THE NEO LEIBNIZIAN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Neo-Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (NLCA) is a slightly weakened version of Alexander Pruss' Cosmological argument from the Restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason for theism (which is also known a few other names). It is an argument for the existence of a monotheistic deity, comparable to the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). However, where the KCA assumes the A theory of time, this argument assumes the B theory of time. And where the KCA uses creation as its central theme, the NLCA uses the abstract reason for existence as its theme.
Allow me to start with some rambling. When I ask a "why" question (which I do far too often), I can respond to the answer by asking "why" that answer is the answer. I can respond to that answer by asking another "why" question regarding the answer, and so on. If I keep asking consecutive "why" questions, I will, eventually, lead to one of 2 answers: "It is a logical necessity", or "There is some (unknown) external reason for it". Lets apply this, in a thought experiment, to the question why the universe exists. So I ask my 257 trillion consecutive questions to some poor soul. Eventually, I must end up in one of those 2 answers. But there is no true logical necessity for the existence of the universe, so it seems that the final answer will be "There is some (unknown) external reason for it". It is this reasoning that will be investigated in this argument.
THE WEAK RESTRICTED PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON (THE NRPSR)
If a biologist is confronted with a green frog, is the biologist not allowed to ask why the frog is green, and not another colour? After all, there is a real possibility that there is a reason that the frog is green, and thus a good biologist will attempt to find the proper induction that tells him or her why the frog is green, and not another colour. Yes, of course the biologist is allowed to ask why the frog is green. In fact, that is his/her job: find out why organisms are the way they are.
If a physicist is confronted with the red-shift phenomenon, is the physicist not allowed to ask why there is red-shift? Well, yes of course this allowed to be asked. It is a physicist's job to find out why natural phenomenon are the way they are.
But this is not limited to the empirical sciences like biology and physics. It goes far deeper that just empirical knowledge. If a mathematician is confronted with an equation, and the result of the equation is that x = 3, is this mathematician not allowed to ask why x = 3, and not another number? After all, there is a real possibility that there is a reason that x = 3, and thus a good mathematician will attempt to find the proper deduction that tells him or her why x = 3, and not another number. Yes, the mathematician is allowed and in fact must ask why x = 3, because that is his/her job as a mathematician.
Moreover, is a philosopher not allowed to ask "why is verificationism universally considered to be self-refuting?" After all, there is a real possibility that there is reason why virtually all philosophers agree verificationism is self-refuting, and thus a good philosopher will attempt to find out the answer. Yes, a philosopher is allowed this question and indeed must ask such questions, as this is his/her job as a philosopher.
To ask for a reason for why a thing is one way and not another is the basis of all attempts to gain knowledge. This includes all the sciences (both formal and empirical) and all the analytic philosophies. As long as there is a mere possibility that there is a reason that a thing is one way and not another, an academic ought to find out why. In other words: gaining knowledge in ANY field requires one to ask why things are the way they are, provided the possibility for an explanation exists.
Alexander Pruss would describe the above as follows: If P is a proposition that is actually true, and if P possibly has an explanation, then it follows that P actually has an explanation. (See: Alexander Pruss, 2004, A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument. Religious Studies, 40, pp 165-179)
But I am going to be even more careful, and posit a slightly weakened version of the RPSR, which I shall henceforth call the Weak Restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason (WRPSR), formulated as follows:
If P is a proposition that is actually true, and if P possibly has an explanation, then one should expect P to actually have an explanation.
This principle is basically what drives science to find new knowledge. Now, if one denies the Weak and Restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason, one denies the most fundamental and most essential principle that drives the formal sciences, the empirical sciences, the applied sciences, and the analytical philosophies. In fact, even a complete philosophical worldview that denies the WRPSR is illogical since philosophy uses the WRPSR in the first place. In other words: the philosophy to reject the essentials of philosophy is self-contradictory.
Thus, if one denies the WRPSR, one denies the most essential principle that moves forward knowledge itself. Therefore, it is my opinion that denying the WRPSR is ridiculous.
APPLYING THE WRPSR ON THE EXISTENCE OF ENTITIES
For the NLCA the WRPSR is applied specifically to the following proposition P: entity X exists. Filling that in for the WRPSR gives: “If the proposition “entity X exists” is actually true, and if “entity X exists” possibly has an explanation, then it follows that one should expect an explanation for “entity X exists”.”
This is a very stiff sentence, but one can re-phrase it as follows: “If something actually exists and it possibly has an explanation for existing, one should expect an actual explanation for its existence.”
Now, explanations for existing things come in 2 forms: external explanations, or explanations of logical necessities. Combining this with the WRPSR, and we get our first premise for the NLCA: “If something actually exists and it possibly has an explanation for existing, it follows it one should expect an explanation for existing, either in its own necessity, or an external explanation”.
Re-phrasing this to get a more natural statement thus gives the following first premise:
If any existing thing possibly has an explanation for its existence, one should expect an explanation. This is either an external explanation or an explanation from its own necessity.
THE UNIVERSE POSSIBLY HAS AN EXPLANATION
So does the universe have an explanation for existing? The default position for this question is of course “possibly”. To say either “yes” or “no” requires proper justification. Personally, I think the answer is obviously “yes”, but allow me to be more favourable to those who would disagree with me and just stick to the reasonable default position of saying that it is possible the universe has an explanation for existing.
It seems absurd to suggest that it is impossible that the universe has an explanation. What kind of justification could this non-default position be given?? I see no such rational justification, as far as I know not a single philosopher has successfully given such a justification, and I am quite sure none exists. Nonetheless, as long as the universe merely possibly has an explanation, it follows necessarily from the WRPSR that the universe is expected to actually have an explanation.
REGARDING CONDITIONAL NECESSITIES
Before continuing I feel the need to be detailed about what is meant with a necessity. I can think of 2 general forms of necessities in logic, one I shall call "absolutely necessary", and the other "conditionally necessary".
Absolutely necessary things are things which must exist no matter what. A great example of an absolutely necessary thing would be any logic truth: its non-existence is entirely and absolutely impossible.
Conditionally necessary things are things whose existence are not necessary per-se, but if the thing does actually exist, the explanation for its existence is that it is a necessity. An example of a conditionally necessary thing is for example the number 7: There is somewhat of a debate among meta-physicists whether or not individual numbers, like 7, actually exists. However, IF the number 7 does exist, the reason for its existence is that of a necessity.
Note that if a certain thing "X" is absolutely necessary, it follows that X is also conditionally necessary. But if X is only conditionally necessary, that does not tell us whether X is absolutely necessary or not (X could be absolutely necessary, but X does not have to be).
What is important to note is that in this argument, whenever I discuss the necessity of GOD or the universe, know that I am speaking about conditional necessity. So even if GOD turns out to be conditionally necessary (which is the point of this argument), I do not claim GOD is also absolutely necessary, because that is unknown to me. This, by the way, also happens to be one difference between Leibniz's original cosmological argument, and the current NLCA: the presented argument here does not assume GOD is an absolute necessity, while Leibniz originally did assume that.
THE EXPLANATION FOR THE UNIVERSE IS EXTERNAL, NOT A NECESSITY
The universe exists, and explanation for its existence is to be expected. The next step is to figure out what kind of explanation one needs for the universe: an external explanation, or an explanation from its own necessity. It is either one or the other.
Is the universe (or multi-verse) as a whole explained by its own necessity? For the universe as a whole to be (at least) conditionally necessary, both of the following statements must be true (thus if only one of them is false, the universe is then not a necessity):
1) If it is true the universe exists, the non-existence of the universe must be logically impossible. (Note the emphasis: without this emphasis, I would be demanding an absolute necessity, which would be too much even for a hardcore materialist).
2) The way the universe as a whole is currently (if the universe exists), must be the only way the universe could logically possibly be.
Obviously, both of these statements are probably false. The first proposition is probably false since there is no logical contradiction in the universe’s non-existence. If there is no logical contradiction in its non-existence, its non-existence is not logically impossible. The second proposition is probably also false because there is no logical necessity for the universe to be exactly the way it is now. For example, there is no logical impossibility in the universe being only a single particle in total. In fact, the field of speculative theoretical physics actually relies on the concept that the model of the universe as a whole could have been different than it actually is.
Thus, the universe cannot be explained by its own necessity. And the vast majority of philosophers agree. Thus, the existence of the universe can only be explained externally, from beyond all space, time and matter.
THE CORE ARGUMENT
All of the previous sections can be combined to form the Neo-Leibnizian Cosmological Argument. The argument which is presented here assumes (1) that the universe exists and (2) that the B theory of Time is true. Note that the latter assumption is only required for my understanding of this argument, as there are philosophers who think the NLCA can be used in the A theory of time as well, but I'm going to keep things safe and restrict myself to the B theory of time.
Now then, the Neo-Leibnizian Cosmological Argument can thus far be formulated as follows:
1) If any existing thing possibly has an explanation for its existence, one should expect an explanation. This is either an external explanation or an explanation from its own necessity.
