GOD is not a good theory

GOD is not a good theory

INTRODUCTION

There is rather bizarre view among some atheists, namely that GOD is not a good theory. Notice that it does not say “GOD is not a theory”; No, the view discussed in this post actually is the statement that GOD is actually a theory in empirical science, just not a good theory. Indeed, this view treats GOD’s existence not as an analytic philosophical question, but an empirical one. For simplicity, I shall call this view “atheistic empiricism” (thus its believers will henceforth be called “atheistic empiricists”). Note that this name itself already points out the dubiousness of this view: atheism is essentially a philosophical worldview, not empirical science.

I think one of the most fore-most proponents of this view is theoretical physicist Sean Carroll. Therefore, I have used Sean Carroll’s lecture of the same name as a guideline for my critique on the “GOD is not a good theory” – view. Additionally, I used his debate with William Lane Craig as an extra guideline. I strongly advice the reader to watch both this lecture and debate.

The point of Sean Carroll’s lecture seems to be to point out that GOD’s existence is primarily an empirical question instead of a philosophical question. This is what I essentially disagree with. One can, of course, use empirical evidence to support premises in a philosophical argument, but that still makes the argument itself formal in nature.

I shall first spend a few small sections discussing some definitions, the late Professor Stephen Jay Gould’s NOMA theory, and the relationship between emprical science and formal science (i.e. logic) regarding GOD’s existence. After those sections, I shall spend a number of sections discussing Prof Carroll’s lecture, and then his debate with Prof Craig.

SOME DEFINITIONS

Let’s start with some generally accepted definitions. First, the definitions of the generally accepted forms of science:

> Formal Sciences: The study of pure logic. This includes mathematics, logic, statistical science, probability theory, game theory, formal linguistics, and so on.

> Empirical Sciences (AKA physical sciences): This is what some would simply call ‘science', althoug doing so simply creates more ambiguity. Empirical science deals with gaining knowledge about the physical world (nature) through observations, testing, experimentations and demonstrations. Usually the empirical sciences are divided in the natural sciences (i.e. physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) and the social sciences (psychology, etc.), but this division is not important for this blog post.

> Philosophy: Philosophy is the application of pure logic and this application goes very wide. All empirical sciences are technically more or less a part of philosophy. But philosophical worldviews - like monotheism and atheism - are, obviously, also part of philosophy. Thus, philosophy is the best place (perhaps even the only place) where science and worldviews can have a meaningful conversation.

> Applied sciences: This is the application of the (primarily empirical) sciences. It is technically not truly part of science, as usually no true new knowledge is actually gained, only applied. Examples are medicine, technology, economics, and law.

> Historical science: A form of science that uses all of the previously mentioned forms of science to investigate the past.

And now also the definitions of GOD and of the universe.

> The Universe (or multi-verse): all of physical reality. The entire space-time continuum. Thus, if one believes in the multi-verse, that is included in the definition of the word "Universe".

> Montheistic GOD: In traditional monotheism, GOD is defined the greatest logically possible being. If you can think of something greater than GOD but does not contradict logic, then THAT would be GOD. But one could also take a more pragmatic definition, and simply define GOD as the entity that would be concluded from the cosmological and moral arguments. I.e. GOD is an immaterial being, not physically limited by time or space, with the power and agency required to bring the universe into being. Both definitions would lead to a similar kind of entity. In case of doubt, I will be taking the second definition.

METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM & ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM

In empirical science, one holds to methodological naturalism. This means empirical science sticks to the physical world (the natural world, hence the name “naturalism”), and does not invent supernatural interference to explain physical events and beings. Notice that this is completely different from ontological naturalism. Ontological naturalism is a philosophical worldview that says that only the physical world exists. Some might think that because science adopts methodological naturalism, that therefore ontological naturalism is automatically assumed in empirical science. This is obviously false: empirical science is merely restricted in its study by the physical world, but it does deny or make any claim whatsoever regarding anything beyond the physical world. Therefore, to say that science supports ontological naturalism is simply false.

It goes deeper than just that, however. For if one would claim empirical science considers ontological naturalism to be true, empirical science would have abandoned its very important restrictive methodological naturalism. After all, by supporting ontological naturalism, one is making a statement about the state of being beyond the physical world (namely its non-existence).

