JUST ABOUT EVERY first year college student knows that in 1859, Charles Darwin published his groundbreaking theory of biological evolution in the famous Origin of Species (Darwin, 1859). By the accounts of biologists and historians, Darwin at that time established evolution as a fact of science and effectively demolished the theory of "special creation," the belief that God created the heavens and the earth as recorded in the book of Genesis (Mayr, 1991; Dawkins, 1996). This official scientific view of history is not without its difficulties, however. Besides the fact that many of Darwin's scientific contemporaries were and remained creationists, even among the seemingly nonreligious there were problems with Darwin's theory that remain unresolved to the present day (Schwartz, 1999). Though debated and discussed rigorously among scientists themselves, anomalies and weaknesses inherent in evolutionary theory have moreover remained suppressed or ignored in textbook treatments and public presentations (Schwartz, 1999; Barnes, 1993).
The Moral Problems in Contemporary Science Education
The above described situation unfortunately makes not only for an intellectual problem, but a moral problem. Specifically, at issue here is that a theory of science is being passed off as a fact, a fact furthermore said to completely overturn the sincere religious beliefs of millions. According to the deontological ethical theory of Thomas Wall--borrowed largely in turn from Kant--any moral controversy can be analyzed rationally in light of the primary moral principles of justice, beneficence, and autonomy (Wall, 2003). Such is the approach to be adopted here in treatment of the problems of the mandatory teaching of evolution in the public schools.
First of these is that evolutionary theorists have a demonstrable penchant for debunking religion, especially "fundamentalist" Christianity. Recounting numerous instances in which academics have openly ridiculed creationists, legal scholar Stephen L. Carter (1993) observes: "All of this adds up to a perception of creationists as backward, irrational, illiberal fanatics--not too smart and not too deserving of respect" (p. 159). Respect for all people, of course, is at the heart of Kant's foundational principle of justice (Wall, 2003). So it may be argued that to the extent that it encourages disrespect for established religious traditions, the mandatory teaching of evolution (henceforth to be termed "secular science") violates a moral principle. Moreover, a large segment of Americans--around 44 percent--believe the Genesis account of creation in "literal" or historically accurate terms (Carter, 1993). If those promoting secular science willingly set out to overturn the religious beliefs of nearly half of our society, then the moral principle of autonomy is also potentially at risk.
On the other hand, scientists and educators maintain that their job is to present the facts of science quite regardless of the implications for any particular religion. To use nonscientific language: scientists are arguing for the preservation of truth over falsehood in education. Beneficence requires that choices be made for good and against evil. If telling the truth is a good course of action, and lying is evil, as our moral rules tell us, it follows that the teaching of anything but objective information in science classrooms is immoral. So if it can be shown that evolutionary theory is a fact of science, then there remains little reason to restrict its presentation in biology courses and textbooks. From this, the principles of respect and autonomy could also be incorporated into the secular-evolutionary viewpoint. That is, because evolution is a fact of science, those scientists who best understand it ought to be granted the credibility (respect) and liberty (autonomy) to teach it as they see fit. Conversely, if it turns out that evolution is something else, then to falsely uphold it as an indisputable fact would be immoral.
Clarifying Concepts
Evidently, then, the moral status of the secular science view depends largely upon the question of whether evolution is or is not a fact of science. Unfortunately, at this point the issues typically become muddled due to misunderstandings and equivocations of terms. To determine whether evolution is a fact of science, it becomes necessary to refine definitions of "evolution," "fact," and "science" in terms that are acceptable to all interested parties. This is no easy task. According to Beckwith (2003), for instance, the term "evolution" is employed in various contexts by biologists to mean everything from the mere change in the frequency of alleles in a population over time--a phenomenon disputed by virtually no one--to a strictly naturalistic (non-theistic) accounting of the origin and history of life from a common ancestor. It is this latter sort of definition, of course, with which believers understandably take issue.
