The assumption that being human is morally significant is embedded in the way we think and speak. It is reflected in how we expect to be treated by others, and structures how we organize our institutions. People make appeals to their human dignity, and rail against being treated like an animal; NGOs confidently proclaim that we have human rights simply because we are human, and the International Criminal Court prosecutes crimes against humanity. Why being human is morally significant, however, remains an open question.
This Fellowship focuses on three core questions: In what sense is being human morally significant? What explains that significance? And what follows, socially and politically, from that significance?
In my own research, I am developing a social metaphysics of the human to answer those questions. Rather than positing inherent properties to justify the moral significance of being human, I explore the possibility that the human is better conceived of as a social, rather than a natural, kind. From this perspective, humanity is a status we bestow on one another, rather than figuring in any kind of natural moral hierarchy.
The Fellowship is supporting two graduate scholarships, an Early Career Researcher Network, and series of events. (Further details coming soon).