BOOKS
Contours of Dignity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020)
Contours of Dignity advances a theory geared towards explaining the complex and varied role dignity plays in our moral lives. This includes the relationship between dignity and respect; the ways in which shame and humiliation can constitute dignity violations; and the relationship between dignity and human rights. Dignity, according to this theory, comes in three strands: personal dignity, social dignity, and status dignity. Each strand involves a specific form of respect. On the one hand, personal dignity involves self-respect while social and status dignity involve the respect of others. On the other hand, personal and social dignity both involve appraisal respect, while status dignity involves recognition respect. With these distinctions in hand, Contours of Dignity then explores the moral significance of dignity, offering a novel explanation of the source and scope of individuals’ claims to have their dignity respected. The book concludes with a discussion of the relationship between dignity and human rights, arguing that we should understand human dignity as a social construct, but one that nonetheless vindicates the human rights project.
NDPR REVIEW: https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/contours-of-dignity/
Taking the Measure of Autonomy: A Four-Dimensional Theory of Self-Governance (New York: Routledge, 2018)
This books takes a radically different approach to the concept of autonomy. Killmister defends a theory of autonomy that is four-dimensional and constituted by what she calls ‘self-definition,’ ‘self-realisation,’ ‘self-unification,’ and 'self-constitution.' While sufficiently complex to inform a full range of social applications, this four-dimensional theory is nonetheless unified through the simple idea that autonomy can be understood in terms of self-governance. The ‘self’ of self-governance occupies two distinct roles: the role of ‘personal identity’ and the role of ‘practical agency.’ In each of these roles, the self is responsible for both taking on, and then honouring, a wide range of commitments. One of the key benefits of this theory is that it provides a much richer measure not just of how autonomous an agent is, but also the shape—or degree—of her autonomy. Taking the Measure of Autonomy will be of keen interest to professional philosophers and students across social philosophy, political philosophy, ethics, and action theory who are working on autonomy.
NDPR REVIEW: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/taking-the-measure-of-autonomy-a-four-dimensional-theory-of-self-governance/
ARTICLES
“What’s Wrong With Gender Critical Feminism?’, Hypatia, 2025
In early 2023 Kellie-Jay Keen-Minshull—also known as Posie Parker—took her “Let Women Speak” tour throughout Australasia. One of those rallies made international headlines due to the attendance of a small group of neo-Nazis (members of the National Socialist Network) who proceeded to perform Nazi salutes on the steps of Parliament House and on the surrounding streets. At that very same rally an academic philosopher, Holly Lawford-Smith, gave a speech in support of gender-critical feminism. This paper is my attempt to make sense of that moment, through critical engagement with Lawford-Smith’s book Gender-Critical Feminism. Since Lawford-Smith positions her book as a philosophical foundation for the gender-critical movement, my primary goal is to show that this philosophical foundation is both metaphysically and politically flawed. My secondary goal is to consider whether, and if so how, enactment of the philosophical views developed in that book would move us closer to the oppressive world neo-Nazis are trying to bring about.
“Dignity as Conferred Status”, in Jesse Tomalty and Kerri Woods (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Human Rights, (New York: Routledge, 2025)
“A Metaphysics of Dehumanization”, Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol 23/22, 2023
Most contemporary accounts of dehumanization construe it either as a psychological phenomenon of seeing the other as non-human, or as as an interpersonal phenomenon of failing to treat the other as they are entitled qua moral agent. In this paper I offer an alternative way of thinking about dehumanization. Drawing on recent work in social metaphysics, I argue that we can productively think of the human as a social kind, and correspondingly of dehumanization as a process of excommunication from that social kind. Such an approach, I show, is better equipped to explain the variety of phenomenon that constitute dehumanization, and the range of processes through which dehumanization can occur.
“Philosophical Approaches to Dignity and Their Applicability to Non-Human Animals”, in Melanie Challenger (ed), Animal Dignity, (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2023)
“The Human in Human Rights”, in Gienow-Hecht, Jobs, and Kunkel (eds), Visions of Humanity: Historical-Cultural Practices Since 1850, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2023)
This chapter interrogates the human in human rights. It challenges the assumption that to be human just is to be a member of the species homo sapiens. Such an assumption presupposes a unique ‘essence’ possessed by all and only human beings, which functions to exclude certain individuals from the realm of the human, and presents a culturally-specific vision of humanity as if it were universal. This chapter develops an alternative conception of the human as a social construct, whereby the human refers to the network of social norms, political status, privileges and burdens that are conferred on individuals.
“I Am a Man: Countering Oppression Through Appeal to Kind Membership”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol 40/5, 2023
All too often, social kinds function as sites of oppression. To be a woman, to be Black, to be trans – each, in their own way, situates someone at the lower end of a social hierarchy. Membership in such groups thus constitutes a liability: notwithstanding the goods people draw from sharing in these identities, they also stand at perpetual risk of those same identities exposing them to significant harm. What, if anything, can members of oppressed groups do to counter that oppression? In this article I explore one possible strategy: people can – and do – strategically invoke their membership in what I call ‘anti-oppressive kinds’, in order to contest the oppression they face qua members of oppressed groups. Focusing on one particularly salient anti-oppressive kind, the human, I first offer an explanation as to how and why its invocation might be politically effective, before considering some hazards with its use.
“Autonomy and Dignity”, in Ben Colburn (ed), Routledge Handbook of Autonomy, (New York: Routledge, 2023)
Like the ‘thoughts and prayers’ so commonly offered by politicians in the aftermath of disaster, it is incredibly common to hear ‘autonomy and dignity’ invoked together in response to some threat to human wellbeing. As such, it seems natural to assume they must bear some kind of relation to one another. But are they merely two core human interests, that happen to be vulnerable to the same kinds of threat? Or are they interrelated in a deeper way? What I aim to do in this chapter is draw on the philosophical literature on both concepts to consider how they might be connected, and explore whether certain ways of connecting them are more fruitful than others. I argue that the two most prominent connections drawn in the philosophical literature – that dignity is grounded in autonomy, and that respect for dignity is synonymous with respect for autonomy – are both highly problematic. Instead, I suggest we see autonomy and dignity as mutually supportive. Doing so has both practical and theoretical benefits: it can help us identify threats to both autonomy and dignity; and it exposes theoretical lacunae, especially within the autonomy literature.
“Constructing Moral Equality”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol 9/4, 2022
Moral equality—the idea that ‘we’ all have equal moral worth, our interests ought to count for the same, and we possess the same bundle of basic rights—is one of the most central principles of liberal thought, being regularly drawn on as a presupposition of moral and political inquiry. Perhaps because it is so often relied on as a presupposition, however, moral equality is more often assumed than argued for. When moral equality is argued for, the most common tactic is to appeal to some inherent property. As is well established, however, such property-based defenses of moral equality face two significant challenges: the problem of exclusion and the problem of inequality. In light of these challenges, in this article I put forward a new, revisionist account of moral equality. Taking inspiration from recent work in the social metaphysics of human kinds, I argue that moral equality ought to be seen as a component of a status that we confer on one another, rather than (grounded in) a property inherent in certain individuals. Conceiving of moral equality this way, I argue, side-steps both the problem of exclusion and the problem of natural equality.
“COVID-19 and the Right of Return”, Australian Journal of Human Rights, Vol 27/2, 2022
Throughout 2020 and 2021, a human right most Australians presumably took for granted was effectively suspended by the Australian government: if you were an Australian citizen overseas, you no longer had any guaranteed right of return. Taking as given that we do in fact have a moral right to re-enter the country of which we are a citizen, in this commentary I draw on the work of philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson to critically examine three possible pathways by which the suspension of this right could—at least theoretically—be morally justified.
“Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability”, in Adam Cureton and Wasserman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability, Oxford University Press, 2020
Dignity is typically taken to be an inherent feature of humans, in virtue of which we have moral status and are owed basic forms of respect. When such claims are made, an explanation is owed as to how we come to have such dignity. A very standard response appeals to purportedly universal capacities held by humans, such as rationality. However, this way of construing dignity has the effect of excluding individuals with severe cognitive disabilities. If such individuals do not have dignity, it follows that they lack moral status and are not owed basic forms of respect. This chapter offers an alternative way of construing dignity. Rather than grounding it in natural capacities, the chapter argues that dignity is grounded in the social kind “human.” On this approach, all human beings have dignity, irrespective of their cognitive capacities.
"The Warty Conception of Human Rights", Journal of Human Rights, 18/5, 2019: 564-578
In this article I explain and defend a new conception of human rights, drawing upon Jeremy Waldron’s account of dignity and Richard Rorty’s account of human rights. Following Rorty, I argue for a conception of human rights on which the central question is not “what is human nature?”: but rather “what kind of world should we leave to future generations?” I suggest that we can make progress on this question by developing Waldron's claim that dignity is a conferred status, as opposed to an inherent feature of persons, into the claim that “the human” is a social kind.
“Paternalism and Autonomy”, in Jason Hanna and Kalle Grill (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism, Routledge, 2018
It’s often taken for granted that paternalism conflicts with autonomy. Since there is no consensus on exactly what autonomy is, however, this claim is less obvious than it appears. Further complicating matters, there is no consensus on precisely how paternalism is supposed to conflict with autonomy. This chapter cuts through the confusion by identifying four distinct ways in which paternalism might threaten autonomy: 1) by frustrating autonomy as condition; 2) by corroding autonomy as capacity; 3) by disrespecting autonomy as capacity; and 4) by disrespecting autonomy as right. Killmister then surveys the leading theories of autonomy, considering what resources each has for vindicating the claim that paternalism and autonomy conflict.
"Deriving Human Rights from Human Dignity: A Novel Political Approach", in Tom Campbell and Kylie Bourne (eds), Political and Legal Approaches to Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2018)
Dignity is typically taken to be an inherent feature of humans, in virtue of which we have moral status and are owed basic forms of respect. When such claims are made, an explanation is owed as to how we come to have such dignity. A very standard response appeals to purportedly universal capacities held by humans, such as rationality. However, this way of construing dignity has the effect of excluding individuals with severe cognitive disabilities. If such individuals do not have dignity, it follows that they lack moral status and are not owed basic forms of respect. This chapter offers an alternative way of construing dignity. Rather than grounding it in natural capacities, the chapter argues that dignity is grounded in the social kind “human.” On this approach, all human beings have dignity, irrespective of their cognitive capacities.
"Dignity: Personal, Social, Human", Philosophical Studies, 174/8, 2017: 2063-2082
The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a novel conception of dignity. I begin by offering three desiderata that a theory of dignity should be able to satisfy: it should be able to explain why all human beingsare owed respect, and what kind of respect we are owed; it should be able to explain how acts such as torture damage dignity, and what kinds of harms this brings about; and finally, it should be able to explainwhy dignity is held to a higher degree by certain individuals. After demonstrating that the dominant, Kantian-inspired conception of dignity cannot fulfill these desiderata, I develop a novel conception of dignit ythat centers around the role of normative standards. Dignity, on this conception, involves being subject to, and then upholding, relevant normative standards; to violate someone’s dignity is to prevent them fromupholding those standards. Importantly, these standards can have either a subjective or a communal source, which in turn explains both the agential and social harms that accompany dignity violations. I thendraw on the idea of social dignity to explain human dignity. Unlike the dominant philosophical conception, I take human dignity to be a status that is conferred, rather than a status that is inherent.
