Alice Pinheiro Walla, (St Andrews): Provisional Acquisition as 'True Acquisition': Kant's Argument Against Colonialism

Kant’s criticism of European colonialism seems to contradict central aspects of his theory of property and of right.Kant argues that the only way to possess something in the state of nature is physical possession, that is, something is mine only insofar as I can defend my possession from others (RL VI: 250, 265 and 269).Further, Kant argues that we are authorized to coerce everyone else to enter a civil condition, for wanting to remain in the lawless state of nature is in itself to wrong others “to the utmost degree”, even in the absence of concrete harm (RL §42 at VI:307-8). In the absence of an international juridical framework, Kant’s theory of property thus seems to legitimate colonialist domination and other kinds of violent occupation of another people’s territory.

However, in his criticism of the ideology of colonialist practice (Jesuitism), Kant argues that occupying the land of another people cannot be used as a means for establishing the civil condition. Kant then offers other ways in which provisional acquisition can be regarded as legitimate independently of immediate physical possession, and must be respected even in the state of nature.

I shall analyze Kant’s arguments for the rights of native peoples to their land, which Kant considers to be valid despite the lack of an international juridical framework securing these rights. I shall also explore how Kant’s notion of provisional acquisition plays a central role for his account of cosmopolitan law."