Research
BOOK: Discovering Welfare
Discovering Welfare: The Politics of Social Protection in Africa
Over the past twenty years there have been remarkable yet uneven investments in elements of social welfare in Africa such as pension systems, social health insurance, and cash transfers. This book offers a comprehensive examination of these developments, rooted in the intersection of democratic politics and historical legacies. Through cross-national anlaysis and in-depth case studies, the book shows how the character of democratic politics in Africa produces divergent incentives to campaign on social welfare and different capacities to implement significant reforms. Likewise, social welfare policymaking emerges from distinct colonial and post-colonial legacies that inlfuence what reforms enter the political agenda and what policy ideas gain currency. The book sheds important light on the green shoots of social welfare in Africa, which has consequences for both human development and state-citizen relations.
Book: How Autocrats Compete
How Autocrats Compete: Parties, Patrons, and Unfair Elections in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2019)
Most autocrats now hold unfair elections, yet how they compete in them and manipulate them differs greatly. How Autocrats Compete advances a theory that explains variation in electoral authoritarian competition. Using case studies of Tanzania, Cameroon, and Kenya, along with broader comparisons from Africa, it finds that the kind of relationships autocrats foster with supporters and external actors matters greatly during elections. When autocrats can depend on credible ruling parties that provide elites with a level playing field and commit to wider constituencies, they are more certain in their own support and can compete in elections with less manipulation. Shelter from international pressure further helps autocrats deploy a wider range of coercive tools when necessary. Combining in-depth field research, within-case statistics, and cross-regional comparisons, Morse fills a gap in the literature by focusing on important variation in authoritarian institution building and international patronage. Understanding how autocrats compete sheds light on the comparative resilience and durability of modern authoritarianism.
'Why do some authoritarian regimes enjoy genuine electoral support, while others resort to electoral manipulation and repression to stay in power? In this sophisticated analysis of contemporary authoritarian regimes, Yonatan L. Morse attributes variation in autocrats' electoral strategies to both the legacies of institution building and to the nature of international patronage. Morse's account is rich in nuance and firmly rooted in African politics, yet provides generalizable lessons that will be of interest to scholars of comparative politics and international relations alike.' Daniela Donno, University of Pittsburgh
'Yonatan L. Morse's book is an excellent contribution to the study of electoral authoritarian regimes. Grounded in a deep knowledge of contrasting cases such as Cameroon and Tanzania, the book focuses on the internal workings of ruling parties to provide new insights on how autocrats manage to hold onto power in some countries without having to resort to violence and fraud during elections.' Leonardo R. Arriola, Director of the Center for African Studies, University of California, Berkeley
'This ambitious, imaginative and well written book has a great deal to tell us about how authoritarians give themselves an unfair electoral advantage - and so keep themselves in power - in Africa. We need to understand that authoritarians have gone from refusing to hold elections to finding new ways to rig them, and this book provides essential insights about how and why this has happened.' Nic Cheeseman, University of Birmingham and author of How to Rig an Election
Published Reviews
Foreign Affairs Perspectives on Politics Journal of Modern African Studies
Democratization African Studies Review Political Science Quarterly
PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS
w/ Suh I Fru Norbert. "Unpacking Candidate Selection in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Cameroon" (FORTHCOMING)
ABSTRACT: Why do autocratic ruling parties adopt certain candidate selection processes, and what effects do they have on political outcomes? This article argues that many contemporary autocracies democratize candidate selection to address the demands of multiparty elections, but that this creates unforeseen hazards. Autocrats manipulate candidate selection to reassert control over the composition of legislatures, but not necessarily to recruit more effective representatives. These ideas are explored in Cameroon, a longstanding authoritarian regime that has altered its candidate selection twice. Using an original biographical dataset and elite survey that measures legislative role orientations, the article shows how changes to candidate selection allowed the Cameroonian regime to retain more partisan legislators and to recruit new candidates who were more oriented to the party than the constituency. The article expands the comparative study of candidate selection to new settings and provides insights into how candidate selection helps shape and sustain authoritarian regimes.
w/Natalie W. Lesta. "Autocratic Legalism, Partisanship, and Popular Legitimation in Authoritarian Cameroon" Public Opinion Quarterly 87, 4 (2023): 935-955.
