Xingtan Zhang's Homepage

Xingtan Zhang (张兴潭)

Associate Professor of Finance

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

125 Guangqumen Nei Street

Dong Cheng Qu

Beijing, China

xingtanzhang AT ckgsb.edu.cn

zxingtan AT gmail.com

[CKGSB Profile] [FTG Profile] [SSRN]

Curriculum Vitae(.pdf)

Winter Finance Summit in Asia

https://sites.google.com/site/xingtanzhang/

WORKING PAPERS

Regulating Credit Markets with Time-Inconsistent Consumers [with Alex Citanna, Daniel Gottlieb, and Paolo Siconolfi]

- We characterize equilibrium contracts for naïve present-biased consumers under regulatory constraints (such as caps on leverages or fees).

Environmental Disclosures in Global Supply Chains [with Christian Opp]

- This paper analyzes disclosures by foreign firms and tax interventions by the domestic government in the presence of market power, asymmetric information, and externalities.

Manipulating Non-Fundamental Information [with Brian Waters, Wei Zhou, and Shrihari Santosh]

- A novel way for smart money to exploit sentiment traders is to manipulate other market participants’ beliefs about future flows further away from the truth by creating new non-fundamental information into prices.- Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Finance

Speculative Financial Innovation [with H. Henry Cao, Hui Ou-Yang, and Dongyan Ye][Slide]

- When investors disagree about the covariance of the newly introduced assets with the original assets, financial innovation decreases the market portfolio's risk premium and increases market liquidity for all existing assets.

Disagreement, Skewness, and Asset Prices [with Christian Goulding and Shri Santosh] [Slide]

- A simple theory that offers joint predictions on the pricing implications of disagreement and skewness in a frictionless framework- Revise & Resubmit, Review of Financial Studies

The Value of Scattered Information [with Christian Goulding] [Slide]

- Scattered structures can increase information production.

The Intermediary Rat Race [with Yu An and Yang Song]

- Dealers can over-compete because the holding dealer imposes a negative externality on non-holding dealers.

A Sharper Ratio [with Kent Smetters] [Slide]

- A theory of using higher moments in performance evaluation- NBER Working Paper No. 19500

Efficient Bargaining Through a Broker

- An imperfectly informed broker can achieve full efficiency in bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information.- Subsumed in "Collective Decision Through an Informed Mediator".