My research is in the fields of experimental economics, industrial organization, game theory, and behavioral economics.

Working Papers:

Abstract: This paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyze how a group of voters experiment with a new reform. The experiment implements the continuous time Strulovici (2010) collective experimentation model. I analyze observations where the reform is bad for a majority of group members and observations where the reform is bad for single decision makers. I find that groups make collective decisions on the reform that are generally consistent with experimentation incentives. In these observations, groups stop experimentation earlier than single decision makers, wait longer to stop experimentation as the number of revealed winners increases, and stop experimentation earlier than the utilitarian optimum predicts. However, I also find that both groups and single decision makers, in these observations, stop experimentation earlier than predicted. Additional treatments show that this result is unlikely to be explained by standard explanations such as incorrect belief updating or risk aversion.

  • Is Experimentation Invariant to Group Size? A Laboratory Analysis of Innovation Contests [Updated 11/1/2018]

Abstract: This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of group size on innovation contests. I analyze a discrete time innovation contest, based on Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2017), where the first contestant to obtain an innovation wins a prize and where all contestants are informed of the arrival of an innovation. I compare two innovation contests, a two-person and four-person contest, that only differ by contest size and that have the same probability of obtaining an innovation in equilibrium. When obtaining an innovation is possible, I observe a higher innovation percentage in the four-person contest. When obtaining an innovation is impossible, I observe a greater level of aggregate effort in the four-person contest, but observe a greater level of individual effort in the two-person contest.

Works in Progress:

  • Dynamic Scoring Contests: Theory and Experiment (with Brian Roberson and Yaroslav Rosokha) [Draft Avaliable Upon Request]
  • A Theoretical Analysis of the Efficiency of the Team Best-of-N Contest

Journal Publications: