THE GUARD FORCE - PROTECTED VILLAGE SYSTEM .
The establishment of the Rhodesian Guard Force is deeply rooted in the Protected Village System. Therefore we went into quite some detail when describing in the previous chapter, which we call Historic Overview, the involvement of Guard Force in the Protected Village [ PV ] system.
Our website is not a platform for discussions on the political strategic level iro the functioning , success or failure of the idea behind the system. It addresses the former soldiers of Guard Force, spending a considerable time of their lifes deployed in Protected Villages established in the rural areas of the Tribal Trust Land , within a system which tried to deny insurgents access to the rural African population.
We want to hear your stories, your experiences and how you feel about it. However small you think your contribution was , it was part of the total Rhodesian War effort. It is important to share it with others and to feel proud about it. This website will help you to do so.
Guard Force Protected Village Structure :
Units of Guard Force, consisting of a number of Protected Villages in a specific area of a Tribal Trust Land [ TTL ], were called “ Groups “. Each Group was controlled by a Group Headquarter. A large number of PVs in a Group Area made it sometimes necessary to establish the sub-structure of Forward Control Posts [ FCP ] for better Command and Control.
The following Groups were established [ using the previous names ]:
· 1 Group Bindura / Madziwa
· 2 Group Chipinga
· 3 Group Chiredzi
· 4 Group Honde Valley
· 5 Group Murewa
· 6 Group Mutoko
· 7 Group Mudzi
· 8 Group Beitbridge
· 9 Group Mount Darwin
A Protected Village was accommodating a few thousand rural African families. It was surrounded by a high wire mesh fence and a single entry / exit gate. The houses were largely pole and dagga huts with grassed roofs. Within the Protected Village there was a fortified strongpoint : The Keep. It was commanded by a European Keep Commander, his Deputy, a few African NCOs and up to 27 Guards. At a later stage African NCO’ were deployed as Keep Commander’s and most of the time there was no Deputy Keep Commander and also the number of Guards was reduced.
The Guard Force soldiers were housed in either A-Frame buildings, brick or corrugated iron buildings. The Keep was protected by three meter thick earth banks. At each corner there was a bunker using railway sleepers as protection and built with firing slits. It was strong enough to withstand mortar fire. More firing positions were situated along the earth wall. There were accomodations for the guards and the Keep Commander with bunkers close by. A diesel generator provided electricity and gaz was used for cooking and a fridge. A Radio Room, close to the Keep Commanders accommodation and storage and cooking facilities complemented the set-up. A water reservoir stored water which was pumped up from the river close by.
Radio Communications were seen as the lifeline for survival. There were radio communications between Keeps, between Keeps and patrols, between Keeps and the Forward Command Posts or direct to the Group HQ. Regular SITREPS had to be sent.
At dawn the National Flag was raised inside the Keep and the first perimeter patrol was send out to check the fence. Guards took up positions at the gate. The entire success of the system depended on the control and checking of everyone and everything that left or entered the Protected Village. Other responsibilities included mine patrols sweeping the roads leading to and from the Protected Village, escort duties, stand-to procedures ,prowler patrols within the Protected Village, clearance patrols of the surrounding area, and most of all : Defending the Protected Village against attacks by insurgents. As Guard Force settled in in their role within the Protected Village system more aggressive patrolling and other COIN tasks were completed within a Group area. Some of the Groups reduced the number of guards in the Keeps and established small Reaction Forces .
Discipline was of utmost importance and quite difficult to maintain taking the situation of African Guard Force soldiers , based within their own people and with all the temptations around them , into condideration. It is a proven fact that soldiers deployed in static protective tasks will create more discipline problems than others in mobile operations. Weapon inspections, training and turn-out inspections together with the rotation of Guard Force soldiers between Keeps were measures to curb this problem.
There was close co-operation and liaison with INTAF, BSAP Ground Coverage, SB and other Government structures being based in or visiting the Keeps on a regular basis. Other Security Forces operating in the area provided always a welcome change.
Group HQs were responsible for the Administration [ emphasis on Personnel Administration ], Logistics and Operational Control of their Keeps within the framework of the total civilian and military war effort of the Rhodesian Security Forces and Government agencies within a Group Area. The Officer Commanding [OC ] or his Second-in-Command [2iC ] attended the daily JOC /. Sub JOC meetings with its all important INT briefings and the co-ordination of operational activities. Reporting lines to GF HQ in Salisbury were maintained and the Group OCs attended the regular meetings of the Guard Force Command Group. Direct and personal liaison with OCs of neighbouring Groups or other elements of Security Forces and Government agencies in the area were maintained.
Ongoing visits and inspections of FCPs and individual Keeps formed one of the most important activities of Group OCs or their 2iCs. The ongoing change-over of the leadergroup through the call-up system and R+R arrangements made it absolute necessary to maintain a tight control of the situation in the Keeps . It was probably quite confusing for the African Guard Force soldiers in a Keep to face every six weeks another European face. Some of them quite young, probably with urban background and unexperienced. For many of them quite a learning experience.These visits provided support and encouragement to the European Keep Commanders and highlighted the importance African Guard Force soldiers played within this system. Briefings were given, mistakes were rectified, discipline was enforced and information of the present security situation gathered. Ambushes and Landmines formed an important part in the COIN terminology experienced by commanders when on the road.
To go more into the detail of describing what it meant for a Guard Force soldier to serve in a Keep or Group HQ will be up to the contribution we hope you will share with all of us after accessing our website.
We are waiting for YOUR story !!!
Other information's about dates, structures and names gathered from sparsely existing papers / documents and other Guard Force soldiers or historia ns / collectors :
· 01 July 1976 GP 1 Madziwa / Bindura established
· 20 December 1976 GP 2 Chipinga established with Asst Comdt Colin Fisher as OC and Asst Comdt J Price as his 2iC, Sergeant Major Ndlela as CSM.
· 1977 GP 3 Chiredzi established with Comdt Frederick Freiherr von der Trenck as OC and naming the GP HQ “ Fort General Rawlings “ .
· 1977 GP 4 Honde Valley established with Comdt Tom [ William ] Lester as OC and Asst Comdt Alan Denham as 2iC. Gp HQ in Haura.
· 1977 GP 5 Murewa, GP 6 Mutoko established.
· 1978 GP 7 Mudzi established
· 1978 [ begin ] Comdt Nigel Langdale takes over GP 3 Chiredzi as OC.
· Begin June 1978, Jnr Comdt Horst Schobesberger served for two weeks at GP 5 Murewa under the OC Comdt Guenter Maeser and his 2iC Asst Comdt John Radford.
· June 1978 to 01 Aug 1978, Jnr Comdt Horst Schobesberger served as Group 2iC with GP 9 Mount Darwin under the OC Comdt Smokey Richardson [ former British SAS and one of the “ old Malaysian Sergeants “, highly respected by British foreign nationals serving with RLI and based at Mount Darwin Airfield ].
· 01 August 1978 to 20 October 1978, Asst Comdt Horst Schobesberger served as Ops Officer at GP 7 Mudzi under the OC Comdt Ed Owen.
· 20 October 1978 to May 1979 Cmdt Horst Schobesberger served as OC GP 9 Mount Darwin. He took over from Comdt Carl de Vries and handed over to Asst Comdt Graham Wright.
· 08 September 1978 the first 3 PVs opened in GP 6 Mutoko and 9 PVs in GP 9 Mount Darwin [ but resentment ]
· October 1978 GP 2 Chipinga, GP 3 Chiredzi, GP 4 Honde Valley , GP 8 Beitbridge and GP 9 Mount Darwin PVs handed over to SFA.
· 08 December 1978 GP 5 Murewa, GP 6 Mutoko and GP 7 Mudzi all PVs opened. GP 9 Mount Darwin 20 PVs opened.
THOUGHTS OF A GUARD FORCE SOLDIER 35 YEARS LATER :
IMAGINE…..JUST IMAGINE…..FOR A FEW MOMENTS………..You are a twenty year old European Keep Commander, coming from an urban background, posted to a Keep somewhere in the rural African Tribal Trust Land. It is your first posting to a Protected Village. You know it will be your home, military base and maybe battle trench for the next six weeks. You are not even sure if you will make it in one piece back home. With you are about twenty African soldiers and two African NCOs. They don’t know you and see every six weeks the face of another European boy and you are not sure if you will be able to rely on them when the shit hits the fan. The only Africans you had to deal with up to now were your nanny, your garden boy and the African bringing the milk every morning. Your 3 months training at Chikurubi was actually too short and a lot of stuff was theory. The Keep Commander you relieved did not want to “ waste “ time to give you a thorough briefing. His only interest was to get out as quick as possible. You may not even have received a proper briefing at the Group HQ. Never enough time. The officer who posted you had no time for you because he had to post a number of other Keep Commanders and Guards to other Keeps and bring Logistic and Admin Support. You are a European and therefore expected to be handle any situation.
The next keep is about 15 km away, connected by a dirt road known as ambush alley and with an extensive history of Landmine incidents. You are lucky, one of the African NCOs is on your side and looks after the keep routine and you learn actually from him.
You have Logistic problems. The waterpump at the river close by was blown up by CTs two days ago. The water in the overhead water tank is nearly finished. The generator gives sometimes problems but you managed to get it going and you are proud of it. The gaz operated fridge is not functioning since 3 months. Your urban comfort is gone. You learn to improvise. At your next call-up you will know what to take with you.
Operationally you are expected to “ kill gooks “, nevermind to protect the rural Africans in the Protected Village. There are about 4000 of them.The first few days you “ explored “ the village and the surrounding area. You joined mine clearance and fence patrols, you spent time at the gate, practiced stand-to procedures and experience Africa.
You found out on the radio that your friend you did training with in Chikurubi is in a PV about 35 km to the south. On the third day one of the officers from the Group HQ is visiting you.[ You are lucky !!! ] He gives you a detail briefing about your duties and makes you aware of the downfalls when serving with African soldiers. He knows the bad and good ones and you listen and you have many, many questions what to do in certain situations. But the worse part of his visit is the “ stories “ he tells you about CT activities in the past and what you can expect during your tour of duty. There are also the stories told by your instructors at Chikurubi. Now you get worried.
The worst time are the nighthours !!! There is no other European Deputy Keep Commander with you, a person you could share your worries and who would make you feeling stonger [ One soldier a coward – two soldiers -two heroes ]. The African NCO is OK, but he is a stranger for you. You lie on your bed. You are not even sure if you should take off your boots, never mind pieces of you uniform. In your mind are the stories of the officer he told you. Large numbers of CTs, cutting the fence, burning African huts, forcing the povos to leave the Protected Village and attacking the Keep with AK-47s, RPDs, RPG-7s, 82mm and 60mm Mortars and probably 75mm recoil guns etc. Nevermind that the CTs are not very good in hitting their target, your Keep, just one 82mm mortarbomb exploding inside the keep walls or one stray AK-47 bullet can mean the end for you. If you have casualties, you have to wait until the next morning. But even in the morning it will not be certain that they will casevac your casualties by chopper. The CTs will have planted landmines on the accessroad to the Protected Village and they must be cleared first to get you out by road. Your worries increase. You get up, take your webbing and rifle and walk out to the earth parapet with the bunkers and firing positions. You know the positions well from the stand-to the previous evening. Checking the sentries you look over the earth parapet and listen into the night. The typical smell of an African village, the sound of drums and singing in the distance and the flickering lights of fires next to the huts. It looks peaceful, but your worries are not gone. Where are the CTs ? Have they already infiltrated the Protected Village ? What will you do if the firing starts now. The worries are still with you. You cannot share them with anybody. You talk casual with the sentries, hiding your anxiety and go back to your room. Stretched out on the bed you can only hear the crackling sound of the radio and sometimes the voices of the radio operators. You fall asleep. You wake up , it is morning, first light and the African NCO is arranging the routine duties. Seeing You, he wishes you a Good Morning or something similar and orders one of the guards to bring you coffee. You look around , feel safe again and enjoy the hot coffee.
Your cousin grew up at a farm and knows Africans and the African environment and Bush very well. He joined the RLI. During his last R&R he told you about HIS operational experiences. The good and extensive training he received, the excellent equipment and reliable modern weapons, sitting in a chopper next to him his fellow soldiers well trained like him and knowing that he can 100% rely on them and all of them in high spirit and extreme confident. Their backup in respect of Air-Support by a professional Air Force and functioning Logistic, Communications and Medical back-up. He spoke about killing gooks and gave the impression that there was nothing worrying him because he was not alone. The soldiers with him were exactly like him – professional, confident and imbued by the spirit of winners.
Sometimes when You are alone with your thoughts and worries in Your Keep , You may say to yourself…..IMAGINE….being a RLI troopie.
During one of your R&Rs you met your cousin again. He just returned from some external Ops and you from Your Keep. He would tell the stories of their victories and the number of gooks they had killed. He would ask you about your experiences and you kept quiet. You nearly felt ashamed.
But then during your next tour of duty in another Keep it happened as you IMAGINED ………..At approximately 21:00 HRS on the 30 FEB 1977, the Protected Village at Matuse in the Matambo TTL came under intense attack from a large group of terrorists using small arms, RPG-7 rockets and 82mm and 60mm Mortars. The attack lasted close to one hour with three 82mm Mortar bombs penetrating the perimeter fence. From the expended cartridges cases recovered from the terrorist firing positions, ballistics confirmed that 29 different AK-47s, 16 SKS rifles, an RDP machinegun had been used in the attack, indicating that at least 50 terrorists had participated. This was an extremely determined attack with the terrorists attacking from 300 meters away. Your soldiers were armed with G-3s.There were only three of your own soldiers slightly injured and you never found out if the CTs took casualties. It was also an indication that the terrorists were feeling the squeeze of the locals being removed from the rural areas into Protected Villages removed also from their influence.
IMAGINE…………….when asked at your R&R about your experiences in your Keep, you would not say much about the attack, because you could not talk about the number of gooks killed as the Glory Boys would do. Besides, people would not understand what it means to be under attack by about 50 CTs using massive firepower and they would not believe you either. Only other Keep Commanders, who had experienced the same ordeal would have understood, but they were not around. So you kept quiet and 35 years later you still keep quiet.
IMAGINE………………the above mentioned story would be true, which it is not, but it could be a story many of you have experienced as Keep Commanders during the days of the Rhodesian War.
Snr Comdt Horst Schobesberger, MARCH 2015.
Tell US about YOUR story as a Keep Commander or Deputy because WE will understand YOU !!!
BECAUSE WE WERE GUARD FORCE !!!
Regional HQs (Numeric) were principally for the areas of Protected Village Operations. .
Other information's about dates, structures and names gathered from sparsely existing papers / documents and other Guard Force soldiers or historia ns / collectors :
· 01 July 1976 GP 1 Madziwa / Bindura established
· 20 December 1976 GP 2 Chipinga established with Asst Comdt Colin Fisher as OC and Asst Comdt J Price as his 2iC, Sergeant Major Ndlela as CSM.
· 1977 GP 3 Chiredzi established with Comdt Frederick Freiherr von der Trenck as OC and naming the GP HQ “ Fort General Rawlings “ .
· 1977 GP 4 Honde Valley established with Comdt Tom [ William ] Lester as OC and Asst Comdt Alan Denham as 2iC. Gp HQ in Haura.
· 1977 GP 5 Murewa, GP 6 Mutoko established.
· 1978 GP 7 Mudzi established
· 1978 [ begin ] Comdt Nigel Langdale takes over GP 3 Chiredzi as OC.
· Begin June 1978, Jnr Comdt Horst Schobesberger served for two weeks at GP 5 Murewa under the OC Comdt Guenter Maeser and his 2iC Asst Comdt John Radford.
· June 1978 to 01 Aug 1978, Jnr Comdt Horst Schobesberger served as Group 2iC with GP 9 Mount Darwin under the OC Comdt Smokey Richardson [ former British SAS and one of the “ old Malaysian Sergeants “, highly respected by British foreign nationals serving with RLI and based at Mount Darwin Airfield ].
· 01 August 1978 to 20 October 1978, Asst Comdt Horst Schobesberger served as Ops Officer at GP 7 Mudzi under the OC Comdt Ed Owen.
· 20 October 1978 to May 1979 Cmdt Horst Schobesberger served as OC GP 9 Mount Darwin. He took over from Comdt Carl de Vries and handed over to Asst Comdt Graham Wright.
· 08 September 1978 the first 3 PVs opened in GP 6 Mutoko and 9 PVs in GP 9 Mount Darwin [ but resentment ]
· October 1978 GP 2 Chipinga, GP 3 Chiredzi, GP 4 Honde Valley , GP 8 Beitbridge and GP 9 Mount Darwin PVs handed over to SFA.
· 08 December 1978 GP 5 Murewa, GP 6 Mutoko and GP 7 Mudzi all PVs opened. GP 9 Mount Darwin 20 PVs opened.
The following extracts are from the book “ Ed Bird, Special Branch War ; Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush – Southern Matabeleland, 1976 – 1980 . published in 2013 by E.A. Bird, Amanzimtoti, South Africa.
The following extracts are from the book “ Jim Parker, Assignbment Selous Scouts. Inside story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer “ published in 2006 by Galago Publishing.