Similarly, "science" corresponds to a number of acceptable meanings in common parlance reaching far beyond the confines of natural science, and from this wider understanding applies to such diverse fields as history, linguistics, psychology, economics, business management, even theology--indeed, any area of specialized study. The "scientific method" is arguably the basis of all legitimate research (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). It follows from this that a theologian proposing an historical interpretation of Genesis on the grounds of textual and archaeological evidence is not an "enemy of science," but simply another kind of scientist. At worst, such a theorist calls into question a particular theory of natural science proposed by Darwin--himself a learned theologian and amateur naturalist, as irony would have it (Mayr, 1991). For present purposes, then, the evolutionary position will be associated with the science of biology.
Though their meanings may seem self-evident, a further distinction must be made between "fact" and "theory." Properly understood, facts form the basis for scientific theories and not vice versa. Facts are empirical data, the stuff of common observation from which explanatory theories can be constructed. Facts are therefore not theories and theories are not facts. Whether Newton's version or Einstein's, "gravity" is often said to be a fact as well as a theory, but gravity is a theory--an abstraction developed in order to make sense of the natural world, to be accepted on a strictly provisional basis (Copi, 1978). The facts it helps explain are the repeatable, observable, physical behaviors of bodies with mass. "Evolution" is a comprehensive theory proposed to explain everything from emerging allele differentials in populations, to the fossil sequence found in the geological column, to seeming examples of design found in nature (Mayr, 1991).
In a famous essay on the subject, Gould (1981) recognized the distinction, but only as a triviality: "Evolutionists have been clear about this distinction between fact and theory from the very beginning, if only because we have always acknowledged how far we are from completely understanding the mechanisms (theory) by which evolution (fact) occurred" (par. 7). Of course, evolution is nothing if not a mechanism proposed to explain the existence of biodiversity: If compelling evidence for the "mechanism" is unavailable, then evolution is not iself a fact. In a sense, creationism and evolution are therefore different theories to account for the same set of facts: "It must be admitted that every proposition, scientific or unscientific, which is a relevant explanation for any observable fact, has some evidence in its favor, namely the fact to which it is relevant" (Copi, 1978, p. 466).
Possible Solutions
To date, traditional proposed solutions to the problem have made little progress toward a workable compromise: (1) The secular-scientific view. By this understanding, biological science has an implicit secular purpose, and traditional religious explanations are simply presumed scientifically or factually incorrect by default. (2) The "balanced" or "two-model" approach. Advanced by "creation scientists" in the seventies and eighties, this proposal suggested students be taught both creation and evolution, then permitted to decide for themselves. The creation side of this arrangement too clearly violated the assumed science vs. religion dichotomy in both legal and academic terms, so it was eventually abandoned and prohibited.
More recent alternatives include: (3) Intelligent design (ID) theory. Closely aligned with the creationist theory, the more sophisticated ID theory proposes a mathematical-scientific "explanatory filter" by which the "specified complexity" of biological structures is said to be scientifically testable within a larger evolutionary framework of common descent consistent with an evolutionary reading of the fossil record (Beckwith, 2003). Another possible option remains, what may be termed (4) The inclusive method. An offshoot of intelligent design, this approach is called "teaching the controversy" by some ID proponents (Meyer, 2002). Here students would not simply learn about "the fact of evolution" or "how evolution works," but would also be introduced to a wide range of theoretical approaches popular among biologists.
Supporting Data
The first and most important datum bearing on this issue is the fact, alluded to earlier, that the theory of evolution as commonly understood (in historical and naturalistic terms) is itself not necessarily a fact. Fact-theory and data-interpretation distinctions are accepted in most every field of academic endeavor (Copi, 1978; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001), and should not be granted a pass on the evolution issue merely to appease a scientific establishment evidently uncomfortable with the idea of accommodating anything resembling a compromise with religion.