NOMA

In light of everything explained previously one should be able to see several reasons why the existence of GOD and physical science are largely unrelated:

1) The empirical sciences (natural and social sciences) deal with the contents of space and time, while GOD is beyond any universe.

2) Empirical science deals with experimentations, observations, demonstrations and testing. Obviously, one cannot directly observe (in the physical sense) or experiment with GOD.

3) Empirical science tries to understand the laws of nature, and uses this understanding to explain physical phenomena. Obviously, GOD has no need to obey the laws of nature (which GOD probably created Himself), and His existence is independent of the laws of nature.

So... is NOMA true then? Stephen J Gould saw the empirical sciences and GOD as completely and utterly separate, with no overlap. He called this “NOMA”: Non-Overlapping Magisteria. So, do I think this is ‘NOMA’ is correct? No, I do not, because physical science could be used to support some premises in philosophical arguments. GOD’s existence is a question that should be dealt with using analytic philosophy. Although the empirical sciences and theism themselves are individually separate, analytic philosophy still deals with both science (all the sciences, not just the physical) and theism. One can use data from the physical sciences to support theologically neutral premises (like “the earth is round” or “the universe had a beginning”), and these premises can be used in a purely analytic philosophical argument, which has a conclusion that involves GOD’s existence. A famous example is (of course) the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). In the KCA, empirical science can be used to support one of its premises, namely that the universe had a beginning. The KCA itself, however, is a philosophical argument with a theologically significant conclusion. It should be noted that the KCA can argued without involving physical science at all: one can deduce logically that an infinite universe leads to mathematical contradictions, and therefore cannot be true (see the main post on the KCA for details).

Thus physical science and theism are individually unrelated. But analytic philosophy is related to both science and theism, thus science and theism may meet each other in a philosophical argument.

THE ROLE OF LOGIC AND SCIENCE REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

It should be noted that the existence of GOD is not an empirically scientific question. You cannot observe GOD, or experiment on him. Miracles are, by definition, not repeatable (except for GOD Himself, of course). The existence of GOD is a question that needs to be addressed through logic. This is actually quite good news: physical science is based partly on our senses, which can be misleading - logic, on the other hand, does not lie. And empirical science pre-supposes logic, making logic the founding pillar of empirical science, and not vice-versa. Empirical science depends on formal science (studies of pure logic), and not the other way around. If something is logically impossible, no amount of experimentation is going to be able to proof that it is possible. Also, if something is a logical necessity, no amount of experimentation is going to be able to disproof this necessity. After all, physical science must use logic for its conclusions, and therefore cannot deny logic. One must keep this in mind at all times, for logic is the fundamental pillar of all rational thinking. As I’m sure I’ve said elsewhere, without logic we are doomed. Without it, there is no use or point to think at all in the first place.

Now that this rough introduction is out of the way, this post will start with a critique of Sean Carroll’s lecture “GOD is not a good theory”.

LECTURE POINT 1: Introduction; Carroll thinks GOD is an idea about the universe

Here starts the discussion of Prof Carroll’s lecture “GOD is not a good theory”. Dr Carroll starts by giving his more loose definition of a theory: “an idea about the universe that may be true or false”. This immediately shows the first problem in light of his premise that ‘GOD is not a good theory’: GOD is not an idea about the universe in the first place. GOD is an idea about ultimate reality, independent of the universe, multi-verse, and in fact independent of the entirety of the physical world.

Sean Carroll then goes on by saying that theists sometimes try to predict things in the universe using GOD, but GOD is not well specified for predictions, which is one of Carroll’s primary objects against GOD. Problem is, most philosophers do not try to make predictions about the physical universe using GOD, because GOD is not a theory at all.

LECTURE POINT 2: Conceptions of GOD; the logical GOD

Prof Carroll gives 3 definitions (or “conceptions”) of GOD: a passive/logical, active/empricial and emergent/rhetorical. Carroll briefly but rightly points out that these definitions are non-exclusive. I agree. He also has no interest in the rhetorical version of the definition of GOD, and neither do I.