ABSTRACT: Authoritarian regimes regularly turn to the law to justify repression. This article examines whether invoking legal institutions has a persuasive effect on public perceptions of repression, and whether that effect is shaped by partisanship. The article uses the case of Cameroon’s Special Criminal Tribunal, created in 2011 to prosecute high-profile corruption cases. A survey experiment was designed that describes the arrest and trial of a suspected corrupt oppositional minister and reminds a treatment group about the Special Criminal Tribunal. The results show that neither regime nor opposition partisans are swayed by legal justifications for repression. By contrast, nonpartisans respond negatively to autocratic legalism, particularly those with low levels of regime trust. The article clarifies when autocratic legalism might be used for public legitimation, suggests that partisanship is a useful lens for understanding public opinion in an autocracy, and elaborates upon the meaning of nonpartisanship in electoral authoritarian regimes.
"Democratic Contestation, Organized Labor, and Pension Reform in Ghana and Malawi" Social Policy and Administration 57, 6 (2023): 855-868.
ABSTRACT: What explains variation in African states’ commitment to pensions? This article argues that differences in the structure of contestation and legacies of state-labor relations can matter. When competition is confined to fewer and more stable parties, social welfare appeals gain currency as a means to mobilize swing voters and makes it more likely that pensions will become a subject of political competition. However, legacies of labor accommodation can strengthen certain elements of pension reform, but also reinforce certain policy mindsets such as contributory insurance. These ideas are developed with case studies of Ghana and Malawi. The cases utilize process-tracing evidence to demonstrate how specific structures of contestation and labor legacies lead to divergent pathways of pension reform. The article highlights the significant challenges involved in strengthening pensions in Africa, and therefore the limited potential for a reconstitution of state-citizen relations based on pension access.
"Pathways to Power in Authoritarian Regimes: Multipartyism, Civil Service, and Legislative Selection in Cameroon" Government & Opposition 57, 3 (2022): 490-507.
ABSTRACT: Legislatures are key institutions that stabilize authoritarian rule. However, less is said about the individuals who populate these institutions or the pathways that take them to power. This is an oversight, since how autocrats recruit reflects upon their institutional capacities and adaptation to changing circumstances. Specifically, recruitment is challenging when regimes lack robust ruling parties to cultivate partisan loyalists and during periods of multiparty elections when candidates must provide a higher degree of self-financing. This article examines these dynamics across the lifespan of Cameroon’s authoritarian regime and introduces an original biographical dataset of over 900 legislators between 1973 and 2019. The data show an increased proportion of businesspeople in the legislature, but also an emerging preference for candidates with civil service experience. The article argues that established civil service pipelines substitute for the monitoring functions a party might serve, while simultaneously preparing candidates for the unique financing needs of elections.
Publishers Version PDF Supplementary Materials Data Do File
"The Legislature as Political Control: Change and Continuity in Cameroon's National Assembly (1973-2019)" The Journal of Modern African Studies 59, 4 (2021): 485-506.
ABSTRACT: A growing literature has begun to more closely examine African legislatures and legislators. However, most of this research has been attentive to emerging democratic settings, and particularly the experiences of a select number of English-speaking countries. By contrast, Cameroon is a Francophone country that reintroduced multiparty politics in the early 1990s but continues to exhibit significant authoritarian tendencies. This article provides a longitudinal analysis of Cameroon's National Assembly and builds on a unique biographical dataset of over 900 members of parliament between 1973 and 2019. The article describes changes in the structure and orientation of the legilslature as well as the social profile of its members, in particular following the transition to multipartyism. While the legislature in Cameroon remains primarily a tool of political control, it is more dynamic, and the mechanisms used to manage elites within the context of complex multiethnic politics have evolved.
Publishers Version PDF Supplementary Materials
"Rebuilding, Rebranding, and Competitive Landscapes: A Set-Theoretic Analysis of Authoritarian Successor Parties" Democratization 27, 8 (2020): 1477-1495.
ABSTRACT: This study reevaluates debates over what has allowed authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) to overcome the baggage associated with their past and remain competitive after the Third Wave. Current scholarship points to variation in several factors – the degree to which ASPs can rebuild support using resources from the authoritarian past, the ability of ASPs to rebrand themselves, and the extent to which the new competitive landscape provides electoral opportunities. Yet, there is less consensus over what generalizable conclusions can be drawn. This article departs from former work by presenting the results of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of forty-six ASPs. This method is particularly attuned to medium ranges of cases and the notion of causal complexity. I find that there are three distinct causal recipes that produce a competitive ASP: (1) resource advantages and competitive landscapes; (2) resource advantages and self-reform; and (3) mixed legacies and competitive landscapes. The article corrects several standing theories by noting the interaction between causal factors and better accounting for the empirically diverse settings in which ASPs remain competitive.
Publisher's Version Data (fsQCA) Data (Casebook)
"Elite Interviews in the Developing World: Finding Anchors in Weak Institutional Environments"Qualitative Research 19, 3 (2019): 277-291.
ABSTRACT: Recently researchers have built on field experiences from novel and challenging settings to develop new insights into elite interviewing strategies, and specifically the question of access. One such context that has been underexplored is the weak institutional environment frequently found in the developing world. Many of the common insights regarding access emphasize an elite's relative insularity and unwillingness to participate in research due to issues of status and prestige. By contrast in weaker institutional settings elites are protected by fewer organizational safeguards, are more accustomed to in-person conversations, and are often quite willing to participate in research. The challenge is identifying elites to begin with, working around flexible scheduling norms, and adapting to a much more direct and persistent form of communication with elites. Drawing on insights mainly from fieldwork in Africa, this article identifies some best practices on how to prepare for elite interviews, organize logistically, and develop contacts once on-site.
"Presidential Power and Democratization by Elections in Africa" Democratization 25, 4 (2018): 709-727.
ABSTRACT: Do elections in of themselves provide mechanisms for democratization? The ‘democratization by elections’ thesis has been challenged, yet scholars still differ over its substantive effect. Some of the disagreement is over the specific outcome of interest, with proponents advocating for a narrower definition of democratization. Others want to know more about the factors that condition how elections impact democracy. This article addresses both points by demonstrating that in Africa the extent of formal presidential power significantly shapes the ability of repeated elections to socialize more broadly democratic behavior in the form of greater civil and private liberties, more civil society participation, increased women’s empowerment, and wider egalitarianism. Using recently available data on African presidents and the democratic qualities of regimes, the article demonstrates the ongoing influence of presidential power in Africa and provides some previously unstudied constraints on the democratization by elections thesis.
Publisher's Version PDF Supplemental Materials Data Do File
"Electoral Authoritarianism and the State in Africa: Ruling Parties vs. Presidents in Tanzania and Cameroon" International Political Science Review 39, 1 (2018): 114-129.
ABSTRACT: State capacity is arguably an essential factor that stabilizes electoral authoritarian rule. Yet, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa many measures of state capacity are generally weak. What therefore explains the persistence of electoral authoritarianism in Africa? This study provides a comparison of Tanzania and Cameroon to highlight two divergent reactions to the problem of power consolidation in Africa. In Cameroon, a centralized presidency and comparatively large coercive apparatus underpinned a strong patrimonial state. By contrast, in Tanzania the ruling party became an institution that integrated elites and appeared to subsume the state. These regime configurations stabilized electoral authoritarianism in unique ways, and led to different dependence on the state during elections. The study sheds new light on contemporary Africa, and the diverse sources of authoritarian resilience in the face of multiparty elections.
"From Single-Parties to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: Party Capacity and the Sources of Competitiveness in Post-Cold War Africa" Comparative Politics 48, 1 (2015): 126-151.