However, any attempted resolution must also take into account the fact that a considerable majority of scientists nonetheless accept the theory of evolution as a theory so well established that the difference between fact and theory is negligible. "The basic theory of evolution has been confirmed so completely that modern biologists consider evolution simply a fact... It is as much of a fact as the observation that the earth revolves around the sun rather than the reverse" (Mayr, 1991, p. 162-3). Moreover, scientists in most fields--biology included--do boast an impressive track record of self-correction and progress, by which medical and technological advancements, for example, have been made. Those who argue that evolutionary theory is simply groundless should examine the data, such as Douglas Theobald's (1999) "29+ Evidences of Macroevolution," a systematic argument for macroevolution from various lines of scientific evidence. On the other hand, many "modern biologists," such as Michael J. Behe, Dean Kenyon, and Jonathan Wells, seem to indicate that Mayr's sentiment doesn't apply to them any more than Theobald's interpretation of the evidence is the only one worthy of their consideration (Beckwith, 2003).
Thus, another fact to bear in mind is that majority opinion in scientific circles is not equivalent to an empirical validation of that opinion. To cite an example that evolutionary theorists should appreciate, most scientists prior to 1859 believed some form of creationism to be the most robust explanation for biological diversity. Included among these creationist scientists were some of the greatest scientific practitioners of all time: Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, Michael Faraday, James Maxwell, and Ernest Rutherford (Barnes, 1993). If a scientific consensus is factually determinative, then evolution theorists would seemingly have to accept the bizarre conclusion that their theory actually became accurate or valid only in 1859, before which time the biological world had been actually created by God--and in relatively short order.
Another important observation is that theoretical science is not beholden to a particular philosophical viewpoint. To put it another way, scientists are not obligated by methodological concerns to arrive at decidedly irreligious metaphysical (naturalistic) conclusions about the origins of life and species, let alone teach them in public schools (Beckwith, 2003). The impressive list of creationist scientists mentioned above should be enough to demonstrate that point. It may turn out that a traditional philosophical question, also pertinent to biology--i.e., how all of life came to exist and thrive on our planet--is currently beyond the empirical reach of professional biologists who understandably would like to know the answers. A sincere scientific desire to know is a poor substitute for actual scientific knowledge.
Assumptions and Points of View
Too often, criticisms of evolutionary theory are summarily dismissed among scholars and scientists on the grounds that they are (or rather, must be) religiously motivated. The fact that such reasoning is even taken seriously perhaps reveals the depths to which intellectual discourse in the scientific-evolutionary academe has descended. If it turns out that evolution is the most firmly established theory in science, it certainly is not because critics of it are religious. Nor, similarly, is an alternative theory wrong simply because its proponents are "motivated" by their religion (Beckwith, 2003; Carter, 1993). It should come as no surprise that most critics of evolution turn out to be religious, since some form of creationism is by far the most prominent of what is apparently a limited number of conceivable alternatives to the evolutionary view.
Methodological naturalism is another common operating assumption from the scientist's perspective, a reasonable and even necessary assumption. Unfortunately, among many influential professors of science methodological naturalism readily converts to metaphysical naturalism--the belief that all of reality is explicable in natural or material terms (Beckwith, 2003). Such a belief is clearly beyond the reach of scientific inquiry, so that to whatever degree it predetermines the presumed factual status of a given theory, that theory is actually scientifically suspect.
From the other side, those arguing against secular science often hold that evolutionary theory is a religion, that few scientists really embrace it anymore, or that it automatically causes moral degeneration in a society. Such claims are questionable, if not patently false. Though perhaps there is something to be said for an argument that secular science amounts to an improper fusion of naturalistic metaphysics and scientific research, it doesn't really qualify as a religion per se. Likewise, the common assertion that evolutionary theory is becoming rapidly, embarrassingly untenable even among scientists, or that it somehow degenerates the social order, is hard to justify on historical or statistical grounds. Nearly 150 years have passed since own Darwin's passing, and a solid majority of scientists still embrace one form of evolutionary theory or another--and they don't appear morally the worse for it (Scott, 2000).