Although I haven’t heard Carroll say this explicitly, his slides lists the personal nature of GOD under the empirical definition. This is clearly incorrect, as philosophers have given purely logical reasons for thinking GOD is personall, without resorting to empirical thinking. The KCA is again a proper example of this. Again, this was just on his slides; I did not hear him affirm this verbally.

Carroll then starts with discussing the logical concept definition of GOD, which is the concept of GOD usually used by philosophers. He says he wants to get this philosophical definition “out of the way”. Here starts the problem: what Carroll calls the “passive” definition of GOD is the ultimate definition of GOD that is normally used. So, am I to conclude that Carroll does not really want to discuss GOD’s existence? More on that later.

Carroll then says about the logical/passive definition of GOD: “You can just argue logically that GOD must be part of the universe”. Not much later he also complains that formal inquiry will not reveal if some notion GOD exists in our specific universe. Caroll then asks how one would refute the notion that GOD (still speaking about the logical definition) does not exist. Carroll’s answer? Invent a universe in which GOD does not exist. Notice that Carroll is constantly talking about GOD as part of our universe. Yet, GOD is not part of the universe: not in the logical nor in the empirical definition of the word “GOD”. Forgive me, but if Carroll truly thinks GOD is somehow part of the universe, then he truly lacks even the most elementary understanding of GOD. GOD is no mere part of the universe as mathematics: both mathematics and GOD completely transcend the physical world, since they are of all ultimate reality.

LECTURE POINT 3: Inventing possible universe where GOD does not exist

One of Carroll’s mistakes as just pointed out, is that he constantly talks about GOD as “part of the universe”, or “in the universe”. The problem is that GOD transcends the universe. GOD is not “part of” or “inside” the universe. Clearly, even with a logical conception of GOD, Carroll outright refuses to think about GOD as is usually done: as a being beyond space and time. But if one a-priori refuses to consider a non-physically related GOD, than one is not disproving GOD; one is merely refusing to debate GOD’s existence. Recall the question I asked not too many lines above: So, am I to conclude that Carroll does not really want to discuss GOD’s existence? Yes, Carroll, indeed does not want to discuss GOD’s existence. But, refusing to discuss an entity does not make the entity non-existent. Refusing to discuss GOD’s existence does not make atheism true.

Then Carroll gives all kinds of cosmological models of the universe that require no GOD. Notice that he treats GOD as if it is just another physical variable. But, obviously, GOD is not a variable of the physical universe. He concludes that thinking about GOD philosophically will never reveal something about our universe. So what? GOD‘s existence is not a question regarding our specific physical universe. It involves pure reality in the same sense as all other formal inquires. It is so strange that Carroll constantly acknowledges the philosophical nature of GOD, but then uses the “bait and switch” technique to say something about empirical science.

LECTURE POINT 3: Carroll says that the statement “whatever begins to exist has a cause” is an empirical statement

After giving a number of cosmological models of a universe that contain no GOD, Carroll admits that this is not the point of philosophical arguments for GOD. Instead, the question is not about a universe, our universe, or whatever. It is about the question of reason. He asks why one cannot just have a universe that just exists without any reason whatsoever. He then says that only inside our universe things have causes, and that there is no reason to think why this should be the case outside of our specific universe. He rightly points out that if you say all things have causes because this is true in our universe, you are actually making an empirical claim. True, but professional philosophers of religion would rarely (if ever) say that everything has a reason or cause under all or certain circumstances, because it is so in our universe. That is faulty form of reasoning.

A good argument for the universe having a cause would be the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), and surprisingly, Carroll actually does start talking about the KCA. Carroll correctly cites the first premise of the KCA, namely “whatever begins to exist has a cause”. Carroll sees this as an empirical claim. Carroll, I think, believes in the B theory of time, in which case I can see why he would see this as an empirical question. However, the KCA is an argument grounded on the A theory of time. Therefore, if Carroll should criticise the KCA, it ought to be done in the A theory of time. Thing is, in the A theory of time, the statement “whatever begins to exist has a cause” can be argued for using pure logic. Therefore, it should primarily be seen as an analytic philosophical statement, and must be assessed philosophically.

