Xingtan Zhang (张兴潭)
Assistant Professor of Finance
Leeds School of Business
University of Colorado Boulder
995 Regent Drive 401B
Boulder, CO 80309
xingtan.zhang AT colorado.edu
Office: 303-492-7541
[Leeds Profile] [FTG Profile] [SSRN]
WORKING PAPERS
Emissions Disclosures in Global Supply Chains [with Christian Opp]
- This paper analyzes disclosures by foreign firms and tax interventions by the domestic government in the presence of market power, asymmetric information, and externalities.Exploiting Sentiment Traders [with Brian Waters, Wei Zhou, and Shrihari Santosh]
- A novel way for smart money to exploit sentiment traders is to manipulate other market participants’ beliefs about future flows further away from the truth by creating new non-fundamental information into prices.Speculative Financial Innovation [with H. Henry Cao, Hui Ou-Yang, and Dongyan Ye][Slide]
- When investors disagree about the covariance of the newly introduced assets with the original assets, financial innovation decreases the market portfolio's risk premium and increases market liquidity for all existing assets.Arms Sales in Financial Markets [with Vincent Glode][Slide]
- We model how the sales of trading advantages (e.g., data and collocation services) affect traders' endogenous participation in a market and vice-versa.- A non-technical summary by Knowledge@WhartonDisagreement, Skewness, and Asset Prices [with Christian Goulding and Shri Santosh] [Slide]
- A simple theory that offers joint predictions on the pricing implications of disagreement and skewness in a frictionless frameworkThe Value of Scattered Information [with Christian Goulding] [Slide]
- Scattered structures can increase information production.The Intermediary Rat Race [with Yu An and Yang Song]
- Dealers can over-compete because the holding dealer imposes a negative externality on non-holding dealers.A Sharper Ratio [with Kent Smetters] [Slide]
- A theory of using higher moments in performance evaluation- NBER Working Paper No. 19500Efficient Bargaining Through a Broker
- An imperfectly informed broker can achieve full efficiency in bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information.PUBLICATIONS
Collective Decision Through an Informed Mediator [with Yunan Li]
Journal of Economic Theory, 218, June 2024 [Slide][SSRN]
Pricing Implications of Noise [with Christian Goulding and Shri Santosh]
Review of Financial Studies, 36, June 2023, 2468-2508[Slide][SSRN]
A Model of Product Line Marketing [with Chuan He and Shaowei Ke]
Management Science, 68, August 2022, 6100-6115[Slide][SSRN]
Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents [with Daniel Gottlieb]
Econometrica, 89, March 2021, 793-824[Slide][Online Appendix][Supplementary Appendix][SSRN][Corrigendum]
On the Efficiency of Long Intermediation Chains [with Vincent Glode and Christian Opp]
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 38, April 2019, pp. 11-18 [SSRN]
Voluntary Disclosure in Bilateral Transactions [with Vincent Glode and Christian Opp]
Journal of Economic Theory, 175, May 2018, pp. 652-688 [Slide][SSRN]