2015-2016: Bayesian Persuasion
At the bottom of this page is a list containing the articles to be discussed on the topic of Bayesian Persuasion.
Students interested in presenting any of these papers should contact me at sarkisian.roberto@gmail.com to schedule a date.
KAMENICA, E. & M. GENTZKOW (2011). "Bayesian Persuasion", American Economic Review, 101(6): 2590-2615.RAYO, L. & I. SEGAL (2010). "Optimal Information Disclosure", Journal of Political Economy, 118(5): 949-987.ELY, J. (2015) "Beeps", working paper.ELY, J., A. FRANKEL & E. KAMENICA (2015). "Suspense and Surprise", Journal of Political Economy, 123(1): 215-260.SCHWEIZER, N. & N. SZECH (2014). "Optimal Revelation of Life-CHanging Information", working paper.- ALONSO, R. & O. CÂMARA (2015). "Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Priors". R&R to Journal of Economic Theory.
KOLOTIN, A., M. LING, T. MYLOVANOV & A. ZAPECHELNYUK (2015). "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver", working paper.BERGEMANN, D. & M. PESENDORFER (2007). "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions". Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1): 580-609.LIPNOWSKI, E. & L. MATHEVET (2015). "Disclosure to a Psychological Audience", working paper.ALONSO, R. & O. CÂMARA (2015). "Persuading Voters", working paper.