So, given the A theory of time, no matter how much empirical data you find, no matter how many times you find an object coming into being without knowing the cause, this will not guarantee the falsehood of the claim “whatever beings to exist has a cause”. Instead, it will only show that we don’t know the cause. This is because it is logically necessary for the statement “whatever begins to exist has a cause” to be true. I have discussed the reasons for this in the blog post for the KCA.

LECTURE POINT 5: Carroll says that all philosophical arguments for a logical GOD come down to empirical claims

Carroll seems to claim that all philosophical arguments for a logical GOD come down to empirical claims, and that therefore only the empirical GOD is worth talking about. This is obviously blatantly false. As pointed out earlier, the KCA can be argued for using only philosophical claims, without referring to the empirical world - other than acknowledging the existence of the physical world in the first place - given the KCA's assumption of the A theory of time to be true. See my post on the KCA for more on this.

But also arguments for the B theory of time, like the Neo-Leibnizian Cosmological argument, are also fully philosophical without any necessity to do empirical research (other than, again acknowledging the existence of the physical world). But Carroll's statement is so bold (and so false), it demands and explanation. Carroll gives no real explanation. He simply asserts that claims like “whatever begins to exist has a cause” is an empirical claim that cannot be investigated logically. He merely postulates it, and gives no supporting arguments. Yet, there are many philosophers who have successfully used various cosmological arguments using only pure and perfect logic, without resorting to problematic empirical reasoning.

LECTURE POINT 6: Carroll discusses the beginning of time using cosmological models, but without giving a point

After having wrongfully concluded that GOD’s existence is an empirical question, Carroll gives several cosmological theories on how the universe began and/or existed eternally. His models, presumably, use the B theory of time, since in the A theory of time purely mathematical reasons could be given for the beginning of the universe. So...why does he waste his time doing this? He does not explain. He seems to try to attack the premise of the KCA that the universe began to exist, but KCA uses the A theory of time, so - again - what's the point?

LECTURE POINT 7: Sean Carroll’s empirical discussion and Q&A

Here, Sean Carroll throws analytic philosophy completely out of the window to the point of no-turning-back. I have no interest in Carroll’s version of 'empirical theism'. I see no need to discuss his lecture from here any further, as my interest in GOD is primarily philosophical. Also, the argument he discusses – the fine tuning argument – is not an argument I would ever use, so this is of no interest for me. Also, the Q&A session was primarily about the fine-tuning argument, which I again would never use. To phrase it in a more positive way, I agree largely with Sean Carroll regarding the fine-tuning argument. The rest of Carroll's talk, however, was an exercises of quite bad philosophy.

End of discussion of the lecture.

DEBATE SEAN CARROLL VERSUS WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

Not too long ago, Sean Carroll and William Lane Craig had a debate about the relation between cosmology and theism. Virtually everything said up until now in this blog post applies to what Sean Carroll said in this debate. But Carroll goes even further in this debate. From this point onward, I will discuss Carroll’s points in William Lane Craig’s debate. First, however, I must stress my disappointment in Craig. Yes, Craig’s performance in this debate was sub-standard compared to his other debates, with the following major issues: (1) as Carroll rightly pointed out, Craig did not elaborate enough on the KCA (normally, Craig elaborates his arguments perfectly); (2) Craig’s Fine-tuning argument only works if the KCA were well-defined; (3) Craig did not respond well to Carroll’s obvious mistakes in the relation between cosmology and theism. Anyway, without further lingering, I will now discuss Carroll’s additional points during his opening speech in his debate with Craig.

DEBATE PART 1: Opening speech

Carroll starts his opening speech by saying that cosmologists don’t take GOD seriously. I’m afraid Carroll is deluding himself. There a number of cosmologists who are devout Christians, and they obviously take GOD seriously. Apparently, Carroll doesn’t think professors of cosmology who are Christians (like for example Prof John D Barrow and Prof Ian Hutchinson) are worthy of being called “cosmologists”.

After pointing out that Craig did not fully explain KCA’s first premise (indeed Craig’s performance here was sub-standard), Carroll makes the insane claim that “metaphysics must follow our physics”. This is absurd. Physical science a-priori assumes the truthfulness of all logic and its applications - including metaphysics - before doing empirical science. Thus, physics must obey metaphysics, not the other way around. Carroll also states “when you open a quantum-field textbook or general relativity textbooks, you will not find the words ‘transcendent cause’ anywhere”. No shit. Cosmology is a physical science, and therefore a-priori does not deal with metaphysical issues. Yet, Carroll acts as if the fact that philosophical discussions do not appear in Cosmology textbooks somehow makes philosophy invalid.

