Lecture14

More Detailed Analysis of Social Norms

This lecture will cover the following two articles:

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

J. Behav. Dec. Making, 22: 191–208 (2009)

Do the Right Thing: But Only if Others Do Soy

CRISTINA BICCHIERI and ERTE XIAO*

University of Pennsylvania, USA

ABSTRACT

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two

different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do

(empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative

expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of

expectation in individuals’ decisions, an issue that is particularly important when

normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high

crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we

exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations in the direction of either selfishness or

fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that

empirical expectations about other dictators’ choices significantly predict a dictator’s

own choice. However, dictators’ expectations regarding what other dictators think

ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for

empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations

are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging

undesirable behavior. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

J. Behav. Dec. Making, 23: 161–178 (2010)

Behaving as Expected: Public Information and

Fairness Norms

CRISTINA BICCHIERI1* and ALEX CHAVEZ2

1Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, USA

2Department of Psychology, University ofMichigan, USA

ABSTRACT

What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a

modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and

perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation—

that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating

informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find

that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree

of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how

these results fit into a theory of social norms. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons,