Justice

WHAT JUSTICE IS

Whence does the need for justice arise?

Fr Duffner explains as follows:

Man, by his very nature, is a social being. In living out his life he tends to be in contact with and dependent on other fellow humans. This contact and dependence will involve many relationships with others which necessitate the recognition of rights and obligations that must be protected and regulated, if man is to live in peace and harmony with his fellow men. The virtue that controls and regulates man's dealing with others in this regard is the virtue of justice. This virtue is as wide in its scope as the extent of human activities, and as varied in its application as human life itself. Adequate treatment of this virtue would fill huge volumes, so this can be but the briefest summary.

What is justice?

Following St Thomas Aquinas, this is how Fr Duffner defines justice:

Saint Thomas Aquinas defines the virtue of justice as a constant and perpetual will to render to everyone his due. (II II, 58,1) From that definition we can see that it is a virtue that resides in the will and regulates those duties which we are strictly bound to discharge towards our neighbor. For this reason the habitual practice of justice - the constant rendering to others their due - is an excellent training of the will, for it brings the will under the guidance of reason enlightened by faith instead of our self-seeking inclinations. And on the contrary, one who is dominated by egoism and self-will will often fail to render to others their due.

The three essential properties of justice directly follow from the definition:

Justice always refers to another person. Strictly speaking, there are no obligations of justice towards oneself.
Strict right: the object of justice is not a free gift, but something that is strictly due.
Exactitude: justice does not demand an approximate compensation, but just what is due, neither more nor less.

The differences between fraternal charity and justice are worth noting. Justice is based on the distinction between persons, while charity is based on their union through love. Out of justice, we give our neighbor what is his; out of charity, we give what is ours. Charity is superior to justice, but the duties of justice are stricter than those of charity.

How does it differ from the other cardinal virtues?

Fr Duffner states:

Being a virtue of the will, in this justice differs from the other moral virtues, for prudence is a virtue of the intellect, and fortitude and temperance regulate the sense appetites and passions. And while the theological virtue of charity also perfects the will and regulates our dealing with others, it differs from justice in that it bids us to regard others as brothers and sisters in Christ, and inclines us to render them services that are not required by strict justice. Since, however, we are looking at justice from the viewpoint of the Christian life, we will see that without charity and the infused virtue of justice - human nature being what it is - one will fail often to fulfill the obligations of this virtue. Finally, the obligations imposed by this virtue are always directed to somebody else, not toward self. In this it differs from the moral virtues of fortitude and temperance which have to do with the control of our inner life, our emotions, our appetites and desires, our fears.

Is there also an acquired virtue of justice, and an infused one?

Fr Duffner explains:

In the discussion of the virtue of prudence in the previous issue, we pointed out the interdependence of the acquired and infused virtues. All that was said in that regard applies to all the moral virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), so we state again that the acquired virtue of justice is at the service of the infused virtue facilitating its exercise by keeping in check our egoism, while the gift of grace and the infused virtues lifts our activity to the supernatural and meritorious level.

What are rights and obligations?

The Catholic Encyclopedia says:

A right in the strict sense in which the term is used in this connection is not a mere vague and indefinite claim against others, which others are bound to respect, on any grounds whatever. We sometimes say that the unemployed have a right to work, that the needy have a right to assistance, and it may be conceded that those phrases are quite correct, provided that such a right is understood as a claim in charity not as a claim in justice. For, at least if we confine our attention to natural law and ordinary circumstances, the assistance to which a man in need has a claim does not belong to him in justice before it is handed over to him, when it becomes his. His claim to it rests on the fact that he is a brother in distress, and his brotherhood constitutes his title to our pity, sympathy, and help. It may, of course, happen that positive law does something more than this for the poor and needy; it may be that the law of the land has given a legal right to the unemployed to have employment provided for them, or to the poor a legal right to relief; then, of course, the claim will be one of justice.

A claim in justice, or a right in the strict sense, is a moral and lawful faculty of doing, possessing, or exacting something. If it be a moral and lawful faculty of doing something for the benefit of others, it belongs to the class of rights of jurisdiction. Thus a father has the natural right to bring up and educate his son, not for his own, but for the son's benefit. A lawful sovereign has the right to rule his subjects for the common good. The largest class of rights which justice requires that we should render to others are rights of ownership. Ownership is the moral faculty of using something subordinate to us for our own advantage. The owner of a house may dispose of it as he will. He may live in it, or let it, or leave it unoccupied, or pull it down, or sell it; he may make changes in it, and in general he may deal with it as he likes, because it is his. Because it is his, he has a right to all the uses and advantages which it possesses. It is his property, and as such its whole being should subserve his need and convenience. Because it belongs to him he must be preferred to all others as to the enjoyment of the uses to which it can be put. He has the right to exclude others from the enjoyment of its uses, it belongs with all the advantages which it can confer to him alone. Were anyone else to make use of the house against the reasonable wish of the owner, he would offend against justice, he would not be render- ing to the owner what belongs to him.

Fr Duffner further teaches:

Wherever there is a right, there is a corresponding obligation. For example: I have rights which my neighbor has an obligation to respect; and my neighbor has rights which I have an obligation to respect. So rights and obligations go hand-in-hand. Unfortunately, however, there are countless persons in today's society whose rights are being disregarded.

Since the virtue of justice has to do with “rights” and the obligations that flow from them, it is important to know the source of those rights. For our purpose we can distinguish various kinds of rights. There are natural rights which flow from the very nature of man. The ultimate foundation of human right is God, Who created man as a spiritual and immortal being with an eternal destiny. The founding fathers of our country were aware of this, for we read in the Declaration of Independence, which is the foundation of our American system: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men were created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men . . ."

However, if a person does not admit the existence of God and the spirituality and immortality of the soul, such a one cannot logically admit that there are any real “inalienable rights.” For such a person the source of rights is the state, and what the state grants, it can take away. And that, our beloved (once-Christian) country is gradually doing. Notice the irony of the turn of events. “To secure these rights,” says the Declaration of Independence, “governments are instituted among men.” And yet, it is our very government that has taken away the most fundamental of human rights, the right to life of the unborn.

In addition to natural rights, there are those which spring from mutual consent, as in contracts; and there are rights which public authority can establish in the form of laws which we will briefly consider below.

One major problem in regard to the matter of justice is that so many people seem only concerned about the rights they have in justice, and not the obligations it imposes on them. The true Christian, knowing his innate tendency to self-seeking and wishful thinking, will try to counter these tendencies by trying to be more concerned about his obligations to others. He knows that the more he is just in dealing with others, the more God's justice will be tempered by His mercy in dealing with him.

Are there many kinds of rights?

A. We can categorise rights as follows:

Natural rights are subjective rights belonging to man by virtue of the very principles of human nature. These are, for example, the rights to self-defense and to private property.
-The more common expression human rights usually refers to natural rights and to their necessary protection by positive law. However, their connection with eternal law is often silenced, thus depriving them of their deepest foundation.
-Rights possessed by the very fact of being born or, rather, of coming into existence, are called innate rights. For example, the right to life and to being nourished by one's parents. Acquired rights, on the other hand, are those possessed because of a contingent act, as ownership of something one has bought.
Ius gentium ("law of peoples") is a series of natural rights that are not immediately known, but are necessarily deduced from natural rights. For this reason, they are common to different peoples or nations. It is somehow in between natural law proper and civil law. Not all authors agree on this, however, and it is often understood in a different but related sense—that of international law, whether written or not.
Divine-positive rights are those rights conferred upon man by a special divine decision. For example, the right to receive the sacraments or to hear the preaching of the Gospel.
Civil or ecclesiastical rights are those stemming from civil or ecclesiastical law. Thus the faithful have the right to receive the sacraments from their parish priest, and the citizens are entitled to have their life and property protected by the civil authorities.

B. We can also distinguish between strict and non-strict rights.

Non-strict rights, or rights in the broader sense, are those whose violation is not an injustice, but just a lack of equity. For example, a person having rendered valuable services has the "right" to be commended.
Strict rights, however, are so closely united to the person that they cannot be taken away without injuring the person. Strict rights can be further divided as follows:
-real rights (ius in re): these refer to what is actually possessed, and
-personal rights (ius ad rem): refer to what is not yet in one's possession.
Thus we have real right to the money we have, and personal right to the money owed us. In principle, the latter does not entitle to take the money at will, but only to demand its repayment.

What are our obligations, then?

Fr Saunders writes:

The first duty in justice is toward God. We have the duty to pray, to worship and to obey the God who has shown such great love to each one of us and whom we must love above all things. In justice to God, we uphold vows taken to Him and make sacrifices for the sake of His love, such as accepting martyrdom rather than abandoning the faith.