2) If the universe’s existence possibly has an explanation, this explanation is an external one, since the universe is not a necessity.
3) The universe exists, and its existence possibly has an explanation.
4) Therefore, following from premises 1-3, one should expect the universe has an external explanation for its existence.
Please Note that with "the Universe" I mean the entire physical reality. So ALL space, ALL physical time, and ALL matter. Thus if one believes in a multi-verse, this is included in the word "Universe".
THE CONCLUSION FROM THE ARGUMENT
Thus, one should expect the universe has a reason for existing. Since the existence of any contingent entity cannot be itself, this means the explanation must be outside of this entity. Since this entity, the universe, involves all of space, time and matter, the explanation can only be found beyond all time, space and matter. There are only two types of things beyond all time, space and matter: Abstract objects (i.e. numbers), or transcendent minds. However, abstract objects do not constitute reasons for the existence of physical entities. Therefore, it follows logically that the explanation for the universe’ existence is a transcendent mind.
A non-necessary transcendent mind leads to an infinite regress of transcended minds, each being the reason for the next one. But one cannot reach the end of an infinite regress of objects, and thus no universe would ever exist. Moreover, an infinite number of hypothetical entities goes starkly against Occam’s Razor. Instead, the transcended mind is an entity whose own existence is explained by its own necessity.
It goes even deeper than just that, though. One can reasonably argue that this mind is an agent, a person. For, the universe does not merely exist as a single point of information; the universe has very specific laws, and thus whatever explains the universe must be able to choose the laws of nature for the universe. Even a multi-verse requires some kind of set of laws that govern the production (and maintenance) of sub-universes. This requires the transcended mind to be able to choose. The ability to choose freely is the fundamental property of an agent or a person-hood. Therefore, it follows that the transcendent mind is a personal mind.
A transcended personal mind whose existence is explained by its own necessity, who is the Reason for the existence of the universe, is what is generally called "GOD”.
THE NEO-LEIBNIZIAN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT: SUMMARY
1) If any existing thing possibly has an explanation for its existence, one should expect an explanation. This is either an external explanation or an explanation from its own necessity.
2) If the universe’s existence possibly has an explanation, this explanation is an external one, since the universe is not a necessity.
3) The universe exists, and its existence possibly has an explanation.
4) Therefore, following from premises 1-3, one should expect the universe has an external explanation for its existence.
C1: Since universe=all time, space and matter, the reason for the universe's existence must be beyond all time, space and matter – for the universe is not an inherent necessity.
C2: Only two type of things are beyond all time, space and matter: abstract objects (i.e. numbers) or else transcendent minds.
C3: abstract objects do not constitute reasons for the existence of physical entities (numbers, for example, do not by themselves explain any physical phenomenon). > The reason must be a transcendent mind.
C4: The Reason of existence is permeated with questions of why things are one thing rather than another. For a entity to "Will" the universe to be existing, the entitiy must decide the properties of the universe. Therefore, choices have to be made by the entity. The ability to make choices is the fundamental principle of a personhood. > The transcendent mind is personal.
C5: Therefore, a transcendent personal mind exists. This is what is traditionally called “GOD”.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NLCA AND LEIBNIZ'S ORIGINAL COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Since the NLCA may be confused with Leibniz's original Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA), here the main differences between the NLCA and the LCA are given.
> Leibniz considered GOD to be an absolute necessity, not a conditional necessity, thereby a-priori assuming GOD's existence (usually through the ontological argument). The NLCA presented in this post only uses conditional necessities, thereby making no a-priori assumptions on the existence (or properties) of GOD.
> Leibniz used his Principle of Sufficient Reason for the LCA, which says that everything that exists necessarily has an explanation. The NLCA presented here uses a slightly Weakened version of Alexander Pruss' Restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason.
> Although Leibniz did distinguish between external explanations and explanations from internal necessity, he did not, in my opinion, make this distinction explicit enough in the premises of his argument. The NLCA, on the other hand, explicitly states this distinction.
> Leibniz, as far as I am aware, did not assume any specific metaphysical theory of time for his argument. The NLCA, as presented in this post, assumes a B theory of time (for an argument using the A theory of time, please see the Kalam Cosmological Argument).
OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT AS A WHOLE
Any objection one might have against the NLCA should be addressed to one of the premises. Such objections will be dealt with in the three posts that follow this one (you could have guessed this: see menu on the right). But sometimes a more general objection is made against the argument as a whole. From this point onward within this post, objections of this latter kind will be addressed.
Everything we know may be false/everything is just speculation
One objection I heard is that the entire argument is just sheer speculation: “We don’t know everything; maybe one day we find out that everything we thought is wrong. Everything is just speculation”. I would say several things in response. To say that the argument is sheer speculation is just plainly false, because the argument is based on what we DO know, not on what we do not know. With respect to the objection of the lack of omniscience, I would say that one has to choose what is more likely, and I seriously doubt logic will be completely overthrown at any time. Furthermore, if an atheist denies mathematics and logic, it is easy for me to say atheism is thus - at least for that particular person - illogical. Finally, with this objection, one does not only object to the NLCA, but to truly all of science.
The argument is working towards a Divine conclusion
Another objection to the cosmological argument is that the argument-giver is using the conclusion to work towards GOD. The problem, however, is that not only the argument itself contains deductive reasoning, but also the conclusion is deductive reasoning. Like all other deductive arguments, it counts that if the premises are true, and the chain of logic is correct, the conclusions is undeniable. Thus, also this objection fails.
Daniel Dennett's objection
Daniel Dennett criticises the use of logic (!) on the universe, because this logic has never been “tested” outside of the universe. The problem with this objection is that Dennett uses the word “logic” as if it is a law of nature. However, logic is not limited to the physical world. Logic is a law of reality. If logic is not ultimately true, than all reasoning fails.
The NLCA is based on a dualistic(!) view of the mind
Some argue that since the Cosmological argument concludes a disembodied mind exists, it therefore is based on a dualistic view of the mind. They continue to argue that since this view is false, the NLCA is also false. This objection has multiple mistakes:
1) A Dualistic mind view is about the relation between the brain (the body) and the mind. The Cosmological argument has nothing to do with brains and bodies or human neurology in general. These are physical things, the NLCA is about what is beyond the physical world.
2) A Dualistic mind view is a neurological discussion, with has got absolutely nothing to do with the NLCA
3) The NLCA is a DEDUCTIVE argument. If the premises are true, and the argument uses logic properly, one cannot logically deny the conclusion.
The NLCA is based on a disembodied(!) view of the mind
Some argue that since the Cosmological argument concludes a disembodied mind exists, it therefore is based on a disembodied view of the mind. They continue to argue that since this view is cannot be shown to be true, the NLCA is also false. This objection is of such an elementary mistake, I cannot believe people actually argue this way. But they do... Now, The Cosmological argument is not based on a disembodiment view of the mind; rather it CONCLUDES it. And since the NLCA is a DEDUCTIVE argument, if the premises are true and they follow each other as a chain of logic, the conclusion cannot be denied. To deny a deductive reasoning is like denying that 2+2 equals 4.
The NLCA argument is based on Divine Psychology
Some philosophers, like philosopher Kevin Sharp, have pointed out that most arguments for GOD rely on Divine psychology: that is to say, many arguments are based on speculations on what GOD would or would not do. Some philosophers would discredit the Cosmological argument based on divine psychology. The argument is that it is unknown whether GOD would want the universe to exist in the first place, whereas the NLCA assumes that to be true. I think this argument is not very good. First of all, as stated many times now, the cosmological argument does NOT ASSUME anything about GOD, but rather concludes it deductively. The Cosmological Argument is a DEDUCTIVE argument: if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be rationally denied. Now, obviously, the universe exists, and there are no assumptions about GOD's intention. But since the NLCA concludes that GOD exists and that HE Willed the universe, one could conclude that GOD would want there to be a universe, but this is not an assumption of the argument. Instead, the argument merely answers the question WHY the universe exists in the first place.
The NLCA invokes causation, but in the B theory of time, causation is imaginary
Whether or not causation works or doesn’t work in the B theory of time is irrelevant. The NLCA does not require causation per-se. It only seeks some form of explanation, the type of explanation is largely irrelevant: causation, stabilization, sustaining, et cetera, they all work for the NLCA.
The NLCA is too simple
I have heard this as an objection to the Cosmological Argument. But this is not an objection, it is a compliment! As it is often said: Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. One should always search for the simplest explanation that has the greatest explanatory scope and power. Being too simple can only be a good thing, provided it has sufficient explanatory scope and power. Since the Cosmoligical Argument is a deductive argument, this is easy to check: if the premises are true, the conclusions follows logically and necessarily. Anyway, this is not an objection but a compliment to any cosmological. So I say "thank you".
Not many objections attack the Cosmological argument as a whole. Objections that attack one specific premise, however, are abundant and cannot be added in this post. See the sub-posts of the NLCA for more objections against - and a more in-depth discussion of - the NLCA.