Moral Reasoning
The assumption established here is that the moral status of secular science is tied in necessarily with the empirical status of evolutionary theory. Though some will undoubtedly disagree, it seems clear that wide-ranging theories like Darwin's cannot rightly be considered facts on a par with an empirical observation. Mayr (1991), for instance, presents Darwin's "explanatory model" of natural selection as a chain of related inferences based on observations of, e.g., population growth, limited resources, and individual variability and heritability. Chains of inferences based on selected facts, however, are not themselves facts.
Though Eugenie Scott (2000) does have a point when she says of fact-theory distinctions such as those discussed here, "No other subject in the science curriculum is so disclaimed" (par. 4), it should also be understood that no other theory besides evolution is so widely advertised as a scientific refutation of an established religious tradition. Whether other theories are similarly "disclaimed" or not, the theory of evolution bears a burden of proof commensurate with its rather uniquely iconoclastic claims. Given that evolution is not a "fact of science" (because it is not a fact at all), to offer it as such appears unethical. The principle of justice states that all persons are inherently worthy of respect, as equal in intrinsic value or dignity (Wall, 2003). One may argue that religion has no place in the practice of teaching science, but the scientific transformation of theory into fact on the grounds that religious people therefore have no practical right to dispute it amounts to an abuse of logic--and because the moral legitimacy of secular science requires that evolution be a fact in its own right, an abuse of ethics as well.
A similar moral argument may be made against secular science on the utilitarian principle of beneficience, the ideal of promoting good and avoiding evil (Wall, 2003). Beneficience means choosing the course of action that produces the most good and the least evil, on the basis of understood moral principles and specific values (Wall, 2003). Because honesty is a universally recognized moral value, the presentation of evolutionary theory as an observable empirical datum or "fact"--when much evidence indicates otherwise--constitutes a violation of morality.
For these reasons, requiring the teaching of evolutionary theory as fact is an unacceptable ethical situation. On the other hand, "scientific creationism" and "intelligent design" theories have proven at least as divisive as the evolutionary dogma they are designed to combat. In a pluralistic democracy, a science class need not promote Christian apologetics any more than naturalistic metaphysics. Perhaps the best solution is to "teach the controversy" (Meyer, 2002).
Teaching the controversy could include an historical treatment of the creation-evolution controversy in our society, a thorough evaluation of contemporary Darwinism, and a look at recent developments such as intelligent design theory. Out of respect for the consensus among scientists, the Darwinian position could and should be presented as such--as the most commonly accepted theory. In addition, highly varying points of view within the Darwinian school would be examined and subjected to evaluation by students. Meyer (2002) contends that an ideological focus on the religiosity of intelligent design actually serves as a diversionary foil for scientific censorship: "The issue is whether students will learn both sides of the real and growing scientific controversy about Darwinism, and whether a 19th century theory will be taught dogmatically to 21st century students" (par.12).
Consequences
Certainly care must be taken to maintain an ethical approach, even in the process of changing an apparently unethical situation. Evolutionary theorists are probably right to argue that the "balanced, two model" approach is an unacceptably simplistic solution to the controversy, but an equally unacceptable and simplistic approach would be to present evolution as a fact of science in order to define the problem out of existence.
Because the fact of the matter is that scientists harbor numerous opinions on what exactly are the facts of the matter, the inclusive method is arguably the best alternative to the current default situation of simply teaching the most popular form of Darwinism as if it were the only viable scientific explanation on the market. Of course, the most importance consequence to arise from students learning under the "teach the controversy" format would be those students having to think for themselves. Such is the price of a real education. If it is true that justice means respecting all people and their opinions, that beneficence entails honestly facing the reality of intellectual diversity, and that autonomy requires permitting such diversity to persist, then teaching the controversy of evolution is a desirable moral alternative to secular science.
References
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