ABSTRACT: Scholarship on authoritarianism has become increasingly concerned with variation in electoral authoritarian outcomes, observed in terms of the competitiveness of elections. Simultaneously, there has been a growing focus on the role of authoritarian institutions, and especially political parties in explaining authoritarian survival. This article seeks to link these two perspectives by focusing on the subset of former African single-party regimes that transitioned to electoral authoritarianism. The article highlights differences in party institutionalization and patterns of social incorporation as key aspects of party capacity that help explain the competitiveness of elections. Through typological theorizing, ten countries are compared along measures of party capacity, economic performance, opposition strength, and external actor pressure. The study aims to highlight variation in institutional development in Africa, and to illuminate the underpinnings of current electoral authoritarian regimes.
Publisher's Version PDF Qualitative Replication File
Yonatan L. Morse. "Party Matters: The Institutional Origins of a Competitive Hegemony in Tanzania" Democratization 21, 4 (2014): 655-788.
ABSTRACT: Electoral authoritarianism has emerged as the primary mode of authoritarian rule in the post-Cold War era, and as a significant area of scholarly study. It is also a notably heterogeneous phenomenon, in terms of its impact upon incumbents and the specific quality of contestation. This article investigates a specific type of electoral authoritarian outcome, a competitive hegemony, and incorporates the role of single-party structure as a primary explanatory variable. In competitive hegemonies regimes are able to win and dominate elections by large vote margins, but with comparatively much lower levels of electoral fraud and coercion. This article uses a case study analysis of Tanzania to show how investments into articulate party governing structures and wide mobilization capacity under single-party rule provides regimes with additional sources of elite cohesion and stability, and prevents oppositions from expanding their support base.
Yonatan L. Morse, "The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism" World Politics 64, 1 (2012): 161-198.
ABSTRACT: In recent years scholarly attention has shifted from the study of democratization to the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism. In these regimes, regular elections are held for national legislatures and chief executives, yet they fail to live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness. A range of new research has investigated these regimes and especially the capacity of elections to either dislodge or reinvigorate authoritarian incumbents. This article reviews some of the current work on electoral authoritarianism and attempts to finds ways to achieve synthesis and better theoretical development. It notes the need for greater conceptual consensus, attention to context, and better evaluation of what electoral competitiveness means under authoritarian conditions. It argues that the next stage for research should be smaller and contextual comparison that can allow for greater attention to concepts, while allowing for strong midrange theory.
Working Papers and Projects
"Institutional Legacies, Democracy, and Welfare: The Changing Landscape of Social Protection in Africa"
ABSTRACT: In the comparative study of welfare Africa stands out as a region of relative scholarly neglect. Yet, while a recognizable and expansive African welfare states does not exist, states have always provided some degree of social protection to segments of their population. Moreover, over the past twenty years there has been signficiant reform including improved access to pensions, health insurance risk pools, and innovations in social assistance. This paper explores the changing landscape of formal social protection in Africa through the use of a novel data set on welfare between 1960 and 2018. This data presents information about the structure of welfare programs and the extent of their commitments, and therefore provides the first cross-national time-series data on welfare in Africa. The paper shows that institutional legacies besides simply colonial heritage shape initial investments into welfare. Likewise, the inception of democracy has had an impact on the expansion of welfare, but a highly uneven one.
"Emerging Ideologiclal Fissures in Cameroon's National Assembly"
"Who Cares About Welfare? Evidence from Malawi"
OTHER WRITING
TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS
"Cameroon" in IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2020, Routledge, London (2020)
"Cameroon" in IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2019, Routledge, London (2019)
BOOK REVIEWS
Nic Cheeseman and Jonathan Fisher. Authoritarian Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2020). in The Journal of Modern African Studies 59, 1 (2021):p.126-128.
Andreas Schedler. The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2015), in Acta Politica 50, 2 (2013): p.246-248.
OTHER WRITING (NON-PEER REVIEWED)
"Cameroon" in Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Berlin (2022)
"Cameroon" in Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Berlin (2020)