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Soochow Lectures in Philosophy
The Soochow Lecture Series will be published by:
Princeton University Press (U.S.A.)
Recently Published Books:
Epistemic Angst： Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing
by Professor Duncan Pritchard
December , 2015
ISBN: 978-0-691-16723-7
Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.
Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.
The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.
Duncan Pritchard is professor of philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, where he is the director of Eidyn: The Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind and Normativity. His books include Epistemic Luck and Epistemological Disjunctivism.
Endorsements:
"This is an outstanding book on issues of philosophical skepticism central to epistemology throughout its history. Writing lucidly and engagingly, Duncan Pritchard tackles these issues in the context of recent philosophy, going back to Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Pritchard also lays out and defends an original proposal in dialectic with well-known rivals, such as relativist contextualism, attributor contextualism, contrastivism, dogmatism, and others."--Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University
"Epistemic Angst will be a must-read for anyone interested in epistemology or Wittgenstein. I don't think there is anything about Wittgenstein's contribution to current epistemological debates that comes anywhere near this book. It provides a helpful survey of these debates and a very clear introduction to Wittgenstein's epistemology. Pritchard is an excellent writer with a gift for summarizing complicated debates, and his book will have a tremendous impact on the field."--Clayton Littlejohn, King's College London
Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
Part 1. Epistemic Angst 9
Chapter 1. Radical Skepticism and Closure 11
Chapter 2. Radical Skepticism and Underdetermination 29
Part 2. Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing 61
Chapter 3. Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation 63
Chapter 4. Hinge Commitments 89
Part 3. Epistemological Disjunctivism 121
Chapter 5. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Factivity of Reasons 123
Chapter 6. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Closure-Based Radical Skepticism 144
Part 4. Farewell to Epistemic Angst 167
Chapter 7. Farewell to Epistemic Angst 169
Notes 189
Bibliography 217
Index 237
February, 2013
Moral Perception by Professor Robert Audi
ISBN: 978-0-691-15648-4
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics.
Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism.
Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
Robert Audi is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. His books include "Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character", "Moral Value and Human Diversity", "The Good in the Right" (Princeton), and "Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision".
Endorsements:
"This book defends the most illuminating and novel theory of moral perception to date. In making a case for objectivity in ethics, Robert Audi insightfully explores the relations between moral perception, intuition, emotion, and imagination. His clear and engaging style, and his use of many examples to explain and illuminate the key distinctions and ideas, makes the book accessible to students, while its substantial contribution to ethical theory makes it a must-read for experts."--Mark Timmons, University of Arizona
"I don't know of any other work in recent years that has examined moral perception so thoroughly or with such epistemological sophistication. Audi's book makes an important contribution to the unduly neglected field of moral epistemology, and it should interest a broad philosophical audience."--Noah Lemos, College of William and Mary
Table of Contents:
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
Part One: Perception and Moral Knowledge 5
Chapter 1 : Perception: Sensory, Conceptual, and Cognitive Dimensions 7
Chapter 2 : Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements 30
Chapter 3 : Perception as a Direct Source of Moral Knowledge 51
Part Two: Ethical Intuition, Emotional Sensibility, and Moral Judgment 67
Chapter 4 : Perceptual Grounds, Ethical Disagreement, and Moral Intuitions 69
Chapter 5 : Moral Perception, Aesthetic Perception, and Intuitive Judgment 103
Chapter 6 : Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment 121
Chapter 7 : The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics 143
Conclusion 170
Index 175
Knowing Full Well by Professor Ernest Sosa
March, 2011
ISBN: 978-1-4008-3691-8
In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. Sosa develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance-theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well.
Ernest Sosa is the Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University.
Endorsements:
"A truly excellent book that will be widely praised across contemporary philosophy. It offers a complete statement of Sosa's extremely influential views on epistemic normativity as a kind of performance normativity, something we have not had before. Sosa is without doubt the most influential figure in modern epistemology, and this book will be required reading for anyone who wants to know the current state of play in the field."--Duncan Pritchard, University of Edinburgh
"Knowing Full Well is one of the most significant contributions to epistemology in the last twenty years. This is a brilliant book."--Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Table of Contents:
Preface vii
Acknowledgments ix
Chapter One: Knowing Full Well 1
Chapter Two: Epistemic Agency 14
Chapter Three: Value Matters in Epistemology 35
Chapter Four: Three Views of Human Knowledge 67
Chapter Five: Contextualism 96
Chapter Six: Propositional Experience 108
Chapter Seven: Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial 128
Chapter Eight: Epistemic Circularity 140
Summing Up 159
Index 161
What Is meaning? By Professor Scott Soames
August, 2010
ISBN: 978-1-4008-3394-8
The tradition descending from Frege and Russell has typically treated theories of meaning either as theories of meanings (propositions expressed), or as theories of truth conditions. However, propositions of the classical sort don't exist, and truth conditions can't provide all the information required by a theory of meaning. In this book, one of the world's leading philosophers of language offers a way out of this dilemma.
Traditionally conceived, propositions are denizens of a "third realm" beyond mind and matter, "grasped" by mysterious Platonic intuition. As conceived here, they are cognitive-event types in which agents predicate properties and relations of things--in using language, in perception, and in nonlinguistic thought. Because of this, one's acquaintance with, and knowledge of, propositions is acquaintance with, and knowledge of, events of one's cognitive life. This view also solves the problem of "the unity of the proposition" by explaining how propositions can be genuinely representational, and therefore bearers of truth. The problem, in the traditional conception, is that sentences, utterances, and mental states are representational because of the relations they bear to inherently representational Platonic complexes of universals and particulars. Since we have no way of understanding how such structures can be representational, independent of interpretations placed on them by agents, the problem is unsolvable when so conceived. However, when propositions are taken to be cognitive-event types, the order of explanation is reversed and a natural solution emerges. Propositions are representational because they are constitutively related to inherently representational cognitive acts.
Strikingly original, What Is Meaning? is a major advance.
Scott Soames is professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California. His many books include What Is Meaning?, Philosophical Essays, Reference and Description, and Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (all Princeton).
Endorsements:
"This is a highly original book from a major figure in the philosophy of language. Scott Soames approaches classic problems about intentionality and the unity of the proposition in a new way. The writing and argumentation are admirably clear and straightforward, and there are careful historical discussions. This book makes an important contribution."--Robert Stalnaker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
"In this short book, Scott Soames makes a major contribution to the general theory of meaning. Along the way he provides a beautiful, concise critical account of several previous attempts to formulate such a theory. What Is Meaning? will be required reading for serious researchers in philosophical and linguistic semantics. It will also serve as a brief introduction to the theory of meaning for students in both fields."--Gilbert Harman, Princeton University
Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments ix
Chapter 1: Meanings 1
Chapter 2: Frege and Russell: The Real Problem of "the Unity of the Proposition" 11
Chapter 3: Why Truth Conditions Are Not Enough 33
Chapter 4: Propositions and Attitudes: Davidson's Challenge and Russell's Neglected Insight 49
Chapter 5: Toward a Theory of Propositions: A Deflationary Account 69
Chapter 6: The Cognitive-Realist Theory of Propositions 99
Chapter 7: Expanding the Cognitive-Realist Model 109
Index 131
The Chinese translation will also be published by:
Linking Publishing (聯經出版社),Taiwan