance mechanism to the existing matching mechanism (with the seat-purchasing option) may have benefited moderately performing students while reducing the welfare of top students. Meanwhile, the upper-tier schools may benefit from the increase in tuition collection and no significant decline in student quality, but middle-tier schools face a significant trade-off between student quality and tuition. If the deferred acceptance mechanism is instead replaced by a strategy-proof ``student optimal purchasing seats'' mechanism, then all student groups would experience a loss of welfare. At the same time, schools under the latter mechanism would collect significantly more tuition with only minimal change in the quality of admitted students.
"The Impact of Anti-corruption on Mental Health: Evidence from China" [pdf ] with Jiawei Fu, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 52, Issue 4, p. 925-950 (2024)
Mental health directly influences individuals' behaviors and decision-making processes, particularly for government officials grappling with mental health issues. This paper utilizes field data from China's anti-corruption campaign to evaluate the campaign's impact on mental health. Our findings indicate that depressive symptoms, as measured by CES-D8 scores, have risen significantly among government employees by 0.4 units per 100 increase in corruption investigation cases. This result suggests that the anti-corruption campaign within a year could potentially result in an average increase of 29% in depressive symptoms among government employees. Interestingly, no comparable effect was found among the general Chinese population. This discrepancy could be attributed to the transformative impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the internal governmental work environment, engendering stress among its employees.
"Interactions among Simultaneous Elections" [pdf] (forthcoming at Political Science Research and Methods)
In this study, we examine interactions among elections by considering two parties that compete in simultaneous elections, in which each party sends candidates to each election. Results show that candidates choose more polarized positions compared with the Calvert-Wittman model. Our model has several applications. First, in multidistrict elections, candidates in districts with extreme ideology move further away from the national median voter's position. Furthermore, if same-party candidates can coordinate, the candidate with a disadvantage in the local election may sacrifice their own candidacy to support the national election for the party. Second, if one party can set up a referendum to manipulate an election, that party could choose a policy close to the median voter's position in the referendum but a polarized policy in the election. In this way, the party may increase its payoff without sacrificing its chances to win the election.
"Last Step to the Throne: The Conflict between Rulers and Their Successors" [pdf] Political Science Research and Methods, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 80-94 (2023)
I model the dynamic between ruler and successor. The ruler wants to cultivate a successor for a smooth power transition but fears being ousted by him, while the successor fears being removed by the ruler; these mutual fears may induce ruler--successor conflict. Each party follows a non-monotonic equilibrium strategy. The successor accumulates power while not threatening the ruler, and he prolongs their relationship by maintaining a low profile. The ruler gradually becomes more intolerant of the successor's growing power but, as her life nears its end, has less incentive to replace him. Thus conflict is most probable in the middle of their relationship. Although an institutionalized procedure may render conflict less likely, a predetermined succession order could increase its likelihood by restricting the ruler's optimal time to select a successor. If there are two candidates then a ruler prefers the weaker one only if their capabilities are similar.
"Optimal Size of Rebellions: Trade-off between Large Group and Maintaining Secrecy" [pdf ] Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16: No. 2, p. 157-183 (2021）
This paper studies a model of regime change in which a rebel leader seeking to mobilize supporters faces a trade-off between increasing the rebel group's size and risking information leaks. I find that repressing a rebellion via collective punishment| whereby not only rebel participants but also those individuals who knew about (but did not report) the rebellion are punished may result in a smaller-sized rebel group than in the case of targeted punishment, under which only the actual rebel participants are punished. Authorities prefer collective punishment to induce information leaks from rebel groups, however one consequence of adopting collective punishment is that citizens are then put to side with the insurgency, which in turn reduces the regime's odds of survival. My findings also indicate that, whereas targeted punishment helps prevent rebellion by ordinary citizens who simply desire policy changes, collective punishment helps prevent a revolution staged by those who are driven by pecuniary rewards. Finally, if authorities compete with rebel leaders for support by threatening retribution against non-supporters, then both parties prefer using relatively harsh methods as a means of forcing civilians to choose sides.
