Jessica Brown: Words, concepts and epistemology

Tuesday, 8th Feb 11

Jessica Brown

*Words, concepts and epistemology* Where: Edgecliffe 104 When: Tuesday 8th Feb "In this paper, I want to examine the relation between a currently popular conception of the subject matter of philosophy and the current methodological practice of the discipline, with special attention to the subarea of epistemology. According to the currently popular conception, the subject matter of philosophy is nonconceptual and nonlinguistic (e.g. Kornblith 2002, Williamson 2007, Kvanvig 2009, Deutsch forthcoming; for an exception to this dominant view, see Goldman and Pust 1998, and Goldman 2007). Despite this, contemporary philosophers continue to make central appeal to linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements in their work. Some detect a tension between the subject matter claim and contemporary philosophical methodology, and argue that the nature of philosophy’s subject matter undermines the appeal to linguistic considerations and

thought-experiment judgements (for instance, Kornblith). Others seem to detect no tension between the subject matter claim and the methodology of the discipline (see Jackson 1998, and Williamson 2007). The task of this paper is to clarify the suggestion that the subject matter of philosophy is nonconceptual and nonlinguistic and so examine whether this claim about philosophy's subject matter undermines the appeal to linguistic considerations and thought-experiment judgements in philosophy."