After wasting some time talking about cosmology instead of GOD’s existence, Carroll states that “theism is not a serious cosmological model”. No shit. GOD’s existence is not a theory of cosmology to begin with. It is a philosophical worldview. There is no point in comparing cosmological models with theism. How about comparing cosmological models with atheism?

Carroll also goes into a lot of arguments that have nothing to do with cosmology, and therefore are completely irrelevant for their debate and unworthy of my evaluation. I will say, however, that philosophers (even atheist philosophers) have debunked all of these arguments (see also my post “Arguments for Atheism”).

DEBATE PART 2: Rebuttal

First, it should be pointed out that Craig makes it clear to Carroll that he is not arguing for an interventionist deity, so the fact that the cosmological models given by prof Carroll are self-contained is irrelevant. The question is not “can this model be mathematically described without GOD”; of course they can be described without GOD. The question is why the universe exists at all, regardless of how the model operates. Craig also makes it quite clear that the transition from an eternal non-classical state (a quantum state) of the universe to the current temporal classical state of the universe, is the beginning of the universe, for the purposes of the KCA. As we shall later see, Carroll quite sneakily chose to ignore this absolutely crucial point.

Now, Carroll starts his rebuttal by saying something what I think is one of the core differences between Carroll’s form of atheism and standard theism, for Carroll states: “There is a deep philosophical difference between us: I claim that a consistent complete model that fits the data, accounts for all we see in the world is a success. There is no right that we have to demand more than that.” Obviously, within cosmology, a consistent complete model that fits the data is indeed a success. But theism is not part of cosmology. Theism is compatible with all manner of cosmological theories (or any other theory in any other field of science). Cosmology is not an extension of atheism. Cosmology itself is completely agnostic when it comes to GOD’s existence.

Carroll continues by saying that theists expect causes because we see causes in our every day experience. Surely, the common folk will use this as a reason, but academic theistic thinkers (like Craig), do not use this as their (primary) reason (I have already gone through this, so there is no need to explain again).

Carroll makes an even more interesting (and naive) statement: “We don’t think our universe is part of a bigger ensemble that obeys laws.” He seems to claim that the laws of formal logic only exist INSIDE the universe. This is, to me, is the height of absurdity. If the laws of logic were dependent on our universe and were not absolutely true, than ANY form of reasoning would have been utterly useless – including Carroll’s own reasoning. Note that logic is not the same as “intuition”. Carroll referred to logic later here as “intuition”. If it is intuition he is complaining about, then sure, he is right. Intuition is not something that would work outside of the universe (it won’t even always work inside the universe!). But the reasoning behind various arguments for theism – including the KCA – is not mere intuition, but formal logic. In light of this, either Carroll is selectively rational, or Carroll is a hardcore materialist who sees logic (including formal inquiries like mathematics) as part of the universe rather than ultimate reality transcending the physical world completely.

Carroll also discusses the beginning of time, and how he thinks time had no true beginning. Here, Craig and Carroll are talking about time in many different ways, and it is no wonder why they seem to not get each other. Craig talks about metaphysical time, whereas Carroll seems to be talking about physical time (as a mathematical variable). Craig assumes the A Theory of Time, and it seems that Carroll is assuming the B Theory of Time. But neither gentleman made clear whether they were talking about time physically or metaphysically and also not if they assumed an A or B theory of time. This was a great failure for both sides. So it seems that when Craig and Carroll are speaking about “time”, they are speaking about two completely different things. No wonder they cannot agree on anything!

Carroll also made the statement by showing that Vilenkin thinks the universe is eternal (that is indeed correct), and that the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem is only true for the classical descriptions of the universe (that is also correct). However, as Craig clearly pointed out, the transition from an eternal non-classical state (a quantum state) of the universe to the current temporal classical state of the universe, is a first event prior to which there was just an eternity of no events. Thus, for the purposes of the KCA, this is the beginning of the universe. Craig made that statement clearly in his own rebuttal statement (see above).

