Published Papers:

Mandatory worker representation on the board and its effect on shareholder wealth
Financial Management, forthcoming.

Several countries legally mandate representation of workers on boards of directors. The evidence on the shareholder wealth effects of such a corporate governance design is mixed. I examine abnormal announcement returns around major milestones leading to the passing of the German Codetermination Act in 1976. I find that news about the act causes an average decline in the equity value of firms that are certain to have been affected by the new law of up to 1.5% relative to the control firms. Firms close to the regulatory threshold of 2,000 employees remain unaffected implying an expectation of avoiding compliance.

Does Rating Analyst Subjectivity Affect Corporate Debt Pricing? (with Cesare Fracassi and Geoffrey Tate)
Journal of Financial Economics, 2016,

Abstract: We find evidence of systematic optimism and pessimism among credit analysts, comparing contemporaneous ratings of the same firm across rating agencies. These differences in perspectives carry through to debt prices and negatively predict future changes in credit spreads, consistent with mispricing. Moreover, the pricing effects are the largest among firms that are the most opaque, likely exacerbating financing constraints. We find that MBAs provide higher quality ratings; however, optimism increases and accuracy decreases with tenure covering the firm. Our analysis demonstrates the role analysts play in shaping investor expectations and its effect on corporate debt markets.

Working Papers:

Determinants of Secondary Market Prices for Structured Products During the 2007--2009 Financial Crisis
, Revise & Resubmit

I test several hypotheses that may explain the asymmetric widening of the bid-ask spread driven by lower bid quotes of index structured retail products (SRPs) during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In addition to index volatility, I identify issuer capitalization as the most important price determinant. Bid quotes from issuers with low equity ratios declined by 65% more than those of the remaining issuers. This drop is even greater in SRPs that do not face competition and that replicate riskier indices because of higher net selling pressure. The results suggest that capitalization of the issuer can influence SRP pricing.

Private Equity Monitoring in Public Firms
, Revise & Resubmit

This paper finds private equity (PE) firms to have an active monitoring role in stock market-listed companies. Little is known about the governance role of PE investors in publicly listed firms. Using a novel dataset of the ownership structures of firms listed on the German stock market, I find a higher likelihood of forced CEO replacements after poor past firm performance in companies with higher PE ownership. The PE monitoring effect only exists if representatives of the PE firm sit on the board of the portfolio firm. PE ownership is generally associated with higher firm value.