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CV and Papers

For a PDF version of my CV, click here.

Educational Background

Florida State University (PhD)
Discipline: Political Science
Fields: American Politics and Public Policy
Research Areas: experimental methods, economic voting, and other-regarding behavior
May 2013

Florida State University (M.S.)
Discipline: Political Science

University of Notre Dame (M.A.)
Discipline: Economics and Econometrics

Dickinson College (B.S.)
Majors: Economics and Mathematics
Minor: German

Academic and Professional Positions

2013 to present: Visiting Assistant Research Professor, Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), New York University Abu Dhabi.
                         - 2014: Acting Director, Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL)

2008 to 2013: Graduate Assistant, Department of Political Science, Florida State University

Summer 2010: Visiting Graduate Student, CREED, University of Amsterdam

2007 to 2008: Associate Economist, Moody's | Economy.com

2006 to 2007: Research Assistant, Department of Economics and Econometrics, University of Notre Dame.


Rogers, Jonathan. 2016. "Tea Party Support and Perceptions of Local Economic Conditions" Electoral Studies. 42: 91-98. (Paper)

Rogers, Jonathan and Marcelo Tyszler. conditionally accepted. "Information and Economic Voting." Political Science Research and Methods. (Paper)

Morton, Rebecca and Jonathan Rogers. 2015. "Religion, Experiments, and Ethical Concerns." in Ethics and Experiments: Problems and Solutions for Social Scientists and Policy Professionals, ed. Scott Desposato. Routledge.(Paper)

Rogers, Jonathan. 2014. "A Communotropic Theory of Economic Voting". Electoral Studies. 36: 107-116. (Paper)

Rogers, Jonathan. 2014. "On the Replication of Experiments in Teaching and Training." The Political Methodologist. 22(1). (Paper)

Papers Under Review

(with Sebastian Goerg and David Johnson)"Endowments, Perceived Similarity, and Dictator Giving"  (R&R at Economic Inquiry) (Paper)

Description: Giving has traditionally been explained by altruism, reciprocity, or allusions to a warm glow experienced by the giver.  However, giving can also be motivated by a desire to rid oneself of the endowment.  This paper reports the results of a two stage experiment.  In the first stage, we use non-laboratory subjects recruited from particular groups to generate a pool of money.  This pool becomes the endowment for laboratory subjects in a dictator game.  We find that negative affect toward the group that generated the endowment significantly increases dictator giving. (under review)
    note: an earlier version of this paper was presented as "Can't Touch This! Willingness to Keep Dirty Money."

"Nothing to Lose: Charitable Donations as Incentives in Risk Preference Measurement" (Paper)

Description: As researchers take laboratory experiments to the field in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, they may find that standard experimental protocols are culturally unacceptable or legally prohibited.  For instance, incentivized risk preference measures that are routine in economic experiments can be interpreted as gambling, which is forbidden in Islam.  However, if subjects derive "warm glow" utility from engaging in other-regarding behavior, then this warm glow should extend to risk preferences.  That is, even in the absence of direct personal stakes, if real gain and loss will be borne by others, warm glow will lead subjects to behave in a manner consistent with their preferences over risk for private consumption.  This study examines how directly incentivized risk elicitation mechanisms correlate with measures incentivized by charitable contributions and provides a behavioral means by which to measure risk preferences, in populations where gambling is forbidden. (under review)
    note: an earlier version of this paper was presented as "Other Peoples' Money: Warm Glow and Risk Preferences."

(with David Johnson) "First you get the Money, Then you get the Power: The Effect of Cheating on Altruism." (Paper)

Description: When people cheat, many feel guilty and engage in moral cleansing so that they can continue to see themselves as being good people.  Others cheat, see themselves as being more savvy than their peers for having done so, and feel no guilt.  In a two stage experiment, we have three results.  (1) That although subjects cheat, they tend not to cheat as much as they could.  (2)  On average, cheaters increase giving in dictator games, to compensate for having cheated.  (3) Those who do cheat maximally however, give less than they would have if cheating was not possible. (under review)

"A False Tale Often Betrays Itself: Deception in Social Science Experiments" (Paper)

Description: The various social sciences take very different stances on deception in experiments. Economists by and large prohibit the practice, while psychologists see it as necessary to study difficult topics. As political scientists are increasingly interested in running field and lab-in-the-field studies, it is important to note the pitfalls of deception and the harms it can cause to subjects, enumerators, and third parties. I go on to provide practical advice to researchers on what constitutes unacceptable deception and how it can be avoided. (under review)

 "By Reinforcing Every Part, He Weakens Every Part: A Modified Blotto Game Experiment" (Paper)

Description: Situations of conflict such as war and terrorism, but also campaign spending, lobbying, and other problems of resource allocation have been modeled as Colonel Blotto Games (CBGs).  These models often, however, omit consideration of important asymmetries and nuances.  Existing research holds that subjects are able to behave remarkably close to equilibrium predictions.  This result is not robust to important features of situations CBGs are meant to model.  By introducing alliances, tilted battlefields, and a more ecologically valid payoff function, I demonstrate that (1) players over-allocate resources where they are not helpful, (2) uncoordinated alliances are readily defeated, and (3) installing a leader in the alliance is only a minor improvement.  Alliances are most effective, when members are aggressive.

"Institutional Obstacles to Voting: Micro and Macro Level Evidence on Registration and Identification Laws" (Paper)

Description: Some argue that voter identification laws directly target minorities and harm their ability to vote.  Researchers however, have generally found that such laws have little effect.  I argue that this is because most studies have looked only at aggregate turnout in a single year.  Changing a voting regulation has two effects: it suppresses some votes, but mobilizes others out of outrage.  This second effect diminishes over time.  Stricter rules do reduce turnout, but only as the law ages and becomes accepted as the status quo.  Examining all US federal elections since 2002, I find that the longer it has been since a law was passed, the lower turnout becomes.  I then move to the individual level and find that in states with voter ID requirements, respondents are more likely to report trying to cast a ballot, but failing, and minorities are less likely to successfully vote.
Works in Progress

"Vote or Try: Voter Turnout When Costs and Eligibility are Uncertainty"

"Protecting Norms or Preventing Change? An Experimental Test"

"Yes we Have no Results! Reducing Fabrication in the Journal Submission Game"

(with Pablo Hernández-Lagos) "Voter turnout after rule changes"

(with Rebecca Morton, Eleonora Patacchini, and Paolo Pin) "Siena Voting Experiment"

(with Rebecca Morton, Eleonora Patacchini, Paolo Pin, and Tanya Rosernblat) "Network Elicitation Validation Experiment"

(with Marco Battaglini, Rebecca Morton, Eleonora Patacchini, and Paolo Pin) "Siena Voting Experiment II"

(with Daniel Mueller) "A Seat at the Table, but no Piece of the Pie: Representation Quotas and Bargaining Outcomes"

(with Rebecca Morton and Francesco Squintani) "Deliberation, Cohesion, and Leadership Selection"


New York University Abu Dhabi
Math for Social Scientists I. Spring 2014
Math for Social Scientists II. Spring 2015
Statistics for the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Summer 2015
Z-Tree Workshop Series. Winter, Spring, Fall 2014, Winter, Fall 2015

Florida State University
Experimental Political Science. Summer 2011, Fall 2011, Summer 2012, Fall 2012
Political Science Research Methods. Spring 2011, Spring 2012
Introduction to Public Policy. Summer 2010, Spring 2013

Selected Presentations

2016: NYU Global Experiments Conference; Trinity College Dublin; APSA

2015: NYUAD Annual Research Conference; IMEBESS, Institute for Advanced Study at Toulouse (Toulouse School of Economics); ESA Europe, University of Heidelberg; Workshop on Behavioral Political Economy (poster)

2014: IMEBESS, Nuffield College, University of Oxford; ASQPS, University of Sydney


2012: NYU-CESS, APSA (conference cancelled-hurricane)

2011: APSA, MPSA

2010: MPSA, University of Amsterdam-CREED, FSU-IESES

Awards, Grants, and Scholarships

2012 APSA Travel Grant

Conference Presentation Grant. "Rethinking Presidential Approval" for presentation at the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2010. Congress of Graduate Students, Florida State University. Amount: $300.

2008-2009 Florida State University New Graduate Student Scholarship. Amount: $1000

2006 CW Fink Memorial Prize in Economics, Dickinson College. Amount: $200

Benjamin Rush Scholar, Dickinson College. Amount: $48,000


Political Research Quarterly, Political Behavior, Electoral Studies, Journal of Experimental Political Science, American Politics Research, Scandinavian Political Studies, Political Science Research and Methods, Comparative Political Studies.

Workshops and Training

Graduate Student Workshop in Experimental Economics. January 5-9, 2010.  Chapman University, Orange, CA.

z-Tree Short Course. Summer 2009. Florida State University Department of Economics

Public Choice Outreach Conference. Summer 2006. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA.

Protecting Human Research Participants”. Certificate of Completion.  National Institute of Health Office of Extramural Research. Certification Number 373311.