A Protection and Recovery Plan for Southern Resident Killer Whales

A Protection and Recovery Plan for Southern Resident Killer Whales by Dr. Gerald Graham, Marine Environmental Consultant

General Comments:

DFO’s March 2005 draft recovery plan is excellent on analysis of the problem, e.g. what we know, what we don’t know, and what we need to know, and what might happen if we fail to act. It is, however, short on prescription; in effect, it is more of a research plan than a recovery plan. In fact, it is not really a plan at all; instead it is a strategy. An action plan, we are told, is to come later, but not before 2007.

The real problem with the plan is that it doesn’t go far enough. It doesn’t, for instance provide society with any real options at this stage; it doesn’t deal with the hard choices society may have to make at some stage, such as curtailing commercial shipping in the area of critical habitat. By and large, the plan doesn’t leave much room for action; it tends to postpone action items for a later day. Moreover, the phase involving development of the action plan does not appear to provide for any public input or review; presumably, the action plan is to be drafted by technocrats. This is not a good way to garner popular support for any initiative.

The predominant theme of the plan seems to be that while the orcas are endangered, we need to do a lot more research to determine what is adversely affecting their numbers to such an extent that they might become extinct. Thus, the emphasis is on more data gathering, study, analysis, research, etc. This leaves the impression that local orcas will, if nothing else, be studied to death. Nowhere in the plan is there any reference to the cautionary principle, in spite of the fact that it is specifically mentioned in SARA. This principle states that lack of scientific certainty shall not be a reason for postponing action.

There is a total absence of economic discussion, such as the value of the salmon industry, local whale watching industry and ecotourism ( $100 million? ), vs. cruise ships ( $500 million ), commercial shipping ( tens of billions? ), etc. Also, recovery plan proposals are not costed-out. It would be useful to know how much all this research and other work is going to cost, and who is going to pay for it.

The report focuses on the long-term, which is fine, but in so doing, any sense of urgency is lost, even though endangered status is conferred only when there’s an immediate threat ( emphasis added ) of extinction. In the case of orcas, it is generally recognised that a sudden, one-time catastrophic oil spill could decimate the SRC, condemning it to certain extinction. Moreover, even though it claims to focus on the long-term, the study fails to take account of projected trends which threaten SRC orcas all the more, e.g. the increase in commercial shipping activity, urban development trends in the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound area, etc.; thus, the question becomes, how is a recovery plan going to run up against this onslaught of pressure from external forces, because if you think orcas are badly off now, just wait to see what happens in the future.

Admittedly, the plan implicitly recognises the immediate threat of a catastrophic oil spill, but measures to prevent that from happening are glaringly absent. Also, the report makes repeated reference to ‘critical habitat’, but curiously fails to take an ecosystem approach, explicitly at least, even though SARA allows the Minister to do so. Nor does it ever mention the NMCA initiative for the southern Gulf Islands, and how this initiative and that mesh. An ecosystem approach could provide the basis for a region-wide strategy to save the orcas; this is why explicit mention of it could be important.

The point is by the time all the proposed studies are complete, there’s a good chance the SRC will not be around any more; it will have either moved on or become extinct; the community, in other words, won’t wait for the scientists to get their act together

In the final analysis, a recovery plan isn’t sufficient – the SRC’s need protection as well. Alas, the level of protection afforded by SARA is insufficient to ensure the future of the SRC; a higher level of protection is required at the present time to avoid potentially catastrophic oil spills, which could put SRCs on the road to perdition.

1. A Viable Protection Plan is Required; this should include:
   1. A moratorium on the commercial Chinook fishery, thereby freeing up 1000 tonnes of Chinook per year for orcas
   2. Certain choke points within the area of critical habitat to be declared an ATBA ( Area To Be Avoided ), which is a type of maritime zone sanctioned by the IMO. And therefore has a regulatory basis, but where compliance is voluntary; it provides a type of sanctuary, and has precedents in the Olympic Marine Park and the Carillon Islands off California; this should keep noise disturbances down from the expected increase in ship traffic expected in the coming years; catastrophic oil spills could wipe out the pod, as it has nearly done in PWS. A candidate area for ATBA status would be the eastern side of Haro Strait, where whales are often found chasing salmon up and down the shore; vessel traffic here could be re-routed to the Canadian, i.e. western side of the strait
   3. A limit on the number of whale watching vessels at any given time
   4. A ban on zodiacs for whalewatching, in favour of land-based whale watching such as at Lime Kiln Lighthouse on San Juan Island ( Ford, Ellis, Balcomb, p. 28 ), and provision for a small number of larger tour boats that are slower, hold more passengers, and afford a better viewing platform of orcas from a distance ( because of their height ); Ellis/Ford book, p. 53 on larger boats being better
   5. Imposing a moratorium on orca research directed at finding out where they go in winter, the theory being that once this location is discovered, the whale watchers will descend on these pods like preying vultures. At least now the orcas get a break from the whale watching fleet every winter.
2. Interim Measures are Required while research continues

The draft plan document underestimates the existing threat from commercial shipping. Eleven thousand vessels moved through the Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1999. This figure includes tankers, barges, cruise ships, cargo vessels, etc. More than 16 billion gallons of crude, refined products and bunker fuel oil moved through the area in 2001. By the year 2020, this figure is expected to increase to 19.2 billion gallons. The average tanker size is expected to increase from 96,000 DWT to 108,000 DWT y 2025. Cargo vessels are getting bigger and bigger, and they tend to carry ever-larger tanks of fuel oil.

The report mentions the disastrous effects EVOS had on the A1 pod of whales in PWS. The same thing could happen here, especially when one considers the fact that we are at the southern end of the TAPs tanker route. A spill like EVOS could destroy or debilitate the critical habitat of the orcas, killing them outright, disrupting their food source, and/or driving them away. So, far, we’ve been lucky in our region, although there have been a couple of serious oil spills in the Puget Sound area in the course of the past two years ( Dalco Passage, other spill ). Spill or no spill, the steady stream of vessel traffic necessarily involves noise, which could well disrupt orca feeding habits and communication patterns.

In other words, the threat to the southern residents is not just ‘inevitable’ extinction in the long-term ( if it were, what would be the point of adopting an expensive and elaborate recovery plan! ), but the very real possibility of extinction in the short-term. Commercial shipping and orcas virtually rub up against one another in Haro Strait, for instance. Roughly 5000 foreign vessel transits of Haro Strait occur in any given year, this number representing the number of times foreign ships pass through these waters on their to or from the port of Vancouver. Hundreds of cruise ship transits occur each year in these waters. In short, the orcas are endangered now; therefore, we need action now. Long-term plans are fine, but as Keynes said, “In the long-term we’re all dead”. The point is that the orcas could be gone in one hundred years, but they could also be gone overnight unless we do something about it. The first recovery plan goal should therefore be to prevent the extinction of southern resident orcas.

What are our options as we move towards this goal? It would seem that drastic measures are needed. The question arises, though, as to how much we as a society really value the orcas. In other words, do we put their survival above the interests of the commercial shipping industry, and the whale watching fleet? What price are we prepared to pay in order to save the orcas? How big a sacrifice are we prepared to make to protect them? As Joni Mitchell says, “You only know what you’ve got when it’s gone”.

Surely, this is as good a place as any to employ the cautionary approach, which states that absence of scientific certainty should not be an excuse for refusing to take action. The truth is we don’t really know what is causing the decline in the southern orca population, although we have a pretty good idea as to what could be causing it.