Carroll also made the statement that “If we are allowed to take opinion polls, I will poll my fellow cosmologists on whether GOD had any to do with creating the universe, and I will win by a land slide.” ... *sigh* ... Theism is not a cosmological issue. Asking cosmologists whether GOD exists is like asking politicians whether human induced climate change is real. Politics and the physics climate change are different subjects. Cosmology and philosophy are also different subjects.

DEBATE PART 3: Closing statements

Carroll states that theism is not well defined because there are no clear predictions to be made. I admit right away, GOD’s existence will hardly influence predictions in cosmology, BUT ... – theism is not an empirical science. So, yes, theism does not explain why the mechanisms in the universe are on way rather than another. If I were an atheist, I would look at cosmological models in the exact same way as I do now (being a theist). In his closing statement, Carroll repeats (in various forms) most of what has been said before, and my critiques have been made known in this post. Only in his closing statement Craig seems to have realised that Carroll and him were talking about two different things (well, at least Craig did realise, Carroll did not seem to have realised at all). Craig makes it clear that theism is not an alternative cosmological model.

Carroll says that most theists don’t become theists because it provides the best biology or cosmology. This is true. After all: theism does not change the science of biology or cosmology.

Carroll also makes the historically ignorant claim that science undermines theism, and gives historical examples of how improvements of science has deteriorated theism. But, as I hope most people know, most branches of sciences have been started by theists, and indeed many of the greatest discoveries in science have been made by theists. And I am quite sure Carroll knows this. This seems a bit like intellectual dishonesty. Moreover, Carroll claims that philosophically, theism is a strategically bad option. On the contrary, there has been a sort of renaissance in philosophy in favour of monotheism, and Carroll simply ignores philosophy entirely.

DEBATE PART 4: Q&A

The Q&A was mostly quite boring (in my opinion). But at one moment Craig was asked the question if GOD popped into being out of nothing. And here Craig used this opportunity to explicitly state what I already suspected half-way through the debate: Carroll probably holds to the B theory of time (the "tense-less" theory of time, as Craig literally said). This difference in theory of time should have come up during the actual debate. What a waste.

Another interesting question was asked to Carroll, namely if one could concede of GOD's existence even with a consisting cosmological mode. Carroll accepted that GOD could create a fully functioning universe that requires no (visible) interference, but, Carroll said, accepting GOD's existence that case would give you nothing. Carroll explained the principle of Occam's Razor, and thus would choose to deny GOD's existence simply because it wouldn't add anything. -> This to me is utterly bizarre. How could Carroll say you'd get "nothing". GOD's existence is of fundamental importance for life's biggest questions. Is Carroll so deep inside empirical cosmology that he cannot concede importance of non-empirical entities??

DEBATE: My own final remarks

All in all, this debate was basically two fine gentlemen talking about completely different things. I think both gentlemen did a very poor job in defining their words and their views, resulting in extreme miscommunication. Carroll talks about some kind of empirical GOD, probably as a “GOD-of-the-gaps” theory to explain physical events. Craig, on the other hand, talks about the philosophical GOD.

A few closing remarks I have about things Sean Carroll does which I find intellectually non-transparent or even intellectually dishonest:

- Carroll pretends as if theists have done nothing but destroy science. But I'm quite certain Carroll knows that a big portion of scientific progress was made by theists.

- Carroll pretends as if predictions is the only value in knowledge. Yet, I'm quite certain Carroll understands the importance of life's hardest questions.

- Carroll pretends as if GOD's existence is an empirical issue. Carroll's not an idiot; he knows the existence of GOD is a philosophical issue.

- Carroll keeps his assumptions very non-transparent. A few examples: He assumes the B theory of time (which is not a common), yet does not state this. He holds to very hardcode materialism, yet never makes this explicit (I had to ind

I hereby end the discussion of the Carroll-Craig debate, and shall continue this post with some general observations on this Atheistic empiricism.

End of the discussion of the debate.

