message7

Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 10:38:26 -0500 (CDT)

From: Bill Hibbard <test@demedici.ssec.wisc.edu>

Reply-To: sl4@sl4.org

To: sl4@sl4.org

Subject: Re: SIAI's flawed friendliness analysis

On Mon, 26 May 2003, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:

> Bill, I've had conversations similar to these before. I'll give the

> challenge that has so far defeated every single proponent of AI regulation:

>

> "Name one specific regulation, in enough detail to make it enforceable,

> that you believe would improve the chances of a safe Singularity if the

> government attempted to enforce it."

>

> It is easy enough to call for "regulation". I have never yet heard anyone

> call for some specific regulation.

My argument for regulation is based on the high probability

of unsafe AI without regulation, rather than any confidence

that I have all the answers about how to regulate. I have

no practical experience with politics, regulation, security

or law enforcement, and so my ideas on this would certainly

need to be refined by professionals.

Nevertheless, its an interesting question and I'll try to

answer it. I think the answer divides into two parts: the

regulation itself, and how to enforce it.

1. The regulation.

Here's my initial crack at it.

Any artifact implementing "learning" and capable of at

least N mathematical operations per second must have "human

happiness" as its only initial reinforcement value. Here

"learning" means that system responses to inputs change

over time, and "human happiness" values are produced by an

algorithm produced by supervised learning, to recognize

happiness in human facial expressions, voices and body

language, as trained by human behavior experts.

Since this is so much shorter than most government

regulations, I suspect that a real regulation, produced

after input from many experts, would be much longer.

The N mathematical operations per second number is picked

to be high enough to allow non-intelligent applications like

weather prediction (actually, most weather models don't learn

and so would be exempt from the N limit), and low enough to

exclude intelligence significantly greater than human

intelligence. Based on the opinions of various experts, a

guess at the value of N might be 10^15. There may be

"mundane" (i.e., no danger they will become intelligent)

learning applications that need more than N operations per

second, that can get case-by-case exemptions (with inspection

to verify how they are being used).

As with any law, disputes would be settled before a court

with judges, lawyers representing both parties, and expert

witnesses.

2. How the regulation can be enforced.

Enforcement is a hard problem. It helps that enforcement is

not necessary indefinitely. It is only necessary until the

singularity, at which time it becomes the worry of the

(hopefully safe) singularity AIs. There is a spectrum of

possible approaches of varying strictness. I'll describe

two:

a. A strict approach.

Disallow all development of "learning" machines capable of

at least N operations per second, except for a government

safe AI project (and exempt "mundane" learning applications).

This would be something like the Manhattan Project (only the

government is allowed to build nuclear weapons, although

contractors are involved).

The project could include people working for the government

and for private corporations. There could be multiple competing

designs in the project (e.g. "Fat Man" and "Little Boy"). The

project would have huge resources, which would have the side

effect of attracting talented AI designers away from the

temptation of outlaw AI projects. All designs would be

inspected and reviewed for compliance with the regulation,

overseen by the National Academies of Engineering and

Science.

The focus for detecting illegal projects could be on computing

resources and on expert designers. Computing chips are widely

available, but chip factories aren't. There is already talk of

using the concentration of ownership of chip manufacturing to

implant copyright protection in every chip. Its called TCPA

and I'm against it - see my article at:

http://www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/roads.html

Something very much like TCPA could be implanted in every chip

over a certain power (N/M where M = 1000 or 10000), to detect

when they are being used in sufficiently large clusters on

tightly coupled problems, and cease to operate unless they

have an inspection certificate.

Another tool of strict enforcement could be to prohibit open

sales of chips with power greater than N/M. Chips with greater

than this power would only be available to certified inspected

server centers. The primary need for computing power close to

users is visuals and sound. Chips at 10^12 operations per

second (just about where the current technology driving Moore's

Law is predicted to run out) should be plenty for these needs,

especially in small clusters (anything less than M would be

legal). Otherwise the trend is to put most computing power in

central server sites anyways, so restricting the most powerful

chips to secure central sites should not distort the computing

world too much (I don't pretend there would be no distortion).

Illegal projects could also be detected through their need for

expert designers. As long as the police are not corrupt or lazy

(hence the need for an aggressive public movement driving

aggressive enforcement), they can develop and exploit informers

among any outlaw community. Its hard to do an ambitous project

like creating AI without a lot of people knowing something

about it. They are vulnerable to bribes, and they get into

feuds and turn each other in.

Although we all love to root for the little garage-shop

operations, the overwhelming probability is that machine

intelligence will first appear in facilities that look like

this (4x10^13 operations per second):

http://www.es.jamstec.go.jp/esc/eng/GC/b_photo/esc11.jpg

Such projects are detectable by the enormous resources they

consume and the numbers of people involved.

Internationally, there could be treaties analogous to those

controlling certain types of weapons. These would prohibit

military use of learning machines capable of more than N

operations per second, and would set up international bodies

analogous to the IAEA for coordinating regulation and

inspection.

b. A less strict approach.

This would be like the strict approach, except that safe AI

projects outside the government could be licensed, in

addition to the government project. These projects would

have inspectors embedded in their design teams. The burden

of proof would be on the designers to convince the

inspectors that their designs comply with the regulation.

As with the government project, all designs would be

reviewed for compliance with the regulation, overseen by

the National Academies of Engineering and Science.

3. Wild cards.

There are all sorts of wild cards that could change the

scenario for regulation considerably:

a. Some new technology, such as quantum computing, enables

anyone with $100 million to fabricate computing devices

capable of 10^30 operations per second.

b. Novamente (just to pick an AI project) demonstrates

human-level intelligence using just 10^11 operations per

second.

c. Saddam Hussein uses his 4 semi loads of $100 bills to

buy a million Playstation 2's and hire AI design geniuses

to create an unsafe singularity in a remote province of

Kazakstan.

There is no way to come up with a regulation plan that will

meet every contingency. The government games out a lot of

contingencies in issues it cares about, which is a lot of

work and usually fails to anticipate what really happens.

In any issue as complex as the singularity, it is

inevitable that strategy must be adaptable.

The other thing to realize is that a lot of scenarios for

the singularity could result in violent human conflict.

If an AI grows fast but does not instantly eliminate human

governments, then the public may be frightened and the

governments may react defensively in a sort of "national

security war over AI". It is impossible to game all these

scenarios out, but the important point is that some pretty

bad scenarios are possible. Which leads to my last point ...

4. The consent of the governed.

AI and the singularity will be so much better if the public

is informed and is in control via their elected governments.

It is human nature for people to resist changes that are

forced on them. If we respect humanity enough to want a safe

singularity for them, then we should also respect them

enough to get the public involved and consenting to what is

happening.

Whether or not you think my regulation ideas can work, my

basic point is that the singularity will be created by some

wealthy and powerful institution, and its values will reflect

the values of the institution. The only chance for a safe

singularity will be if that institution is democratic

government under the control of an aggressive public movement

for safe AI, similar to the consumer, environmental and

social justice movements.

----------------------------------------------------------

Bill Hibbard, SSEC, 1225 W. Dayton St., Madison, WI 53706

test@demedici.ssec.wisc.edu 608-263-4427 fax: 608-263-6738

http://www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/vis.html