Thomas Wiseman



Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX  78712

Office:  BRB 2.114
Phone:  (512) 475-8516
Fax:  (512) 471-3510
E-mail:  wiseman@austin.utexas.edu




School Choice with Neighbors, with Umut Dur, 2019, Journal of Mathematical Economics 89, 101-109.

Competitive Long-Term Health Insurance, 2018, Journal of Health Economics 58, 144-150.

When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?, 2017, Econometrica 85, 555-584.

War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems, with Colin Krainin, 2016, Journal of Politics 78, 1139-1152.

A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory, 2015, Review of Economic Dynamics 18, 881–893.

A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes, with Marcin Pęski, 2015, Theoretical Economics 10, 131-173.

A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning, 2012, Theoretical Economics 7, 217-239.

Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry, with Ken Hendricks and Ilke Onur, 2012, Review of Industrial Organization 40, 1-19.

Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods, with Ken Hendricks and Alan Sorensen, 2012, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, 1-31.

               2015 AEJ: Micro Best Paper Award.

Conflict and Compromise: Changes in U.S. Strike Outcomes, 1880 to 1945, with Thomas M. Geraghty, 2011, Explorations in Economic History 48, 519-537.

A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation, with Li Gan and Roberton Williams, 2011, Economic Inquiry 49, 674-684.

                2011 Economic Inquiry Best Article Award.

                            (An earlier version is NBER Working Paper No. W10463.)

Group Insurance and Lending with Endogenous Social Collateral, with Beatrix Paal, 2011, Journal of Development Economics 94, 30-40.

Sequential Choice and Non-Bayesian Observational Learning, 2009, International Game Theory Review 11, 285-300.

Reputation and Exogenous Private Learning, 2009, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1352-1357.

Wage Strikes in 1880s America: A Test of the War of Attrition Model, with Thomas M. Geraghty, 2008, Explorations in Economic History 45, 303-326.

Disagreement Leads to Complete Learning: Sequential Choice with Continuous Types, 2008, Economics Letters 100, 53-55.

Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture, with Preston McAfee, 2008, Review of Economic Studies 75, 317-332.

Reputation and Impermanent Types, 2008, Games and Economic Behavior 62, 190-210.

The Impact of Gun Laws: A Model of Crime and Self Defense, with Hugo Mialon, 2005, Economics Letters 88, 170-175.

(Reprinted in Economics, Law and Individual Rights, Hugo Mialon and Paul Rubin, eds. London: Routledge, 2008.)

A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions, 2005, Econometrica 73, 629-645.

Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma, with Okan Yilankaya, 2001, Games and Economic Behavior 37, 216-242.

Working papers:

When do Traffic Reports Make Traffic Better?, with Jim Wiseman.

How to Sell in a Sequential Auction Market, with Ken Hendricks.

Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game, with Ben Sperisen.

Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War, with Colin Krainin and Caroline Thomas, R&R at Quarterly Journal of Political Science.

Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games with Gradual State Changes, with Marcin Pęski.