ATHEISTIC EMPIRICISM: MY TAKE ON IT

I have listened to many atheists in my personal life. I have also listened Prof Carroll’s lecture and his debate with Prof Craig. From these I have come to a list of viewpoints I think atheistic empiricism takes which are quite different from the standpoints of most monotheists. These viewpoints are so very different from the standpoints of most monotheists, it is understandable that atheistic empiricists and monotheists can watch the exact same debate between a monotheist and an atheist, and come to completely opposite conclusions regarding who won the debate and who lost. Could these viewpoints lie at the core of why monotheists and atheists believe things so differently? Maybe; anyways, here’s my little list of atheistic empiricist viewpoints, including my critiques of each of those viewpoints (in italics):

> Atheistic empiricism claims that all logical claims (at least those used to support the existence of GOD in philosophical arguments) come down to empirical claims. As numerous philosophers have successfully demonstrated, this is clearly false.

> Atheistic empiricism treats theism as an empirical science meant to predict things in empirical science. Theism is not an empirical science, theism is a philosophical worldview.

> Atheistic empiricism treats logic as part of the laws of nature of this specific universe. It is not. Logic constitutes the laws of all of ultimate reality, irrespective of the physical world, regardless of the universe or multi-verse.

> Atheistic empiricism treats formal inquiries (inquiries in logic) as an extension or part of physics. It is the other way around. Physics is limited to the physical world, whereas logic is about all of reality.

> Atheistic empiricism treats GOD as an empirically research-able physical entity. But GOD is an abstract entity, to be researched philosophically. You cannot put GOD in a tube with chemicals to see what happens.

> Atheistic empiricism a-priori assumes GOD is a “God of the gaps” kind of GOD. Undoubtedly there are some common folk who think that, but this is absolutely not the GOD talked about by analytic philosophers of religion. Notice, for example, that the KCA is a deductive argument in which the premises not based what is not known, but based on what we actually DO know (both formally and empirically). Thus, no gaps are involved here.

DISCUSSION

I really wish to understand atheistic empiricism, for the above points strike me as mightily weird. Why would one believe any of the above points? Well, since Carroll never gives any consistent clarification on his views, I am afraid I have to make some educated guesses. My guess is that these are based on the following philosophical views regarding methodology (the so-called “isms”):

> Verification-ism: this is the view that only truth statements that can be verified empirically are acceptable truth statements.

> Neoposivitism: This is logical empiricism combined with logical posivitism, and it is the philosophical ideology centred around verification-ism

> Hardcore Materialism: this is the view that only the physical world (universe/multi-verse) exists, and thus that abstract entities exist only within the space-time continuum. In this view, mathematics, for example, only exists as far as it would make sense in the physical universe.

From the above isms follows the grand view if GOD’s existence cannot be established using empirical science, there is no point in discussing GOD’s existence in the first place.

This grand view seems to be entirely consistent with Carroll’s statements. After all, Carroll doesn’t truly defend atheism; he just wants to get GOD “out of the way” (as he literally stated himself). This also explains Carroll’s demand for Craig to predict something in cosmology using GOD’s existence, since predictability is an essential part of empirical science (see the definitions section at the beginning of this post). This is why Carroll constantly tries to make GOD to be part of empirical science (especially cosmology): it seems that in his view, statements outside of empirical science are not worth discussing. Finally, this view explains why Carroll says that all philosophical claims boil down to empirical claims: his hardcore materialism doesn’t allow him to see logic as the laws transcending physical reality.

Luckily, it just so happens that I have discussed all of these isms: namely in the blog post “arguments for atheism”, specifically in the section named “non-theistic arguments” (see menu on the right). But wait, one might ask if I have already dealt with this, why this lengthy post? Well, unlike other atheists who are straightforward about their views, I have never ever heard Carroll be straight forward about his philosophical views. He merely makes implications and hidden assumptions, but never spells these out. This goes against intellectual transparency, and his implications and hidden assumptions need to be pointed out. He should be straightforward in his views (even Richard Dawkins is straightforward, and that’s saying something). I find Carroll’s attitude to keep his views vague and inexplicit to be a bit sneaky.

Alhtough I have grown to dislike Carroll's lack of intellectual disclosure, I do like Carroll’s consistency, as far as it was made apparent to me. Where most atheists only use their hardcore materialism when it suits them, Carroll seems to be going all the way with his view, to the point that he would consider physics being more pure than mathematics (or perhaps that's just the typical arrogance commonly displayed by physicists).