"Dignity, Torture, and Human Rights", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19/5: 1087-1101, 2016
This paper focuses on a distinct puzzle for understanding the relationship between dignity and human rights. The puzzle is that dignity appears to enter human rights theory in two distinct roles: on the one hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as the foundation of human rights, i.e. that in virtue of which we have human rights. On the other hand, dignity is commonly pointed to as that which is at risk in a narrow subset of human rights, such as torture. But how can dignity underpin all human rights, and yet only be at stake in very specific human rights violations? In this paper I offer a solution to this puzzle, in the form of a reconceptualization of dignity. On this new theory, an individual’s dignity can be constituted via either of two sources: the agent’s own normative competencies, or the authority of her community. The former is what’s typically at stake in practices such as torture; it in virtue of the latter that we have human rights.
“Autonomy Under Oppression: Tensions, Trade-Offs, and Resistance”, in Marina Oshana (ed), Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2015)
It is a commonplace in philosophical discussions of oppression to assume that it compromises personal autonomy. Indeed, this is often taken to be one of oppression’s most distinctive and insidious harms. My aim in this chapter is to explore precisely how oppression compromises personal autonomy and what individuals might be able to do to insulate themselves from these effects. The focus of my discussion will be on the distinctive harms of double binds. Double binds occur when an agent is faced with a decision, either side of which subjects her to some form of sanction or frustration. In this respect, they are analogous to moral dilemmas. A classic example of a double bind is the situation faced by many women in contemporary Western societies with respect to career and family: given the absence of adequate child-care options, many women must still choose between fulfi lling their career goals and raising a family. I argue that double binds such as these compromise personal autonomy: by their very nature, such double binds prevent individuals from realizing some or other goal or value. Moreover, given the inescapability of choice, these double binds force individuals to actively frustrate one of their goals or values, which, as I will go on to show, necessarily constitutes a reduction in the agent’s autonomy.
“The Woody Allen Puzzle: How ‘Authentic Alienation’ Complicates Autonomy”, Noûs, 49/4: 729-747, 2015
Theories of autonomy commonly make reference to some form of endorsement: an action is autonomous insofar as the agent has a second-order desire towards the motivating desire, or takes it to be a reason for action, or is not alienated from it. In this paper I argue that all such theories have difficulty accounting for certain kinds of agents, what I call ‘Woody Allen cases’. In order to make sense of such cases, I suggest, it is necessary to disambiguate two distinct forms of endorsement, both of which contribute to autonomy.
“Resolving the Dilemma of Group Membership”, in Bessone, Calder, and Zuolo (eds), How Groups Matter: Challenge of Toleration in Pluralistic Societies (New York: Routledge, 2014)
"Autonomy, Liberalism, and Anti-Perfectionism", Res Publica, 19/4, 2013
John Christman has recently objected to substantive conceptions of autonomy on the grounds that they introduce unwanted perfectionism into political thinking. I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy against Christman’s critique on two fronts. First, I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy against the charge that their utilisation in political theory would result in the inappropriate exclusion from democratic respect of individuals in oppressive relations. Second, I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy from the charge that they fail the ‘endorsement constraint’, i.e. that incorporating a substantive conception of autonomy into the concept of the person at the heart of a political theory would be alienating for citizens.
"Autonomy and the Problem of Socialization" Social Theory and Practice, 39/1, 2013
One of the most intractable problems in the debate over how to conceive of autonomy revolves around the problem of socialisation. Autonomous action should spring from the self. Yet that same self often appears to be the product of external influences. This causes an inescapable tension in determining the conditions for an act to be considered autonomous. What is required is a principled way to determine the boundary between benign and pernicious socialisation. This requires having a plausible conception of what autonomy is, and ascertaining the mechanism by which some forms of socialisation, but not others, compromise that autonomy. Given the centrality of the problem of socialisation to the issue of autonomy, it is perhaps surprising to discover the lack of progress that has been made towards resolving it. In this paper I first show how even those theories that explicitly engage with the problem of socialisation fail to adequately resolve it. I then sketch an alternative theory of autonomy and argue that it contains the resources to adequately address the problem of socialisation.
"Autonomy and False Beliefs" Philosophical Studies, 164/2, 2013
The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on what the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy.
"Why Group Membership Matters: A Critical Typology", Ethnicities, 12/3, 2012
The question of why group-differentiated rights might be a requirement of justice has been a central focus of identity politics in recent decades. I attempt to bring some clarity to this discussion by proposing a typology to track the various ways in which individuals can be harmed or benefited as a consequence of their membership in social groups. It is the well-being of individuals that group-differentiated rights should be understood as protecting, and so clarity on the relationship between group membership and well-being is vital. One of the problems with the way in which such justifications have often been formulated in the past has been that they inadvertently position the group as a handicap to be overcome, rather than a value to be protected. I seek to overcome this limitation by clearly specifying the circumstances under which group membership is a liability, and the circumstances under which it has value. While this distinction is important, in both cases there is a relevant interest at stake, and thus the groundwork can be laid for a defence of group-differentiated rights.
"Group-Differentiated Rights and the Problem of Membership", Social Theory and Practice, 37/2, 2011
In recent decades the literature surrounding what Will Kymlicka has termed ‘group-differentiated rights’ has burgeoned. In this paper I explore a different problem that has been given insufficient attention by those who advocate the introduction of group-differentiated rights at a policy level. The problem is this: once we move from the theoretical justification of group-differentiated rights to their implementation in practice, we are immediately confronted with the dilemma of identifying which particular individuals are to benefit. In other words, for any given group-differentiated right, we need to be able to pin-point who the members of that group are. For example, if we hold that the state has an obligation to create legal exemptions for some citizens on the basis of their cultural or religious affiliations, to which particular citizens are we going to grant the exemption? Or if we hold that the state has an obligation to institute some form of affirmative action for positions of power or status, which particular citizens are we going to include under this policy? While defenders of group-differentiated rights do not appear to see this as a problem, the issue of determining membership has been seized upon by skeptics as a fatal flaw in the practice. If group-differentiated rights are to be more than an abstract ideal, then, the problem of group membership must be addressed. In this paper I offer a solution to this problem of group membership.
"Dignity: Not Such a Useless Concept", Journal of Medical Ethics, 36/3 2010
In her 2003 article in the British Medical Journal, Ruth Macklin provocatively declared dignity to be a useless concept: either a vague restatement of other more precise values, such as autonomy or respect for persons, or an empty slogan. A recent response to Macklin has challenged this claim. Doris Schroeder attempts to rescue dignity by positing four distinct concepts that fall under the one umbrella term. She argues that much of the confusion surrounding dignity is due to the lack of disambiguation among these four concepts, but that once we understand the different values in question dignity becomes a powerful tool in the fields of human rights and bioethics. It is the goal of this paper to build upon Schroeder's insights by reconnecting the multiple strands of dignity she identifies. It will be argued that the usefulness of dignity as a guiding principle in medical ethics can be much improved by identifying the single conceptual link that ties together the various values flying under its banner. That conceptual link is provided by understanding dignity as the capacity to live by one's standards and principles.
"Remote Weaponry: The Ethical Implications", Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25/2 2008
The nature of warfare is changing. Increasingly, developments in military technology are removing soldiers from the battlefield, enabling war to be waged from afar. Bombs can be dropped from unmanned drones flying above the range of retaliation. Missiles can be launched, at minimal cost, from ships 200 miles to sea. Micro Air Vehicles, or 'WASPS', will soon be able to lethally attack enemy soldiers. Though still in the developmental stage, progress is rapidly being made towards autonomous weaponry capable of selecting, pursuing, and destroying targets without the necessity for human instruction. These developments have a profound — and as yet under-analysed — impact on just war theory. I argue that a state under attack from remote weaponry is unable to respond in the traditional, just war sanctioned, method of targeting combatants on the battlefield. This restriction of options potentially creates a situation whereby a state is either coerced into surrender, or it must transgress civilian immunity. Just war theory in conditions of remote warfare therefore either serves the interests of the technologically advanced by demanding the surrender of targeted states, or else it becomes redundant