Xingtan Zhang (张兴潭)

Assistant Professor of Finance

Leeds School of Business

University of Colorado Boulder

995 Regent Drive S404

Boulder, CO 80302

xingtan.zhang AT

Office: 303-492-7541

[Leeds Profile] [Google Scholar] [SSRN]


Efficient Bargaining Through a Broker

- An imperfectly informed broker can achieve full efficiency in bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information.- Carnegie Mellon, Colorado, Indiana, Northern Illinois, Peking, Toronto, Tsinghua, UPenn, Wharton, China Meeting of the Econometric Society, FTG Summer School Contributed Papers, and International Industrial Organization Conference

The Value of Scattered Information [with Christian Goulding]

- Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Financial Intermediation - Scattered structures can increase information production.- Media coverage: Columbia Law School's Blog- CICF, FMA, and MFA

A Sharper Ratio [with Kent Smetters]

- A foundation of using higher moments in performance evaluation- NBER Working Paper No. 19500- Wharton, WU Vienna, and The Q Group

Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents [with Daniel Gottlieb]

- For naive agents, the welfare loss from time-inconsistency vanishes as the number of periods grows.- Colorado, Harvard-MIT, Princeton, UC Berkeley, Wharton, and Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE)

The Intermediary Rat Race [with Yu An and Yang Song]

- Dealers can over-compete because the holding dealer imposes a negative externality on non-holding dealers.- Colorado


On the Efficiency of Long Intermediation Chains [with Vincent Glode and Christian Opp]

Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming

Voluntary Disclosure in Bilateral Transactions [with Vincent Glode and Christian Opp]

Journal of Economic Theory 175, May 2018, pp. 652-688