"High School Admission Reform in China: A Welfare Analysis" with Tong Wang [pdf] Review of Economic Design, 24.3, p. 215-269 (2020)
In recent years, China has experienced a trend of changing from the Boston mechanism(BM) to the Chinese parallel mechanism for high school and college admissions. Using a unique data set from the high-school-assignment system in China that combines survey data eliciting students’ school preferences with administrative data that cover students’ school choices and admission records under both mechanisms, this paper compares the welfare performance of BM, the Chinese parallel mechanism, and the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism.We find a non-monotonic relationship between the manipulability and efficiency of school choice mechanisms: DA yields significantly higher welfare than the Chinese parallel mechanism and BM, but BM yields higher welfare than Chinese parallel mechanism although not significantly. We also find that switching from BM to Chinese parallel mechanism hurts students regardless of their socioeconomic status, but benefits students with higher test scores. Students with lower socioeconomic status benefit more than those with higher socioeconomic status when switching from BM to DA, but when switching from Chinese parallel mechanism to DA, students with higher socioeconomic status benefit more.
Working Papers:
"Who gets the bonus? Affirmative Action Reforms in High School Admissions in China" [pdf ] with Umut Dur, Onur Kesten and Tong Wang
China has implemented affirmative action reforms to improve access to quality high school education for students from underperforming middle schools by awarding bonus points to a select group of students. Our study reveals significant flaws in practice due to challenges in determining how bonuses should be distributed. We propose a choice rule that ``endogenously’’ identifies bonus-recipients and show that it is the unique acceptant and fair choice rule that efficiently assigns the bonus. Embedded in the deferred acceptance mechanism, it ensures stability, strategy-proofness, and constrained optimality. Empirical analysis shows that our proposal significantly improves representation for underperforming schools and effectively assigns the bonus to the ``right’’ students
"Party Membership as a Signal in China’s Labor Market" with Hongbin Li, Lin Lin and Junjian Yi
This study explores the dynamics of grassroots political selection in single-party regimes, focusing on its interplay with labor market outcomes. By investigating the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) recruitment practices, we highlight how the rigorous selection process enables party membership to act as a signal of high noncognitive abilities. This membership, in turn, confers substantial labor market benefits, such as increased employment opportunities and higher starting wages. Leveraging a field experiment with fictitious resumes sent to employers, we quantify the signaling effect of party membership, which accounts for a significant portion of its labor market advantages. Complementing this, through the college survey dataset, we reveal that both self-selection and institutional selection mechanisms, driven by noncognitive traits, are integral to the CCP’s recruitment process. Our results suggest that party membership serves as an informative signal of high noncognitive abilities in the Chinese labor market.
"Contagious Media Bias: How Authoritarian Propaganda and Censorship Shape Global News Narratives" [pdf] with Liqun Liu
We develop a model to explore the conditions under which authoritarian regimes' information manipulation might induce global media bias. In a competitive market, such regimes' propaganda cannot sway public perceptions due to the presence of independent media, which reports truthfully to build a reputation. When censorship prevents independent media from reaching audiences under authoritarianism, it not only intensifies the authoritarian control over domestic media but also encourages misreporting by independent media to international audiences. When regimes employ different propaganda tactics for domestic and international audiences, they disseminate unreliable information domestically while providing relatively more reliable information to the international community.
"International Trade and Political Assignment in China" [pdf ]
In this paper, we attempt to answer the question: How does the Chinese government relocate its officials or human capital inside the political system to achieve economic goals. The central government increases the number of officials assigned to non-export-oriented provinces in an effort to promote local exports. We use a difference-in-differences method to examine the effect of the WTO on these cross-province official assignments. The results indicate that joining the WTO significantly increased the probability that officials from the export-oriented provinces were promoted to the non-export-oriented provinces. However, the officials from the export-oriented provinces do not necessarily have higher promotion probability to the central government or other export-oriented provinces.