Justice towards God is the highest and most important form of justice. It is also called the virtue of religion. The Catholic Encyclopedia teaches us:

A religious attitude towards God is essentially the product of our recognition, not only of His sovereign majesty, but also of our absolute dependence on Him. Thus, as Father Rickaby says, He is not merely "the Great Stranger", our behaviour towards whom must be invested with awe and admiration; He is besides our Creator and Master and, in virtue of our supernatural filiation in the present order of things, our Father. Hence we are bound to cherish habitually towards Him sentiments of adoration, praise, thanksgiving, loyalty, and love. Such a demeanour of soul is inexorably required by the very law of our being. We must not, however, rest satisfied because perchance our interior bearing is fairly in conformity with this standard. We are not simply spirits. Our composite nature needs to express itself by outward acts in which the body as well as the soul shall have a part -- this not only to spur on our inner feelings, but also because God owns us body and soul, and it is right that both should show their fealty to Him. This is the justification of external religion. Of course God does not need our worship, whether interior or exterior, and it is puerile to impugn it on that score. We cannot by our homage add anything to His glory, unless it be the extrinsic increment of the theologians of which account need not be taken here. It is not because it is strictly speaking of use to Him that we render it, but because He is infinitely worthy of it, and because it is of tremendous value to ourselves. The chief acts of this virtue are adoration, prayer, sacrifice, oblation, vows; the sins against it are neglect of prayer, blasphemy, tempting God, sacrilege, perjury, simony, idolatry, and superstition.

How about justice towards others (subjective parts of justice, version I)?

Fr Saunders tells us:

The second duty in justice is toward our neighbor. A person must not only refrain from doing evil toward his neighbor, but also do what is good toward his neighbor. As such, a person must respect the rights of each person and establish relationships that promote equity among all people and build-up the common good.

Many authors classify justice according to the persons involved in the relationship. Fr Saunders summarises for us the three aspects of justice as follows:

The virtue of justice has three dimensions: commutative or reciprocal justice, distributive justice and legal or general justice. Commutative or reciprocal justice governs relationships between individuals. Strictly speaking, here is contractual justice. The meaning of the contract between individuals is to identify each party’s rights and to guarantee one party’s claim to a certain benefit as much as the other’s obligation to provide that benefit.

Looking at the broader spectrum of justice, distributive justice orders the relationship of the community as a whole to its individual members. In justice, the whole community must promote the common good for each person, not just the majority. Therefore, those entrusted with the care of the common good must make sure individual members are given what is their due. For example, in justice, the government must ensure that each person has proper food, clothing, shelter, medical care and educational opportunities, which are basic goods for the dignity of each person. Here one recognizes the duty of the whole community to care especially for those members who are most vulnerable — the unborn, the old, the sick and the disabled.

Finally, legal or general justice concerns the individual’s relationship to the whole community. Every person has the duty to uphold and obey the just laws that ensure the common good. For instance, every citizen has a duty to support the common good through the defense of the country or through the payment of taxes (too bad, but true).

Fr Duffner elaborates further on these three kinds:

A. Commutative Justice (person to person). The purpose of commutative justice is to preserve equality of rights between individuals, e.g. between the value of an item purchased and the price paid for it, or between the wage paid by the employer and the work done by the employee, etc. A special characteristic of commutative justice is the obligation of making restitution when the rights of one has been violated. That restitution may involved the returning of something stolen (or if not possible, its value), the repair or restoration of something damaged or destroyed, compensation for an injury that has been unjustly inflicted, etc. The following are some examples of infractions against this virtue:

By deeds: Human life is man's greatest gift in the natural order. To deprive one of that gift without a just cause is truly a grave sin of injustice, for which no adequate restitution can be made.
Besides life itself, another bodily good that can be taken away is bodily integrity, the right to which one can be deprived of by mutilation, wounding, or destruction of bodily functions (e.g. sterilization without medical necessity), all of which would be gravely sinful.
Not only are theft and destruction of property an infraction of one’s right to his own possessions, but also against that right are the culpable non-payment of debts, and the non-returning of borrowed items (or the excessive unnecessary delay in these matters). If one is in debt, some of the money he may have is strictly not his since it is owed to another. Hence, it would be against justice for such a one to spend money on luxuries while keeping another waiting for repayment of what belongs to him.
By words: Some common ways of offending against one’s right to his good name are: revealing one's hidden faults, speaking ill of another behind his back, spreading falsehoods about another or exaggerating his faults, imputing evil intentions to one's good deeds, etc. All such actions involve grave matter for they blacken one's good name. The gravity of such sins depends on the harm done and the intention of the speaker. Although justice demands that restitution be made in such cases in whatever way one can, the damage done in these cases can never be completely repaired; for even retractions, or apologies, or having the accusation “struck from the record” do not completely erase the stain from the memory of some. And yet, how freely and thoughtlessly do some people at times reveal damaging information about another only adding to the misfortune of the one at fault.
In business: Numerous are the ways in which justice can be violated in the business world. To mention a few: fraud in business contracts or in billing, not revealing defects in an item sold, deceiving another as to the quality of an item sold, demanding excessive prices without sufficient reason, etc.