The following extracts are based on incidents recorded in the Beitbridge Special Branch Incident Log [ War Diary ] which formed the foundation of Ed Bird’s book. It is also an account of enemy activities impacting on the duties of Guard Force soldiers deployed within the Protected Village system and the protection of the line of rail. Each of these incidents is a story on its own . The story of soldiers of the Rhodesian Guard Force and their operational activities during the final years of the Rhodesian War.
…On 10 February 1978, Guard Force located a landmine on the road between Tongwe and Penemene protected villages. Engineers were deployed and destroyed the landmine in situ .
…During the early hours of 15 February 1978, the Tongwe protected village in the Mtetengwe TTL, came under attack by a group of twenty terrorists. The attack lasted approximately thirty minutes. Guard Force retaliated with no injuries being inflicted on the opposing force, none of the occupants of the protected village were injured.
…On 22 February 1978 , Shabwe protected village came under small arms, rocket and mortar attack. No casualties were inflicted on any of the occupants of the PV. The following morning, elements of D Company 6 RR located the twenty firing positions one kilometre from the PV.
…At approximately 09:30 on 5 March 1978, the protected village at Shabwe in the Mtetengwe TTL, came under intense attack from a large group of terrorists using small arms, RPG-7 rockets and 82 mm and 60 mm mortar bombs. The attack lasted three quarters of an hour with three 82 mm mortarbombs penetrating the perimeter fence, causing no injuries, but several tents were damaged by shrapnel. From the expended cartridge cases recovered from the terrorist firing positions, ballistics confirmed that 29 different AK-47 assault rifles, sixteen SKS rifles, and one RDP machine gun and one FN rifle had been used in the attack, indicating that at least fifty terrorists had participated. This was an extremely determined attack with the terrorists attacking from threehundred meters away. It was also an indication that the terrorists were feeling the squeeze of the locals being removed from the rural areas and placed into protected villages. The objective of this and subsequent attacks on protected villages was to drive the locals, through fear, back to their homes, but for the rest of the war they were unable to achieve this.
…Farther on, we encountered a Guard Force roadblock / ambush site where we reported the developments to them. Later that afternoon the Guard Force unit received reinforcements and proceeded to the scene of the morning’s action. As they approached the same kraal, they came under attack by approximately six terrorists. The terrorists fled once again and the Guard Force withdrew to their ambush site as night was rapidly approaching. For several hours firing was heard emanating from the area. The following morning, when we returned, the kraals were deserted as the locals had fled, never to return. All their livestock was abandoned – over time, the cattle went completely wild. These locals should, in fact, have been moved into the protected villages in the Mtetengwe TTL but somehow seemed to have been overlooked. The cattle managed to survive and even thrived in that harsh environment. They were to stay in the bush for the duration of the war.
…Also on 18 April 1978, at approximately 19:00 hrs, ten terrorists entered the Chaswingo protected village were they were fed by a kraal head. They then left, firing rifles and directing 60 mm mortar bombs at the Guard Force strongpoint inside the protected village. Guard Force returned fire with no casualties on either side. Later that night, the terrorists again attacked the PV with 60 mm mortar and small arms fire. Fire was returned and, again, there were no casualties on either side.
PV areas North-East Rhodesia
In 1979 a five-man team, led by Lord Boyd, was sent to Rhodesia by the Conservative Party to observe the first one-man-one-vote elections in Rhodesia. The following is the full text (in 2 parts) of their report, with the exception of some appendices consisting of photocopies of leaflets and brochures used during the election. The report is in the form of a typed and stencilled MS, signed by the five members of the team. The copy I was able to obtain was originally in the collection of Patrick Wall, MP, together with another report on the election by John Drinkwater (Queen's Council). Due to the length of the report, it has been divided into two sections.
65. The collection of the rural population into large settlements behind wire and with a permanent Guard Force pre-dated the 3 March Agreement by some time. It had as its purpose keeping the farmers and villagers free of guerrilla intimidation and denying the latter the food and solace which they could otherwise easily obtain. Its disadvantage, from the administration's point of view, was that intelligence became much harder to acquire.
66. The Transitional Government decided to take action on protected villages, since these were an emotional issue and a matter for hostile propaganda. Some were dispersed, with the result, we understand, that the inhabitants tended to go to another such village still existent, and ask for admittance. Having visited several such villages and talked to their inhabitants we are sure that they are no "concentration camps". To the families who live there the system has its inconveniences. The main one is the distance which lies between the village and families' farm land which they continued to cultivate unless they had been given other land closer by. Apart from that these protected villages were, we heard from their inhabitants, a haven.
67. If the war ended, said some old men in such a village in Manicaland, they would wait a while and then go back to their kraals. They had all voted, but they said that nobody had come in from the Tribal Trust Lands to do so, because of fear. The vast majority of those living in protected villages voted on the first day. We talked to many of them after they had voted. We are quite clear that they do not look upon their residence in such villages as an imposition, but as a relief; and that the system of protected villages did not constitute intimidation by way of forcing people to vote.
PROTECTED SUBOFFICES / BASES
PROVINCE / DISTRICT NAME MAP REF
Goromonzi Chehamba UR1058
Marufu UR4054
Marandellas Mahusekwe UQ1075
Soswe UQ6170
Mrewa Magunje UR7176
Mashambanaka UR7589
Muskwe UR8878
Mtoko Charewa VS1102
Tsiko VR1885
Mudzi Kondo VS6233
Wedza Mukamba UQ7610
PROVINCIAL TOTALS 11
PROTECTED VILLAGES AS AT 14TH APRIL 1978
PROVINCE/DISTRICT NAME OF PV MAP REF
Mashonaland East
Mrewa Borera US9018
Chidodo UR8687
Chipfunde UR8796
Chitimbe UR7171
Guyu US9719
Karimbika UR9586
Kaseke UR6578
Katiyo UR7796
Magunje UR7177
Manyika UR8380
Mashambanaka UR7859
Matsenga UR7884
Morris UR7485
Musanhi UR9175
Muskwe UR8879
Mutawatawa UR9108
Nhakiwa UR7280
Nyagande US7805
Nyakasoro VS1430
Nyamhara UR9677
Rukariro UR7772
Mtoko Bondamakara VR3391
Chimoyo (akaSasa) VR4084
Chindenga VR0594
Chipfiko VR3477
Chitekwe VR2377
Danda VS1007
Gurure VR0688
Kagande VS1001
Kapondoro VR4579
Katavinya VR3994
Katsakunya VR0877
Kaunye VR2675
Makosa VR4490
Maneemba VR0177
Mshimbo VR3672
Mudzonga VR3185
Mutswaire VR1278
Nyamazuwe VR2091
Rukau aka All Souls VR3581
Tarewa VR1697
Tsiko VR1885
Mudzi Benson VS2220
Chipako VR7799
Gozi VS8601
Kagoma VS6824
Kondo VS6233
Marembe VS7123
Makasha aka Mtondo VR5589
Morosi VS4928
Njera VS5617
Nyakuchena VR4692
Nyamakoho VS2812
Nyamande VR6898
Shinga VS3920
Stephen VS4911
Suswe VS3504
Total no of PVs as at 14 April 1978 57 (From an original from Dudley Wall ex Intaf)
The modus operandi of insurgents attacking a keep in a Protected Village.
I am using extracts from books and articles to highlight the issue.
This is the extract from the book : John Dove : Luisa , published by Mambo Press , Gweru 1989 :
“ Fr Gibbs then mentioned attacks by the guerrillas on the Protected Village garrison [ keep ]. He says in the attack I witnessed, it was the custom for the guerrillas to cut their way into the Protected Village and set up their firing lines in among the huts within the range of the strong point [ keep ]. Many Protected Villages were very large and it was too dangerous for the guerrillas to fire from outside the Protected Village in case their fire fell short and landed in the huts. Fire from the guerrillas would be returned by the Security Forces and innocent people were sometimes caught in crossfire. Fires occasionally broke out when a hut was ignited and, because nobody was able to help put out the fire, all the belongings were destroyed, thus adding to the misery of the people.
Rina described one such attack on the Protected Village. She says that the guerrillas obviously did not want the Protected Village and so they kept attacking the garrisons [ keep ] in order to free the people. They would also burn the huts of the people inside the Protected Village to force them to flee from the Protected Village.”
During the attack six mortarbombs were fired by the insurgents, causing damage to the Hospital at All Souls Mission. The extract from the book continues : “ The guerrillas sent a note to apologise to Luisa [ Missionary Doctor ]. They mistook the hospital roof shining in the moonlight for the roof of the keep. Also their mortar had no base and so had erratic fire. “ No additional comments !
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