Publications and Works in Progress
Books
Catharine Trotter Cockburn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.
This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn's philosophy and covers her contributions to philosophical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. It not only examines Cockburn's view that sensation and reflection are the sources of knowledge, but also how she draws attention to the limitations of human understanding and how she approaches metaphysical debates through this lens. In the area of moral philosophy, this Element argues that it is helpful to take seriously Cockburn's distinction between questions concerning the metaphysical foundation of morality and questions concerning the practice of morality. Moreover, this Element examines Cockburn's religious views and considers her understanding of the relation between morality and religion and her religious views concerning the resurrection and the afterlife.
Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
My book offers a new perspective on John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. My interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. I argue that taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity over time, means that his account of personhood should be considered separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, I argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. Moreover, I shows that Locke’s religious beliefs in an afterlife and a last judgement make it attractive to distinguish between the ideas of persons, human beings, and substances, and to defend a consciousness-based account of personal identity. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, I argue that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.
Edited Volumes
Guest editor (with Graham Clay) of special issue on Rethinking Early Modern Philosophy, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (2023): 105–265.
Guest editor of special issue on Agency in Early Modern Philosophy, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2019): 625–773.
Journal Articles
"Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2022): 143–61.
Abstract: This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration.
"Thomas Reid on Promises and Social Operations of the Human Mind." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2022): 350–71.
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to offer a new interpretation of Reid’s account of social operations of the mind. For Reid social operations include mental activities such as promising, testifying, asking a question, or commanding. I argue that to properly understand Reid’s account of social operations it is important to acknowledge the counterpart structure of social operations. By this I mean that for Reid every social operation is paired with a counterpart operation. For instance, promising is paired with accepting a promise, or commanding is paired with obeying. On the view that I ascribe to Reid, at least two intelligent beings take part in a social operation and the social operation does not come into existence until both the social operation and its counterpart operation have been exercised and the relevant mental thoughts made known to the other being by words or signs. I highlight the advantages of my interpretation by comparing it with Rebecca Copenhaver’s and Gideon Yaffe’s interpretations.
"Francis Hutcheson on Liberty." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 88 (2020): 121–42.
Abstract: This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson’s thinking about liberty. Since he does not offer a detailed treatment of philosophical questions concerning liberty in his mature philosophical writings I turn to a textbook on metaphysics. We can assume that he prepared the textbook during the 1720s in Dublin. This textbook deserves more attention. First, it sheds light on Hutcheson’s role as a teacher in Ireland and Scotland. Second, Hutcheson’s contributions to metaphysical disputes are more original than sometimes assumed. To appreciate his independent thinking, I argue, it is helpful to take the intellectual debates in Ireland into consideration, including William King’s defence of free will and discussions of Shaftesbury’s views in Robert Molesworth’s intellectual circle. Rather than taking a stance on the philosophical disputes about liberty, I argue that Hutcheson aims to shift the focus of the debates towards practical questions concerning control of desire, cultivation of habits, and character development.
"Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2019): 731–52 .
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.
"Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity, and Character Development." Philosophy Compass 13 (2018): e12471 .
Abstract: Shaftesbury’s major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity. I argue that Shaftesbury is willing to accept that persons are substances and that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the need to supplement the metaphysical debates of personal identity and believes that we have to turn to the character that is realized by a substance if we want to understand who we are. For Shaftesbury persons have a particular character, can act, and govern themselves. He regards metaphysical questions of personal identity as intimately intertwined with normative questions of character development. I propose that Shaftesbury’s approach to persons has a developmental dimension, which is meant to encourage personal development and character improvement. The developmental dimension can be understood as an intellectual journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our character, to seek happiness, which ultimately involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe. I argue that my developmental interpretation is preferable to other existing interpretations.
"Locke on Personal Identity: A Response to the Problems of his Predecessors." Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2017): 407–34.
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the strengths of John Locke’s account of personal identity can be revealed by understanding it in the context of the metaphysical and religious debates of his day, especially the debates concerning the possibility of the afterlife and the resurrection. I adopt Locke’s classifications of the views of his predecessors and examine metaphysical problems for material, Cartesian and non-Cartesian immaterial views of the soul, and views that regard human beings as mind-body unions. I show that Locke was well aware of these problems and argue that the strength of his account of personal identity in terms of same consciousness is that it provides a response to the various problems that arise for the views of his predecessors. Furthermore, the advantage of his theory is that it does not require him to prove the views of his predecessors to be mistaken, and it is thereby consistent with their mutually exclusive views.
"The Role of Appropriation in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity." Locke Studies (2016): 3–39.
Abstract: According to Locke, appropriation is a precondition for moral responsibility and thus we can expect that it plays a distinctive role in his theory. Yet it is rare to find an interpretation of Locke’s account of appropriation that does not associate it with serious problems. To make room for a more satisfying understanding of Locke’s notion of appropriation we have to analyze why it was so widely misunderstood. The aim of this paper is fourfold: First, I will show that Mackie’s and Winkler’s interpretations that have shaped the subsequent discussion contain serious flaws. Second, I will argue that the so-called appropriation interpretation – that is the view that appropriation is meant to provide alternative persistence conditions for persons – lacks support. Third, I will re-examine Locke’s texts and argue that we can come to a better understanding of his notion of appropriation in the Essay if we interpret it in analogy to his account of appropriation in Two Treatises. Fourth, I will offer a more fine-grained interpretation of the role of appropriation in relation to persistence conditions for persons. I conclude by showing that the advantage of this proposal is that it reconciles interpretations that have commonly been thought to be inconsistent.
"Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences." Hume Studies 41 (2015): 105–35.
Abstract: Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ.
“The Moral Dimension in Locke’s Account of Persons and Personal Identity.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2014): 229–47.
Abstract: I offer an interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke’s characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke’s claim that sameness of consciousness is necessary for personal identity depends on two components: First, his particular moral and legal conception of a person, and second, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability for past actions. Had Locke given a different account of personhood, or thought differently about the conditions of just accountability, he might have given a non-psychological account of personal identity.
Book Chapters
"Catharine Trotter Cockburn against Theological Voluntarism." In Varieties of Voluntarism in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Sonja Schierbaum and Jörn Müller (251–270). New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2024.
“The Active Powers of the Human Mind.” In Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume II: Method, Metaphysics, Mind, Language, edited by Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris (255–92). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023.
"Character Development in Shaftesbury's and Hume's Approaches to Self." In Hume on the Self and Personal Identity, edited by Daniel O’Brien (107–30). Cham: Palgrave, 2022.
“Locke and William Molyneux.” In The Lockean Mind, edited by Jessica Gordon-Roth and Shelley Weinberg (15–21). Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2022.
“Locke’s Moral Psychology.” In The Lockean Mind, edited by Jessica Gordon-Roth and Shelley Weinberg (360–9). Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2022.
“Locke on Being Self to My Self.” In The Self: A History, Oxford Philosophical Concept Series, edited by Patricia Kitcher (118–44). New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.
Book Reviews
Review of Stewart Duncan: "Materialism from Hobbes to Locke.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, online first.
Review of Shelley Weinberg: "Consciousness in Locke." In Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2017): 164-65.
Review of Galen Strawson: “Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment.” In British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2013): 803-06.
Major Reference Work
“John Locke: Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity.” In Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.