B. Legal Justice (Social Justice) aims immediately at the common good of society, and brings about the establishment of just laws and ordinances. It inclines those who govern to establish just laws to promote the common good, and disposes all citizens to observe perfectly the laws and constitutions of the society to which they belong. It disposes members of society to devote themselves generously to the common good, and if necessary, to sacrifice time and personal convenience to that end. We receive much from society, and to it we are indebted. The true Christian is aware of the many ways he benefits from the common good, and does what he can to promote and maintain it. When one’s concern about the common good is motivated by Christian charity, it is a building up of the Mystical Body of Christ.

As Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. points out “the equity (Latin - epikeia) that legal justice establishes considers not only the letter of the law, but the spirit of the law, and that not only of civil laws, but of all those that govern Christian conduct. . . . It is attentive not only to the letter of the law, but especially to its spirit, to the intention of the legislator. As it considers chiefly the spirit of laws, it does not interpret them with excessive rigor, in a mechanical or material manner, but with a superior understanding, especially in certain special circumstances in which, according to the intention of the legislator, it would not be advisable to apply the letter of the law. . . .” (Three Ages, II, 91,94; Summa Theologiae II II q120 a2) Such an interpretation, however, of the mind of the legislator applies only to human laws, and never to obligations of divine or natural law - forbidding such actions as the use of contraceptives, divorce, premarital sex, or anything forbidden by the ten commandments.

(NOTE: Moralists point out that the use of epikeia is both useful and dangerous. It is useful if rightly used, for it liberates one from the letter of the law in certain rare situations not foreseen by the legislator; but it is dangerous, for it rests on the judgment of the individual, which is prone to decide in his own favor to the detriment of the common good as well as of self.)

We must be careful of the word “legal” in our day, for there are certain actions which are legal by civil law, but which are condemned by divine law, and are destructive of the common good, such as abortion and divorce. The former deprives the unborn of the right to life, and the latter destroys the family which is the foundation of society. There is abundant proof from history that a general corruption of morals is a form of national suicide.

C. Distributive justice. While legal justice, as we saw, inclines the individual to fulfill his duties to the state or community for the common good, distributive justice inclines those who govern the state or community to distribute public benefits and burdens among its members according to the merit, ability and needs of each citizen or group. Among those burdens the state can impose are taxes and military service. Violations of distributive justice would be the distribution of public benefits or the imposition of public burdens through discrimination or favoritism, that is, not based on merits and true needs, but singling out one less qualified because of friendship, family ties, bribes, in return for favors, etc.

While the fair and just regulation of rights of commutative justice is according to equality, the rule which governs the bestowing of benefits and burdens of distributive justice is proportional. For example, the taxes imposed on a rich man and a poor man are not equal, but in proportion to their income, material possessions, etc. Again, by way of contrast, while legal justice is concerned about the obligations of the individual citizen to the state, distributive justice is concerned about the obligations of the state to the individual citizen. Because the decisions of those who govern affect the welfare of so many individuals and of the state as a whole, we should pray fervently for those in office, that they may faithfully and justly fulfill their important duties.

How else may we classify the kinds of justice (subjective parts of justice, version II)?

The classification above is not accepted by certain authors. They argue that the proper way to classify virtues is according to their primary end, not according to the persons they are directed to. Therefore, the traditional division of Aristotle and St. Thomas (Cf Summa Theologiae, II-II q58 a7) seems to be more appropriate:

Legal, general, or social justice is directly and primarily aimed at the common good. These terms are taken here as equivalent. General justice is the stable determination to render to civil or ecclesiastical society what is its due.
This virtue moves citizens to pay their taxes and obey the law, civil servants to fulfill their duty, legislators to make just laws, judges to apply them properly, and so on. It is also called legal justice because its main function is establishing and obeying laws.
General justice is especially necessary for the common good. When it is not practiced, peace is disturbed and citizens are sorely harmed, especially if the rulers are the ones breaking it by issuing unjust laws.
Particular justice is directed to the private good. It is the stable determination to give to each physical or juridical person what is his due. It can be further divided into:

Commutative justice. Commutative justice is a private person's stable determination to give another private person what is strictly his or her due. There must be an absolute equality between what is given and what is received.
The name commutative refers to the commutations or exchanges it primarily covers, like buying and selling. But it also applies to other subjects, like the matter of the last six commandments of the Decalogue.
Commutative justice is not stricter than legal justice or distributive justice. Just like these, it does require restitution when transgressed. But here the object or amount of the restitution is much easier to determine, and thus the obligation is more pressing.
Distributive justice. Distributive justice is the stable determination inclining the ruler of a community to equitably distribute burdens and honors among its members according to their capacities and merits. Unlike commutative justice, it does not require absolute equality, but rather proportional equality.
The more prosperous nations are obliged, to the extent they are able, to welcome the foreigner in search of the security and means of livelihood which he cannot find in his country of origin.

What are the virtues annexed to justice? What are its potential parts?

Fr Saunders says:

Virtues that derive from justice include piety (here the proper reverence and service to our parents, country and others in legitimate authority), obedience, gratitude, veracity, affability (the proper friendliness and civility among all) and equity.

The potential parts of justice are virtues with the same general object as justice, but lacking the perfection of justice in some aspect.

A. Virtues lacking the perfect equality of justice.

Religion is the virtue inclining man to give to God His due. But we will never be able to give God what he deserves, or even something equivalent to what we have received from him.
Piety inclines man to give to his parents what is their due. Again, children cannot give to their parents something equivalent to what they have received from them—life.
Reverence inclines man to give due honor to persons of great virtue and dignity. But virtue can never be properly rewarded in this life.

B. Virtues lacking the strict obligation of justice—what is received is not strictly due.

Sincerity inclines man to say the truth and always avoid lies.
Gratitude inclines man to reward in some way the benefits received.
Vindication moves man to seek restitution for the sins of others. It should not be confused with revenge, which is a sin.
Generosity inclines man to moderate love for earthly goods and to use them properly for one's own and other's benefit, and for honoring God.
Politeness inclines man to be pleasant in dealing with others.
Equity or epikeia inclines man to ignore the letter of the law when there is a just cause, in order to better follow the presumed intention of the legislator.

HOW DOES ONE SIN AGAINST JUSTICE?

Injustice is any action contrary to the cardinal virtue of justice. It is also called wrong or injury (from in-iuria, "violation of a right").

Injustice can be mortal or venial (cf 1 Cor 6:10). It is not easy to determine what constitutes a slight or a serious matter. As a general rule, there is serious matter when a considerable harm is done to another person or to the common good. Or, in other words, when the victim or the rulers of the community strongly and reasonably oppose the injury.

One who inadvertently or unintentionally violates another's rights only commits a material injustice, not a formal one. Hence, he is not always bound to make restitution.

No one can suffer an injustice if he does not oppose it. If he knowingly, willingly, and lawfully suffers an injury, that action is no longer an injustice. Thus no injustice is committed by taking away something with the knowledge and free consent of the owner.

The two main categories of injustice are the unjust appropriation of another's property and unjust damage. What is the difference? Unjust damage is an action by which harm is inflicted on another without taking away any property of his. The second clause distinguishes it from unjust appropriation.

The harm may refer to natural goods, either spiritual or corporal, or to supernatural goods. The latter is more vicious, and has already been studied as scandal.

WHERE DOES CHARITY COME IN?

Fr Duffner writes:

As we have seen, while justice inclines one to respect the rights of others, charity goes beyond respect for those rights; for example, it inclines one to share through almsgiving, forgiving offenses and other works of mercy. It inclines us to love our neighbor as ourselves for the love of God, the result being, says Saint Thomas, that “we wish to fulfill our neighbor’s will as though it were our own.” (Summa Theologiae II II q29 a3)

Thus in the settlement of disputes, while justice may accomplish the restoration of rights, it will not of itself restore peace. In this regard the Angelic Doctor states: “Peace is the work of justice indirectly, insofar as it removes the obstacles to peace; but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature causes peace; for love is a unitive force. . . .”

Time and again Pope John Paul II has stressed in his messages to the world that justice, while essential for peace, is not enough. “The experience of the past and of our own time demonstrates that justice alone is not enough, that it can lead to the negation and destruction of itself, if that deeper power, which is love, is not allowed to shape human life in its various dimensions.” (Dives in Misericordia)

From the above it is clear that true justice will never be attained in this vale of tears if one is concerned about justice alone. Whereas, “He who pursues justice and mercy will find life, justice and glory.” (Proverbs 21:21)