Office hours: By appointment
When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?, forthcoming at Econometrica.
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems, with Colin Krainin, 2016, Journal of Politics 78, 1139-1152.
A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory, 2015, Review of Economic Dynamics 18, 881–893.
A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes, with Marcin Pęski, 2015, Theoretical Economics 10, 131-173.
A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning, 2012, Theoretical Economics 7, 217-239.
Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry, with Ken Hendricks and Ilke Onur, 2012, Review of Industrial Organization 40, 1-19.
Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods, with Ken Hendricks and Alan Sorensen, 2012, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, 1-31.
2015 AEJ: Micro Best Paper Award.
Conflict and Compromise: Changes in U.S. Strike Outcomes, 1880 to 1945, with Thomas M. Geraghty, 2011, Explorations in Economic History 48, 519-537.
A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation, with Li Gan and Roberton Williams, 2011, Economic Inquiry 49, 674-684.
2011 Economic Inquiry Best Article Award.
Group Insurance and Lending with Endogenous Social Collateral, with Beatrix Paal, 2011, Journal of Development Economics 94, 30-40.
Sequential Choice and Non-Bayesian Observational Learning, 2009, International Game Theory Review 11, 285-300.
Reputation and Exogenous Private Learning, 2009, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1352-1357.
Wage Strikes in 1880s America: A Test of the War of Attrition Model, with Thomas M. Geraghty, 2008, Explorations in Economic History 45, 303-326.
Disagreement Leads to Complete Learning: Sequential Choice with Continuous Types, 2008, Economics Letters 100, 53-55.
Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture, with Preston McAfee, 2008, Review of Economic Studies 75, 317-332.
Reputation and Impermanent Types, 2008, Games and Economic Behavior 62, 190-210.
The Impact of Gun Laws: A Model of Crime and Self Defense, with Hugo Mialon, 2005, Economics Letters 88, 170-175.
(Reprinted in Economics, Law and Individual Rights, Hugo Mialon and Paul Rubin, eds. London: Routledge, 2008.)
A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions, 2005, Econometrica 73, 629-645.
Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma, with Okan Yilankaya, 2001, Games and Economic Behavior 37, 216-242.
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game, with Ben Sperisen.
Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War, with Colin Krainin and Caroline Thomas.
School Choice with Neighbors, with Umut Dur.
Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games with Gradual State Changes, with Marcin Pęski.