Lecture15

Social Norms: Defining them and assessing their effects

This article was NOT covered in Lecture 14. It is attached there -- It will be covered in LEcture 15.

Behaving as Expected: Public Information and

Fairness Norms

CRISTINA BICCHIERI1* and ALEX CHAVEZ2

1Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, USA

2Department of Psychology, University ofMichigan, USA

ABSTRACT

What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a

modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and

perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation—

that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating

informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find

that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree

of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how

these results fit into a theory of social norms. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons,